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INTRODUCTION
Dimitris Dalakoglou & Antonis Vradis
You are a child growing up in Greece in the nineties. There is a high 
likelihood that one of  your distant relatives, or even your aunt, your 
uncle, your grandfather, or your mother or father may be haunted by 
the memory of  a few years in their life from whence no bedtime sto-
ries will ever arise. “Exile,” “dictatorship,” “civil war”: these strange 
words ring about, yet remain lost behind the veil of  the untold. Si-
lent grandparents with lingering gazes, voters-for-life of  a party that 
would repeatedly betray them over the course of  a lifetime too far 
along to change its course. These were times past, hidden by the 
thick screen onto which the capitalist spectacle projected itself. By 
the mid-2000s, the spectacle had grown to Olympic proportions. 
The Games were here: development fever, a certain euphoria mixed 
with longing, the longing to become “Western,” to finally “make it.” 
For a brief  moment in time it actually seemed to happen for some.
And suddenly the screen went blank. December 2008: the 
month when the country’s divided past returned in full force. The 
time that followed was an animated reminder that class and po-
litical struggle had not been tucked away in museums or history 
books—and most certainly would not stand to be so any time soon. 
A sudden awakening. Or was it?
Contradictions, struggles, the ubiquitous feeling that his-
tory marches over everyday victories and defeats—the December 
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revolt was the precise moment when an entire generation awoke to the 
realisation that the muted stories of  the past had always been part of  
the present.
Revolt and Crisis in Greece: Between a Present Yet to Pass and 
a Future Still to Come is a collective attempt to map the time between 
the revolt of  December 2008 and the crisis that followed. Most of  us 
were children who grew up in Greece in the nineties. Some of  us are 
still there, some are now elsewhere, and some have never even visited. 
For all of  us, however, December is a key point of  reference. It may 
have started out as a territorial reference, but it quickly moved beyond 
geographical boundaries; it became so much more. We feel that what is 
being played out in Greece poses some enormous questions that reach 
far beyond the place itself  or the people who live there. We were told 
that it was “a bad apple,” the first European country to see austerity 
measures kick in, to see the IMF arrive. But Ireland was quick to follow. 
Portugal was next in line, then perhaps Spain. The bad apples multi-
plied, like dominoes of  unrest that did not seem to care much about 
border crossings or planned schedules. Revolts continued to spring up, 
seemingly out of  “nowhere,” at unexpected times. Think of  Alexis 
Grigoropoulos’s assassination in Athens and they days and months that 
followed. Or Muhamed Bouazizi, the street vendor in Tunisia who sim-
ply had enough. He lit himself  on fire and set the entire region ablaze. 
Algeria, Egypt, Bahrain, Libya…. In a circle almost full, the flames of  
revolt have become visible from Greek shores once again.
Yet questions remain: What gave birth to the revolt on these 
shores, and what has followed since? Our collective exploration of  
these questions is divided into three parts. Part One, entitled “The 
Site: Athens,” is the reader’s landing strip, an introduction that sheds 
light on the context for these events. Part Two, “The Event: Decem-
ber,” is a reading of  the revolt of  December 2008 traced through its 
remnants in the present, designed to illuminate not only what made 
those events possible, but also what those events made possible in re-
turn. The final part is called “Crisis.” To be sure, this is about the 
global capitalist crisis as grounded and lived within the territory of  
Greece. But these concluding essays are also about the social antago-
nist movement’s moment of  crisis: even if  the colloquial meaning of  
the word suggests a downfall, in its original (Greek) meaning, it refers 
to judgement and thinking—which means, in our case, some much-
needed self-reflection. 
The notion of  crisis may also imply a moment of  rapid change, 
a moment that marks and reveals an almost instantaneous transition to-
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wards something different. What remains an open question and a chal-
lenge, then, is to try to make sense of  this transition—of  how we position 
ourselves within it as anarchists, as part of  the global antagonist move-
ment, as people inspired by the December revolt who nevertheless want 
to be better prepared for the next Decembers that are sure to come.
THERE ARE NO PALM TREES IN ATHENS
When presenting or discussing events that took place in Greece to au-
diences in other countries, we have sometimes been confronted with 
what largely feel like awkward questions. “What is it like to live in an 
anarchist neighbourhood?” has come up often. So too has “Did people 
still go to work after the December revolt?” This is not radically differ-
ent than the treatment our global antagonist movement has reserved for 
movements of  armed struggle in distant times and/or places—and so, 
we felt that the first thing we needed to do was to break away from the 
mythical image of  Greece as a politically exotic “Other.” This is an ex-
oticisation that is both distorting and dis-empowering for the struggles 
taking place here and now. So be assured, dear reader: there are no 
palm trees in Athens. That is to say, there is nothing politically exotic, 
mysterious, or alien about the city. True, if  you were to cruise through 
its avenues there is good a chance you might see the dried-out remnants 
of  a palm tree: one of  the scandals of  the Olympic Games was the 
planting of  over-priced palm trees across a city where the climate was 
entirely unsuitable. But this proves our point precisely, that despite its 
particularities, Athens is yet another European metropolis. And, as all 
of  the contributors to this book imply or explicitly demonstrate, there 
are no ideal political or cultural conditions for a revolt—it can happen 
anywhere at the right time.
So how did the revolt materialise in Athens in the first place? 
Vaso Makrygianni and Haris Tsavdaroglou’s chapter offers some great 
insight into these questions. They show how the capitalist development 
frenzy after WWII shaped the appearance of  Greek cities, in particular 
the capital, where near half  of  the country’s population lives. They 
explain how a sizeable hybrid social class of  workers and small-scale 
landlords formed within a few decades. They also explain how these six 
decades of  capitalist urban development created the spatial and mate-
rial site where the revolt of  2008 was realised. An extensive, day-by-day 
description of  the geographical spread of  the revolt in the city of  Ath-
ens is followed by an exercise comparing December 2008 to the revolts 
in Buenos Aires, Paris, Los Angeles, and Milan.
INTRODUCTION
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In contrast, Christos Filippidis offers a fresh spatial analysis 
of  Athens. He explores the experience of  being in the urban jungle 
(the “polis-jungle,” as he calls it), providing a reminder that cities are 
primarily produced politically—or, even better, that politics become 
spatialised and grounded via the practice of  urban planning. Filippidis 
brings us straight up into the heart of  the December revolt, revealing 
the endemic violence of  the city. Though the discourse of  sovereignty 
claimed that the violence of  the revolt could not possibly belong to a 
“civilised” or “modern” city, Filippidis shows how Athens, and modern 
capitalist urbanity overall, is a machine of  violence. The polis-jungle is 
not Athens alone; it speaks to every and any urban experience under 
the crisis of  capitalism.
The first part of  the book ends with a chapter on the every-
day politics of  the polis-jungle as formulated after the December re-
volt. Here, we wanted to read Athens through the political polarizations 
forming within it, by looking at the examples of  two opposing political 
tendencies, each fighting to spatially define and materialise their own 
right to the city. On the one hand, there is a radical reclaiming of  space 
and its transformation through guerilla gardening in a public park, all 
at the heart of  the neighbourhood that gave birth to the 2008 revolt. 
On the other hand, in a square located just a few kilometres away, neo-
Nazi groups have been trying to establish a “migrant-free zone” since 
late 2008. The moment of  the revolt provided the opportunity, the per-
fect ignition for these two materialisations of  everyday politics to erupt. 
What is at stake here far exceeds the mundane or the triviality often—
but wrongly—associated with the everyday. Claiming a right to urban 
space becomes a challenge and a question of  how to act politically in a 
city and society as a whole.
THE NOT-SO-SECRET LIVES OF DECEMBER
For many distant spectators, the events of  December 2008 were a per-
fect storm in an otherwise clear sky. But the revolt was far from that. 
Our section on “The Event” opens with a chapter by Christos Giova-
nopoulos and Dimitris Dalakoglou, which traces the historical condi-
tions that shaped the Greek state’s “enemy within” over the course of  
the last three decades or so: the genealogy of  the 2008 revolt. Beginning 
with the student movement of  1979–1980, they discuss key youth move-
ments in post-dictatorial Greece and highlight how each contributed to 
the history of  the Greek antagonist movement, noting the particular 
events that have shaped the collective memory of  these youth move-
 17
ments since the end of  the dictatorship in 1974. This collective memory 
is not something abstract: we can feel how tangible it is every time it 
accumulates, merges with momentary circumstances, and triggers the 
outpouring of  fresh political activity back in the streets. Giovanopoulos 
and Dalakoglou point out some of  the most significant ruptures on the 
surface of  the post-dictatorial political regime, ruptures that were quick 
to become cracks and lead to the December eruption in return.
But ruptures are not caused by social movements alone. The 
past four decades have also seen structural tears in the political sys-
tems of  governance—many of  which are linked to the neoliberal re-
configuration of  the conditions of  labour, a process taking place simul-
taneously all over the planet. In Chapter Six, TPTG (“Children of  the 
Gallery” or, in Greek, “Ta Paidia Tis Gallarias”), an anti-authoritarian 
communist group from Athens, discuss the December rebellion and the 
developments in its immediate aftermath as aspects of  the crisis of  capi-
talist relations in Greece. TPTG put December in a different perspec-
tive, describing the recent neoliberal reconfigurations of  the capitalist 
relation in the country and the extent to which these were linked to 
the revolt. Taking the global capitalist crisis as a point of  departure, 
they turn their focus back to Greece, highlighting the particularities 
of  the social and political crisis and the ways December made itself  
felt within them. They go on to describe the class composition of  the 
2008 revolt, illuminating the ways in which pre-existing class subjectivi-
ties were transcended to form an entirely new, spontaneous collective 
subjectivity in the streets and in occupied spaces. TPTG suggest that 
the revolt could not have been manipulated by reformist tendencies of  
the Left, neither could it have been represented in any way by armed 
struggle groups that emerged around that time, which were little more 
than a voluntaristic self-perceived vanguard who ignored the political 
dynamics of  the collective actions of  the revolting masses of  December. 
Ultimately, TPTG address one of  the central questions regarding De-
cember, namely: why didn’t the rebellion extend to the places of  waged 
labour? They try to formulate an answer by looking at the limited class 
composition of  the rebellion in terms of  the low participation of  those 
workers who can be described either as “non-precarious” or as “work-
ers with a stable job.” Moreover, they try to explain why the minority 
of  “non-precarious” workers who took part in the rebellion, as well as 
the “precarious” ones, could not extend it to their workplaces. Not-
withstanding the limits of  the rebellion, after December the state was 
quick to respond to the latent threat of  the overcoming of  separations 
within the proletariat through the enforcement of  a whole new series of  
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repressive measures, as well as through an ideological and physical at-
tack against the marginalised/immigrant/delinquent proletarians who 
occupy the inner city area of  Athens—all of  which is an an attempt to 
demonise the reinvented “dangerous classes.”
The landscape is changing beyond recognition: not only by 
the emergence of  new movements in the face of  neoliberalism’s charge 
ahead, but also in terms of  the tools these movements take on. Counter-
information—that is, the diffusion of  information on social struggles 
from below—has come to the fore as a key tool in the service of  radi-
cal social movements in Greece. In Chapter Seven, the Metropolitan 
Sirens (a collective pseudonym for comrades involved in the practice of  
counter-information in Greece) talk us through the historical evolution 
of  counter-information and its importance in the December events. It 
is not a coincidence that, shortly after December, MPs, ministers, and 
journalists attempted to shut down Athens Indymedia. A keystone of  
counter-information in Greece, the website received over ten million hits 
between the day of  Alexis Grigoropoulos’s assassination and the follow-
ing one (6–7 December 2008), quickly becoming a central node for com-
munication between those participating in the revolt and the diffusion 
of  news about it. Beyond the internet tools used in December, occupied 
physical sites (mostly public buildings such as universities, town halls, 
etc.) also became nodes of  counter-information, spreading the word of  
those who revolted throughout the country and beyond frontiers.
The genealogical approach employed in the first three chapters 
might suggest it that should have been possible to see the December 
eruption coming. Yet, still, the revolt was a surprise—not only because 
it was hard to predict such an enormous and widespread reaction to the 
assassination of  Alexandros, but also because it would have been im-
possible to even imagine the political implications it would have. Yannis 
Kallianos begins Chapter Eight by establishing that what happened in 
December 2008 was unexpected for both those in power and for the 
social antagonist movement alike. Kallianos then provides an analysis 
of  the actions that took place during the days of  December in Athens, 
the ones that turned the revolt into a historical moment. In other words, 
Kallianos outlines December as a historical moment, one marking a 
transition and a certain social and political transformation.
Despite the enormous historical value of  December’s events, the 
lived experience of  the revolt itself  was multiple and even contradictory. 
These contradictions and reflections are discussed extensively in the next 
four chapters by comrades both inside and outside of  Greece. Chapter 
Nine by Hara Kouki is addressed directly to each one of  us. It is a reflex-
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ive text, critical of  our collective self  as people who were involved in the 
revolt, who were active in the antagonist movement before it and who 
continue to be. As many of  our contributors explain, during the revolt 
people who were already politically active came suddenly into contact 
with the thousands who took to the streets for the first time. This experi-
ence was a unique moment marking life-crisis transitions— or as Hara 
Kouki describes it: “Your sole reaction was this sense of  bewilderment 
at being together in the streets and an urge to do and write thousands of  
meaningful things that made no sense.” Still, this sense of  bewilderment 
and this connection between so many people who would not meet in any 
political project under normal circumstances did not last long. For this 
reason, a question that quickly emerged after the end of  the revolt came 
into sight, in January 2009, was about the legacies December would 
leave behind. To a certain extent these legacies were appropriated by 
the mainstream while stripped of  their radical political meaning—both 
because the systemic forces were already prepared to do so, and also be-
cause we as a movement did not manage to organise any follow-up. So, 
then, what remains of  the revolt in the present, Hara Kouki wonders—
and has quite a few answers to suggest.
Chapter Ten offers plentiful imagery from December: the bar-
ricades, the “carpet” of  broken glass and stones in the streets, buzzing 
assemblies, hooded teenagers, older activists, burnt-out shops resem-
bling archetypal caves by the morning after, collectively-cooked looted 
food, and insurgents sleeping in occupations, mass demos and clashes in 
the streets of  Athens. Kirilov knows well the difficulties of  talking about 
the revolt. Our own memories of  the event betray us, and sometimes 
words are simply insufficient, even for those who can use language ex-
ceptionally well. What matters is not just what we articulate but also the 
stories of  the revolt that remain untold. This in turn makes it even more 
difficult to put concrete thoughts on the revolt together without omit-
ting parts of  the picture that would be crucial for the author. Kirilov re-
minds us that “an explanation of  insurrection demands a very different 
method of  inquiry: a militant research that does not simply interpret 
and analyse reality, but modifies it.”
How was the reality of  the revolt experienced outside Greece? 
We asked two comrades from North America, to write about their ex-
perience. Their reply, that “Nothing happened,” is a letter to friends in 
Greece that discusses their effort to interpret the events in the country 
while encountering the brutality of  Canadian police apparatus at the 
same time. They talk about their faith in our common ideas and the 
joy derived from the events in Greece—but, at the same time, confess 
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an apparently unavoidable depression and rage from the lack of  such 
situations and activities in their own local setting. Soula M., a recipi-
ent of  the Canadian letter, offers a reply: despite differences between 
those who experienced the revolt directly and those who witnessed it 
from afar, the mixture of  feelings in the present is, if  anything, quite 
similar. We all feel fear, faith and rage. Neither December nor the social 
antagonist movement in Greece are nearly as perfect as they may seem 
to some. The bottom line for her is that what matters for all of  us (all 
those who experienced the revolt directly or indirectly, all who read 
these lines right now) is what we make of  December and of  our feelings 
about it. These two, the event and our feelings, are interwoven—and 
it is this interconnection that will bring about the Decembers we have 
yet to live.
CRISES
After the fury, the rage, and the joy of  December, Greece entered the 
trajectory of  crisis proper. The crisis had, of  course, been looming before 
December and it was experienced by some of  the most vulnerable parts 
of  society—like the young proletariat—as TPTG makes clear, and yet 
it was not until 2010 that the state would officially admit that the wave 
of  capitalist crisis had reached the shores of  Greece, and acknowledge 
the massive accumulation of  debt that marked capitalist consumption 
across Europe as a whole. Christos Lynteris discusses the economic cri-
sis as an evental substitution, in a way engaging with Yannis Kallianos 
who opened the discussion several pages before by seeing an event in 
the December 2008 revolt. In Chapter Thirteen, Lynteris deconstructs 
the medico-juridical origin of  the notion of  “crisis,” suggesting that it 
may be seen as a moment of  truth, a moment when lengthier processes 
show their “real” substance. He expands this deconstruction to the po-
litical arena, explaining how crises are read as events that not only arise 
as a culmination, but which also define how entire processes will evolve, 
since they are—ostensibly— a moment of  action and conflict. Regard-
less of  whether the revolt was a genuinely course-changing event, the 
problem here is that in this moment of  crisis that has followed, there is 
no single political tendency (Left, Right, or even anarchist) that is not 
going through a political crisis of  its own—and none of  them seem able 
to offer any viable alternatives as a result.
In Chapter Fourteen Yiannis Kaplanis comes in to talk about 
the economic crisis on a tangible level. He writes about the econom-
ics of  the sovereign debt crisis in Greece and describes how a country 
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with an astonishing level of  economic growth only saw this benefit very 
few. The economic data he presents shows how most people received 
a much worse deal even during the years of  the “Greek miracle.” This 
supposed economic “miracle” was based on credit expansion, the con-
struction of  public works, and the real estate boom, rather than well-
planned developmental policies that would be for the benefit of  the 
wider social strata. As a result, precarious forms of  employment and 
job polarisation were on the rise, particularly for younger people and 
women. And so came the moment of  December, after approximately 
a decade of  long-drawn-out crisis experienced by the most vulnerable 
strata. Kaplanis contextualises this eruption within the framework of  
the ongoing crisis. What is more, this economy that excludes the many 
and benefits the few was not interrupted by the revolt; it lived on, lead-
ing to the eruption of  the sovereign debt crisis, which, in turn, led to an 
even worse reconfiguration for the poorer strata—whose numbers were 
dramatically increasing all the while.
In Chapter Fifteen, David Graeber reminds us that no debt can 
exist without another party benefiting from it. One person’s debt is an-
other person’s surplus—or, in other words, the surplus of  other countries 
is intertwined with the Greek debt. Graeber shows that, historically, debt 
came before the invention of  money, but suggests that monetary econ-
omy is directly linked to the existence of  debt. Various political powers 
throughout history have managed to control the system of  debt with a 
level of  regulation that did not allow debt to spiral out of  control. It is 
only in the current system of  late capitalism that the control over debt 
has become so weak. In light of  his historical analysis, Graeber proposes 
that this current politico-economic system has reached its limit: “the ut-
ter moral bankruptcy of  this system… has been revealed to all,” he sug-
gests, and we are now inevitably in transition toward another form. As 
Graeber concludes, the trajectory of  this transition will depend, among 
other things, upon the choices made by the antagonist movement and 
wider social fractions—and these will most definitely include the choice 
of  approach toward debt itself.
Chapters Thirteen to Fifteen put the Greek crisis in context, 
whether historically (Graeber), economically (Kaplanis), or philosophi-
cally (Lynteris). Then, in Chapter Sixteen, TPTG attempt to place the 
Greek crisis in a global context. Here, they demystify the “debt crisis” 
by showing that it is the most recent expression of  a protracted crisis of  
capitalist social relations, i.e. an exploitability crisis of  labour power and 
a legitimacy crisis of  the capitalist state and its institutions through a his-
torical class analysis both on a global level and on Greece’s national lev-
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el. TPTG suggest that the so-called “‘debt crisis’ is intended to become a 
productive crisis: a driver of  primitive accumulation, dispossession, and 
proletarianization, a linchpin for the terrorizing, the disciplining, and 
the more effective exploitation of  the proletariat through the curbing 
of  class conflicts, proletarian desires, and expectations.” They go on to 
demonstrate all the measures of  “shock therapy” applied to the prole-
tariat in Greece until approximately September 2010 and the response 
of  the working class up until then. The article concludes with remarks 
on the limitations of  the current means of  struggle in the fight against 
these attacks and the working class’s relatively disproportionate reaction 
to the profound attacks against it.
Chapter Seventeen begins a subsection of  critical discussion on 
the crisis of  the social antagonist movement, exploring its practices and 
discourses in face of  the wider economic and social crisis. For Christos 
Boukalas, the jumping off  point is the murder of  three bank workers 
on 5 May 2010 during the demonstration against the IMF/EU/ECB 
loan—one of  the largest demonstrations Athens had seen in recent 
times. Identifying the event as a watershed moment for the anarchist 
movement, Boukalas looks back at its causes, and forward to its impact. 
He tries to find out what went wrong politically and ideologically, and 
how some fractions of  the antagonist movement ended up causing what 
would lead to a tragic event in the midst of  one of  the most important 
demonstrations in recent Greek history. He traces its main source to 
the construction of  a fetishised “revolutionary” socio-political identity, 
an identity that positions its bearer as separate from, and against, so-
ciety. The political and ideological fallacies of  these tendencies have 
profound impact on the entire anarchist movement. Boukalas tries to 
assess it by discussing the numerous anarchist reactions to the 5 May 
events. He sees the events as a rare occasion when the movement would 
be forced to undertake some critical evaluation of  its attitudes and prac-
tices. His study of  anarchist responses to the events seems to indicate 
that even this opportunity went begging. 
In Chapter Eighteen, Alex Trocchi attempts a wider theoreti-
cal critique of  our collective self  as anarchists, insurrectionists, or other 
tendencies of  the antagonist movement. In an age of  crisis, and given 
the epochal apogee we lived during December’s revolt, the question is 
not how to achieve insurrection but rather how to sustain it. Trocchi 
suggests that we need an outright change in our theory. Starting with 
the example of  the revolt in Greece and the situations that followed, 
Trocchi’s point is that for the insurrection to succeed we must perceive 
and do things far beyond the cliches of  the anti-globalisation movement 
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and other “protest” movements in the past few decades. One problem 
is the lack of  a well-developed theory, which leads not only to identity-
based politics and fetishising the insurrection itself, but to the trapping 
of  anarchists within the regime of  social war as enforced by late capital-
ism. As Trocchi puts it: “The insurrectionary question should change 
from ‘How do we increase the intensity of  the attack?’ to ‘How can the 
number of  people involved in the attack increase?’” He ends by call-
ing for the development of  a new insurrectionist metaphysics, first of  
all amongst insurrectionists themselves. Revolts, as he concludes, have 
many more sympathisers than we may think. The question is how not 
to separate ourselves from them. 
AN EXCEPTION NO LONGER
For many years we have grown accustomed to treating nearly every-
thing coming out of  Greece as somewhat mythical, or at least excep-
tional. Take its geography for example: the country is European, we 
are told, yet it is somewhat Oriental; it lies in the southern end of  the 
Balkan peninsula yet it’s in the West. Or politically: here is a Euro-
pean Union member-state whose laws resemble the bureaucracy of  the 
Ottoman Empire, its finances edge closer to a “developing” country 
than the EU “core,” and so on. And, let us not forget of  course, the 
perceived strength of  its anarchist and social antagonist movement in 
general: “They riot so often, and there are thousands of  them in the 
streets”; “Well, that’s just Greece.” Here we have the peculiar Greek 
state, then, a state that has been perceived as—quite literally—a State 
of  Exception, a territory in which all sorts of  peculiarities, diversions, 
and anomalies can prevail. A haven on the edge of  the Western world 
where social and class antagonism is still alive and kicking, a dissenting 
singularity standing as a reminder of  the consensual veil falling over the 
political realm elsewhere. In his famous definition, Carl Schmitt reads 
sovereignty as the power to decide on the state of  exception (1985: 5). 
The Greek territory had long ago joined the club of  romanticised, far-
away places in an imaginary realm decided upon and dictated by sov-
ereignty itself: Chiapas, Buenos Aires, South Central, the French ban-
lieues, Exarcheia…. Perceived as ultimate sites of  anomaly, these were 
distant places (no matter how geographically close, in fact, you might 
happen to be to them), places supposedly playing host to struggles neo-
liberal sovereignty would never allow within its geographical core.
A strange thing happened after December 2008. From that mo-
ment on—that is, from that moment of  absolute diversion from normal-
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ity, of  the ultimate exception—the Greek case was no longer exceptional. 
It would seem as if  people across so many boundaries finally responded 
to Walter Benjamin’s call for a real state of  emergency (1942), a state of  
exception brought about by the oppressed, not their oppressors. 
Sure enough, this was not just Greece anymore. So, then, was 
the Greek revolt a prelude to a European version of  this global crisis? 
Or was it the last few words of  the preceding chapter? By now, the 
question of  what happened first matters little. More significant than the 
sequence of  events is the occurrence of  the events themselves. Blending 
in with global struggles, the moment of  revolt was no longer a near-
fantasy in a far-away place. And by being the first area in the Eurozone 
to ground the crisis so firmly, Greece was entering a global condition, 
therefore abandoning any exceptionality of  its own for good.
A feeling of  déjà vu, anyone? The U.S. government-backed 
military dictatorship of  1967–1974 was a crucial and failed experiment 
to determine whether Latin American-style military dictatorships could 
flourish on European soil. This time around, the same territory would 
once again host an experimental mode of  governance in which powers 
are shifted away and above the level of  national territory. Of  course 
to us, as anarchists and anti-authoritarians, the distance from which 
orders come would not matter so much (more important is the fact that 
they are still coming!). But the landing of  the IMF/EU/ECB “troika” 
in Athens as a key player in the everyday operations of  the state is an ex-
periment with repercussions reaching way beyond the ground on which 
we stand. What happens on Greek territory in the coming months and 
years may prove to be absolutely crucial. With the eyes of  so many of  
our comrades in the social antagonist movement turned there during 
and after the December revolt, any perceived failure to halt the IMF’s 
charge ahead could be incredibly demoralising. Yet in the face of  this 
crisis, some of  our comrades in the antagonist movement have been 
quick to dismiss our chances of  victory in any possible way. One of  
the 20th century’s major capitalist crises led to Fascism, then Nazism, 
as the argument goes, and thus there is supposedly a good chance that 
history will repeat itself. Of  course history is never truly repeated and 
the outbreak of  Nazism as a refuge of  a previous capitalist crisis cannot 
act as any sort of  indicator for its repetition. 
Something new is about to be born. We live in a period that 
is not at all distant from its immediate past and is yet so alien, so mon-
strous. The gruesomeness of  the monster lies precisely in its not-quite-
human form of  life: it resembles something human, but it is not quite the 
same. In this sense, our times are monstrous, but not for the first time. At 
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the twilight of  the rise of  Fascism, Antonio Gramsci predicted from his 
prison cell: “The old world is dying away, and the new world struggles 
to come forth: now is the time of  monsters” (Gramsci 1971). He was 
insightful enough to see that the world was changing and, even behind 
prison bars, he could feel the spectre of  Fascism hanging in the air. 
Yet take heart, for not all periods of  transition create monsters. 
If  they did, we might very well give up struggling and resign ourselves 
to the idea that history will continue to jump from one monstrosity to 
the next, even more appalling one. We remember Gramsci, but we also 
must remember what a “monster” is to begin with: it is a hybrid living 
being—usually part human, part animal. The fear it induces in humans 
is precisely due to its resemblance to them. 
Instead of  a conclusion, then, we want to close with the notion 
of  hybridity as a metaphor for our time and place. The monster is the 
quintessential hybrid, a combination of  life forms, human and bestial. 
Our own, collective position is also a hybrid one. As political subjects 
and as writers, all of  us contributing to this collection stand simulta-
neously inside and outside the geographical boundaries of  the Greek 
state and, of  course, we stand between two points in time— between a 
present and a future, a fleeting moment, a moment that gives birth to 
monstrosities and the enormous potentialities contained in them. This 
is not a purely negative moment; living in these in-between times is not 
a threat, it is a potentiality. Breaking down the boundaries of  present 
and future, we must read this relationship, following Georgio Agamben, 
as one between the outside and the inside: “the outside is not another 
space that resides beyond a determinate space,” he says, “but rather, 
it is the passage, the exteriority that gives it access in a word, it is its 
face” (2007: 68). Let’s take this as a metaphor for the present and the 
future: the future is not another time entirely outside our present; it is 
the exterior of  the present, its façade—what gives it access, what allows 
us simultaneously to understand the limits of  the present and to sense 
the move to the future. We are at that precise moment, dancing on that 
façade: A time when struggling for the way in which this transition will 
happen is more crucial than it has been for a long, long while. Wherever 
we are, we must quickly erect our antagonist social structures, as bar-
ricades ensuring this can happen on our own terms. For this transition, 
the place is here and the time is now.
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The revolt of  December 2008 was not just a flare that lit suddenly or 
momentarily in the streets. It sprang from existing structures and rela-
tions among us and sowed seeds that are still very much alive. As soon 
as the news of  Alexandros Grigoropoulos’s murder broke, a surprisingly 
well-coordinated crowd of  people managed to bridge existing territorial 
and social distances to create fields and forms of  resistance no one had 
previously dared to imagine. The men and women rising up comprised 
a mixture of  politically conscious individuals, university and high-school 
students, migrants, unemployed, and precarious workers who threw their 
identities into the melting pot of  the rioting streets. December 2008 was 
unique mainly because the virus of  contestation and resistance spread to 
every part of  the city and deeply influenced the people who fought dur-
ing the course of  those days to claim back their lives. Greece, and Athens 
in particular, welcomed the revolt in their own way, different by far from 
the reaction to previous revolts as in LA, the French banlieues, or Argen-
tina. In fact each December was and will be different as it emerges from 
varying places and invariably lays different roots.
This chapter does not constitute yet another more or less 
chronological narrative of  December’s events. This would have been 
impossible, despite the appreciable efforts that have been made to con-
ceive the span and recurrence of  the events in their entirety. Rather, it 
roams the Athenian metropolis before and during the revolt, attempt-
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ing to illuminate those angles that ignited December’s conflict. It sees 
space as a derivative of  human relations, and cities as places of  coexis-
tence that can function as fields of  resistance and as sites where every-
day life can be reclaimed. Through a tour of  Athens’s particular urban 
characteristics, the chapter presents the territorial spread of  conflict, 
examining the relationship between urban space and the events that 
took place in December and their consequent feedback into the city’s 
vast web.
THE SPATIAL AND CLASS COMPOSITION OF ATHENS AFTER WWII
Greece’s greatest urban transition took place after World War II and in 
particular after the end of  the Civil War [the emfylios, see Glossary]. 
The post-war authorities, in their attempt to achieve social peace and to 
control the population, pushed for two parallel processes: first, a violent 
urbanisation2 and proletarianisation of  what was, by a vast majority, 
the left-wing rural population, and second, a certain amount of  tol-
erance towards unlicensed building and construction. The latter was 
linked with the emergence of  the system of  antiparochi [a construction 
system that brought together landowners and building contractors—
see Glossary]. In its promotion of  private ownership and development, 
antiparochi would in fact comprise a spatial and social extension of  
the Marshall Plan3, which aimed at the capitalist development of  the 
country. The Plan’s aim was the post-war elimination of  communist 
visions—still popular at the time—by promoting a liberal ideology of  
economic development, strengthening small private property, and pro-
moting specific new patterns of  consumption. 
Yet this strategy of  unlicensed building in fact led—from the 
mid-1950s onwards—to extensive proletarian neighbourhoods and 
slums. Combined with already existing refugee4 neighbourhoods and 
traditional working-class quarters, the new districts created sites with 
strong class consciousness. These districts had some very particular spa-
tial characteristics: a high population density; low-rise, small buildings; 
narrow streets; limited communal public space; mixed land use; etc. 
The state response to the emerging militant working class 
of  the 1960s took the shape of  the mandatory demolition of  slums 
through the further promotion of  antiparochi and the subsequent class 
transformation of  some of  the workers into petit bourgeois. Thus, from 
the mid-1960s and continuing through the 1970s, concrete apartment 
blocks began to dominate the cityscape of  Athenian neighbourhoods. 
During the 1980s, however, Athens began to suffocate as a capitalist 
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mega-machine. Its chaotic gigantism was not accompanied by the con-
struction of  the necessary infrastructure. The city was plainly not func-
tioning effectively; it was short-circuiting (Michalis 2007). The Opera-
tion for the Reconfiguration of  the Urban Plan (ORUP) and the 1985 
Master Plan of  Athens constituted the authorities’ attempt to ratio-
nalize the city’s development. Entire districts of  buildings constructed 
without licences were legalised and vast pieces of  land were allocated 
to the towns surrounding Athens, laying the foundations for future sub-
urbanisation. In the case of  inner Athens, the model of  a polycentric 
city was applied. 
The ORUP project involved an attempt to suppress the city’s 
anarchist and far-left political spectrum by means of  urban planning. 
The idea was to gentrify the very downtown district to where much of  
the city’s radical political activity had been gravitating since the early 
1980s: Exarcheia. The attempted modernisation project largely failed, 
partly for bureaucratic reasons and partly because the clientelist form 
of  the state and widespread petty ownership prevented large-scale in-
vestments. These factors, plus the social struggles taking place in the 
area during the early 1990s, were not conducive to the gentrification 
of  Exarcheia. Simultaneously, the bourgeois strata started to flee to the 
northern and southern suburbs. This movement would be accelerated 
during the 1990s and 2000s, when more than 500,000 migrants arrived 
in Athens.5 
The 1990s and the early 2000s were the times of  the so-called 
“powerful Greece”6 with the country joining the European Union’s 
Economic and Monetary Union (2001), its ruthless exploitation of  
the Balkans (1990s–2000s) and Athens’s hosting of  the 2004 Olym-
pic Games. Gentrification and major infrastructure construction work 
became driving forces of  the economy. Social movements’ response 
came quickly, with the eruption of  the 2006–2007 student movement. 
Alongside this, the schoolteachers’ movement of  2006 would once 
again fill the capital’s streets with people protesting against the neo-
liberal reconfiguration of  education. The ultra-parliamentary left and 
particularly the anarchist and autonomous scene would simultane-
ously establish stable points of  reference in the metropolitan domain, 
setting up gathering-places and squats. In addition, urban movements 
emerged in resistance to the environmental destruction caused by pre-
Olympics building work. Finally, the first base unions—mainly work-
ers in the most precarious labour sectors—were formed. These would 
play a key role in disseminating the December revolt into the wider 
social strata.
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ATHENS TODAY
The metropolitan area of  Athens-Attica
Contemporary metropolitan Athens covers an area of  3,375 
km2 with an official population of  3,740,051 inhabitants: one third of  
Greece’s entire population.7 The municipality of  Athens covers 412 
km2 and has an average population density of  8,150 inhabitants/km2. 
In some areas, however, this density exceeds 40,000 inhabitants/km2. 
The city’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was €17,823 in 
2001, but more recent years have seen a significant increase: in 2006, 
the GDP per capita of  the Attica region reached €26,212, surpassing 
the EU average at the time by 131.1%—ranking Attica amongst the 42 
richest districts in the EU. In viewing the entire urban complex of  Ath-
ens, one can clearly identify which neighbourhoods are working class, 
which are middle class and which contain bourgeois strata.
THE CITY CENTRE
The centre of  Athens has a higher population density than all 
European capitals, including Istanbul. Only cities in Africa and Asia, 
such as Cairo and Mumbai, have higher population densities in their 
urban cores.8 Besides this very high population density, Athens’s distinc-
tive features also include diffuse and mixed land use, increased urban 
density, lack of  public open spaces, and high-rise blocks as the prime 
constituent units of  the urban area.9 
Although the historical centre of  Athens during the 1990s was 
abandoned by many of  its old inhabitants in favour of  the suburbs
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The class composition of  municipalities in Attica, 2001. Concentrations of  higher 
economic strata are shaded darker, lower economic strata lighter. 
Source: Gortsos, K. Mark, A., P. Camoutsis 2008.
new “clandestine” residents would quickly settle there. Central neigh-
bourhoods, therefore, are now largely migrant neighbourhoods. The 
centre of  Athens is something between a site of  vitality and a ghetto, 
where globalisation and racist attacks coexist. Just before the 2004 
Olympic Games, a large redevelopment project was undertaken in 
the Attica basin, including central Athens. Areas of  the centre such 
as Gazi, Psirri, and Metaxourgeio were gentrified, land values rose 
sharply, and the old residents were displaced in order to allow for gi-
gantic entertainment facilities and accommodation for the nouveau 
riche. This process would involve the emerging “creative class,”10 large 
contractors, real estate companies, the government, and “concerned 
citizens.” Efforts to turn the centre into a controlled multiplex for tour-
ism, entertainment, consumption, and innovative entrepreneurship 
are still ongoing, creating an even more mixed and complex situation. 
The historical centre of  Athens is the place where its admin-
istrative, police, and judiciary authorities are concentrated and where 
they coexist with commercial use, housing, education, culture, welfare, 
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Land use in the central area and urban complex of  Athens: Areas of  central 
functions are shown in dark grey, general residential areas in grey, and pure 
residential areas in white. 
entertainment, and even industrial areas. Despite an ongoing attempt to 
remove all central administrative functions11 from the centre of  Athens, 
this does have a clear strategic importance when it comes to social-politi-
cal struggles—hence the enhancement of  policing and surveillance.12 
PRIVATE SPACES: HIGH-RISE HOUSING BLOCK
The most common private residential space in Athens is the 
high-rise housing block (polykatoikia in Greek, literally multiple housing, 
see Glossary)—the primary cell of  urban social reproduction. Although 
these housing blocks were a symbol of  modernisation in interwar Greece, 
over the following decades they came to fulfil urgent housing needs. 
The structure of  the building contains the characteristics of  
vertical social class segregation: basements (low income), ground floor 
(shops), intermediate floors (middle-class homes and offices), penthouse 
(high income). Although originally specified as residential, the block of  
flats offers endless options through its flexible structural system: space 
inside the block may be used for accommodation, an office, a ministry, 
 35
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a shop, a warehouse, a restaurant, a workshop, a supermarket, a café, 
a bar, or even a garage. At the same time, because Athens only has a 
few public spaces and very narrow streets, these housing blocks absorb 
the city within them and in turn empty out their interior to the city 
(Woditsch 2009). Private and public life interact in its hallways, its bal-
conies and façades. Flags hanging over balconies, scribbles on walls, 
stickers in elevators, slogans on walls—multiple signs of  communica-
tion transforming the impersonal shell of  the building into a dynamic 
living organism that constantly beats, yells, makes a multitude of  noises, 
falls in love, and quarrels.
PUBLIC SPACES: STREETS
Green spaces in the city of  Athens measure 2.5 m2 per inhabit-
ant, whereas in most European cities13 the figure exceeds 15 m2 per in-
habitant. The largest part of  public space in the city is its most authentic 
form—that is, the street. Streets as public spaces are alive for 24 hours a 
day, as the mixture of  multiple uses permits and promotes such a situa-
tion. The street is a place of  open-air trade, meeting, finding a job, and 
so on—while, of  course, it is also the prime site of  protest. 
During the past fifteen years, nearly 500 demonstrations 
have taken place in the city annually.14 Urban planning in Athens is 
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The geometric characteristics of  streets.
characterised by the small distances (an average of  70 m) between street 
intersections. This is owed to the small size of  building blocks, which 
is in turn a result of  the fragmented nature and small size of  property-
holding in the city. The frequency of  road intersections has particular 
significance when it comes to the crucial moments of  demonstrations 
and clashes with the police. Factors such as visibility, ambushes, or the 
ability to communicate are directly related to the physical and geometri-
cal characteristics of  urban space. So, for example, streets in “unruly” 
Exarcheia intersect every 45 m, while in the bourgeois neighbourhoods 
of  the northern suburbs, junctions occur every 220 m.15 
Compared to its western counterparts, Athens has much small-
er blocks and many more streets. Its public space, which has to be under
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Sections of  the city centres of  New York, Mumbai, Berlin, Athens, Paris, and 
Cairo. The maps are at the same scale and cover areas of  600m x 600m.
surveillance and control, is therefore much larger and denser. In terms 
of  urban planning and zoning, Athens is a pure failure. If  anything, it 
may even come closer to the largely spontaneously-formed populous 
concentrations of  the Middle East, India, and Africa. 
MOVEMENT STRUCTURES, SQUATS, SOCIAL CENTRES, AUTONOMOUS SPACES
Squats and social centres emerged in Greece in the late 1980s 
and the early 1990s, the era of  the high-school student movements of  
1990–1991 and the emergence of  the punk scene. Anarcho-punk squat-
ters occupied abandoned buildings and turned them into spaces for 
subcultural activity, collective living, and dissident action (see c/krümel 
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2005). Yet it would take a decade for the practice of  squatting to spread. 
Between 2000 and 2005, anti-authoritarian squatted places would 
spring up all across the metropolitan complex. At the same time, more 
than fifteen squats were created in cities outside Athens while many po-
litical, social, and student centres (stekia, see Glossary) appeared in every 
university city. These social and political centres and squats were precon-
ditions for establishing an antagonistic everyday reality. December 2008 
was the first time the dynamics of  the social centres and squats found 
themselves organised in the streets, all across the country. 
Squats and social centres in the urban area of  Athens.
UNIVERSITIES
The first universities were established during the mid-19th and 
early 20th centuries in Athens, the then-newly-named capital of  the 
young Greek state. They were located on what was then the edge of  
the city and comprised of  small campuses of  between one and three 
hectares (e.g. Kapodistrian, Panteion, Technical, Harokopion, and 
ASOEE). These first universities had a manageable size and a high den-
sity of  students for the area and created an intense sense of  community; 
by no means did they have the impersonal and chaotic characteristics 
of  the large campuses of  the later period. As Athens expanded and 
movement structures 2008
stars indicate areas with squats or social centers
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the universities were organically integrated into the urban fabric, they 
became inextricable entities in the city’s everyday life. The liveliness of  
the universities and the political procedures that take place there are 
increased by the fact that the composition of  the student community 
has spread across social classes. Yet due to a lack of  space, and follow-
ing the experience of  the subversive student movements of  the 1960s 
and the 1970s, university campuses built during the dictatorship or the 
post-dictatorial years would purposefully be built away from the urban 
core. Nevertheless, old university buildings in Athens and other cities 
are still prime places in which social movements organise. These build-
ings offer resources for meetings, events, concerts, and sites from which 
to organise the logistics of  the movement. 
University faculties in the urban area of  Athens.
TERRITORIAL EXPANSION OF A REVOLT
“A BURNING CITY IS A BLOSSOMING FLOWER”
Athens may have been the European metropolis with the most 
barricades in the first decade of  the new millennium. December 2008 
was not the first time that streets and public buildings were occupied, 
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but it was one of  the very small number of  occasions when this took 
place in such a massive and coordinated way. Starting on the Saturday 
evening, the nuclei of  revolt were mainly the streets, the schools, the 
university faculties, the public buildings, the social centres, and the oc-
cupations that spread across Athens and all over the country. These nu-
clei stayed in place for days; the remarkable nature of  the revolt was the 
fact that the revolted [see Glossary] were simultaneously and constantly 
at countless points in the city.
GROUND ZERO—SYMBOLIC SPACE BECOMES REALITY
Saturday night in Exarcheia: Alexis’s murder takes place in the 
“hottest“ area of  the city, at the “hottest” time of  the week. The time 
and the place of  the murder could not have been more symbolic and 
provocative. Only a few hours after the murder, as the news spread 
all over Greece instantly via mobile phones and the internet, people 
gather in the district of  Exarcheia. It is clear, from the very outset, that 
the revolt is situated in the public space. People attack many targets, 
recognising that their enemy is not the one who squeezed the trigger 
but the system that created him. Therefore, they target not only the 
police departments but also everything that expresses the domination 
of  the police. For years, Exarcheia has had a symbolic meaning for the 
antagonistic movement; there, any clashes or the very presence of  po-
lice has been treated as an intrusion on to “a ground occupied by the 
antagonistic movement.” Exarcheia can stay alive as long as its people 
can stay there. The murder of  a place’s people means the death of  the 
place itself. Therefore, the murder of  Alexis Grigoropoulos was inter-
preted as a murderous attack against the entire neighbourhood. People 
are gathering at the square, the reference point of  the neighbourhood 
and the entire city, but also at the Technical University, the reference 
point for every emergency. What is known, “safe,” and always expected 
is taking place in Athens during the following hours; clashes all night 
long, on Patision Street, starting from Athens Polytechnic. Those who 
had the fastest reaction times are running to the common confronta-
tion areas in order to make themselves visible, to awaken the city, to 
defend their life. Exarcheia, the Technical University, Patision Street, 
have retained their character and their memories for years. The clashes 
are spreading easily, initially at a smaller scale compared to what the 
following days will bring. The streets are full of  targets and the instan-
tiation of  nearby pillars is easy and sensible. Therefore, the Faculty of  
Law and the University of  Economics (the former ASOEE) are being 
occupied, so that they can be turned into counter-information centres 
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and strongholds for clashes. The existence of  a closed and clearly pro-
tected space helped but also captured the street revolted. The university 
institutions have turned once more into nuclei of  revolt. After the first 
evening, another dimension of  the events emerges, as the actions grad-
ually move beyond the common routes. The news is travelling fast via 
mobile phones and the internet. The points where the first “reactions” 
gather are not randomly chosen. They were essentially central areas 
of  the metropolis where young people spend their Saturday evenings 
(Monastiraki, Petralona, etc.) and they serve as a centre for people who 
are looking for other areas besides Exarcheia. Clashes are now taking 
place on Ermou Street, targeting commercial shops and the police sta-
tion of  the Acropolis district, near Omonia Square. So far, the targets 
are known; police stations, banks, rubbish bins, the offices of  the ruling 
party, shops; easily-approached targets in the city centre. Nobody has 
yet got closer to the crucial police station of  Exarcheia, from where 
the murderers started patrolling, or the police headquarters, where the 
murderers took shelter afterwards. 
NEW SUBJECTS = NEW PLACES OF CONFLICT VS. NEW PLACES OF CONFLICT = 
NEW SUBJECTS
By the next morning, Sunday 7 December, had become clear 
that the perpetrator of  the murder, the police, would be targeted. The 
make-up of  the forming demonstration is a characteristic example of  
demonstrations over the following days. Thousands of  people are gather-
ing, under the identity of  a raging crowd. The target is the General Police 
Department of  Athens.16 The location of  the target in Athens is extreme-
ly convenient and this will always pose a problem for the city administra-
tion. Of  course, the 2.5 km distance to it is greatly extended by the pres-
ence of  hundreds of  police officers, shop windows, and tear gas. This is 
how space and time are doubled. On the way, Alexandra Avenue, a road 
40–45 m wide, is literally devastated. Rage is actively expressed on every 
corner of  both sides of  the street. Shops and petrol stations as well as 
public buildings are under attack. Every space that represents trade, con-
sumption, the city in its dominant form, must be destroyed as a means of  
revenge, because in the end everything and everybody is responsible for 
a death that symbolizes thousands of  other deaths on the city concrete. 
Of  course the cops are not going to allow any approach to their fortress. 
As the demonstration is disbanded, people are being chased towards the 
upward narrow streets of  Neapoli, while others will turn back, towards 
the Polytechnic School. After a while, the police station in Exarcheia will 
see its first attack. After all, it is only 700m away from Alexandra Avenue.
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The police’s tactic, to push demonstrations into the city alleys 
in order to decentralize the protesters’ force, did not bear fruit this 
time. At the same moment, new, smaller fractions of  resistance were 
created, and they spread with the same aggressiveness towards differ-
ent parts of  the city centre. Similar formations played a vital part in 
most Greek cities over the course of  the following days. The people 
were determined, whether on an avenue or dissolved in the city alleys. 
For every different space, there was a different tactic. The situation was 
beginning to spread across the city, while the police strove to surround 
the perceived source of  all evil, Exarcheia. Exarcheia, at that moment, 
was, however, more of  a symbolic space, since the news had already 
spread across the streets and houses, through the television, to the bal-
conies and rooftops from which the smoke of  the burning Alexandra 
Avenue was visible. The situation spread, of  course, across people’s 
minds and consciences as well, something that is hard to restrict geo-
graphically. The real space of  conflict was, at that moment, the city as 
a whole. The riots continued, eventually involving migrants who were 
living near Patision. For the migrants, Exarcheia itself  and the Poly-
technic School probably did not mean much; for them, it was about the 
neighbourhoods in which they lived and in which they were persecuted 
every day. At this exact spot, when the new subjects entered onto the 
field of  battle, facts began to take a new form. Space, in its wider than 
material sense—urban space but also the social space of  conflict and 
resistance—expanded even more, and it is at this point that the revolt 
began to look like a revolt.
The turmoil no longer belongs to Exarcheia. It now belongs 
to Athens and to the whole of  the country, and therefore to the people 
who mostly experience its “ugly” side. As ever-expanding groups of  
people become involved, new spaces enter the topology of  the revolt 
and new places of  conflict emerge. Expropriation begins. In the city 
centre, expropriations take place near Piraeus Street, Koumoundourou 
and Victoria Square. These are places where migrants live, and they are 
familiar with violence and police operations.
The constituted presence of  students marked the beginning 
of  the third day of  revolt, Monday 8 December. Many youth had al-
ready taken part in squats and riots, but on Monday, the first school 
day, they organise as pupils, recognising that the gun was turned against 
one of  them and thus against them. The appearance of  students and 
new residents changed the geography of  revolt rapidly. Every neigh-
bourhood has a school and a police station, and those places will 
bring the revolt to a peak, thus filling the map with spots of  resistance.
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Districts of  the demonstrations, clashes, and direct actions.
The student demos start from different parts of  Athens, where the 
schools are located, and converge at a common place of  reference, 
Propylea.17 The metropolis is filled with targets, which are not hard to 
find. The telephone network and the internet, along with the school 
network, have proved to be of  great use, as have with the three squats in 
the city centre. The Monday demonstration was a combination of  all 
of  the above and managed to fill the centre of  the city for 3 km. On the 
same night, a unique situation, which will astonish millions of  people, is 
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created. During the next evening, on Tuesday 9 December, the down-
town “aura” will reach Zephyri.18 This night in Zephyri will be of  great 
importance, since it is one of  very few occasions when its residents will 
try to interact with events in the city centre.
The involvement of  various subjects was a characteristic of  the 
revolt. Although the people repeatedly gathered under pre-formed iden-
tities, new identities arose through the December conflicts and everyday 
presence on the street: those of  the struggling subjects, who meet and act 
together, creating a new collective We, ready to defend its everyday exis-
tence on the streets of  the metropolis. The revolt materialized because it 
concerned an ever-growing number of  groups. In this way it spread all 
over the city, and for that reason it is of  spatial interest.
THE STREET
On Tuesday the 9th, another spot is added to the map, a neigh-
bourhood in the south, in Faliro, where Grigoropoulos is to be buried. 
On the streets, in the middle of  conflicts after the funeral, policemen 
trying to defend the local police station will use their weapons. The vio-
lence of  the state has no limits and will reach almost all areas.
Until this point, the place of  revolt has definitely been the 
street. It is one of  the last intra-class places in town, where its residents 
coexist, although in a far from harmonious way. It is one of  the primary 
places of  control. The ruler of  the street becomes the ruler of  the city. 
Although the streets may constitute a continuous channel for the flow 
of  commodities, they are easily transformed into a channel for conflict, 
since they are, most of  all, places of  communication and the meeting 
of  people. The natural space in the city is still a protagonist in extreme 
cases. In states of  emergency, that tend to become the rule in the mod-
ern metropolis, an event must be made known through the presence of  
people in the most public part of  town. Barricades are set up, the flow 
of  everyday life is interrupted, and the streets and squares become the 
fields of  an open public battle that now concerns everybody.
The occupation of  university spaces, schools, and pre-existing 
structures functioned more to create bases than places that could absorb 
the crowd. The rebels had conquered the street during those days, and 
they would not leave it for any occupation. On the other hand, the road 
as a place of  conflict is fluid and hard to demarcate. Therefore, even 
during the conflicts, the rebels will often seek the “safety” of  a building, 
whether as shelter, as a starting point, or as a place for discussion and 
counter-information. The stability of  a building against the fluidity of  the 
street will always be an important issue for the antagonistic movement.
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During the days of  the revolt, and after them, the streets func-
tioned in various ways. They served as channels of  communication that 
daily transferred the message of  revolt to the metropolis, as parts of  a 
network that connected the distant neighbourhoods of  Athens, but also 
as links among buildings that brought the revolt into the private spaces 
of  the city. Their unlimited capacity always leaves all chances open. 
The streets of  Athens hosted hundreds of  demonstrations and events 
and thousands of  people during the days of  December. The continu-
ous presence of  the rebels on the streets caused enough problems to the 
circulation of  commodities, and the market was literally paralysed.19 
The interruption of  traffic and the conversion of  road use takes place 
in many different, and sometimes inspired, ways. On Friday 19 Decem-
ber, a concert in Propylea is organized, and almost 5,000 people use the 
street as a huge music stage. A few days later, during the occupation of  
the Athens Opera House (Lyriki), the “rebel ballet” will shortly inter-
rupt the traffic in Academia Street, in order to dance in front of  the 
astonished drivers.
The assassination of  Alexis Grigoropoulos happened in pub-
lic, at the corner of  Mesologiou and Tzavela Street. In the same pub-
lic way, thousands filled the public space, claiming it as a space for 
meeting and “doing” life in the city, and not as a place of  death for 
its residents.
COMPARING DECEMBER’S REVOLT IN ATHENS TO URBAN REVOLTS 
ACROSS THE WORLD
December’s revolt in Athens started with clashes in the neighbourhood 
of  Exarcheia, yet such clashes, demonstrations, and direct actions were 
quick to spread to the city’s periphery. Distances within the Athens met-
ropolitan area are small when compared to respective areas that have 
seen urban revolts in the past. Population density, on the other hand, is 
extremely high in Athens. The maximum distance of  actions and clash-
es from the city centre were thus confined to a 5 to 13 km zone.
In order to better understand the importance of  the spatial 
confinement of  December’s revolt in Athens we would like to use the 
examples of  revolts in other urban areas: namely, Paris, Los Angeles, 
Milan, and Buenos Aires.
The revolt closest to Athens in terms of  time is the Paris revolt 
of  2005. The sites where the clashes took place were the remote sub-
urbs next to highways, the dormitory towns, the working-class migrant 
neighbourhoods: single-use banlieues [“suburbs” in French] with no 
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commercial or other functions, cut off  from the city centre, resembling 
the characteristics of  a ghetto. The metropolitan area of  Paris is three 
times as populous and five times as large as Athens. In Paris, the dis-
tance of  the protesting suburbs from the city centre was between 13 and 
25 km. Clichy-sous-Bois, the suburb from which the revolt began, lies 
19 km east from the city centre; clashes spread northward to Goussain-
ville (22 km from the city centre) and southward to Neuily sur Marne 
(20 km), while the closest nucleus of  the revolt was Saint Denis, itself  
13 km from the city centre. The revolt, for the most part, circulated be-
tween neighbourhoods on the perimeter of  Paris and only threatened 
the city centre for the briefest moment. Similarly, even though the revolt 
inspired and ignited smaller-scale migrant revolts in other French cities, 
it almost completely failed to spread among other social groups (stu-
dents, workers). The result being that the revolted, despite their enor-
mous rage and fighting spirit (they engaged in clashes with the forces of  
repression for twenty days) found themselves isolated—and the revolt 
never became generalised.
Los Angeles, the city with the largest and most diffused metro-
politan area in the USA, played host to the Watts Rebellion in 1965. 
Lasting for five days, the rebellion took place 22 km away from the city 
centre. The urban parts where it took place were migrant areas of  resi-
dential use, where the narrowest streets are 20–25 m wide and avenues 
are up to 70–80 m. The revolt of  1992 took place in South Central 
Los Angeles, again in residential migrant neighbourhoods and with the 
distance from the city’s financial and commercial centre exceeding 10 
km. Despite its extremely violent characteristics, the revolt was quelled 
within six days. 
In Milan in the seventies (from the heated autumn of  1969 
to the generalised movement of  1977) a constant struggle was in pro-
cess for the takeover of  the city by workerist autonomy, the so-called 
“Indians of  the metropolis,” and the proletarian youth. This was the 
time that saw the transition from the vertical and centralised structure 
of  leftist organisations and the “mass worker” to the threshold of  the 
“social worker” and the diffused social factory. The spatial expression 
of  this transition takes place with the decay of  the headquarters of  
leftist organisations, situated exclusively within the administrative and 
financial centre of  the metropolis (competing, as they were, with the 
institutional political status quo) and the parallel formation of  street 
groups, occupations, and social centres in the perimeter of  Milan. For 
the people in struggle, centralised place no longer comprises an identity, 
a becoming of  the self, or a characteristic (Moroni 1996). The form of  
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Nodes and flows of  revolt.
the new subjects of  struggle overlooks the city centre and treats it as 
merely a place where new tactics of  auto-reduction are applied, along 
with appropriations and clashes. The places where the circles of  the 
proletarian youth, punks, and “metropolitan Indians” grow roots coin-
cide with the working-class suburbs and are situated on a perimeter of  
7–15 km from the historical centre of  the city. Subsequently, then, the 
direction is from the periphery toward the occupation of  the centre. Ad-
ditionally, apart from the vast working-class suburbs, hordes of  people 
come from the hinterland of  Milan to participate in the demonstra-
tions. The movement in the metropolis of  Milan never saw a moment 
of  revolt; nevertheless, the entire decade of  the 1970s was packed with 
periods of  intense movement activity, struggle, clashes, and creativity.
The Argentinian revolt of  2001 and its course in Buenos Aires 
might be spatially closest to the Athenian example. However, what ig-
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nited it was substantially different to the cases of  Paris, Athens, and Los 
Angeles—since, after a prolonged period of  financial crisis and supervi-
sion of  the country by the IMF, what ignited the revolt was the freezing 
of  bank accounts and the middle classes coming out on to the streets. 
The revolted, unlike most other cases of  urban struggle, included a 
great range of  politicised individuals, students, unemployed, and petit-
bourgeois strata who came from nearly the entire city. On the very first 
day, they were able to take over the city centre and the Plaza de Mayo 
and to besiege the parliament. At the same time, more than 200 popu-
lar assemblies were taking place in nearly all the neighbourhoods and 
suburbs of  the Argentine capital, over a radius larger than 10 km. The 
revolt in Argentina and Buenos Aires saw —besides clashes, appropria-
tions, and direct actions—the occupation of  workspaces (factories, ho-
tels) and created structures of  reproduction, a precious legacy for the 
generations to come. 
INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION
SPACE AS A FIELD OF POWER 
Spatial dominance is of  great importance for those in resis-
tance—and not just for them. Urban space operates as a symbol of  
power and authority, as a signal of  overall dominance in political and 
everyday life. What took place in Athens in December was a parallel 
struggle not only for territorial dominance but also for the control over 
meanings produced by the city space. A typical example was the strug-
gle over the plastic Christmas tree in Syntagma Square. The revolted 
did not merely torch a plastic tree, but the symbol of  Christmas for the 
entire city of  Athens. This was considered a matter of  major impor-
tance; in the days that followed, strong riot police forces would protect 
the new Christmas tree, following the Mayor’s orders. A few days later, 
the Mayor himself  would send bulldozers over to Kyprou and Patision 
Park [translator’s note: the latter is one of  the two parks taken over 
by locals in Athens after December’s revolt], his aim being to create a 
parking space in one of  the densest neighbourhoods of  the city. The 
defence of  the park and its trees by neighbours would be described as 
vandalism on the side of  authority—yet the protection of  the plastic 
tree was an act of  the highest importance for the life of  the city! Un-
doubtedly, in those days revolted were in large part dominating the 
city. And if  the dominant is the person who has the capacity to change 
the rules (the capacity to install an exception) then the revolted were 
dominant over the production of  their space; they were the dominant 
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producers of  a rupture in the everyday life of  the city. For many, this 
was a game of  authority. The magic of  control over the streets (the ab-
solute public space) can lure even the most devoted anti-authoritarian. 
Yet for most, it was a change in everyday life beyond anything that had 
been imagined so far. 
There is no central planning or strategy; tiny elements of  this 
will make an appearance only in the aftermath of  the events. The cen-
tral stage belongs to the memory and experience of  similar events but, 
above all, to the determination and acts of  the thousands who met in 
the streets. In any case, what was typical of  December’s revolt was not 
a defensive stance against state violence (defence, after all, makes little 
sense in a revolt) but a constant offensive against all that resembles the 
presence of  sovereign power. In the tiny space of  one or two nights, the 
torching of  the “old world” had to be complete, not to allow the slight-
est shadow of  doubt over the fact that revolt had taken over every part 
of  the urban whole.
FROM THE CENTRE TO THE CITY—THE LONG MARCH OF A REVOLT 
“The wave” began from those places already bearing mean-
ing, where everyone feels “familiar” with clashes, where tear gas and 
fire arouse the senses on an everyday level. Actions take place with a 
direction from the already-conquered centre toward the outside. This 
“exodus” from the centre was typical of  the revolt movement. Despite 
the fact that perhaps the most “spectacular” actions would take place 
in the continuously-occupied centre, the “exodus” to the periphery and 
the rest of  the country comprised an even larger spectacle—the assas-
sination and the instinctive responses allowed not even a shadow of  
doubt that the situation concerned everyone. Alexis, after all, was “one 
of  us”—whatever the repercussions of  this might be. The involvement 
of  new subjects was by then a given and crucial in putting the mes-
sage across: “You will not shoot us in cold blood—and when you do so, 
expect anything in response.” From the moment this was no longer a 
minority issue (e.g. belonging solely to the anarchists), it automatically 
escaped the symbolism of  Exarcheia and ceased to be defined within a 
given “space,” as authority would perhaps hope. In order for the inter-
vention into everydayness to be “real,” it had to be as close to everyday 
life as possible: to the family, the neighbourhood—not a “sterile cluster 
of  freedom” in the centre. As the revolt was distancing itself  from a 
mere clash between police and anarchists it would simultaneously try to 
inhibit other meanings. The revolted tried to touch as many aspects of  
the everyday life as they could, such as labour, public space, the arts, cir-
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culation, and survival in the city—all by taking decentralised action in 
symbolic spaces. This is how the GSEE building was occupied, as well 
as the opera house, town halls, and schools; interventions took place 
at theatres, ticket validation machines on the public transport network 
were sabotaged, and so much more. In reality, the periphery of  the 
metropolis was never immune to the “virus of  freedom.” For the first 
time, however, everything came under the same light—“co-ordinated,” 
“simultaneous,” and diffused. The actions taking place at the same time 
in countless places of  the city created a labyrinthine network with a 
start but no finish. After December 2008, one can only suspect that, no 
matter how far centres of  power relocate, future revolts will be possible, 
since the creativity of  the revolted easily surpasses any imagination on 
the side of  the planners of  authority. 
At the same time, the revolt traversed through networks of  re-
lationships and communication, but also via images and testimonies in 
places no one could have predicted. The place of  the revolt expanded 
to reach France when, on 15 December 2008, the minister of  educa-
tion there temporarily revoked the educational reform plan, perhaps af-
fected by the wave of  disobedience in Greece. Zapatistas sent their very 
own message of  support, while solidarity actions took place in more 
than 30 countries and 150 cities, from Japan to Argentina and from 
Cairo to Helsinki.
THE SPACE OF THE REVOLT 
Most actions, occupations and marches of  the revolt took place 
primarily in the central and southern part of  the metropolitan area of  
Athens, in a zone with a 15 km radius—only a handful of  actions took 
place outside this. The space of  the revolt is situated primarily south of  
Attici Road, west of  Immitus Mountain, north of  the suburb of  Gly-
fada, east of  the Egaleo ring road. The countless occupations of  schools 
and universities did not “trap” people inside these buildings. The space 
of  the revolt was primarily that of  the street, the public space, the park, 
and the square. It was also, however, the space of  radio waves, of  televi-
sion (thanks to station occupations), of  the internet, and the telephone. 
The countless blogs offered fertile ground for the circulation of  ideas 
as much as the immediate spread of  information. In this case, the in-
ternet and mobile phones greatly expanded the space of  the revolt. If, 
then, space requires all senses in order to be produced and understood 
(Pallasmaa 2005), all senses were at the disposal of  the events. And so 
the sound of  a stun grenade would create space beyond the physical 
boundaries of  an action, while the taken-over PA system of  a shopping 
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mall would transmit the message of  the revolt even to those pretend-
ing nothing was going on. At the same time, newspapers with smashed 
shop fronts on their covers hanging outside corner shops,20 the image 
of  Alexis and of  the torched Christmas tree would create the setting of  
a revolt even at the most “distant” point of  the metropolis.
EVERYDAY LIFE AND RARE ACTS—THE RANDOM EVENT IN STATISTICS 
Important acts are not always captured by statistics.21 Indeed, 
during December possibilities opened up for everything to happen 
everywhere. The revolt was full of  events against normality of  which 
even the Situationists would be jealous. It was full of  disruptions to the 
hourly schedule of  the city, which no statistical analysis could predict. 
December sought (just like capitalism—and after all, December is part 
of  it too) endless novelty, surprise. Space could not be policed by ex-
perts, whether these were on the side of  the repression or the protesters. 
Everyone stood in a fluid space (Bauman 2007) and even experienced 
participants did not know what could happen. And this is where there 
are two sides to the coin. On one side, the side of  authority, this was a 
“liquid fear” (Bauman 2006), a possible “lift” of  the “security” condi-
tion. On the other side, however, possibilities opened up for each and 
everyone to turn desires into reality. At that point, exceptional things 
were born. The revolt was doubtlessly a rupture in the everyday, per-
haps reaching its apogee at the moment when the everyday became 
revolt. This exact “reality” had so far been trapped within the island of  
Exarcheia but would now spread across the entire city—and so, a few 
days after 6 December, it seemed normal for someone to sit on a couch 
in the middle of  a street while a bank was in flames nearby. Indeed, 
important acts such as those of  December cannot be captured by statis-
tics—we should never forget they are born from everyday life.
THE REVOLTED 
These people did not arrive here in an organised manner, that is, they did not 
come here with some social façade, bearing any social representation. They 
did not arrive and come in the building stating that they want to protest for 
anything at all.… [T]hese people then did not arrive in an organised manner 
at the ERT headquarters and I denounce them.… [A]t no point, to be precise, 
was there any occupation, no one occupied the broadcasting corporation. What 
happened was its storming by small unorganised groups which entered the TV 
studio by the use of  force.… [T]hey also gave me a text with no signature, 
with no title, a non-paper with which they denounce the way in which various 
TV stations present the events… something which does not concern us at 
all.… [W]e cannot tolerate units and particular groups with no image, with 
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no face, which engage in a targeted operation to withhold the Greek people’s 
right to information. It is a condemnable event with characteristics that exceed 
democracy.
—Panagopoulos 200822
The outburst of  the director of  ERT reveals the unbelievable 
thrasos of  authority to insist, even in the midst of  a revolt, to define the 
form, the faces, and the rule of  behaviour of  the revolted. Yet it does 
something else too: it outlines in the most vivid of  ways the ghost of  
the revolted as seen through the eyes of  authority. It describes the com-
plete confusion caused by the mix of  the “faceless” protesting people. 
No koukoulonomos [the so-called hoodie-law, see Glossary] could ever 
hold when faced with such a crowd. Indeed, authority could not have 
done a better job in outlining the face of  its enemy. And this surprise for 
the identity of  the revolted was not felt only from the side of  authority 
but also from the antagonist movement. Thousands met in the streets, 
not in organised groupings but in a crowd. The “old” correlatives were 
lost in face of  a collective—and at the same time “peculiar”—“we.” 
Whatever attempt to create an identity of  the revolted failed. It is nec-
essary for forces of  repression to create a face for their enemy in or-
der to target them more easily. And yet, the divisions that the voice of  
sovereignty would spit out through mass media, between the “good” 
and “bad,” “justly” and “unreasonably” protesting, between migrants, 
looters, hooligans, anarchists, and “even young girls” that would be in 
the streets—these divisions were not entirely untrue. Indeed, inside this 
crowd there existed discreet “groupings” with their own practice. The 
“new urban residents” found themselves in their own neighbourhoods, 
destroying or looting what for them were not “carriers of  alienation” 
but essentials of  which capitalism had deprived them.23 
Many were quick to distance themselves from such events. 
Others hid behind the identity of  the concrete politicised subject, while 
some just kept on smashing things up. At the same time, public space 
would vindicate yet another aspect of  its history. The conditional pres-
ence of  gender, or even its exclusion, was a reality even in the “open 
and public” spaces of  the revolt. We saw very few migrant women 
out in the streets. December was a part of  everyday life as-we-knew-
it and failed in breaking through the limits of  gender sovereignty, de-
spite the fact that the presence of  anti-sexist discourse was particularly 
strong. Incidents of  sexist violence occurred even in the demonstrators’ 
blocks.24 After all, the mere presence of  subjects in the revolt would not 
automatically free them from whatever sexist or homophobic behaviour 
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they had engaged in before. Nevertheless, December also comprised a 
field of  apt questioning of  machismo, the “Rambo” executor,25 with 
many of  the revolted, male and female, rethinking the roles socially as-
signed to them through all these years.
HANGOUTS, OCCUPATIONS, AND AUTONOMOUS SPACES
The hangouts and occupations that existed prior to the revolt 
played a crucial part in its first days. Because they were dispersed across 
nearly the entire country, they acted primarily as recipients and igni-
tions of  the events. Most occupations and hangouts [steki, see Glos-
sary] are in the central parts of  cities, a fact that helped significantly in 
whatever organising there was on the side of  the revolted, their coming 
together, and counter-information overall. Afterwards, they had more 
of  an auxiliary role and something of  an invisible character because the 
events had become everyone’s business. In Athens, during recent years, 
there have also been attempts to put together such spaces outside the 
city centre. These “peripheral” steki played perhaps the most important 
role as sites of  reference and getting together during decentralised ac-
tions, perhaps due to the easier connection with neighbourhoods. Even 
there, of  course, it was primarily other meeting points that were chosen, 
public buildings that were less politically defined by the political identity 
of  anarchism or the extreme left. This, in an attempt to approach local 
residents but also to spread the revolt to everything that is still con-
sidered “common.” In those cases however, where relationships were 
developed between steki and local residents (such as in the neighbour-
hood of  Agios Dimitrios, with its local town hall occupation), results 
were incredible.
DECEMBER IN ATHENS’S PRESENT 
Contrary to commands for “gentrification“ inundating the 
modern city, December’s revolt reminded those feverishly trying to for-
get that coexistence in Athens cannot be a peaceful endeavour. It re-
minded one also that ghettos exist on both sides of  the metropolis, that 
is, the ghetto formed by new city centre dwellers and the ghetto consti-
tuted by the old-money residents of  Kolonaki [Athens’s most bourgeois 
central neighbourhood—see Glossary]. December functioned substan-
tially as a magnifying lens of  the violence that thousands of  the city’s 
residents suffer daily. At the same, the ability of  those who revolted to 
form new fields of  resistance in the frozen metropolitan time and place 
came as a loud response to all those who acted concerned about the 
political characteristics of  the conflict, pointing to what appeared to 
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be a glaring absence of  any demands. In reality, December gave birth 
to a plethora of  spaces and practices. The Skaramanga squat, Nava-
rinou Park, graffiti, and stencils all around—these are only some of  
its spatial legacies. Mainly, however, it left behind human relationships 
that enable people to develop more acute reflexes in case their mass 
presence in the streets is called for once again. On the other hand, we 
cannot neglect the fact that December also bequeathed an individual-
istic perception and attitude towards collective issues and structures, 
as it enhanced the perceived image of  the protestor as a “soldier” and 
thus commanded the absolute destruction of  collective objectives. The 
memories from those days are still alive in the turmoil of  economic re-
cession and will appear more useful than ever. Shadowed by economic 
crisis and IMF control, the period between December 2008 and the 
summer of  2010 displayed various pockets of  resistance indicative of  
the wealth of  the struggle: dock workers, lorry-drivers, railway workers, 
and air-traffic controllers went on strike, joined by committees against 
paying tolls. On the side of  state authority, December left many new 
laws aiming to prevent the worst-case scenario—it has left the menace 
with which cops would uproot trees at Navarinou Park during one of  
their usual raids; the new Dias motorcycle police force, aspiring to win 
back the force’s long-lost flexibility in urban terrain—and an even more 
bloodthirsty, murderous state, immune to the disdain for it that hordes 
of  people seem to cherish.
Any presentation of  the 2008 revolt is deemed to be incomplete 
and weak. This is simply because December was exceptionally multi-
faceted; central and suburban at the same time; chaotic and structured; 
for some familiar, to others unique. In no way did December exhaust 
the forms and ways of  offering resistance—on the contrary, it stirred 
the imagination and opened doors for new, even greater, gatherings. Its 
importance and contribution may only be fully understood in years to 
come—or then again, in the present crisis, this may come much sooner. 
In any case, as a genuinely “unfortified city,” Athens will always vindi-
cate its urban character thanks to its smaller and larger revolts.
NOTES
1 The present chapter is a shortened version of  a booklet published by the same authors 
titled Athens,Unfortified City (2010, in Greek). Visit http://www.urbananarchy.gr for 
more information.
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2 The period between 1952 and 1974 comprises the most notable urbanization in 
modern Greece. Within twenty years, the population of  Athens doubled after 1.5 
million domestic migrants relocated to the city. 
3 This was the US aid plan offered to European countries after WWII (mainly during 
1948–1951). On one hand, it aimed to strengthen national economies, yet on the other 
hand it would serve US foreign policy, in the sense that it also aimed to prevent aid-
receiving countries from entering the Soviet Union’s sphere of  political impact. The 
initial recipients were those countries that—according to the US government—were 
in immediate danger from the expansion of  communism, namely Greece and Turkey. 
4 After Greece’s unsuccessful expedition to Asia Minor, the Lausanne Treaty was 
signed in 1922. The Treaty dictated major population exchanges between Turkey and 
Greece. As a result, more than 200,000 refugees from Asia Minor (Turkey) settled in the 
periphery of  Athens during the 1920s and 1930s.
5 According to the 2001 census, migrants comprise 19% of  the population in Athens 
municipality. Today it is estimated that they make up 30%. 
6 This term, frequently used by the government and corporate media during this 
period, became a widespread slogan.
7 According to ESPON.
8 Until the mid-1990s, Athens had the characteristics of  a compact city with mixed 
land use, increased residential densities and clear urban boundaries. Trends of  spread 
from urban to rural areas (urban sprawl) have only begun to appear during the last 
fifteen years, leading its metropolitan area to acquire the features of  a diffused city. 
However, this suburbanisation is limited to Athens’s metropolitan area, and in 2001 
only 10% of  the population lived outside its firm and relatively limited agglomeration. 
The percentage of  suburbanisation in the metropolitan area stands at 10%, much 
lower than that of  other metropolises (for comparison: Paris 81%, San Francisco 79%, 
Buenos Aires 77%, Los Angeles 75%, Milan 73%, Tokyo 68%, Barcelona 67%, Cairo 
61%, Madrid 49% [Source: ESPON, Urban Audit]).
9 Even though the fourth CIAM took place in Athens in 1933—which praised the 
“functional city“ and opened the way for “zoning” of  cities globally through the 
“Charter of  Athens”—the city of  Athens itself  was never zoned, which has given it the 
urban vitality it retains to the present day. 
10 According to Richard Florida, cities that attract gay people, artists, and ethnic 
minorities are the new economic forces of  our era, because they are the areas inhabited 
by creative people. Creative employees make up the creative class, have a high 
level of  knowledge and skills, and are called in to solve problems by incorporating 
innovative solutions and ideas. The creative class seeks intense social interaction and 
the coexistence of  many different lifestyles, emphasising “public life” over “community 
life”; it prefers quasi-anonymity, the presence of  minimal strong social ties, and the 
potential to be surrounded by strangers and different types of  people. “Cities without 
gays and rock bands are losing the race of  economic growth,” says Florida (see Florida 
R. The Rise of  the Creative Class).
11 During the last decade, the Athens Stock Exchange and several ministries have been 
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relocated away from the centre, while there are plans for even the house of  parliament 
to follow. 
12 1,300 police CCTV cameras were installed in the streets of  Athens on the occasion 
of  the Olympic Games in 2004. Many have suffered extensive damage and destruction, 
during either marches or direct actions.
13 Proportion of  green space per inhabitant: Sofia 169 m2, Helsinki 146.6 m2, 
Amsterdam 35 m2, Berlin 27 m2, Rotterdam 24 m2, Rome 15 m2 (Data available at 
http://www.urbanaudit.org/index.aspx). 
14 Available at http://www.metopo.gr/article.php?id=1817 [in Greek].
15 In New York, the equivalent distance between road intersections stands at 245 m, 
making spatial control easy; in Barcelona it is 115 m, in Paris 105 m, in Berlin 270 m, 
but in Cairo it is 35 m. In the war zones of  Baghdad and Kabul the equivalent distance 
is 30 m. 
16 The General Police Department of  Athens is located in a thirteen-storey edifice on 
Alexandra Avenue. The main building has stood since the 1970s like a beehive at the 
centre of  the city, true to its Modernist principles.
17 Propylea, the square in front of  the University of  Athens, is a traditional place for 
gatherings. It is, at the same time, under the academic asylum regime and an open 
space in the heart of  the city. 
18 Zephyri is a greatly impoverished area in Attica, where many Roma live. In Zephyri, 
conflicts with the police are frequent, but there is an impenetrable barrier between 
the neighbourhood and the rest of  the city. It is rare for events in the one to affect the 
other. On the night of  9 December, it could be said that Zephyri sent “smoke signals” 
towards the city centre, by driving a flaming vehicle straight into a police department 
in the area. 
19 According to estimates of  the Chamber for Commerce and Industry, 435 businesses 
in Athens suffered damage (37 were completely destroyed), at a total cost of  €50 million. 
20 Note: in Greece, newspapers usually are sold in kiosks. These kiosks are located on 
the sidewalks and squares. 
21 Statistical laws only hold when we are dealing with large numbers and long periods. 
Unusual/important acts or events can statistically only appear as diversions from the 
rule (Arendt 1986).
22 Panagopoulos C. (2008) Statements by the Director of  ERT [in Greek] available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1niOJ4hlKYk&feature=related.
23 Of  course there were also generalised looting incidents with the aim of  profit/
reselling of  goods. We are in no position to know what exactly happened during those 
days. We can, however, imagine a few migrants watching TV without having to go to 
a public cafe in order to do so, or wearing new shoes and clothes they might have had 
otherwise needed to spend years saving to buy.
24 Language for example is never innocent; rather, it reproduces exclusions and phobic 
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behaviours. A typical example here would be the slogan “cop cunts, you kill kids” 
and the disputes between male and female demonstrators (See Riot Girls 2009 “This 
Revolt is Bollocks Comrades…” 9 January 2009 [in Greek] http://indy.gr/analysis/
ar3c7idia-eksegersi-syntrofoi-3).
25 After all, the trigger of  the revolt, the act of  the assassination, was also part of  the 
deeply patriarchal attitude of  “machismo” and “male” survival, which overcame the 
cop and murderer Korkoneas and “pushed” him to shoot.
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The law is not born of  nature, and it was not born near the fountains that the 
first shepherds frequented: the law is born of  real battles, victories, massacres, 
and conquests which can be dated and which have their horrific heroes; the law 
was born in burning towns and ravaged fields. It was born together with the 
famous innocents who died at break of  day. 
 —Michel Foucault (2003: 50–1)
THE SPATIALITY OF THE JUNGLE 
One phrase in the realm of  common discourse undoubtedly exemplifies 
certain perceptual spatial and figurative images of  popular understand-
ing, whilst at the same time indicating certain particularly important po-
litical schemes. What the popular phrase “the city has become a jungle“ 
principally articulates is, on the one hand, the practical difficulty of  ori-
entating oneself  within dense urban environments and, on the other, the 
quotidian absence of  encounter with any signs that might bear meaning. 
This unfocussed schema teeters between the practical impossibility of  
spatial cognition and symbolic impossibility and recalls in reverse fash-
ion the unique possibility, as Walter Benjamin said, of  losing oneself  in 
the metropolis in the same way that one gets lost in a forest.
“Not to find one’s way around a city does not mean much,” 
writes Benjamin (2003a: 352). “But to lose one’s way in a city, as one loses 
one’s way in a forest, requires some schooling.” With this statement, the 
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German philosopher intended to evince the modern urban experience 
and the imposing position occupied by the (orienting) information held 
within it—perhaps announcing, in his own way, that the city requires of  
us an enormous effort if  it is to be understood and lived as a jungle.
Beyond this territorial-urban reference, what seems to retain the 
greatest importance in the above formula is that the city is no longer to 
be understood as a field for the formation of  a political construction, i.e. 
as a polis. Complicated and dense urban clusters evoke the impossibility 
of  navigation through a dense jungle area but, beyond that, another co-
vert operation is in progress. The political dimension of  the metropolis 
seems to be violently brought into a state of  doubt. The upshot here 
is the immediate reduction of  urban social phenomena to counterpart 
events within the city’s erstwhile communities of  wildlife. Two objections 
are immediately raised from such a blatant reduction, concerning two 
separate misconceptions, which require some clarification in return.
A SOCIETY THAT IS WILD YET POLITICAL
The first objection is one that this article would not want to put under 
any scrutiny—this concerns the anthropological and colonial finding 
that the reference to “wild societies” does not set a ground for col-
lective political subjects and that it instead invokes a treaty of  war, at 
the heart of  which individual interest triumphs. Conflict is organised 
upon this interest, always on an individual level. This claim on the one 
hand makes use of  a Hobbesian2 political interpretation: in the ab-
sence of  any centralised authority, a mechanism of  arbitration (read: 
rule) seems unable to understand other reasons for cohesion and/
or conflict. On the other hand it recalls a point from the Marxist an-
thropological tradition whereby the absence of  coherent and distinct 
forces of  production obliges us to talk only of  pre-political and non-
historical societies. Those who study the archaeologies of  violence of  
Pierre Clastres (1989) or the nomadology of  Deleuze and Guattari 
(1986) would clearly suggest that the main challenge in this Western 
anthropological anxiety has been and remains to confirm and validate 
the State’s role as the only vehicle through which to establish a col-
lective political entity. And therefore, what this anthropological and 
political tradition must display to the “savage societies“ is the distance 
it keeps from such a centralised scheme.
The jungle, from which the modern metropolis derives its con-
ceptual schemes, seems to therefore host a strange “primitive” condi-
tion. And as a sign of  an anthropological centrifugal tendency it invites 
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us to seek the very centre from which it has transgressive tendencies. For 
the Hobbesian tradition this centre is occupied by the imposing figure 
of  the state, the only one worthy of  carrying the commands of  natural 
law or divine will. Therefore, by means of  induction, we can only talk 
of  the phenomena of  the jungle in the absence of  such a figure. Not 
about competing modes of  political formation but wild pre-political 
phenomena. Not groups but individuals. Not about social heterotopias 
but social cannibalism. Thus, a jungle is born in those cities that fail to 
commit to the primary contractual oath, resulting in them giving host 
to centrifugal exceptions, abnormal behaviour and deviant properties: 
in other words, internal enemies, enemies within. This, then, is the city-
jungle, where war reigns and the social contract is buried forever along 
with the thousands of  corpses of  an eternal and undefined war. Where 
competing political groupings are not recognised as such and where the 
state appears as the sole guarantor of  the political constitution in ques-
tion and as the exclusive arbitrator of  political decisions.
WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR THE CONTINUATION OF POLITICS     
BY OTHER MEANS
Our second objection concerns a hypothesis that has acquired the sta-
tus of  a certainty within the Western legal and philosophical discursive 
tradition: a certainty that establishes the State’s fundamental truth and 
haunts anti-state discourse. A number of  critical questions are born as 
a consequence and must be applied directly to the heart of  this founda-
tion. Suppose savage societies did therefore exist before “politics” and 
that their main feature was the war of  all against all (in Hobbesian 
terms). In the first event, what does the exclusion of  the phenomenon 
of  war from the political sphere mean and what form does the argu-
ment “the city was a jungle” take? The problem therefore arises from 
the moment when this hypothetical case assumes the characteristics of  
an objective reality. And its profundity was never more visible than in 
those days of  December. During those days we witnessed an unprec-
edented operation to exclude these phenomena of  urban violence from 
the political sphere of  the metropolis. In this effort, December united 
the orchestrators of  bourgeois democracy who alleged that such violent 
phenomena were located somewhere in the state of  nature. 
Such an insidious attempt to apportion this mass outbreak to 
jungle phenomena of  pre-political violence and instinctual delirium be-
yond any rationality made it clear that sovereignty, once again, was not 
prepared to understand these metropolitan riots as a potential field of  
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political formation—a formation that would most certainly be threat-
ening to it. In this sense it forced these riots to situate themselves in the 
irrational maelstrom of  the natural condition. The city-jungle, then, 
especially in those days hosted a double condemnation: first it strength-
ened and largely contributed to the desperate enterprise of  consolidat-
ing the misleading shape of  the “wild society” as a non-political soci-
ety, attaching to it one more pre-political event. Second, it situated the 
metropolitan-political unrest in a vast area of  wild (re-)representations 
and therefore in a forced, eternal, natural condition.
It makes sense to pause at this double conviction and reflect 
upon the value of  those days. This was a pure reflex outburst of  the 
youth which, after its first two or three days in the public eye, was at-
tributed the typical characteristics of  urban “thuggish behaviour” and 
indiscriminate violence; an apolitical outburst with angry shopkeepers 
as its victims. This outbreak did not escape a ton of  always-at-the-ready 
bourgeois ink which wrapped these unprecedented events up in a veil 
of  mystery, making sure to treat them as yet another violation of  some 
supposed universal contract.
Such a move revealed a U-turn of  the media which had initially 
come close to recognising political elements in a social phenomenon that 
has constituted to date an historical scourge of  such dialectical think-
ing—that is, violence per se. Yet fortunately, once repented, they viewed 
things clearly and confessed: all against all, irrational violence against 
reputable merchants—i.e. a state of  nature, or at least nothing that would 
resemble any political process. A brilliant social war was therefore within 
a matter of  days transformed through a media delirium into some sup-
posed “natural condition,” that is, into a pre-modern drama containing 
absolutely no political content. No relation-commodity, no relation-state 
was able to magnetise the interpretations to guide the understanding, to 
declare war. It was therefore clear that the duty of  the agents of  commu-
nication was to highlight the absurdity of  the extremely violent reaction 
next to the extreme reason of  everyday legal violence. The only thing 
that could guarantee this was the bombardment of  public opinion with 
images of  damaged and looted “innocent” commercial functions. An 
image of  “all against all”; the law of  the jungle. 
FROM THE INTERMEDIATE COMMENTARY ON THE CONCEPT       OF 
THE POLITICAL…
Paradoxically, the concept of  the “asymmetrical threat”—which con-
ceptually refers to an uncontrolled war condition—was unexpectedly 
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“adopted” during the August 2007 forest arsons in Greece, yet it was 
not part of  the communications arsenal of  sovereignty in December, 
even though it would have suited it perfectly. This was because those 
responsible knew that what they were asked to address was not un-
balanced. They knew exactly what gave birth to it and what it would 
host in the future. The ways in which it was manifested were perhaps 
asymmetric, but its sources certainly were not. The causes of  the riots 
of  December were therefore not at all unspecified and yet they had to 
disappear within the irrationality of  the natural condition. Under this 
management regime, Giorgos Karatzaferis3 seemed a worthy interpret-
er of  the events and loyal to the theoretical tools of  domination when 
on 21 December 2008—fifteen days after the outburst—he found him-
self  vocalising angry calls for the “mature” political world to consider 
the establishment of  special courts to prosecute acts that threatened 
democracy, “acts of  war” as he called them. He therefore demanded a 
hybrid juridical scheme for “attitudes that have no place in the family 
of  bourgeois democracy” and which cause a peculiar embarrassment 
to its political representatives. The embarrassment was detected in try-
ing to deal with a political Enemy Within in ways and means that do 
not belong to the bourgeois political sphere, i.e. by wartime–military 
rather than by political means.
 This is what Slavoj Žižek (2002: 93) seems to question when 
he refers to the paradox of  al-Qaeda terrorists: “the enemy,” he 
claims, “is criminalized if  he simply defends himself  and returns fire. 
A new entity is thus emerging which is neither the enemy soldier nor a 
common criminal: the al-Qaeda terrorists are not enemy soldiers, they 
are ‘unlawful combatants’; but they are not simple criminals either—
the USA was completely opposed to the notion that the WTC [World 
Trade Center] attacks should be treated as apolitical criminal acts. In 
short, what is emerging in the guise of  the Terrorist on whom war is 
declared is precisely the figure of  the political Enemy, foreclosed from 
the political space proper.” This exclusion will be seen clearly later on 
through Schmitt’s comments on the partisan.
By the same token, the “outlaw insurgents” in December were 
responding to this paradox. In this instance the paradox manifested it-
self  in the fact that, at a moment when the riots in question constituted 
“attacks on the political stability of  the country” and an “attack on the 
democracy itself ” and were therefore closely politically related to the ex-
isting order, the leader of  the extreme-right-wing LA.O.S. would dare to 
express the innermost fantasies of  bourgeois democracy in articulating 
a radical concept: the idea that the entire political system should pro-
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ceed united in the establishment of  special military tribunals—in other 
words, it should activate the arsenal of  martial proceedings to suppress 
political (and not mere criminal) acts that were nonetheless neither ac-
cepted nor perceived as such. He was therefore recalling once again the 
natural condition and arguing that we should mobilise military resources 
in order to maintain political stability. In so doing, he contradicted him-
self  in many ways: whilst refusing to recognise any political attributes 
whatsoever to those in revolt, he would nevertheless demand the launch 
of  a war against them with a clear political (sacred) purpose.
As a figure of  the extreme right, Karatzaferis intimately knows 
the culture of  the Decision, and this was confirmed in the request that he 
made. The moment of  the establishment of  a hybrid semi-bourgeois/
semi-military court would be the culmination of  the domination enjoyed 
by the bourgeois-democrats. And he would have repeated what has 
become absolutely clear in modern history—that is, that the one who 
dominates is not the person who establishes law but rather the person 
who decides on its suspension. Not the one who constantly negotiates 
the “criminality” of  a diversion but the one who at a crucial moment 
will signal that the political game is over and that now is the time for 
war. An absolute moment, perhaps most eloquently described in Walter 
Benjamin’s Theses on the Philosophy of  History: 
The tradition of  the oppressed teaches us that the “state of  emergency” in 
which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception 
of  history that is in keeping with this insight. Then we shall clearly realize that 
it is our task to bring about a real state of  emergency….4 
What does Benjamin mean when he talks about the true state of  
emergency? And how is Schmitt’s famous definition of  sovereignty rein-
stated in this context? Schmitt (1985: 5) declares in his political theology: 
“Sovereign is he who decides on the exception”—which confirms that 
in a time of  crisis (whether caused by war, revolution or natural disas-
ter) the dominant will seek to ensure the maintenance of  law and order 
even if  they must thereby declare, temporarily, its suspension (or not-so-
temporarily as demonstrated in the Nazi example). This event therefore 
retains its own particular significance in history. This admittedly was the 
motivating force in the riot scenes of  December. A just political event 
constituting nothing but a marginal conduit, a conduit that may never-
theless sometimes be placed in the service of  the oppressed.
Seizing this tremendous opportunity, Panagiotis Kondylis5 ar-
ticulated his observations on the positions of  Schmitt. If  Schmitt reads 
the declaration of  emergency as a tool solely serving the state, Kondylis 
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invites us to rethink the importance of  its limitations to the extent that 
such a tool might be activated to the benefit of  the oppressed. And the 
moment of  this paradoxical activation will escape the limits of  domina-
tion since it will comprise a pure limit, a limit existing outside the state. 
Since this declaration leaves behind any imposition of  law, it is no lon-
ger characterised by any anxieties regarding its perpetuation. This state 
of  emergency, which according to Kondylis is a revolutionary moment, 
suspends the rule of  law not in order to restore it later, nor to maintain 
it in the limbo of  its own suspension, but, rather, in order to practise and 
claim something entirely new—something that is written “…in memory 
of  the suffering of  humanity and not in promise of  a bright future; for 
revenge rather than eschatology.” (Faraklas 1997: 32). It is precisely this 
vengeful route that comprised the ground for the negations of  those days, 
giving the impression that if  Kondylis was still alive he would speak of  his 
famous “absolutist miracle.” A miracle that for a fraction of  a moment 
seemed real, a miracle that would not allow any return to the natural rule 
of  law but would instead set a definite break with the historical continu-
um, the history of  winners. This is the absolutist miracle for which Ben-
jamin calls when he speaks of  the true state of  emergency in his eighth 
thesis. And it is to this call that those thousands of  anonymous rebels 
seem to have responded—and sooner or later, it seems, will do so again.
In those days revenge circulated in the streets along with a re-
minder that history is not always written by the winners. That within 
the existing margins of  the glorification of  imperial achievements a 
war-fuelled discourse is born which is totally oblivious to natural law 
and enforced peace. And that right next to it, in an erratic and often 
frenzied manner, it prepares the ground for the totalitarian wonder. In 
those places and moments we were once again reminded that these out-
bursts are nothing but arrhythmias in the body of  the ever-enforced/
obligatory social peace. Visible traces in the image of  order, traces that 
loudly reveal that their peace is war, that it presupposes war and that 
this has been so since the 16th century. That peace needs to account 
for the war it produces and which is inherent to its survival. In this 
sense Foucault reversed Clausewitz’s famous aphorism and declared 
that “politics is the continuation of  war by other means”; that the po-
litical peace in which we live is war. For this reason he claimed that the 
challenge lies in identifying the “forgotten past of  real struggles, actual 
victories, and defeats which may have been disguised but which remain 
profoundly inscribed… in rediscovering the blood that has dried in the 
codes and not, therefore, the absolute right that lies beneath the tran-
sience of  history” (Foucault 2003: 15).
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The riots of  December showed that no blood was left to dry 
and they erupted as a worthy retaliation to peace’s everyday war. Re-
venge while the blood was still fresh. The very vindictive preparation 
of  the riots instantly lifted the burden of  decision and declared that it 
would allow both mourning and celebration,6 that it would allow space 
for both creation and destruction. And it hosted first and foremost in its 
illegal territory the purest—in a Benjaminian sense—form of  violence.7 
The kind of  violence that exists beyond the boundaries of  law and that 
no compromise whatsoever can be reached with it. “The proper char-
acteristic of  this violence is that it neither makes nor preserves law, but 
deposes it and thus inaugurates a new historical epoch” writes Agam-
ben (2005: 53). He then states that this violence resides outside the law, 
that is, precisely where the state of  emergency does too. It occupies a 
void area of  law that “seems, for some reason, to be so essential to the 
juridical order that it must seek in every way to assure itself  a relation 
with it, as if  in order to ground itself  the juridical order necessarily had 
to maintain itself  in relation with an anomie” (Agamben 2005: 51).
…TO THE INTERMEDIATE COMMENTARY ON THE CONCEPT               
OF THE SPATIAL
Beyond the temporal dimension of  such development, however, it is 
important to observe its very spatiality since this marginal condition 
does not only suggest a historical break or a time interval from/within 
the linear-historical account of  the winners but precipitates the unfold-
ing of  a huge range of  elements entered directly into space. And this 
is precisely what arises from the positions of  Agamben, too. For if  one 
encounters pure violence in a non-juridical space, this violence simulta-
neously occurs in a natural-material place in whose territory dominant 
law remains—even temporarily—unable to show any force whatsoever. 
And this is what is shocking in true time: the fact, that is, that the sites 
of  this violence are exempt from the legislative and administrative ter-
ritory; in other words, that they produce an unlawful space—not to 
mention that this space may be unpredictable, sudden, and therefore 
uncodifiable, occurring in the heart of  the safety of  commerce and 
“Justice” like, say, in the heart of  Kolonaki.8 Moreover, the definition of  
Agambian deduction as an extra-juridical site does not only reveal a sit-
uation unable to find its place in the syntax of  the philosophy of  law but 
also a natural or artificial space at the limits of  which this syntax cannot 
be implemented. The exception, therefore, is not only a place outside 
of  the frame of  law but also a material (three-dimensional) location out-
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side the force of  law.9 This is what the Italian philosopher emphasises 
when he speaks of  counter-laboratories of  deduction/exemption, refer-
ring to the favelas of  Latin America: highly specific, natural–artificial 
sites that inhibit the force of  law, and more specifically sites that, on the 
one hand, do not allow the police to enter but, on the other hand, are 
also not subject to the dominant property relations.10 These sites outline 
a peculiar and valuable space for present and future transgressions.
The very anomy then seems to generate its own site and ap-
pears to be placing it on the existing legal and spatial condition. It thus 
reclaims and expropriates temporary parts of  applied law/justice. The 
more that these deductions multiply, the more frequently their tem-
porary spaces occur. And, as these sites proliferate, the dominant site 
of  law disintegrates. These sites are inhabited by external entities that 
obligate suspensions of  the law and seem to be the same entities that 
make up the rugged scenery of  the jungle. The same entities that seem-
ingly manufacture and inhabit the natural condition they constantly 
fight. These martial exceptions eventually produce their own battle-
space and this space takes us once again back to the jungle. The city 
as a jungle, then, is a city that hosts many of  these exemptions but not 
the natural state. The war of  all against all is not a war between indi-
viduals but a war between groups of  people (and both Schmitt and the 
Boulaivilliers would agree on this). In particular it is a war of  groups 
against the absolute group, that is, the state. This proves that there is no 
natural condition, only a diverse and unregulated field of  political set-
ting—conflict. The city-jungle therefore is at the heart of  this field and 
appears dangerous for the dominant state of  rule in the same way that 
Hobbes would hear the inarticulate cries of  the “wild” to be danger-
ous too. If  what Foucault argues truly stands, regarding the significance 
of  war through the historic discourse from the 16th century onwards 
(which began to identify war in terms of  the pattern in battle rather 
than the controversial two-tier mechanism of  attacker/victim, winner/
loser etc. [Foucault 2003: 199]) then one has to pay tribute to the city-
jungle for the value of  such an approach. The value of  the open po-
litical process weighs above the natural condition. Where the Enemy 
Within flourishes and discipline loses its meaning. Where the city-jungle 
turns into a polis-jungle.
THE ASYLUM DENSITIES 
If  one characteristic is typical of  the jungle, this must be density. This 
characteristic is therefore worthy of  our attention in our attempt to 
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interpret and analyse the functions of  the jungle. Density was what 
was at stake in designing the city of  the Enlightenment and the crav-
ing for density paved the way for the domination of  commerce. The 
city that should allow both adequate blood circulation (read: the unim-
peded flow of  goods and people through its road arteries) and successful 
breathing (read: adequate ventilation of  buildings and the likely pres-
ence of  a green component)11 was a city primarily obliged to manage 
densities (frighteningly similar to modern calls for bio-climatic design). 
And this demand for management was recorded, as history conclusively 
proves, in a broader demand for civilian control.
The doctrine of  social control is based upon these biologi-
cal functional necessities of  breathing and blood flow. This is rather 
paradoxical, considering that the political Hobbesian demand for eter-
nal escape from the natural condition presupposed natural functional 
frameworks. And that this denial of  the natural pre-political condition 
could not ultimately be conceived outside natural, biological, or apo-
litical frameworks. The demand of  dominant urban design from the 
Enlightenment onward therefore brought a “biological” type of  war-
fare, attempting to rewrite the contract in space. And careful densities 
constituted the syntax for such a successful rewriting. This biological 
warfare had already been organised since the time of  the Victorian city 
through a moralistic campaign concerning public health, and it sub-
sequently annexed parts of  the (micro)biological discourse to displace 
their “dark” neighbourhoods spatially and their “dirty” social life politi-
cally. Official medical town planning was therefore called to organise 
obedience in territorial terms and, in so doing, to eliminate the possibil-
ity of  a territorial breach of  the social contract. Yet nights and days like 
those of  December serve to remind us how urban space was, is, and will 
remain a site of  deviation too.
The Situationists were well aware of  all of  this when they 
wrote:
if  the city’s history is the history of  freedom, it is also the history of  tyranny, 
of  state administration controlling the countryside and the city itself. The city 
has so far only managed to comprise the territory of  the historical struggle for 
freedom, not its acquisition. The city is the environment of  history because it 
comprises simultaneously both a concentration of  social power (which makes its 
historical undertaking possible) and a consciousness of  the past. (Internationale 
Situationniste 1979: 120) 
A consciousness that keeps alive the tradition of  the oppressed found in 
Benjamin’s eighth thesis, and which will explode within the uncontrol-
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lable density that hosts it. The Situationists, after all, seemed to be in 
need of  these densities for their own games and wanderings for which 
they would probably not even bother to draw psycho-geographical 
maps should they be able to use Pikermi, Pilea,12 or a French banlieue 
[suburb] as their sites of  experiment. Which brings us back to the ques-
tion of  urbanity as such. “Our field is therefore the network of  urban 
space, a natural manifestation of  collective activity that is able to un-
derstand the creative forces unleashed by the decay of  an embedded 
culture of  individualism” (ibid.: 56).
The encounter of  December’s riots with the properties of  ur-
ban densities restored for the oppressed the magical moment of  com-
mitting an offence disputing urban formation itself. The problem for 
sovereignty therefore arises when some people decide to transform the 
city from a realm of  commodity and spectacle into a public realm of  
war; from a site hosting the state relationship to a site that questions this 
very relationship. Amidst sovereignty’s desperate attempts to evacuate 
areas, to split up neighbourhoods and normalise movements, outbursts 
of  anger in memory of  the suffering of  mankind often render these 
spatial or territorial divisions useless. Consequently, in similar cases, any 
attempt to organise urban space according to security zones often re-
treats in the face of  bold threats that may have even been anticipated. 
The emergence of  the Enemy Within is spatially organised through 
the discourse about walls, about those walls that move into the heart of  
cities and which may be materialised either in the form of  ring roads 
(see the example of  the riots in the suburbs of  Paris), red zones (see the 
temporary control and exclusion zones every time the heads of  global 
domination meet) or, finally, actual physical walls (see the now-common 
blast walls of  Fallujah, Baghdad, or the West Bank). 
But what causes more outrage during such outbursts is the ne-
gation of  principal spatial segregation and any structure in the midst of  
widespread lawlessness. Even more so if  they do not enjoy the immuni-
ty of  a large-scale event but instead develop within the bounds of  their 
own singularity and produce a threatening and dangerous outstretched 
period of  lawlessness for no obvious reasons in the eyes of  the public—
as the raid of  Kolonaki13 in broad daylight aptly showed. That is, with-
out any “respect” for critical spatial or temporal pre-existing structures, 
nor for critical intangible spatial and temporal walls. Density, therefore, 
as a cover for such operations keeps alive the hope that conflict will 
inhabit cities upon the ground of  historical struggle for freedom, as a 
problem that is rather difficult for sovereignty to solve. 
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MARTIAL SURFACES…
When Schmitt attempted to demonstrate the problems introduced by 
the appearance of  the partisan on the backdrop of  20th-century war, 
he insisted on points that, along with their political specificity (how, for 
example, this strange figure would be included in the Geneva Conven-
tions of  ’49), highlighted the spatial and chronological dimensions of  
this figure’s actions. The importance of  the partisans’ arrival lies in a 
dual specificity. On the one hand, it violates the conventional limits of  
a warfare process with whatever repercussions for its inclusion in the 
dictionary of  the war and the conditions that defend it and thus for the 
partisan’s own visibility. On the other hand, it redefines the gravity of  
the subscription space, liquidating the relationship of  the subject along 
with the necessary systems of  spatial reference. The four criteria set in 
Carl Schmitt’s theory on the rebel/partisan are particularly revealing 
for the new face of  war-spatial approaches and are indicative of  a start-
ing point for the questioning of  this “unorthodox” warrior.
The elements of  non-regularity, increased mobility, growing 
political commitment and telluric character organise a discursive space 
that can only involve the spatial dimension from the very beginning 
(Schmitt 2007). Whether as a reference to strict coordinates, as static 
development for confrontation in a set territory to secure its defence 
or as a foundational process of  motion and laceration/rupture, these 
criteria highlight the role of  space; the importance that its strategy has 
always yielded. However, they soon shine upon it, and, in a manner 
that recalls a series of  signs reminiscent of  the fact that space had been 
crumbled through the lens of  relativity, we can no longer speak in the 
same terms for the space of  Sun Tzu and Clausewitz. Since, as Schmitt 
argues, a new dimension has been added through the rebel/partisan: 
the dimension of  depth. A dimension articulated in space either, for 
example, through the underground burrows of  the rebels in Kabul or 
through the vertical integration of  (micro-)war taking place in the lim-
ited territory of  a single building in Palestine. Something that points 
ultimately to the role of  the vertical dimension in the outcome of  mod-
ern military operations, something that caused Eyal Weizman (2002) to 
claim that geopolitics was traditionally a horizontal plane discourse (a 
flat discourse), a discourse that omits the vertical dimension. Inside the 
importance of  this escape, its geopolitics no longer holds the perceptual 
flexibility that would offer the possibility of  a complete mapping of  the 
skyline of  the future complex and flexible urban conflict, a mapping 
that will include the third dimension and therefore cannot be reduced 
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to a two-dimensional reality. One that is reduced, that is, to figurative 
surfaces incapable of  delivering the very decisive concept of  depth.
Holding in mind the position that the concept of  space tends 
to enjoy in such approaches then creates the impression that Schmitt’s 
four “tools” ultimately illustrate not only the profile of  a rebel, and 
therefore an idiom within strict space-time framework of  a military pro-
cess, but also a critical technical decryption of  contemporary urban 
phenomena, if  not the one and only “Survival Guide” in the city of  
flows and networks.
Such a theory recalls the notorious figure of  the war machine 
as composed by Deleuze and Guattari in their essay on nomadology, 
which in turn also yields a prominent position in the dimension of  
space. Yet it is recalled paradoxically, since while the rebel in Schmitt 
resides in an embossed area, one that is particularly dense, organised in 
particular via tensions in terms of  depth and verticality, Deleuze and 
Guattari imagine their own irregular war machine to slide in a smooth 
horizontal non-metric space (a smooth space) like the desert, the steppe 
or the sea (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 32–34, 59–62).
In any case, this random individual or collective confronta-
tional entity restores the Foucauldian position on the importance of  
the process of  a battle/confrontation and, in a very heavy symbolism 
of  the word battle, the concept of  density is seen for the oppressed as 
a key regulator for its successful outcome. Schmitt’s horror in the face 
of  the organised emergence of  a collective subject competing with the 
state forced him to illuminate perhaps the most competitive of  them 
all, that of  the partisan. And he led the drafting of  his theory, giving 
him an honorary (for the partisan, not for Schmitt himself) attribute of  
the concept of  interference in the political—that is, the intervention in 
the Friend/Enemy distinction (Schmitt 1996). This intervention has to 
do with the unorthodox partisan features that offer from the outset the 
option not to be visibly involved in the relationship between Friend/En-
emy, within the political relationship par excellence: to remain, there-
fore, within a non-codifiable yet political sphere.14 And, respectively, 
allowing it to construct a fluid space, using the density, installing tempo-
rary lawless zones like those in December, putting sites briefly outside 
law and ultimately making an equally critical interference in the con-
cept of  the Spatial. And this is of  the utmost importance: the fact that 
the interference in the concept of  the political can only be conditional 
and eventually lead to a corresponding sense of  interfering with the 
concept of  the spatial. For this reason both space and the physical pres-
ence within it will continue to assert their sense of  conflict in the fluid 
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and impersonal conditions of  virtual networks of  information.
“The relativity of  space,” writes Doreen Massey,
…with the opening means that the space always contains an unexpected degree, 
unpredictable. So, apart from the edges that do not meet, the place always 
involves an element of  ‘chaos’ (not specified by the system). This is a ‘mess’ 
created by those accidental confrontations, those random separations, the often 
paradoxical nature of  geographical formations in which some special orbits 
intertwine, and sometimes interact. The space, in other words, is inherently 
‘cleft.’ Perhaps, above all, given the prevailing attitudes, the space is not surface. 
(2001: 34)
It therefore makes sense for someone to insist on a focus on this 
negativity. Space is not a surface (as illustrated by Weizman) because 
the city is not the seat of  the contract alone. Space is discontinuities, 
gaps, but above all, it is the very relationships that it hosts and the 
“chaos” resulting from them. Urban densities indicate that they give 
space to relationships that do not fit the terms of  the social contract 
and for this reason they have been fought historically and continue to 
be so. And they seem to create their own system of  law; some system 
that has long ago cut its ties to the natural documentation but is in no 
case Singular. It is a multiple law of  conflict and encounter and, in this 
sense, a concept of  law that is constantly under question and mutation. 
And, within the infinity of  this property, the densities in question are of  
unique value for the oppressed. Because these densities are where “ex-
ception” eventually finds refuge; where possibility is given to “minor-
ity” sexual preferences to manifest themselves, to criminals of  all types 
to structure their own public sphere and to political spaces to establish 
their own sacrosanct arenas.
… AND THE EXTREME URBAN MAKEOVER
This is the city-jungle that frightens. And in the face of  this fear the 
bulldozer often takes charge. Either through normalising non-benefi-
cial and non-productive conceptually empty territories in Eleonas,15 in 
the colonial logic of  commercial gain, or through destroying buildings 
thanks to the unique ability of  armoured D-9 vehicles (as in the refugee 
camp of  Jenin) or simply by demolishing hubs of  political resistance 
(see the recent example of  the Ungdomshuset squat in Copenhagen). 
The remnants of  these operations often show us that this destruction 
was in itself  the aim, rather than a means to implement a plan (as the 
rubble of  the demolished occupation Santa Barbara squat in Patisia, 
Athens, will remind us for some time to come). Urban destruction is 
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after all a nodal point of  urban redesigning within the framework of  
urban gentrifications and is always of  crucial importance to geopolitical 
development. Conceiving this importance, the Modernist Movement 
in the iron grip of  Le Corbusier testified—right between the two world 
wars—to its own proposals for the defensive deadlock that the war of  
nation-states carried with it. Again, density comprised the navigator of  
modern designs. Rare densities therefore came as a defence along with 
tall buildings that would enable cities between the two world wars to 
limit their losses in a potential bombing (Graham 2004: 38–41). Tight 
medieval urban densities, therefore looking vulnerable in face of  the 
iron death that came from the sky, had to be levelled. A process that 
simply revoked the importance of  geopolitical factors in the business 
of  urban redesign and confirmed in its own way the leading role that 
densities hold in this undertaking.
Baron Haussmann, the famous demolition artist, seemed to 
understand this as early as the mid-19th century, and so the first thing 
he attempted was the management of  densities. These were the densi-
ties that hosted the Enemy Within in the heart of  Paris and had to mu-
tate. The defensive deadlock they caused did not concern the potential 
development of  an external war at this time but an internal one. Or 
more precisely, they concerned a strictly civil war, right in the body of  
the city. “The real aim of  Haussmann’s works was the securing of  the 
city against civil war.”16 The unique protection sought first and fore-
most to inscribe itself  upon space. The straight and extremely wide 
avenues that were opened up to cross over and through urban densities, 
to install permanent axes of  control, eventually both settled the im-
possibility of  the construction of  a barricade and made direct military 
intervention all the more possible. Not accidentally, this urban renewal 
effort, with its political roots and extravagant spectacles, was dubbed 
“strategic gentrification.”17 
This is an oxymoron schema which in a way does justice to 
Foucault’s position, namely that war is inherent to peace and the law 
that is born amidst the wrecks of  demolished towns. A schema that 
shows how urban renewal is often an urban war at heart. The Com-
munards of  1871, in defiance of  this position, attempted to prevent the 
declaration (to cause, in Benjamin’s terms, the real state of  emergency 
and to build their own double-decker barricades) in the hope that this 
war would end with them rising as the victors in the diverse urban ter-
rain. Ever since, every such outburst in any part of  the world attaches 
to this war the historical significance to which it corresponds. Perhaps 
eventually these martial exceptions produce their own space: a novel 
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contribution to the concept of  participatory planning. As Mike Davis 
has pointed out,18 perhaps vandalism is ultimately a true production of  
space. A bizarre production that claims its share in urban design and 
which understands the city as an unfinished work of  art, as the site of  
relationships in continuous conflict, as a disputable historical object. 
In response to the events of  the Commune, Walter Benjamin (2003b: 
25) ultimately reached the conclusion that “the burning of  Paris is an 
apt end to the devastating work of  Baron Haussmann.” It remains to 
be seen whether the burning of  Greek cities in December was indeed 
an ending and to whose “devastating work” it would deserve to be so.
Christos Filippidis, May 2009
NOTES
1 A Greek version of  this article first appeared in the Athens-based magazine 
Hooliganizater.
2 See the political tradition accommodated in Thomas Hobbes’s book Leviathan, or 
the Matter, Forme and Power of  a Common Wealth Ecclesiastical and Civil.
3 Karatzaferis is the leader of  the ultra-nationalist far-right parliamentary party LA.OS.
4 See Löwy 2005: 57.
5 Kondylis is the translator of  Schmitt’s Political Theology into Greek. His translation 
includes an extended postscript commenting on Schmitt’s analysis. 
6 See the chapter “Feast, mourning, anomie” in Agamben (2005).
7 “[I]f  beyond droit, violence sees its status insured as pure and immediate violence, 
then this will prove that revolutionary violence is possible…” (Benjamin 2004: 300).
8 Translator’s note: Kolonaki is the most bourgeois neighbourhood in central Athens.
9 We are also reminded of  this double meaning via the term “extraterritoriality,” 
etymologically deriving from outside (beyond) jurisdiction. This could mean either 
non-conforming to the law of  a given authority, or (and here the importance of  the 
term shines through) the absence of  limits within which this authority actually exists. 
Clearly however, the term under scrutiny here can mean, in both its component words 
(extra-territoriality), an exceptional territorial condition. Spatial metaphors during 
the symbolic-juridical formulation of  the limit become strict territorial inscriptions. 
Similarly, the appeal to a notional-juridical site that will host the exception can only 
follow the literal application of  the suspension of  the rule in an entirely specific physical 
and material place. 
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10 See the conversation between Giorgio Agamben and Zygmunt Bauman at the 
conference Archipelago of  Exception Sovereignties of  Extraterritorialities, Centre 
for Contemporary Culture in Barcelona, 10–11 November 2005, available online at 
http://roundtable.kein.org/node/385.
11 For the biological-natural equivalents of  urban functions, see primarily the chapter 
“The body set free” in Sennett 1994.
12 Remote suburbs of  Greater Athens and Greater Thessaloniki respectively.
13 In March 2009, a group of  anarchists went on a rampage in the area, destroying 
luxurious shopfronts and cars.
14 Schmitt’s theory of  the partisan and the notion of  nomadology in Deleuze and 
Guattari could both be read, after all, as theories of  an asymmetrical warfare—in 
the sense that they describe an entity that cannot be codified, that does not conform 
to common rules of  combat and that is therefore not predictable. The elements that 
Schmitt focuses on in examining the partisan reveal the problem arising when he ignores 
the dictionary of  war—and by extension, the terms of  codification and recognition 
of  the partisan’s martial presence. Similarly Deleuze and Guattari describe a martial 
collective figure that has the exceptional ability of  adjusting to any given conditions and 
of  constantly redefining the terms under which it will negotiate and clash with them.
15 Translator’s note: Eleonas is a vast area of  approximately 9,000 m2 in Athens, mostly 
unused at present and the subject of  a great deal of  speculation regarding its possible 
development as a sports ground or commercial site in the near future. 
16 Walter Benjamin “Paris, Capital of  the 19th Century” available online at http://
www.newleftreview.org/?view=134.
17 Benjamin, as above.
18 “If  you wanted to generate a theory of  participatory architecture or urbanism, 
vandalism seemed to be the most common and popular form of  participating in 
the built environment.” See the interview “Resisting, subverting and destroying the 
apparatus of  surveillance and control” with Mike Davis, on the Occupied London 
website. Available at http://www.occupiedlondon.org/davis/.
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What grounds gave birth to December’s revolt and most importantly, 
what new grounds has the revolt given birth to in return? The political 
background of  the events of  those days and their repercussions are dis-
cussed extensively in the next part of  this book.2 What we have tried to 
do here is to take a look at the actual, physical grounds of  the uprising 
and its legacies—to read it, that is, through its inscription in the urban 
space of  the city of  Athens. To look at urban struggles in new sites of  
confrontation that have opened up there since; everyday reminders that 
December lives. 
But why is the site of  the uprising important and why should we 
concern ourselves with its spatial legacies? It is easy enough to answer 
this question—after all, the spontaneous gathering of  thousands at the 
scene of  the police killing in the neighbourhood and the reverberation 
of  the protests across Greece and around the globe were driven by two 
main factors. First, the near-instant spread of  the news of  the police 
killing was made possible by grassroots media and particularly by inde-
pendent media websites;3 only hours after the assassination, impromptu 
demonstrations began taking place in dozens of  cities inside and out-
side of  Greece. Second, though, and perhaps most importantly, there 
was the political symbolism associated with the location of  the murder 
of  Alexis Grigoropoulos. Exarcheia is adjacent to the Athens Polytech-
nic, the epicentre of  the anti-dictatorial student uprising of  1973 and 
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the place where acts of  political dissent and unrest in the country’s post-
dictatorial era (1974–present) have been centred since. The site of  the 
ignition of  the revolt was equally important to the breathtaking speed 
with which it spread.
The December uprising quickly became the focal point for an 
emerging radical movement. At the same time, it also became a refer-
ence point for both state authorities and reactionary non-state actors. 
Both have reconfigured their strategies in the process of  confronting 
an empowered and confident radical social movement in the country. 
Beginning in the immediate post-revolt period (from early 2009 on-
ward) the two sides in December’s conflict have produced new relation-
ships to public space as expressions of  their own political identities and 
strategies. These new urban spatial practices are the main subject of  
our chapter. More precisely we consider the socio-spatial dynamics of  
two urban sites that emerged in Athens in the aftermath of  the 2008 
uprising: one, the self-organised Navarinou Park, born in March 2009 
in Exarcheia; and two, the Ayios Panteleimonas Square, only a few ki-
lometres away. Members of  the neo-Nazi group Chrysi Avgi (Golden 
Dawn) have been attempting to establish since May 2009 a “migrant-
free” zone in explicit cooperation with the police force permanently 
stationed in the area.
The conflicts at these small urban sites can only be seen as de-
riving from and at the same time reflecting wider social dynamics. We 
offer some thoughts on these two examples in the context of  what has 
become an important current within social struggles in the metropolises 
of  the West, including segments of  the “social antagonist movement,” 
within which we place ourselves. We are talking about struggles for “the 
right to the city” (RtC): by placing our two examples alongside both 
contemporary debates about the RtC and the original conception by 
Henri Lefebvre we suggest that these place-specific struggles can help 
us rethink the “right to the city” altogether.
A SANDBOX OF FREEDOM 
On the morning of  7 March 2009, a mass of  people armed with shovels 
and plants marched through the central Athens district of  Exarcheia. 
They were heading for an abandoned parking lot just a few yards from 
where Alexandros Grigoropoulos was murdered. Breaking the asphalt 
surface of  the lot, they quickly replaced it with plants. In the digging 
and planting that followed, the first self-organised park of  central Ath-
ens was born thanks to the combined efforts of  experienced activists, 
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new activists politicized during the events of  December, and “ordinary” 
local residents. But these are no ordinary times and this is most cer-
tainly not an ordinary neighbourhood: Exarcheia has a long radical tra-
dition, partly due to the presence of  the Athens Polytechnic and some 
premises of  the University of  Athens in its vicinity. Relatively cheap 
housing has historically allowed students, intellectuals, radical political 
groups, bookshops, and affordable eateries to thrive in the area. As the 
centre of  the city’s intellectual and political activity, the neighbourhood 
has long been a hotbed of  radical action too. For the greater part of  the 
country’s post-dictatorial era both media and popular discourses have 
characterized Exarcheia as the heart of  anarchist activity in Athens. 
In the coverage of  the events of  December 2008 alone, Exarcheia was 
portrayed as anything from a “volatile district”4 and an area that “an-
archists regard as their fortress,”5 to “Athens’s answer to Harlem”6 and 
even a “ghetto.”7 
Yet for all the area’s history and potential, it was not until after 
December 2008 that the Exarcheiots would dare attempt such a bold 
appropriation of  public space, transforming it into a meeting point for 
the people of  the neighbourhood—green and public space of  a kind 
notoriously lacking in Greek cities. The park’s organising assembly (a 
loose but regular gathering of  people interested in running the space) 
explicitly traces its origin to December’s uprising. People in the area 
often call the park “December’s park,” not only because it is close 
to the point where Grigoropoulos was assassinated, but also because 
the park would not have been born without the collective empower-
ment and confidence gained for radical activities in the aftermath of  
the revolt. Since March 2009, this experiment in freedom has seen a 
wide variety of  local residents, individuals, and various radical politi-
cal groups (many of  whom played a key role in the December events) 
come together, overcome long-standing sectarian divisions, and use the 
new space for concerts, film screenings, meetings and info-nights, exhi-
bitions and festivals. The open-air space has provided unprecedented 
visibility for many political groups: for example, the curious onlooker 
can stop and take a peek at the regular public screenings organised by 
the Haunt of  Albanian Migrants, whose declaration of  participation in 
the uprising was exemplary of  December’s spirit.8 Besides such public 
events, people continue to gather almost weekly in order to carry out 
the work necessary for the maintenance of  the park, which has also 
received positive coverage in some mainstream media.9 
One year after the uprising, the “Self-Organised Navarinou 
Park” hosted a three-day event about the revolt. Similarly, several other 
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December-related protests, like the demonstrations in solidarity with the 
hunger-striker Iliopoulos (arrested in December 2008) started or ended 
there. This little park has become a new base of  struggle for post-De-
cember grassroots political activities in Exarcheia and beyond. It is not 
surprising, then, that it has itself  become an object of  struggle: in the 
eyes of  the authorities the park is an emblematic child of  December, 
which continues to inspire various anti-authoritarian activities and must 
therefore be suppressed. In the first twelve months of  its existence alone, 
the park had already claimed at least three major police raids (under 
both the conservative Nea Dimokratia government and, since their as-
cent to power in October 2009, the social democrats of  PASOK). Dur-
ing these raids, police in full riot gear stormed the park and arrested and 
beat those who happened to be there at the time. Merely being present 
in the park has become a political act—and a punishable one at that. 
WHEN THE NAZIS CAME TO THE SQUARE 
This direct and violent suppression of  the Navarinou Park coincided 
with the emergence of  another space operating on completely anti-
thetical principles. In May 2009, a mere two kilometres away in the 
neighbourhood of  Ayios Panteleimonas, members of  the neo-Nazi 
group Golden Dawn—along with right-wing populist partners—start-
ed visibly organising.10 The area, which together with Exarcheia stands 
among the most centrally located residential zones of  Athens, had seen 
a recent influx of  migrants—many of  Afghan origin. Most ended up 
there after having been pushed out of  the more tourist-oriented cen-
tral areas of  the city by police “cleansing” operations in the lead-up to 
the 2004 Olympics. Anything deemed “dirty” by authorities, from stray 
dogs to undocumented or homeless migrants, street vendors, and drug 
users, was to be eliminated from public view. 
Four years after the Olympic spectacle, neo-Nazis hijacked the 
area’s so-called “local resident committee,” an organisation that had 
been founded sometime earlier by residents of  various political back-
grounds. But this political diversity was soon pushed out as neo-Nazis—
many living in other areas of  the city—took control as of  November 
2008. It was at that time that they organised their first protests against 
what they claimed was the supposed occupation of  their neighbour-
hood by clandestine migrants. Gathering at the Ayios Panteleimonas 
Square, the neo-Nazis argued that migrants without papers, the recent 
riots, self-organised parks, and all such things disorderly had to be con-
fronted directly by so-called ordinary citizens. Members of  Golden 
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Dawn envision a system of  authoritarian rule that would make urban 
areas “ethnically and politically clean” through mass deportations of  
migrants and other means. Their aim was to rid the area of  “undesir-
ables,” particularly the migrants who had found refuge there after the 
Olympic pogroms of  2004. What the Nazis lacked in numbers they 
quickly made up in support from authorities. Police-backed Nazi patrols 
ensured that the square’s playground was locked up in order to prevent 
migrants’ children from using it. A local church—located by the square 
itself—was forced to stop providing free meals to local migrants out of  
fear after direct neo-Nazi threats against the church’s head priest.
On 26 May 2009, “persons unknown” set fire to the church’s 
basement, where the priest had been offering shelter to homeless mi-
grants. Weeks later, a parent who tried to break the siege of  the play-
ground along with his five-year-old son was physically attacked by 
neo-Nazis; police arrested the parent for “provocative behaviour” and 
detained him for hours in the local police department, which was be-
sieged by a mob of  a few dozen members of  the “Ayios Panteleimo-
nas Resident Committee” who threatened to lynch him. Throughout 
the summer of  2009 a number of  anti-fascist demonstrations entered 
the square and temporarily opened up the playground only to be tear-
gassed and pushed back by police units. In July 2009, the then-Vice-
Minister of  Public Order Christos Markoyannakis visited the square 
and met with the neo-Nazi-led resident committee—never hiding his 
sympathy for their extreme right-wing politics. Only minutes after the 
meeting ended, a small group of  neo-Nazis left the square and headed 
for the nearby Villa Amalias squat only to be outnumbered and chased 
away by those defending one of  Athens’s oldest squatted buildings. 
At the time of  this writing (late 2010), the square is still ef-
fectively under neo-Nazi control. The playground is locked up, the 
“Ayios Panteleimonas Resident Committee” still organises its own anti-
migrant patrols, and riot police units are still permanently stationed 
by the square to provide assistance in preserving their authoritarian 
rule. Throughout the past year, stories have surfaced in mainstream 
media about ruthless attacks on migrants in the neighbourhood. In late 
August 2009, a local Afghan shopkeeper was forced to close his café 
early in the evening “so that migrants would not mingle around it.” 
The police have refused to take testimonies from migrants who have 
been assaulted.11 The soothing words of  the then-social-democratic 
Minister of  Citizen Protection12 (who called the situation around Ayios 
Panteleimonas Square “scary” in October 2009) have not been accom-
panied by any concrete changes on the ground.
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Contrary to the relatively unchanged situation in Ayios Pan-
teleimonas, the Exarcheia neighbourhood quickly felt in its bone the 
rise of  the social-democratic PASOK government in October 2009. 
From the government’s second day in power, the area was besieged by 
police. The new government’s intention became evident not only in 
the repeated raids on the Navarinou Park but also—and especially—in 
the daily siege of  the entire neighbourhood in those days: restrictions 
on the free flow of  people in and out, constant ID checks of  passers-
by, random detentions, forced detouring of  people, etc. Yet the most 
important aspect of  the Exarcheia operations after PASOK’s rise to 
power has been played out at the level of  representation. One only has 
to take a glimpse at mass media coverage of  these operations to realise 
that the new government sought to simultaneously occupy the physical 
and representational space of  the neighbourhood. 
Bolstered by these media distortions, the new government took 
things as far as claiming that Exarcheia was en route to becoming a 
“Greek Montmartre”13 (as then Deputy Minister of  Citizen Protection 
Spyros Vougias had put it). Its interventions in Exarcheia were intended 
to demonstrate a capacity to enforce order and a containment of  the ri-
otous spirit of  December 2008. This representational project has been 
aimed at two target audiences: one, a conservative segment that was to 
appreciate the state’s show of  force in the physical presence of  police 
on the streets of  this famously unruly neighbourhood; and two, the 
anarchist and leftist activists who, according to media representations, 
concentrate themselves exclusively in Exarcheia. The idea, it seems, has 
been to reassure the conservative parts of  society by intimidating those 
who would dare to continue to resist after December.
THE RIGHT TO THE CITY
State repression aside, what is it that remains of  an urban uprising af-
ter the dust settles? What can the cases of  Navarinou Park and the 
square of  Ayios Panteleimonas tell us about the articulation of  an up-
rising’s legacy through the new and more permanent sites of  political 
confrontation it produces? And how do the emergent spatial practices 
in post-revolt Athens fit into the broader legacy of  uprisings and riots in 
European and American cities more generally? 
These questions must be approached in the context of  a more 
generic one—namely: what is the potential of  violent crowds to become 
agents of  change and what might spatial practices linked with this po-
tential social change look like today? This is a question that has been re-
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peatedly posed by historians, from Eric Hobsbawm’s (1965) descriptions 
of  the “pre-political” urban mobs of  medieval cities to E.P. Thompson’s 
analysis of  the “moral economy” of  crowds in 18th century. A major 
turning point in the “revolutionary” potential of  such crowd action oc-
curred between the French Revolution of  1789 and the Paris Commune 
of  1871. And yet, at the dawn of  the era of  bourgeois democracy and 
industrial production, violent crowd action found itself  out-manoeuvred 
by urban design (e.g. the so-called “Hausmannization” of  Paris as the 
prototype for social control through urban planning),14 outdated by 
changes in social stratification, with the crowd’s spontaneity being “in-
compatible with the long-lasting solidarities” (Hobsbawm 1965: 124) of  
the then-emergent working class. It found itself  outmoded by the sup-
posed evolution of  political representation since bourgeois democracy 
was widely considered to be “both an improved substitute for violence 
and altogether incompatible with any form of  violence” (Moore 1968: 
1). For all these reasons you could have expected city mobs, violent 
crowds, and urban riots to have all but vanished: it was for these reasons, 
in fact, that Hobsbawm had announced their “passing.” (1965: 124).
But in the last decades of  the 20th century this idyllic image 
of  First World urban politics has been “shattered by spectacular out-
bursts of  public unrest, rising ethnic tensions, and mounting destitu-
tion and distress at the heart of  large cities” (Wacquant 2008: 18). The 
examples are many: acts of  urban rioting have taken place in numer-
ous metropolises including Paris (1968); Brixton, London (1981); Los 
Angeles (1992); Bradford, Leeds, and Oldham in the north of  England 
(2001); and more recently Paris (2005) and, of  course, Athens (2008). 
Academic efforts to grapple with this most recent upsurge of  urban 
rioting have focused on the structural causes underlying each instance. 
These range, for example, from the perceived social policy failures that 
led to the French suburban uprisings of  2005, (see for example Dikeç 
2007), to the interracial tensions that erupted into a string of  urban 
riots in the north of  England in 2001 (See Amin 2003 and Bagguley 
and Hussain 2008) and the long-standing animosity between police 
and members of  the black community that served as backdrop to the 
outpouring of  violence in Los Angeles in 1992 (see Baldassare 2004 
and Jacobs 2000). The dominant approach has been to read acts of  
rioting primarily as responses to particular structural injustices and to 
focus on operations aimed at preventing their re-emergence. But there 
are reasons to think that another perspective, more attuned to spatial 
dynamics, might provide important insights about the legacies of  ur-
ban riots and revolts.
CHAPTER FOUR: DECEMBER’S LEGACIES
REVOLT AND CRISIS IN GREECE
84
Consider Manuel Castells’s reading of  the string of  urban riots 
in the US of  the 1960s as a form of  urban social movement, with partici-
pants claiming the right to occupy and re-use certain urban spaces (the 
black ghettos) for their own purposes as a key “organizational basis of  
the revolt” (Castells 1983: 53). Individuals and collectivities participating 
in urban riots for this purpose might then be understood to be making 
a claim to a “right to the city” which, in Lefebvre’s original conception, 
was a call for “a radical restructuring of  social, political, and economic 
relations, both in the city and beyond” (Lefebvre 1996: 34). This original 
conception of  the right involved the capacity to access urban services, 
but also considered a “right to appropriation”—that is, inhabitants’ right 
“to physically access, occupy, and use urban space” (Purcell 2002: 103).
It is in this conception of  the “right to the city” that a fun-
damental political and material-spatial difference between Navarinou 
Park and Ayios Panteleimonas Square can be seen. First of  all, the Na-
zis who physically occupied the square lacked the explicit legacy of  re-
volt that animated the occupation of  Navarinou Park. The Nazis were 
simply reacting to the December event and its legacies, creating a field 
of  artificial social tension in an effort to manifest their limited spatial 
and political presence in a city that was briefly overcome by anti-au-
thoritarian revolt. However, and more importantly, the people of  Nava-
rinou Park had the power and the will to access, occupy, and radically 
alter the actual materiality of  the former parking lot: they tore apart 
the asphalt, planted trees, painted the walls, transformed building walls 
into cinema screens, and threw away metal and plastic fences. In short, 
the people involved in Navarinou Park turned the site into a lived space, 
organically integrated into the life of  Exarcheia while at the same time 
reflecting and affecting political developments in the country. On the 
other hand, by preventing migrants and anti-Nazi inhabitants from be-
ing in the square and using the playground, the Nazis in Ayios Pan-
teleimonas altered none of  the established materialities of  the square’s 
space. This was because they lacked the social legitimacy and power 
that the revolt offered to the Navarinou Park people and because, to-
gether with government forces, they concentrated exclusively on the 
politics of  representation and symbolism rather than on the politics of  
lived urban space. The most that the authoritarian occupiers of  Ayios 
Panteleimonas can stand for is the fragmented and local right of  Greeks 
to use the square as opposed to foreigners, establishing a regime of  fear 
and violent discrimination: a single-issue politics materialised with a 
very passive and limited spatial practice—that is, closure and fencing of  
the site where they want to root their explicit political project. 
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In contrast, the Navarinou Park project has reached beyond 
the representations of  what can be achieved without the intervention 
of  the state and when people self-organise. It is a spatial-material legacy 
of  the revolt but it is now also a lived everyday space with a constant 
flow of  people and events. Integrated within a broader framework of  
post-revolt political potential in Greece, it is open both socially and spa-
tially to the transformations in Athens after the uprising. This becomes 
clear in light of  the most recent police raid on the park that took place 
in April 2010, only days before the loan agreement between the Greek 
government and the International Monetary Fund, the European Cen-
tral Bank, and the European Union.15 
In December 2008, popular consent for the post-dictatorial 
political settlement broke down rapidly and spectacularly, bringing a 
simmering political crisis to boil; at its core was a rapidly fading faith in 
the political legitimacy of  the Greek state and its apparatuses. Since the 
December revolt the Greek state has been confronted with some very 
tangible ruptures. Several segments of  the population have emerged 
from December more confident about the potential of  their own po-
litical identities and projects, which have a strong anti-state and anti-
authoritarian character. Many of  these post-December political sub-
jects were brought together through the Navarinou Park occupation. 
While this site may be a relatively minor instance of  urban reclamation, 
it nevertheless represents a significant resistance-scape16 that poses a 
tangible danger for the Greek authorities and their political crisis (now 
presented as a fiscal one) because of  its potential to evolve into a much 
broader escalation by some of  the most progressive and militant ele-
ments of  society. 
Governance in the post-dictatorial period has alternated between 
the two main political parties, which have bred nepotism, large-scale 
corruption, and enabled the domination of  the political landscape by a 
small number of  families. The shifting of  attention to narrow financial-
administrative issues in the current moment can be read as an attempt 
by political elites to distract attention from this long-standing political 
crisis that was expressed so dramatically in the December revolt. Since 
October 2009, when PASOK came to power, an attempt has been made 
to create a war-like atmosphere of  financial emergency. The state has 
exploited this sense of  crisis to characterize protests, strikes, occupations, 
and similar actions as being not only opposed to the government and 
financial elites, but also to some imaginary common (“national”) good. 
On the night of  April 12, 2010—one day after arranging the 
details of  a major loan from the IMF, the ECB, and the EU (the so-
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called Troika, see Glossary)—Greek authorities sent hundreds of  police 
special forces to raid the Navarinou Park where they beat up and de-
tained more than seventy people. Because of  its potential as a base from 
which the new policies and measures related to the Government-Troika 
deal could be opposed, the very first target the Greek state chose was the 
park. What defines the park is that it openly questions the consent that 
Greek authorities—along with the Troika—request from large segments 
of  the society to work more, to be paid less and to come under increased 
surveillance. The park shows the possibilities of  spatialising resistance 
and the potential of  a radical conception of  the “right to the city.”
While many urban political groups from the left have invoked a 
version of  this right to the city, the term has too often been mobilized in 
precisely the ways that Lefebvre would have warned against—that is, in 
the terms of  single-issue politics. Even worse, the “right to the city” has 
at times signalled a narrowing of  political forms from the global and 
national to the regional (specifically, the urban) arena—or even as an 
imagined exit from the milieu of  politics altogether. In this sense Mark 
Purcell is quite right to point out that the right to the city has often 
been misinterpreted to describe groups applying “fragmented, tactical, 
or piecemeal resistance” (Purcell 2002: 101). Citizen groups looking to 
create more green spaces in their neighbourhood, for example, could 
do so in the name of  a common good and as an act that is apparently 
not political, since it does not seem to produce any immediate political 
confrontation. Surely everyone is in favour of  planting a tree! 
Indeed, there are good examples today in which to see both the 
pitfalls and the potential of  claims to the right to the city. For example, 
Critical Mass bike rides are seen by some of  their participants as little 
more than a means to carve out space for bicycles to share the road with 
other vehicles: the right for yet another transport vehicle (the bicycle) to 
exist side-by-side with the emblematic vehicle of  capitalist culture, the 
car. But this reading misses how these mass demonstrations can func-
tion as a challenge to the culture of  capitalism. Within a broader politi-
cal framework, the Critical Mass ride might serve as a key challenge to 
the legitimacy of  an icon of  capitalist culture: the socially isolating and 
environmentally destructive car and its capacity to provide the capital-
ist system with constant and speedy flows of  people and commodities. 
Critical Mass rides—by the sheer volume of  their participants, their 
slowed-down pace, and their attack on the individuality imposed by 
car transportation—challenge inherent and fundamental elements of  
capitalism and hierarchy more than many traditional demonstrations 
ever manage to do.
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As we saw in the example of  Navarinou Park the “right to the 
city” is not about rights, and it is not about cities; at least, it is not ex-
clusively about either. If  fragmented and narrowly understood “rights” 
were this concept’s only criteria, then the Nazis’ claim for the exclusive 
right of  Greek citizens to access and use of  the square and the play-
ground might also qualify. The Navarinou Park version of  the right to 
the city is much closer to more radical conceptions of  a “collective hu-
man right” that have, according to David Harvey, emerged throughout 
history as responses to the fact that most notions of  human rights “do not 
fundamentally challenge hegemonic liberal and neoliberal market log-
ics, or the dominant modes of  legality and state action” (Harvey 2008).
What has been happening in Athens since December 2008, 
then, is an attempt by some of  the participants in the December up-
rising to make their own claim to the city, and through this process to 
subvert the authority of  the state over everyday life and to experience 
an unmediated and unobstructed fulfilment of  their needs and desires. 
This is no small order and, for this reason, the authorities’ crackdown 
on these spaces should come as no surprise. After all, it is there, outside 
the margins set by authority, that the legacy of  the 2008 revolt can be 
fought for and where it can be materialized on an everyday level.
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In mid-December 2008, a teacher from Athens narrated the following 
incident: a few days before, her nine-year-old son had come home from 
school and asked her if  she knew how to make a Molotov cocktail. The 
woman was surprised, but wanted to tease him so she asked him if  he 
knew how. The boy replied that he did and started describing the pro-
cess with confidence: 
“You take a bottle of  beer,” the boy explained.
“Why not a bottle for orange juice?” his mother asked. 
“No, no! It must be a bottle of  beer; you drink the beer first and 
then fill the bottle with petrol, you put a piece of  cloth on the top and 
you light up the cloth and throw it.”
Although some readers may be surprised to hear of  a nine-
year-old kid accurately describing how to make a petrol bomb, the 
fact is that this story is indicative of  the diffusion of  political images 
and imagination across entire generations, including the very young, 
in recent Greek history. Many of  the kids who familiarised themselves 
with these radical discourses and imaginations sooner or later helped 
to form or participated actively in the recent political movements in 
the country. Three high school and university students’ movements in 
the last twenty years (1990–1991, 1998–2000, 2006–2007) confirm this 
radicalization of  teenagers and people in their early twenties. Further-
more, the December 2008 events comprise a further confirmation, as 
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students—who saw their peer being shot—made up the main body of  
the revolt. 
There are various ways that one can conceptualize the social 
activism of  young people in Greece today. For example, one could 
argue that it reflects the level of  politicization of  the rest of  society. 
This is a politicization that is linked with recent history: the civil war 
(1946–1949) of  two generations ago was followed by several decades of  
police-state oppression and pogroms against the defeated left, and of  
course there was the military junta (1967–1974), all of  which have left 
a mark on the personal and family histories of  most people in Greece. 
However, despite the historical continuities that we should take into 
account, we have to state clearly that the radicalization of  the youth 
during the post-dictatorial period is very particular and takes on a dif-
ferent character in the post-1990s period. Although this period signifies 
the longest-lasting parliamentary regime in Greek history, there has also 
been a large concentration of  social movements, coinciding with the 
introduction of  neoliberalism in the country.
In this article we hope to demonstrate that this “restored” Greek 
parliamentary democracy could not afford to allow acts of  disobedience 
or protest against its own ills and the ills which it inherited. The line of  
argument they have used against the young protesters is that those who 
have revolted and protested against the supposedly democratic state do 
not have the right to do so as they have no legitimate reason for protest. 
Especially the youth has been represented and criticized as the “lucky 
generation,” living in a free society, in a “Europeanised” and fully mod-
ernised polity with social provisions, etc. Furthermore, according to 
some public commentators, the youth of  the post-dictatorial period  is 
the first generation to live in affluence in comparison to their parents’ 
generation. This discourse was very popular amongst the reactionary 
journalists and academics in December 2008. They emphasised that 
Alexis was a private school kid, coming from relatively wealthy, middle-
class parents.1 This argument about wealthy kids revolting for fun has 
been used repeatedly against the youth who have chosen a radical and 
often violent way of  resisting the authorities. Without fetishising the 
lower economic classes, one should notice that actually not a word was 
spoken about those kids who spread the rebellion to the poor, working-
class suburbs of  Athens and throughout Greece’s rural, small, and oth-
erwise quiet towns. Neither did we hear about the great number of  
young migrants or second-generation immigrants who also participated 
in December in large numbers. This meeting of  youth from various 
paths of  life in the streets in December 2008 did not come out of  the 
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blue. Since the end of  the dictatorship and especially since the begin-
ning of  the 1990s in Greece a lot of  young people identify with far-left 
and anarchist agendas regardless of  their class or wider social origin, 
not least because the youth have been constantly the primary target by 
various neoliberal measures and oppressive state campaigns.
The reader has to bear in mind that our argument throughout 
this paper is that there exist several distinctions applied to the people 
involved in the post-dictatorial movements. The main distinction we 
will draw is between the more fixed political subjectivities of  the pre-
neoliberalism period (up to circa 1990–1993) and the people who were 
raised or even born after the establishment of  neoliberal (called mod-
ernization) policies in Greece. Our purpose is to outline the momen-
tous genealogies of  the December 2008 revolt in Greece and show the 
gradual emergence of  a new social agency, political subjectivities and 
political tactics that contributed to the unmaking from below of  the 
political context of  metapolitefsi (the post-dictatorial period, see Glos-
sary). In that respect we focus on the “breaking continuities” (or, con-
tinuous breaks) that led to the December eruption, which we consider 
to have been a radical break with metapolitefsi’s political structures. So 
our article aims to talk both about the political genealogy and the po-
litical formation of  the actual genea (generation) of  December’s revolt.
The empirical historical part of  this chapter cannot be ex-
haustive, as there have been many more movements in Greece than 
we could include in this text. Instead, we will focus on five moments of  
mass militant student and youth movements (1979–80, 1987–88, 1990–
91, 1998–99, 2006–07) that moved beyond the established margins and 
challenged the dominant political configurations in each of  these peri-
ods. Moreover, we will underline three critical moments (1985, 1990, 
1995) as in-between instances where the intervention of  youth outside 
of  the mainstream politics was felt strongly. 
THE 1979–1980 OCCUPATION MOVEMENT: THE FIRST BLOW
In 1979–1980 Greece saw the formation of  a mass student movement 
that was led by the extra-parliamentarian left, mainly its Marxist-Le-
ninist contingent. This movement forced the prime minister at the time, 
Karamanlis (senior), to announce in his national address on New Year’s 
Eve the cancellation of  the notorious 815 legal act, which pertained 
to educational reform. This movement formulated a militant political 
culture by actively challenging the political consensus of  the “newly 
reborn” democracy of  the early post-dictatorial period. The movement 
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was also linked to the appearance of  a new extra-university youth that 
referenced the autonomous and antiauthoritarian ideologies and met 
and mingled with the students in the occupied universities. This meet-
ing occurred at a moment when the people’s demand for real change 
and an end to the—still ongoing at the time—right-wing post-civil-war 
police state was gathering momentum. During this period, and largely 
thanks to the occupation movement, the structural weakness of  the 
conservative government of  New Democracy—albeit its clear parlia-
mentary majority—became apparent.
Despite the apparent weaknesses of  the regime, there were 
efforts by the institutionalised and newly-legalised mainstream left to 
control the youth movement and support the established order. For 
example, the socialist- and communist-youth-controlled National Stu-
dents’ Union of  Greece (EFEE) decided to close all universities just 
before Christmas in 1979 in order to diffuse the movement’s dynamic 
that had developed outside the union’s control. Arguably, amongst the 
crucial political contributions of  the 1979–1980 protests was that they 
exposed the role of  the communist youth (KNE)—the strongest student 
organisation at the time—in applying the political pact of  metapolitefsi. 
KNE not only condemned the occupations but its members tried to re-
occupy the Chemistry School of  Athens, which was already occupied 
by the students’ assembly, in order to regain order. For this action they 
received the congratulations of  the conservative minister of  Internal 
Security. In fact, through the KNE the government could bypass the 
obstacle that the academic asylum (see Glossary) imposed on the inter-
vention of  the police. On the other hand, the occupation movement 
functioned as the next reference point in the line of  students’ upheav-
als since the anti-junta revolt of  17 November 1973. In wider terms, it 
expressed the surfacing social and political changes from below in the 
post-dictatorship era. 
Nevertheless, despite the 1979–1980 movement’s attempts to 
define and intervene in the processes of  social transformations, it was 
not able to substantiate an alternative route. It seemed that it reached 
the peak of  its potential on 17 November 1980 when the radical part 
of  the movement attempted to break the ban on marching towards 
the US embassy that the conservative government had imposed on the 
commemorating demonstration for the anti-junta revolt.2 The break of  
the ban led to head-to-head clashes with the police outside the Greek 
parliament and the death of  two militants: Stamatina Kanelopoulou, 
a worker, and Iakovos Koumis, a student. While the 1979–1980 move-
ment challenged the strict limits of  the post-dictatorial democracy and 
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exposed the demand for an end to the post-civil-war regime and for 
political change, what followed was characterised by a lack of  strategy 
or the ability to take any further initiative. These changes culminated the 
next year in the victory for the first time in Greece of  what was consid-
ered at the time to be a left party, PASOK: the populist social-democrats 
of  Andreas Papandreou. Also faced with a dubious stance toward PA-
SOK’s left rhetoric (a year later), the movement suffered the dissolution 
of  its most significant and large Marxist-Leninist organisations. 
1981–1989: CHALLENGING THE “SOCIALIST” VERSION OF DEMOCRACY
After PASOK’s domination for a number of  years and despite the fact 
that a large number of  activists remained active in higher education 
and at a local and social levels, the framework had changed. Although 
the political system of  metapolitefsi was still intact, and more stable 
than ever, it was disguised in its most democratic gowns. Under this new 
condition a generation emerged, characterised by an anti-authoritarian 
sentiment, that challenged PASOK’s hegemony and democratic cred-
ibility. It was a new breed that responded to the institutionalisation of  
the so-called Polytechnic Generation (see Glossary) and the November 
1973 revolt. It was a youth critical of  PASOK’s modernisation and to 
the traditionalism and compliant integration of  the left and the trade 
unions3 whose ineffective forms of  struggle were actively refused. 
The disillusionment and the numbness that affected the ma-
jority of  the radical left after PASOK’s first season in government, 
was interrupted in 1985 by violent protests and the occupations of  the 
Chemistry School and the Polytechnic after the murder of  the fifteen-
year-old school student Michalis Kaltezas by the police. Kaltezas was 
shot by a riot cop named Melistas during clashes with the police in the 
neighbourhood of  Exarcheia on the anniversary of  the revolt of  17 
November. The events were a culmination of  numerous moments of  
intervention by the far left and the anarchist movement in the previous 
period, which were characterised in practice by violent clashes with the 
police: university occupations (e.g. of  the Chemistry School occupation 
prior the general elections of  1984), the attack on and cancellation of  
a neo-Nazi meeting with Le Pen4 in Caravel Hotel in Athens (1984) or 
the conflicts for “territorial control” (i.e. resistance against the gentrifi-
cation of  the highly politicised Exarcheia square). Arguably, in this yet 
organisationally infant political culture, it was rather the subcultural 
urban identity politics that prevailed, interwoven with the phantom of  
a militant tradition and a prevailing antiauthoritarian sentiment. The 
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events of  these years mark the first autonomous appearance of  the an-
archist/anti-authoritarian movement trying to establish a culture of  di-
rect action based largely on an anti-state and anti-police agenda. The 
intervention of  this “angry youth” (as it was labelled at the time) signi-
fied an end to the golden years of  PASOK. However it failed—or rather 
did not attempt at all—to create or connect with larger struggles, which 
to a large degree it despised. It was also during this time that the “an-
nual rendezvous” with the police each 17 November was established. 
Thus, against the co-optation of  the November revolt and the con-
sumption of  its ideals in the electoral terrain, one meets the mutation 
of  the revolt to its simulacra, a formal repetition of  the signs of  revolt 
which created its own referential reality and political imagination that 
reached its limit in, or immediately after, December 2008. Nevertheless, 
the de-marginalisation of  practices—such as school occupations—and 
their expansion outside the universities (or rather the gradual shift of  
the main subject of  the youth movement from the politicised and or-
ganised university students to the more contingently mobilized school 
kids) marked another important difference of  the period. 
However, these events functioned as semiological and histori-
cal preludes to larger developments that the youth were at the front-
lines of. The most significant phenomenon was the beginning of  the 
de-alignment of  notable parts of  the Greek society from the political 
parties. Within the rigid polarisation of  the post-WWII and the early 
metapolitefsi era, the struggles of  those who were rejected by the state 
or prevented access to the goods of  modernisation and democracy (e.g. 
the defeated of  the civil war) coincided with the anti-right sentiment 
of  political struggles, parties, and institutions. The memories were still 
very fresh and the political alignments were quite polarized on either 
side, that of  the state and that of  the popular resistance. Hence such 
polarity expressed an abstract and ideological subjectivity which was 
directly linked to the concrete conditions of  people’s everyday lives. 
Therefore the distinction between the social and the political was very 
difficult to make for several decades after the end of  the civil war. This 
changed with the victory of  PASOK in 1981; the coming of  PASOK to 
power was portrayed as the reconciliation of  the civil war and as a re-
unification of  the Greek society. Nevertheless, these politics of  the so-
called “national reconciliation” during the 1980s signified a process of  
consolidation that removed the basis on which previously socio-political 
subjectivities and affiliations were based on. 
Thus the integration of  the previous outcasts into the politi-
cal establishment created considerable gaps, but not yet a vacuum. To 
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be fair, the right/anti-right dichotomy was still active and long-last-
ing (manifesting itself  indirectly even in the December 2008 revolt) 
and formulated the dominant bipartisan system (PASOK-ND) in the 
exchange of  power. However, another mass youth movement of  the 
1980s, signified by a new round of  university and school occupations in 
1986–1988, marked the emergence of  the so-called “party of  the dis-
content,” namely a youth with only loose reference to the previous po-
litically-based identities. The mobilisation of  this youth was motivated 
by its own experience, namely the eye-witnessing of  the collapse of  po-
litical difference between PASOK and ND in power, in their policies, 
discourses, and practices. A collapse those previous generations refused 
or could not apprehend, as the older generations still referred to those 
two poles in terms of  imagined or actual differences. The collective 
and individual subjectivation of  the 1980s movements was founded on 
this collapse and manifested itself  with the spread of  the action of  oc-
cupation. Until that moment the occupation of  public buildings, even 
universities and schools, was considered an act almost outside the limits 
of  law (for the most conservatives it was an outwardly terrorist act), and 
certainly outside the “pact of  metapolitefsi,” which laid out the agreed-
upon borders of  social confrontation. The efficiency of  the 1979–1980 
occupations, which managed the cancellation of  an already-passed law 
by occupying just four university departments, underlined the real and 
symbolic power of  this form of  struggle. The people involved in the 
1986–88 movement, however, created different constituencies and an 
agency that was characterised by two new elements. The first was the 
prevalence of  their everyday social needs (as basis for their subjectivity 
and actions) and not of  their ideological position. This had as a con-
sequence the second: a distancing from, and critique of, party-based 
youth politics. They had a critique expanded beyond the two poles 
(PASOK and ND) and encompassed the rest of  the parties, including 
those of  the left (KKE and KKE) who had dominated the “politicisa-
tion” of  the Greek youth. The spread of  the act of  occupations in sec-
ondary and higher education, for first time in the majority of  the main 
cities in the country, exemplified the retreat of  the party-youth control 
of  the movement. 
This loosening of  party affiliation and social background ex-
pressed within the universities was combined with the structural chang-
es of  both higher education and of  Greek society broadly. The expan-
sion of  higher education in the post-1981 era brought changes to the 
demographics of  university students that also affected the politics of  
the students’ movement. Larger portions of  students with working-class 
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origins did not translate automatically in stronger working-class-orien-
tated student politics. On the contrary, at the level of  student elections 
the results gradually converged with those of  the general elections. 
This meant a retreat of  the dominant communist youth representa-
tion that won the student elections until 1986, and the ascent of  the 
student group of  the conservative-party-affiliated DAP, fuelled by the 
ideal of  upward social mobility and the promotion of  the neoliberal 
yuppie dream. 
In this context, the non-party affiliated student formations of  
the radical left provided to the movement the organisational know-how 
and a political framework and analysis. The latter though was some-
what distant for the majority of  students. This was obvious due to the 
fact that, despite the rise of  radical left activists and better results in 
the student elections after each occupation movement, the radical left 
groups failed to formulate a political subject or force, or to extend their 
hegemony at a social level. More importantly, this gap was obvious in the 
relationship between forms of  activism and content. The more radical 
the former became, the less the latter, which was increasingly restricted 
to specific demands regarding education and provided less of  an overall 
critique of  the capitalist system. However, the spread of  such radical 
practices of  political contestation underlined deeper changes in Greek 
society, as the 1990s will show, with the main characteristic being the 
increased discrepancy between political institutions and social agency. 
1990s: REFORMING METAPOLITEFSI AND CONTESTING 
NEOLIBERALISM
Structurally, the 1989–1990 period can be considered a transitional 
period in the reconfiguration of  the dominant discourses and politi-
cal establishment in Greece. This occurred as both the result of  larger 
changes in world geopolitics (the collapse of  the Soviet block) and of  the 
antagonisms in struggles for internal domination between the emerg-
ing neo-bourgeois sectors (expressed by PASOK) and the traditional 
ones (ND). This antagonism created a climate of  violent interventions 
between competing economic groups and extrapolitical institutions 
(e.g. media corporations) through the eclectic disclosure of  scandals 
in an effort to remake the social contract and political map of  meta-
politefsi. The “end of  metapolitefsi” has become a permanent slogan 
since then. In reality, what was introduced by the three governments 
of  the 1989–1993 period was an openly neoliberal restructuring of  the 
Greek economy and society, which needed to disintegrate those social 
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obstacles for the “modernization”—the second dominant slogan—of  
the country. These obstacles included the social and public services of  a 
poorly-developed welfare state, employment rights, sovereign policy for 
economic development, and any organized, antagonistic social agency, 
such as trade unions. 
This neoliberal offence was implemented by the conservative 
government of  K. Mitsotakis (1990–1993). This wouldn’t, however, have 
been able to occur without the consensus of  the rest of  the parliamentar-
ian parties at the time. Indeed, the Mitsotakis’s administration governed 
with a very thin parliamentary majority. He secured this through the tol-
erance of  all the oppositional parties (from its arch-rival PASOK to the 
unified Coalition of  the Left—SYNaspismos, namely the unified KKE 
and KKE) and their consensus for this “catharsis.” The slogan, literary 
meaning a “clearing” of  the scandals,5 in reality regarded the direction 
of  the reforms and each party’s position in the frame of  a reformed 
metapolitefsi. The collapse of  PASOK’s government (1989) under the 
weight of  scandals and corruption led to two elections without any party 
gaining a majority. Thus after the first elections of  1989 a coalition gov-
ernment combining the right wing ND and the two unified communist 
parties (Synaspismos) was formed. While the latter was hoping that its 
participation would deepen the PASOK’s crisis and eventually margin-
alise the social democratic party, it was considered to be a betrayal of  
the whole post-WWII struggles against the police state of  the right.6 
Thus, instead, the result in the new elections two months later was that 
PASOK gained the lost ground and participated in a new “ecumeni-
cal” (national) government, which included all the parliamentary elected 
parties: PASOK, ND, and the unified Synaspismos. 
1990–1991: MASS SCHOOL OCCUPATIONS
It was in this context that the 1990–1991 occupation movement 
emerged. It was preceded though, by the January 1990 monthly occu-
pation of  the Polytechnic. The Polytechnic was occupied by anarchists 
because Melistas—the cop who killed fifteen-year-old Michalis Kalte-
zas back in 1985—had just been cleared of  all charges in his second 
trial. Although anarchists and anti-authoritarians initiated this occupa-
tion, it was supported by the decisions of  the students’ assemblies of  
the different departments of  the Polytechnic and it was also reinforced 
by student occupations of  other universities for a shorter period (1–2 
weeks). This occupation, remembered as “the blossom of  the Greek 
youth” (named after the proverbial slogan on the banner of  the last 
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demo), marks a qualitative difference within the anti-authoritarian 
movement and the anti-organisational anarchism of  the 1980s, mainly 
due to the prominent role of  the Athens squatters’ movement. Despite 
being a relatively small group, the anarcho-punk squatters’ organisa-
tional skills—gained from their DIY experience—were transferred into 
the running of  the occupation. This meant not only a position against 
the destruction of  buildings and university facilities, but also control at 
the gates, the setting up of  a collective canteen, cleaning shifts, etc. This 
new spirit, along with the organised communication (mainly by way of  
leafleting and flyer-posting) to the schools outside the centre of  Athens, 
allowed the occupation to last for a month and to gain a mass support. 
One could say that indeed the January occupation left some footprints 
that led to the school occupation movement that erupted in November 
of  the same year and lasted almost three months. 
The 1990–1991 movement was the biggest—almost univer-
sal—school occupation movement in the history of  the country, involv-
ing hundreds of  thousands of  students and several thousand schools 
and higher education institutes. In fact, it was eclipsed only by the 
uprising of  December 2008 as one of  the most significant moments 
in the history of  social antagonism and political contestation in the 
post-dictatorship era. In addition to its mass character, the 1990–1991 
movement was distinguished by strong qualitative differences from 
previous ones and defines the entrance into a new era of  antagonistic 
politics in Greece. 
Demographically, this movement was made up of  those who 
belonged to a generation of  people who were born or grew up after the 
dictatorship and entered their teens under the PASOK government. 
This means that they had been severed from the first-hand memory 
of  the radicalisation of  the metapolitefsi years and its political culture, 
if  not of  the (institutionalised by now) 1973 Polytechnic revolt, too. 
While the political representation of  the uprising consisted of  univer-
sity students—largely due to their ability to politically articulate the 
movement’s positions, their experience, and their national networks—
the real backbone of  the movement consisted of  secondary school stu-
dents. The massive participation of  schools and universities, reaching 
around 90%, meant that for the very first time every town in Greece 
had a secondary education school occupied. This invasion of  school 
students in the forefront of  social contestation meant that the political 
subject (not of  one or the another party, but as such itself) was left to 
the social agency of  those making the movement. Organised political 
groups were forced to follow the initiative of  the youth, which in real-
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ity set the agenda and exercised the real hegemony in the movement. 
Therefore the attempts to politicise the movement with larger aims and 
goals, or even analyses and perspective, failed. In the previously de-
scribed atmosphere of  disillusionment and de-alignment from political 
parties, the youth did not share much with the pre-1990s experience 
and posed its own kind of  politics and culture of  protest. Its political 
logic was unique; on the one hand it had the potential to revitalise those 
“old” and “stereotyped” methods, while on the other hand it asked for 
something different. In short, this first instance of  the prevalence of  so-
cial agency and rather unplanned responses (which were, however, not 
spontaneous despite being strongly intuitive), in comparison with the 
political subjects already active in the movement, provided a glimpse 
into the shifts that would emerge during the following years and expand 
beyond the educational sector. This movement also holds strong paral-
lels with the December revolt regarding the relation between the “po-
litical” and the “social” subject, and regarding either what was called 
the “spontaneity” of  the movement or its lack of  concrete demands and 
political procedures of  decision making. 
Politically, the lack of  any alternative within the system, either 
nationally due to the ecumenical government, or internationally due 
to the collapse of  the Soviet Union and the bipolar world, was spot-
ted clearly within this mass movement. Going beyond the wider ac-
knowledgement that “everyone is the same”—a sameness materialized 
very tangibly by the coalition and the ecumenical governments—this 
movement tried to constitute its antithesis to the political system by the 
slogan: “when you [the mainstream parties] agree in the parliament, 
the only opposition is us.” In that way, it reworked and subverted the 
promoted and dominant, at the time, anti-populist and anti-political 
discourse that propagated the need of  technocrats and specialists to be 
at the helm rather than politicians. A discourse (of  ignoring the politi-
cal cost) that aimed at the marginalisation of  the energetic politically 
Greek populace. 
In this context, the 1990–1991 occupation movement managed 
to reconfigure the promoted system of  political indifference amongst all 
the parliamentary parties and turn it into a condemnation of  the politi-
cal system as a whole. They did this by drawing and emphasizing an ex-
plicit line between the strategically-unified political personnel and the 
people who had taken over the streets and the education institutions. 
The workers’ and teachers’ struggles in the following years (1991–1993) 
against the de-industrialisation of  the country and the privatisation of  
the public services in one sense resisted and derailed the neoliberal ref-
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ormation of  metapolitefsi. As result it deepened the internal contradic-
tions of  the political establishment, contradictions that were based on 
a developed clientèle system that absorbed social discontent and main-
tained electoral power. However, the contraction of  the state apparatus 
and the deregulation of  the working market shrunk this system’s abili-
ties to provide favours. This contradiction was given a radical form by 
the current IMF intervention that has exposed and shaken the political 
system in Greece to its foundations. 
The contribution of  the 1990–1991 movement to the legiti-
misation of  a series of  political practices was immense. Most notably, 
the perception of  building occupations and road blockades as marginal 
behaviour used mainly by extreme revolutionary political groups was 
radically altered as a result of  the movement. At the same time, the dis-
solution of  the Youth of  the Communist Party (KNE)7 allowed space 
for more immediate, or rather unmediated, expressions of  social anger 
and more radical and inventive forms of  resistance to emerge. One 
could suggest that the characteristics of  the 1990–1991 movement, as 
they appeared in its slogans, actions, and organization, were more in 
sync with the movements of  the French youth in 1986 and of  the Ital-
ian students of  the “panther” movement in 1990 than with the hitherto 
political culture of  the radical students of  Greece. 
In that sense, the entry of  a new generation, without the politi-
cal links of  the previous one, refreshed the logic and the vocabulary of  
political protest in Greece but at the same time was lacking the abil-
ity to articulate concrete demands or perspective. Namely, its demands 
were mainly defensive. This was not a new feature, only now it had 
become the dominant one. Due to the lack of  any alternative proposal, 
the demands were very specific and were articulated against the most 
obviously reactionary elements of  the proposed “white paper” for edu-
cation. So the movement’s most popular demands were a refusal: to pay 
for their textbooks, to return to the regime of  school uniforms, to cut 
the days of  school holidays, and to decrease the ceiling of  the allowed 
absences from school. Their limited aims were directed against the 
economic consequences and the disciplinary functioning of  the edu-
cational system. Nevertheless, larger demands or platforms connecting 
such consequences with the deeper restructuring of  education failed to 
be embraced or prevail. But the unity and strength, both in numbers 
and morale, that these specific aims gathered showed the ability of  the 
movement to expand, endure, and eventually succeed. 
A second distinct element was the lack of  the confrontation-
al character that past youth movements had applied, a logic of  force 
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that was exercised not only against the system but also for acquiring 
power within the movement. This does not mean that the 1990–1991 
movement renounced or did not use force or violence, but rather that it 
did so as a last resort. Confrontation was not prioritized in its political 
practice. Instead, argumentation, inventiveness, ridicule, humour, and 
collective participation were the main attitudes of  the movement and 
these things encompassed even its violent moments. And yet, the dis-
ruption that this movement caused was much greater than any other 
until then—both in terms of  time and space. However, blocking the 
roads with their school desks in order to inform the public of  their de-
mands and creating “functional occupations”—namely staying in their 
schools and creating their own spaces that they cared for, cleaned up, 
and maintained—were tactics clearly distinct from the destroying of  
systemic symbols. Such tactics of  spatial reclaiming proved so effective 
that the usual rhetoric of  vandalism was unable to break the public 
support for the movement, to allow the success of  legal or more radical 
anti-occupation actions organised by authorities and vigilante groups, 
or to unease and mobilise parents against their kids. 
The political practice that this movement produced manifested 
a different set of  ethics, subjectivity, and agency that, retrospectively, 
one could argue had more in common with the ethics of  the first days 
of  the anti-globalisation movement—ten years later—than with the 
previous experiences of  youth mobilisation in Greece. Its non-violent, 
or rather, non-destructive attitude was manifested even in its slogans, 
which gave it an integrity that was instrumental for its endurance and 
final success. One must also underline the determination of  this move-
ment to resist all attacks by the government and the state. Integrity and 
determination were fundamental elements for the maintenance of  its 
mass character and support, as well as its unprecedented endurance—
expressed with the slogan “I endure”—that kept the schools open and 
occupied during the Christmas break. It was also effective in resisting 
the government’s attacks on the refusal of  the movement to negotiate 
with it, and in mobilising masses broader than the youth. 
Then at the beginning of  January 1991, three days and nights 
of  clashes with the police in the major cities of  Greece erupted, mark-
ing, to a certain degree, the end of  this movement. The event that had 
triggered this revolt was the murder of  Nikos Temboneras, a teacher 
who had, together with his students, defended his school’s occupation 
from the right-wing vigilantes who were trying to break it. 
In addition to the aforementioned particularities of  the 1990–
1991 movement, it is important to underline a number of  other novel, 
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albeit minor, traits that it bore, as they have since become constant fea-
tures of  the emerging political culture. Something striking about this 
movement was the difference of  its slogans and banners from the pre-
vious ones. The highly-politicised slogans and demands had been re-
placed with slogans that expressed feelings, attitudes, and sometimes vi-
sionary truisms: “When injustice becomes law/resistance is [our] duty” 
or “Our dreams will be your nightmares,” etc. Also, instead of  declar-
ing political organisations or mere educational institutions, the banners 
declared the location of  the schools and thereby linked the groups with 
their neighbourhoods, suburbs, towns, or villages.
Moreover, in terms of  the spatial allocation of  the marches 
one could also notice differences: Until then the white banners of  the 
student unions—usually controlled by the youth of  the Communist 
Party—were at the head, followed by the red banners of  the ultra left 
students, with the anarchists tailing off  the march. The 1990–1991 
marches, however, had no particular order. 
Moreover, the use of  political slogans and their distinctive 
rhythm, while still present, had been sexed up by rhythms and slogans 
brought in from the football pitch. Famously, the slogan “Never, never, 
never” (shouted to the opposite team to suggest that they will never 
score a goal) became a dominant one in the political movements that 
followed, suggesting that the proposed reforms which the movement 
resisted, would never be enacted. This refreshing of  the slogan culture, 
joined by more upbeat demonstration “performances,” underlined a 
paradoxical return of  the social to a waned political rhetoric and vo-
cabulary. The newly involved masses of  school kids brought their mu-
sical preferences in as well. A typical example of  this was the slogan 
suggesting that “It’s better to be the generation of  chaos8/than in Afto-
kinisi [a hip club at the time] and dance to house [music].”
One can argue that the movement of  1990–1991 had a rather 
“positive” or “constructive” character in comparison to the December 
revolt. However, the movement of  1990–1991 had the doubtful “privi-
lege” of  being the first one to act against the newly formed neoliberal 
regime, and was not yet defined by the violent conditions that neolib-
eralism would soon produce. The movement was composed of  youth 
who, while experiencing the impasse of  social policy and its incompe-
tence to fill its promises, stood against the neoliberal destruction of  their 
future. They defended, albeit intuitively and politically incoherently, 
their right to the future, before its vision collapsed entirely, as it had 
for the December youth eighteen years later. If  the 1990–1991 genera-
tion had something to defend (or loose), the December generation had 
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nothing. December’s generation was born and grew up during and after 
the introduction of  neoliberalism and was formed within its context—in 
terms of  both its individual and collective subjectification—a context 
that produced subjects with a generalized marginality as antagonistic 
subjectivity and of  a “deregulated” political action.
RECOMPOSITIONS CONCLUDING THE 1990s
The 1990–1991 student unrest functioned as the model for following 
school occupation movements opposing the further attempts at neolib-
eral educational restructuring made by both conservatives and by social 
democrats. The next important moment was the 1998–1999 school oc-
cupation movement. However, before we get to 1998 we should outline 
a number of  developments that followed the 1990–1991 movement. 
Firstly, there were the workers’ struggles against the deregulation of  the 
labour market through deindustrialisation and privatisation. Most nota-
bly, the strike of  the public bus drivers (the EAS strike), including its “All 
or none” (workers would stay at work) slogan and its dynamic and con-
frontational character against the state and police. However, the other 
trade unions did not actively support the strike despite the mass solidar-
ity demonstrations that saw tens of  thousands taking to the streets even 
in the vacation season of  August. Parallel to the general disappearance 
of  the official trade unions came the radicalization of  the struggles of  
various sectors of  workers—at least as far as forms of  struggle are con-
cerned. Thus, in the 1990s, there were two big farmers’ movements with 
road blockades that split the country in two for weeks; multiple month-
long strikes by school teachers; and a lengthy blockade of  the port of  
Piraeus by dock and sea workers—to mention but a few struggles. How-
ever, these mobilisations remained isolated and unsynchronised with 
each other, despite having developed simultaneously at times. 
A second development is that within the atmosphere of  emerg-
ing struggles in 1990–1993, the Communist Party split between those 
who wanted to stay within the SYNaspismos coalition and those wished 
to see the Party regain its autonomy. The official pretext for this divide 
was the agreement by SYNaspismos to the Maastricht Treaty. In real-
ity, part of  the top cadre of  the party saw opportunity in the vacuum 
that developed between the rising social discontent and the political 
formations of  the 1989–1991 transitional experiment to a post-meta-
politefsi era. Thus, they aimed to fill this gap and control these new 
constituencies, seeing a renovated role as a way to cushion social ten-
sions before they got out of  hand. So on one hand the Communist Par-
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ty organisations were mobilized especially amongst farmers, construc-
tion and port workers struggles that at times tested the tolerance of  the 
system’s limits; on the other hand, in the decisive moments they always 
retreated or replaced the real conflicts with symbolic ones. These sym-
bolic conflicts included mock and controlled occupations of  ministries 
(executed by assigned squads of  party members) or other “dynamic” 
imitations of  direct action. This new configuration of  reformism that 
used means of  struggle that had been previously condemned as acts 
of  provocation reveals once more the extent to which the “pact” of  
metapolitefsi had by that point been broken down under the pressure 
of  the people’s movement. 
A third moment that ought to be recounted is the 1995 Poly-
technic occupation by the anarchist movement that followed the 17 No-
vember annual march. The fierce clashes with the police around the 
barricaded Polytechnic, the burning of  Greek flags (demonstrating an 
anti-nationalist agenda), the solidarity expressed with the continuing 
revolt of  the inmates of  Korydalos Prison, and the besieging and even-
tual arrest of  530 young people—a large majority of  whom were school 
students—were all aired on live television channels. The newly-funded 
private TV channels, alongside the state-owned ERT, undertook a new 
role that they have kept up with since: to create a social consensus for the 
police offensive that aimed to silence a radical part of  the youth that had 
been gaining ground since 1991. The state aimed to make an example 
of  the protestors—arresting everyone who was present in the occupa-
tion—and to renegotiate the “academic asylum,” which prevented the 
police from entering university grounds. Nevertheless the hostage-like 
situation that the arrested and their milieu were thrown into was indeed 
a blow to the anarchist movement, though it also marked an internal 
transformation. It forced, in one respect, a part of  that movement to 
develop different strategies from those of  the singular scheme of  police-
state-banks vs. society, leading to a renegotiation of  the tactics of  violent 
confrontation. Thus a number of  social centres (steki) were established 
at universities and in neighbourhoods. This relatively new anarchist ac-
tivity led to the introduction of  new people who had been politicized 
within the post-1995 atmosphere, while the pre-1995 radicals gradually 
returned or found themselves in a scene that was rapidly developing. 
Eventually, anarchism in Greece made an impressive comeback during 
the anti-globalization movement’s struggles of  the 2000s, and today it is 
considered one of  the largest anarchist movements in Europe.
What we have labelled the youth movement did not calm down 
during the 1990s. New waves of  students entering high school con-
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tinued to resist new educational reforms. Thus, in 1998, the Arsenis’s 
generation (named after the PASOK minister of  education) managed 
to build the next big school occupation movement. By now, the com-
munist youth  had managed to reconstitute itself  and supported the 
occupations. Its presence, however, only divided the schools between 
those that followed a national coordination assembly controlled by the 
KNE and those that ascribed to the independent school coordination 
initiative in which leftists and anarchist students, among others, were 
represented. Despite the dominating presence of  the KNE’s coordi-
nation, the group was for the first time forced to adopt occupation as 
a means of  struggle, though they avoided such tactics whenever they 
could. Still, they were unable to marginalise the non-KNE schools and 
students. The threat that the latter posed to the KNE, and the real at-
titude of  the KNE towards them, became obvious at the beginning of  
the so-called Arsenis movement. In 1998, once more on 17 November, 
the riot police—with the active assistance of  the KNE—arrested, with-
out reason, around 160 people who were marching with the anarchist 
bloc, the majority of  them secondary school kids. 
The KNE managed over the course of  the following years to 
become the first organised left force within universities—electorally 
speaking, as it is still weak in the general assemblies. It quickly returned 
to its orthodox position of  condemning the occupations, but yet it fails 
to convince even its own members of  this position when the issue comes 
up. During the latest student movement (2006–2007), in support of  the 
constitutional Article 16 (which prevents the foundation of  private uni-
versities, an article that the conservative government of  ND wanted to 
change through constitutional reform), the Communist Party was ada-
mant that they did not support occupations. Similarly, and even more 
vociferously in December 2008, the KKE (Communist Party of  Greece) 
received official congratulations—by the right-wing government and 
the extreme-right party LAOS—for its denunciation of  violence and its 
respect for the government’s right to impose “law and order.” “In the 
revolution, not even a shopping window will be broken,” the KKE’s 
general secretary Aleka Papariga declared in December 2008 in the 
Greek parliament.9 
As previously mentioned, more radical forms of  action have 
been established as the norm throughout the last two decades. A typi-
cal example of  this was the so-called ASEP strike of  1997–1998. ASEP 
was the name of  a new state organization that used written exams to 
determine a teacher’s right to work. ASEP was pushing hiring practices 
towards a market-oriented evaluation process that would replace the 
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previous system of  placement based on teaching experience and aca-
demic merit. After numerous strikes, the movement decided to physi-
cally prevent the new exams from being administered. This meant three 
days of  occupations of  the exam centres and it meant clashes with the 
police. The fight was lost, but the movement, despite its organisational 
shortcomings, raised the stakes to an unprecedented level. It was one of  
the few cases in which a formal trade union decided to make use of  di-
rect action, which shows how particular dynamic practices had become 
legitimised forms of  action. 
2000s: TOWARDS THE UNEXPECTED
The Greek far left and anarchist movements participated actively in the 
various anti-globalization gatherings that followed Seattle during the late 
1990s and early 2000s, most notably in Prague (2000) and Genoa (2001), 
which several thousand activists from Greece travelled to and partici-
pated in. The same model was repeated in December 2001 in Brussels 
and it was followed by an anti-EU demonstration in the Greek city of  
Thessaloniki in the summer of  2003. This international experience gave 
the chance for the Greek movement to put some of  their tactics into 
a new perspective, to compare and to solidify them in order to proj-
ect them within an international framework. New international points 
of  reference were added to the logic of  the Greek movement and new 
codes emerged. At the same time, this globalization of  the movement 
has to be seen in parallel with the changes that globalization brought to 
Greek society itself. A typical example is that of  an increasing number 
of  youth migrating for studies and thus increasing the international links 
between the youth of  Greece and the rest of  Europe. Moreover, this 
was happening as a drastic inflow of  immigration was taking place in 
Greece at the same time, particularly since the early 1990s. Migrants’ 
rights and solidarity were added to the agenda of  the movement while a 
lot of  migrants—particularly second-generation—started participating 
in secondary school and university movements. 
It was during the 2000s when, for the first time, a sizeable group 
of  people emerged into the terrain of  social and political struggles on 
such numerous fronts as local issues regarding environment and free ur-
ban spaces, official or grassroots union struggles, anti-racism, anti-war, 
anti-imperialism, and international solidarity campaigns, etc. This so-
called “social left” identified with some of  the objectives and strategies 
of  political groupings (from radical left to anarchist ones) but did not 
wish to become explicitly part of  them, although many hold anti-hier-
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archical or/and anti-authoritarian views. This part of  society became 
visible quite suddenly in May 2005 when, at the closing demonstration 
of  the European Social Forum of  Athens, more than 70,000 people 
participated. The sudden appearance of  this part of  society and in such 
great numbers not only surprised everyone, but it catalysed the kick-off  
of  the “Defend Article 16” movement. 
This university-centred movement took place in 2006 and 
2007. It was a year-and-a-half-long campaign against the aforemen-
tioned change of  the constitution’s Article 16, which secures a free and 
public higher education. The movement represented an important 
moment because it showed an attempt of  political subjects, especially 
on the side of  the radical left within the education movement, to cor-
respond to and mould themselves to social shifts and aspirations in a 
militant movement. The broadness of  this movement was a success-
ful—though a weak and contingent—meeting of  the political subject 
and social discontent. Of  course, it is not coincidence that this occurred 
in the realm of  the education sector in which a long tradition of  mo-
bilisations had established patterns of  cooperation between different 
parts of  the movement. It was this wide inclusion and unity of  focus 
that made this movement successful in the end and even enabled it to 
revitalise hope for the potential of  the intervention of  the radical left in 
the central political scene. This was also supported by the unification of  
different tendencies within the left that could not have been previously 
imagined. These two last statements refer particularly to the project of  
SYRIZA (Coalition of  Radical Left).10 
However, when these ruptures became an eruption in Decem-
ber 2008, the social movements and the people more actively involved 
met with their limitations and had to deal with events that, while they 
may have contributed to, were beyond their reach. The role of  this 
radical social left in building new sites for the antagonistic movement, 
and in acting as a national network of  activists distributing a differ-
ent political culture, must not be neglected in the effort to discern new 
shifts in the formation of  social antagonism in Greece. Not in the least 
because it manifests the changing relations between social agency and 
political organization, even within the left.
A second development, closely paralleling the first, was the ex-
pansion of  and further integration of  the anarchist/anti-authoritarian 
movement over the past few years. In other words, anarchist groups, 
organizations, media, publications, and activities started appearing in 
more cities and towns than they ever had been before. Simultaneously, 
anarchist groups started getting more involved with wider social issues 
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such as labour relationships or neighbourhood demands, and for first 
time during this period we have a much wider dissemination and popu-
larization of  anarchist ideas within society. One must recognise the role 
of  new media and technology (particularly Athens Indymedia) in both 
acting as a “centre” (not exclusively, but primarily) for the anarchist/an-
tiauthoritarian movement while at the same time multiplying its decen-
tralisation and creation of  its experience and practices (e.g. social cen-
tres). It is obvious that this spread of  the movement and the increasing 
fluidity of  the terrain of  various local or national-scale struggles diversi-
fied the anarchist movement even more and created a whole group of  
activists that refuse any fixed ideological position. This shift manifested 
in the participation of  “anarchists/anti-authoritarians/autonomists” in 
the movement for Article 16, in contrast with their previously hostile 
attitude towards the student movements. As such, the 2006–07 move-
ment provided more than just the confidence inspired by its victory, but 
also a fresh memory and organising experience for the generation that 
revolted a year later. 
POST-DECEMBER ’08: “MOVING BY ASKING”
This text began with the story of  a teacher and her son. Although the 
two of  them had different demographic cohorts, they both seem to have 
experienced moments of  political ruptures during their school years. 
Then we described some moments in the political genealogy of  revolts 
in post-dictatorial Greece and the emergence and development of  the 
practices and discourses that could be seen during December 2008. 
December, although it surprised everyone, did not come out of  the 
blue. Although social injustice and social rage had been accumulating 
at the time, the event bore with it a legacy; a legacy not in terms of  
direct physical links—although these too were part of  December 2008, 
as older activists who had not been on the streets for years ended up 
in the demonstrations, at the barricades, and in the occupations—but 
in terms of  semiology, practices, discourses, and imagination. In other 
words, December 2008 was an intensive materialization of  previously 
constructed images and experiences. 
Moreover, in this chapter we have tried to demonstrate that, al-
though the post–dictatorial political ruptures have often been portrayed 
and perceived in continuity with previous movements, they actually also 
carry some distinct qualities. First of  all, they took place in what was 
formally the longest-lasting democratic period in modern Greek his-
tory and at the same time reflect the neoliberal restructuring that has 
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affected every sector of  Greek society since 1989–90. The frequency of  
these mass movements and the rebellion of  students and young adults 
that occurred in the last twenty-five or so years also released a social 
dynamic that at the same time reflected and propelled such shifts on 
many levels. Most importantly, the emerging political subjectivities of  
the neoliberal era of  Greece challenged the political structures that cor-
responded to the pre-neoliberal conditions as they had been formed 
after the collapse of  the dictatorship. 
The December 2008 events constituted the full disintegra-
tion of  such political superstructures, following the complete removal 
(thanks to neoliberal restructuring) of  the social grounds over which 
they stood, resulting in their violent collapse. However, in the eruption 
of  December 2008 and during the previous ruptures, this depositioning 
of  the social in relation to its political abstraction (representation and 
state) was not articulated into a coherent social alternative. It was ar-
ticulated as a violent, non-directional (or rather multi-directional) “re-
alignment” of  the political with the social terrains of  the dismantled 
previous structures, forced into being by “the street.” It is in this sense 
that those who revolted in December completed the work of  previous 
moments of  social antagonism that had challenged the “limits of  pro-
test” that the democratically-elected regimes had imposed. Those pre-
vious moments had caused several cracks in the political establishment 
of  the post-dictatorship state that led to the eruption. December also 
signifies one of  the first revolts within the latest global economic crisis, 
marking in one sense the end of  the neoliberal hegemony by exposing 
its remnants.
Throughout the post-dictatorial period, and especially over the 
course of  the last twenty years, movements in Greece had been building 
towards an end that December 2008 materialised and fulfilled. But as 
we know, there is no end that is not also a beginning—the only question 
is of  what sort. What kind of  political logic, agency, field, and discourse 
has December 2008 produced? To confine this only to the participants 
of  December 2008 would be an act of  evasion. It would be evasive 
to not try to understand, face, and deal with the results of  that great 
unmaking, of  what the December 2008 revolt produced by penetrat-
ing all levels of  the Greek society, not only those who participated in it. 
Failing to frame the action within the larger shifts in the post-December 
2008 picture would be an attempt to avoid the questions that Decem-
ber 2008 has raised, questions that we need to face if  we really want to 
turn the momentary grasp of  the impossible, that we all felt, into a real 
potential. That, however, is another article. What we address herein are 
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the discernible changes that December 2008 has produced as (part of) 
its legacy, both in the still-active social subject that was formulated by 
experiencing (or, rather, making) it and in the larger political culture 
within the antagonist movement. 
Occupations and violent confrontation as dominant forms of  
political activism drew a formal line between revolutionary practices 
and reformist ones. However, we argue here that the gradual demar-
ginalisation of  these tactics, as part of  consecutive political and social 
struggles, met its own end in December 2008. In one sense the “abso-
lute” domination or exercise of  these tactics meant also their end as 
political indexes of  radicalism (if  they ever were as such by themselves). 
December 2008 challenged their limits and, by trespassing the borders 
of  the most radical or maximal forms of  political action, laid bare the 
nakedness of  the political discourses and identities that had been build 
around their formality. This was something that was unfortunately re-
alised with tragic consequences a year and a half  later on 5 May 2010. 
On that day, three bank workers died in a fire set, allegedly, by “black 
bloc” activists, during an anti-IMF general strike. 
At the same time, the December 2008 revolt reproduced such 
forms at their highest fidelity, realising them as simulacra. Thus the 
“non-result” of  December 2008—which far from being non-produc-
tive, produced something that was and is of  a different order—revealed 
not the inadequacy of  such forms of  action necessarily, but the political 
vacuum beneath or behind them, in that they were not supported by, 
nor did they support, an alternative way of  doing or imagining things. 
That suggests that the December 2008 revolt was rather the expression 
of  a social implosion rather than of  a social explosion. It is within this 
context of  implosion that one can detect the December 2008 revolt 
both as disruption and as a missed opportunity. Or as a slogan on a wall 
in Athens during those days put it: “December was not an answer. It 
was a question.” 
One could argue that any attempt to return to the pre-Decem-
ber 2008 political normalities is impossible at any level and for any 
actor in Greek political life. What followed the December revolt was 
a culmination in the intensification of  the Greek crisis,11 the neo-colo-
nial regime of  the IMF-EU imposed rule, and the unmaking of  meta-
politefsi from the top down through the forced collapse of  any social 
and public regulations, the development of  a securitised state, and the 
popular resistance to it. Even if  the resistance is inefficient and lacking 
when compared to the size of  both the attack and the social anger, the 
threat of  a new eruption is still a visible phantom over Greece. It is not 
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only the social anger that boils. Since the post-December struggles a 
new militant subject is emerging, one whose political culture cross-cuts 
the existing radical and revolutionary political actors and changes their 
qualities. There are developments that, in any case, have accelerated 
and condensed socio-historical time so much that they have made in-
complete any critical discourse on December 2008 that doesn’t project 
it in the context of  more recent events. Having said that, one should be 
equally cautious not to underestimate the similarly incomplete, but real, 
social potential that the revolt opened up, a potential that still burns and 
re-shapes both the political culture at large and the antagonistic move-
ment in Greece.
NOTES
1 For a typical example of  such a position one can see in The New York Times a 
text by a Greek professor at Yale named Stathis Kalyvas, under the title “Why 
Athens is Burning,” published during the December revolt. See: http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/12/11/opinion/11iht-edkalyvas.1.18595110.html 
2 The ban had been in place since 1976 and respected by the institutional left (PASOK, 
KKE, and KKE), until November 1981 when, under PASOK, the ban was lifted. It 
is still a contested of  the US embassy each year. The US embassy is the destination of  
the annual 17 November demonstration because the US government backed the Greek 
junta. 
3 It is important not to forget that this is also the era of  the “farewell to the working 
class” among the disillusioned social democrats, leftists, and anarchists, the era of  
alternative social movements, and the era of  the ascendancy of  the neoliberal agenda 
and culture as expressed by the yuppies. This is not a minor point: the processes of  
pre-neoliberal politics and the emergence of  neoliberalism as political structures/field 
have defined, to a certain extent, the production of  its negation and its opposing social 
subject. 
4 Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of  the extreme-right National Front party in France. 
5 The Greek equivalent of  the Italian “operation clean hands” that changed drastically 
the map of  Italian politics to date. However, in Greece, it was merely a caricature as the 
two-party system of  corruption and carried on.
7 A few months earlier, the majority of  KNE had been kicked out of  the Party because 
they disagreed with the collaboration between the Party with the right-wing ND. 
8 Generation of  Chaos (Genia tou chaous) was the name of  an anarchist punk rock 
band of  the 1980s.
9 This congratulation of  the KKE was repeated by the current minister of  education 
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in October 2010. When a new school occupation movement began, with the potential 
to put the IMF-subdued social democratic government in a difficult position prior to 
the start of  elections, the KKE was quick to separate itself  and to condemn those kinds 
of  actions.
10 This was particularly obvious in the case of  SYRIZA, a left coalition party with 
parliamentary presence. SYRIZA was the only parliamentary party that explicitly 
expressed its solidarity with December’s revolt. Moreover, parts of  SYRIZA had a 
visible and active participation in December. SYRIZA increased its electoral strength 
during the 2006–2007 students’ movement. However, the full project is now falling 
apart, as some parts of  the coalition have broken away from it. 
11 We consider “the Greek crisis” to be something that is not merely an economic, but 
is instead an organic systemic crisis, and we see and the December 2008 revolt as its first 
grand moment. December 2008 was the first instance of  an implosion of  the system, 
rather than a social explosion due to its internal socio-economic contradictions (on the 
international level) and the specific socio-political discrepancies (on the national level) 
that together formed the current crisis in Greece. 
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AN EPOCHAL CRISIS?
Since the mid-1970s there has been a worldwide permanent crisis of  re-
production of  capitalist relations in all their forms (political, economic, 
and ideological). As we understand it, this crisis has two aspects: it is a 
crisis of  over-accumulation of  capital, which means an inability, on the 
part of  the capitalists, to increase the rate of  exploitation and reduce 
the cost of  constant capital and so increase the rate of  profit demanded 
by an advancing capital accumulation. At the same time this is a legiti-
mization crisis—that is, a crisis of  the political and ideological forms 
that guaranteed the discipline of  the labour power. We could therefore 
talk of  the inability of  capital and its state to put forward a new global 
productive/social model that would replace the post war Keynesian 
deal, hard hit both by the struggles of  the planetary proletariat and the 
capitalist policies against them.
During this long, drawn-out crisis of  reproduction there have 
been periods of  cyclical depressions. Capital in general has tried to 
deal with them in various ways: by changing the global institutional 
and legal framework of  the movement of  capital and “liberalizing” the 
markets, by promoting a mixture of  neoliberalism and Keynesianism 
through war, by decreasing wages and institutionalising the precarisa-
tion of  labour, by accomplishing new enclosures, by putting the “dan-
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gerous classes” under penal surveillance and/or integrating them into 
the credit system through a policy of  “privatised Keynesianism.”
Despite temporal recoveries, the ultimate failure of  all the 
above strategies and tactics—aimed at deferring the aggravation of  the 
crisis—has in the long run turned this crisis of  reproduction into an 
epochal one, as many would argue.
During the last two decades the crisis of  reproduction in Greece 
has been dealt with by capital and the state by successive reforms of  
the education and welfare system, by promoting the precarisation of  
work relations, by continuous legal attempts to discipline immigrants 
and control immigration flows, by cutting down allowances, wages, and 
benefits and replacing them with bank loans. All these measures aiming 
at devaluing, disciplining, and dividing the working class and making 
workers pay the cost of  the reproduction of  their labour power have not 
succeeded in decisively reversing the crisis to the advantage of  capital—
this, despite the fact that during the period between the mid-1990s and 
the mid-2000s capital had managed to increase the rate of  exploitation 
and expand its profitability.
In Greece the crisis of  reproduction has manifested itself  
most explicitly as a crisis of  legitimization of  capitalist relations, either 
through the permanent crisis in education in the last thirty years (see our 
text on the primary teachers’ strike in 2006 and the student movement 
in 2006–07)1 or a lot more through the December rebellion. The rebel-
lion was a clear expression of  proletarian anger against a life that is get-
ting more and more devalued, surveilled, and alienated. However, the 
December crisis cannot be directly connected with the recent depression 
that started manifesting itself  in Greece in September 2008.
THE REBELLION: ITS CLASS COMPOSITION
We won’t describe here thoroughly the various things that happened 
during the rebellion as we have done this elsewhere.2 As far as the class 
composition of  the rebellion is concerned, this ranged from high school 
students and university students to young, mostly precarious, workers 
from various sectors like education, construction, tourism and enter-
tainment services, transportation, even media. (Of  course, it is not easy 
to distinguish students from precarious workers.) As far as factory work-
ers are concerned, there can be no accurate estimation about their in-
dividual participation in the riots since no reports from such workplaces 
became known. Some of  the students and the workers were second-
generation immigrants (mostly Albanians, although there were also 
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some immigrants of  other nationalities). There were also many older 
workers with more or less stable jobs, but they were a minority. Some 
of  the students and the workers that participated in the riots were also 
football hooligans. Last but not least, we should mention the participa-
tion of  “lumpen” proletarians, junkies, for example, mostly during the 
first days of  the rebellion. In general, it was precisely those segments of  
the class that have directly been experiencing the violence of  the state 
surveillance and the deterioration of  work conditions that were more 
active in the rebellion. On the other hand, many older workers that had 
just started experiencing the so-called “financial crisis” (layoffs, wage 
reduction, etc.) were very sympathetic towards the burning down of  
banks and state buildings, but were mostly passive.
It might be interesting to add that because of  the motley com-
position of  the multitude and its violence a lot of  politicos (even some 
organised anarchists) found it too “uncontrollable“ and distanced 
themselves from what happened—especially on the third day of  the 
rebellion, when violence reached its peak. 
The high percentage of  immigrants in the rebellion requires 
some explanation. The influx of  many Balkan immigrants, especially 
Albanians, in the last twenty years has changed significantly the compo-
sition of  the working class in Greece. At the same time, due to the immi-
gration policy of  the Greek capitalist state, a whole generation of  young 
immigrants, mostly Albanians, that were born or grew up in Greece 
are not considered Greek citizens. The legalisation of  all immigrants is 
undesirable for capital and the state, because in their world immigrants 
are only needed when they constitute an insecure, cheap, and obedient 
workforce. The so-called process of  “legalisation,” in Greece and other 
countries has long been considered as necessary for capital and its state 
only in order to control and keep track of  immigration flows. That is 
why even second-generation immigrants cannot easily get a green card; 
on the contrary, they have to prove their “ability” to stay and work in 
the country every five years at most and of  course they do not have the 
right to vote. Not to mention that their work conditions are the worst 
as far as wages and social security are concerned. But despite racism 
of  both social and state origin most second-generation immigrants are 
quite well integrated—especially Albanians, who comprise the majority 
of  the immigrant population in general.
Second-generation young Albanians fitted in very well with the 
rest of  the native rioters. They felt more “comfortable” taking part in 
confrontations with cops, in attacks against state buildings and banks, 
and in lootings alongside Greek young proletarians than other immi-
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grants—mostly Asians and Africans who still live on the fringe, isolated 
in their ethnic communities. For the latter it was easier and less risky to 
participate in the riots through looting or frequenting the open Nation-
al Technical University occupation in the centre of  Athens where big 
communities of  them live in areas resembling ghettos: when the riots 
erupted near “their” neighbourhoods that was the way they “contrib-
uted” to them. They received the most violent onslaught from both the 
police and media propaganda. They were presented as “plunderers” 
and “thieves” and in some cases there were pogrom style attacks against 
them by fascists and undercover cops.
THE REBELLION: ITS CHARACTER AND CONTENT
The rebels who met in the streets and occupations temporarily super-
seded their separated identities and roles imposed on them by capitalist 
society since they met not as workers, university or school students, or 
immigrants but as rebels. They may not all have used a proletarian lan-
guage, they may not have been able to go on strike, except for the high 
school and university students, but what they really did was to create 
proletarian communities of  struggle against the state and capital. The 
spontaneous and uncontrolled character of  the rebellion was proved 
precisely by the lack of  any political or economic demands whatsoever, 
by a complete negation of  politics and trade unionism. This proved to 
be the strength of  the rebellion: the fact that it was impossible to be rep-
resented, co-opted, or manipulated by political mechanisms that would 
make bargains with the state. The extra-parliamentary left organisa-
tions that participated in the occupation of  the Faculty of  Law tried to 
impose some political demands (ranging from disarmament of  the cops 
and resignation of  the government to granting interest-free mortgage 
loans), but found no reception. 
Here we will quote from the first account of  the rebellion we 
wrote in late January: 
Judging from the slogans and the attacks against the police, an overwhelmingly 
anti-cop sentiment was dominant during the days of  the rebellion. The cop 
stood for power and particularly the brutality and arrogance of  power. However, 
it was as symbols of  a certain power—the power of  money, the power to impose 
the exploitation of  labour and deepen the class lines separating Greek society—
that big stores, banks as well as state buildings (town halls, prefecture buildings, 
ministries) were attacked, burnt down, or occupied. So, we could speak of  a 
dominant and widespread anti-cop, anti-state, anti-capitalist feeling. Even 
the intellectuals of  the left acknowledged the class element of  the rebellion 
and some mainstream newspapers admitted that “young people’s rage” was 
 119
not expressed only because of  police violence. The cops were rather the most 
visible and crudest tip of  an iceberg made of  government corruption scandals, 
a security-surveillance state—armoured after the 2004 Olympics—that does 
not even hesitate to shoot in cold blood, a continuous attack on wages, an 
increase of  working-class reproduction costs through the gradual demolition of  
the previous pension and health system, a deterioration of  work conditions and 
an increase of  precarious jobs and unemployment, a load of  overwork imposed 
on high school and university students, a tremendous destruction of  nature, a 
glamorous façade consisting of  abstract objects of  desire in malls and on TV 
ads, obtainable only if  you endure a huge amount of  exploitation and anxiety. 
In the first days of  the revolt you could almost smell all these reasons in the air 
and then a lot of  texts, articles, leaflets followed, written both by insurgents or 
sympathizers and “commentators” to acknowledge that there was “something 
deeper.” This “deeper thing” that everybody was talking about was the need to 
overcome the individual isolation from real, communal life [gemeinwesen], an 
isolation that all the above historical reasons have created.3 
Six months later it is still important for us to lay emphasis on 
this last point because many comrades abroad think that the move-
ment only attacked the cops and the institutions of  control—the “tip of  
the iceberg.” The rebellious experience was more than that. It was the 
common activity of  an emerging subversive undercurrent that knows 
that—alongside the sphere of  immediate production—school, family, 
consumption, politics, prison, and the police do produce and reproduce 
classes. The rebellious experience, the material community of  strug-
gle against normalisation—when one deviant individual became the 
mediator of  another deviant individual, a real social being—mediated 
emotions and thought and created a proletarian public sphere. This 
open sphere is the necessary presupposition of  the decisive moment of  
social subversion: the communisation of  the means of  production and 
intercourse. But this decisive moment, the point of  no return, was never 
reached. After all, this was just the rebellious passage of  a proletarian 
minority through a brief  period of  time and not a revolution. However 
the feeling that there lay “something deeper” in all that, the idea that 
the issues raised by the rebels concerned everybody was so dominant 
that it alone explains the helplessness of  the parties of  the opposition, 
leftist organisations—even some anarchists as mentioned before. 
Here, just because high school and university students were 
such a significant subject of  the rebellion, we should be more analytical 
about the load of  overwork imposed on them that we mentioned be-
fore. Education, as the main capitalist institution that shapes, qualifies, 
and allocates the labour-power commodity in a continuously develop-
ing capitalist division of  labour, has been expanding in terms of  student 
population since the 1960s in Greece. This development has given rise 
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to new “popular” demands, expectations, opportunities of  social mo-
bility, and individual “successes.” It has also led to the accumulation 
of  tensions and contradictions, frustrations, and individual “failures” 
(also called “failures of  the schooling system”). The mass production 
of  expectations (and the corresponding rise in white-collar proletar-
ians and new petit-bourgeois strata in the 1970s and 80s) caused by 
the democratisation and expansion of  education created an inevitable 
structural crisis in the hierarchical division of  labour and a crisis of  
discipline and meaning in school; in other words, a legitimisation crisis 
that hit state education hard. No matter what you call this crisis—a 
“crisis of  legitimacy,” a “crisis in the selective-allocating role of  edu-
cation,” a “crisis of  expectations,” or a “crisis in the correspondence 
of  qualifications to career opportunities”—the truth is that education 
has been seriously crisis-ridden. As the recent massive student move-
ment of  2006–2007 showed, this situation has exploded. It is possible 
to understand both that movement and the rebellion if  we see them as 
expressions of  the accumulated dissatisfaction a whole generation of  
working-class youth has been experiencing since the previous reforms 
in the 1990s. These reforms were instrumental in imposing intensified 
work rates in the school and in the realm of  proper wage labour. This 
generation could not be stopped from expressing its discontent for a life 
that is increasingly characterised by insecurity and fear. At the same 
time, they revolted against an everyday activity that looks similar to any 
other kind of  work. This revolt against student labour was given a boost 
by a significant number of  students who already directly experience 
exploitation and alienation as proper wage labourers.
SOME FORMS OF ORGANISATION THAT CAME OUT OF THE 
REBELLION
From the first day of  the rebellion three universities in the centre of  
Athens were occupied and were used effectively as “red bases” of  the 
movement from which subversive actions were organised4 and where 
rebels could seek refuge if  necessary. These occupations ended just be-
fore Christmas. In direct communication with them, several local as-
semblies appeared gradually, linked to occupations of  public buildings 
in some neighbourhoods. As we said in the same text mentioned above:
In all these activities, the common new characteristic was an attempt to 
“open up” the rebellion towards the neighbourhoods. These assemblies were 
understood as “neighbourhood assemblies of  struggle” or “people’s assemblies,” 
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as they were called. In most cases, there appeared distinct tendencies inside 
this social “opening,” particularly as the rebellion was simmering down. One 
tendency wanted to organize a community of  struggle broadening the issues of  
the rebellion, another one preferred a kind of  activity more orientated towards 
dealing with local matters on a steady basis. In the beginning, the assemblies 
looked pretty innovative and lively. There was not a formal procedure of  
decision-making or majority rule and initiatives were encouraged. However, 
by the end of  January, the occupations of  buildings—whether public, union 
or municipal ones—did not flourish any more.… There was a lot of  sympathy 
and interest for the insurgents but very little active involvement on the part of  
the “population.”5
Some of  these assemblies are still going on but with fewer and 
fewer people involved, mainly activists. Their main interests nowadays 
are the expression of  solidarity with those prosecuted by the state and 
with immigrants, the defence of  the occupied spaces in the city, as well 
as the organisation of  several activities connected to current struggles 
(e.g. the new anti-motorway movement). 
THE SPECTACULAR SEPARATION OF ARMED “STRUGGLE”
The need to mediate proletarian anger politically, even if  it is to medi-
ate it with an armed mediation, was not something that stemmed from 
the struggle itself  but it was something that was being imposed on 
the struggle from the outside and afterwards. In the beginning there 
were two attacks by the so-called “armed vanguard,” one on 23 De-
cember after the peak of  the rebellion and one on 5 January, when 
the resurgence of  the rebellion was at stake. From a proletarian point 
of  view even if  these attacks were not organised by the state itself, the 
fact that after a month all of  us became spectators of  those “exem-
plary acts,” that had not at all been part of  our collective practice, was 
a defeat in itself. The “armed vanguard” avoids admitting not only 
that they were not the first ones to target the police but also that no 
“armed vanguard,” anywhere, has forced the police from the streets, 
or frightened individual cops from carrying their official identities with 
them for a few days. They can’t admit that they were surpassed by the 
movement. Claiming that there is “a need to upgrade” violence, the 
so-called “armed vanguard” essentially tries to downgrade the socially 
and geographically diffused proletarian violence and violation of  the 
law; the latter are the true opponents of  the “armed vanguard” within 
the movement and, as long as such practices go on, no intervention-
ism of  “upgrading” things can find a fertile soil. It is on that basis that 
the armed struggle allies with the state: both are challenged by the 
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proletarian subversive activity, the continuation of  which constitutes a 
threat to the existence of  both.
The proletarian subversive activity in the rebellion gained a 
temporary but not so superficial victory: an insubordination that weak-
ened the security-surveillance state for a month and proved that we can 
change power relations. This became possible since the rebels targeted 
the social relations in which they are forced to live, something that no 
“armed vanguard” has ever managed to do. 
Considering the range and intensity of  all the December 
events, the state repressive apparatus proved practically weak. Since 
they had to deal with a de-legitimisation of  the institutions of  control 
and not just bullets and grenades, the infamous zero tolerance became 
a simple tolerance towards the rebels’ activities. The state counterattack 
could actually become successful in January only by making use of  the 
“armed vanguard” operations: first, on an ideological level, by equating 
the state murder with the wounding of  a riot cop, thus re-legitimising 
the police and the security-surveillance state in general. Secondly, on 
an operational level, intensifying its repression. They even exploited the 
place of  the attack (Exarcheia), presenting the rebellion as a spectacular 
vendetta between cops and “anarchists,” as a grotesque and banal per-
formance staged in a political ghetto. 
As the rebellion was dying away there was a notable prolifera-
tion of  attacks against banks and state buildings by several groups that 
cannot be placed in the same category with the “armed vanguard’s” 
“deeds,” since most of  them do not claim to be part of  the actual 
movement (although they do not necessarily lack a voluntaristic or ar-
rogant posture). 
However, the return of  the “armed vanguard” proper with 
the execution of  an anti-terrorist-squad cop in early June 2009, when 
even the memory of  the rebellion had weakened, has given militarism 
and the escalation of  pure violence a pretext to present themselves as 
an attractive alternative to a portion of  those who participated in the 
rebellion—if  we are to judge by the political tolerance of  the anti-au-
thoritarian milieu towards this action. The limited class composition of  
the rebellion, its restricted extension beyond the level of  the de-legiti-
misation of  the security-surveillance state and the gradual weakening 
of  several communal projects in the centre and the neighbourhoods—
mostly in Athens—led to the flourishing of  a separated kind of  blind 
violence as a dangerous caricature of  “struggle,” or rather a substitute. 
As certain important subjects of  the rebellion were gradually leaving 
the stage (the high school students, the university students, the immi-
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grants), its social content got weaker and weaker and political identities 
were again strengthened as was previously the norm. The violence of  
the “armed vanguard” is just one of  these political identities, even in 
its naive and nihilistic form, appearing in an era of  a generalised crisis 
of  reproduction when the state and capital are unable to offer any so-
cial democratic type of  “remedy” to heal the wounds of  the rebellion. 
It’s not important for us now to doubt the real identity of  these hit 
men with the ridiculous but revealing name “Revolutionary Sect”; what 
causes us some concern is the political tolerance of  some quarters to-
wards them, given the fact that it’s the first time that in a Greek “armed 
vanguard” text there’s not one grain of  even the good old Leninist “for 
the people” ideology but instead an antisocial, nihilistic bloodlust. The 
crisis of  neoliberalism, as a certain phase of  capitalist accumulation 
and legitimisation crisis, seems to lead to a deeper crisis (even to serious 
signs of  social decomposition) and not to any signs of  revival of  reform-
ism. Even the recent electoral failure of  the governing party combined 
with the high percentage of  election abstention (the highest ever in an 
excessively politicised country like Greece), which was an indirect result 
of  the legitimisation crisis that the rebellion expressed and deepened, 
have not led to any concessions on the part of  the state. With all its own 
limits, the rebellion made the limits of  capitalist integration even more 
visible than before. The slogan “communism or capitalist civilisation” 
seems timely more than ever. 
THE REBELLION, THE WORKPLACES, AND THE RANK AND FILE 
UNIONS
To discuss the reasons why the rebellion did not extend to the places of  
waged labour—a question often asked by comrades abroad—we need 
first to be more analytical about certain segments of  the proletariat. 
From our empirical knowledge, those workers who can be described 
either as “workers with a stable job” or non-precarious, had very lim-
ited participation in the rebellion—if  any. For those stable workers who 
actually took part in the rebellion to try to extend it to their workplac-
es would mean engaging in wildcat strikes outside and against trade 
unions since most strikes are called and controlled by them, although 
their prestige has been undermined for a long time now. In the last 
twenty years many strikes have been called in the public sector (educa-
tion, public utility services, some ministries). These past struggles have 
shown that the workers were not able to create autonomous forms of  
organization and let new contents emerge beyond the trade unionist 
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demands. Occupations of  workplaces have only taken place as defen-
sive struggles against closures or relocations, mostly of  textile factories. 
But even those, as well as most strikes, in the previous years have by and 
large ended in defeat.
Capitalism in Greece is characterised by a low concentration of  
capital resulting in many small firms where even fewer than ten people 
are employed and there is almost no unionism. The precarious waged 
workers, one of  the main parties involved in the rebellion, who mainly 
work in such places, do not consider them to be a terrain of  proletarian 
power and mobilisation. In most cases these workers are not attached to 
their job. Possibly it was precisely their inability or even unwillingness 
to mobilise on the job that made young precarious workers take to the 
streets. Moreover, like we said before, this first urban rebellion in Greece 
was, like all modern urban rebellions, a violent eruption of  de-legitimi-
sation of  capitalist institutions of  control and, what is more, a short-lived 
experience of  a communal life against separations and outside the work-
places—with the notable exception of  the universities and the munici-
pality of  Aghios Dimitrios. In the case of  precarious workers, extending 
the rebellion to their workplaces would mean wildcats and occupations 
and nothing less. Given the practical possibilities there and their subjec-
tive disposition, such activity was both unfeasible and undesirable. 
However, many rebels realized these limits and tried to make 
such a leap. The occupation of  the central offices of  the General Con-
federation of  Labour of  Greece (GSEE) stemmed from the need for 
workplace action and to undermine the media coverage of  the rebellion 
as a “youth protest at the expense of  the workers’ interests.” Besides, it 
offered an opportunity to expose the undermining role of  GSEE itself  
in the rebellion. The initiative was taken by some members of  the rank 
and file union of  couriers, who are mostly anti-authoritarians. Howev-
er, during the occupation it became obvious that even the rank and file 
version of  unionism could not relate to the rebellion. There were two, 
although not clear-cut, tendencies even at the preparation assembly: a 
unionist-workerist one and a proletarian one. For the unionist-worker-
ist tendency the occupation should have had a distinct “worker” char-
acter as opposed to the so-called youth or “metropolitan” character of  
the rebellion, while those in the second tendency saw the occupation 
as only one moment of  the rebellion, as an opportunity to attack one 
more institution of  capitalist control and as a meeting point of  high-
school students, university students, unemployed, waged workers, and 
immigrants, that is as one more community of  struggle in the context 
of  the general unrest. In fact, the unionist-workerist tendency tried to 
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use the occupation rather as an instrument of  the union, and the idea 
of  a base unionism, independent of  political influences, in general. 
This didn’t work. That’s why some of  them remained there just for 
two days.
As far as the rest of  the “independent” left unions are con-
cerned, things were even worse. There was only one assembly of  trade 
unionists in the Faculty of  Law on December 10th where several left 
bureaucrats stressed the need for a “political prospect” in the rebellion, 
meaning a political and unionist mediation expressed in a list of  mostly 
populist demands. They rejected any proposals for violent action and 
pompously called for extraordinary general assemblies and agitation at 
the workplaces for a general strike after one week—needless to say that 
nothing of  the sort was ever tried.
In January the media workers that had participated actively in 
the rebellion occupied the offices of  the corporatist journalists’ trade 
union. The Union of  Editors of  the Daily Newspapers of  Athens (ES-
IEA) is the main journalists’ trade union in Greece. It includes jour-
nalists from the major Athenian newspapers—many of  whom are, at 
the same time, employers because they are TV producers or they own 
newspapers—but it excludes those journalists who work with precari-
ous contracts or are hired as “freelancers.” The occupation of  ESIEA 
focused broadly on two issues: the first was work relations, in particular 
the widespread precariousness in the media industry and the fragment-
ed form of  union organisation of  the media workers; the second was 
the control of  information by the official media, the way the revolt was 
reported by them, and how counter-information could be produced by 
the movement. 
After the end of  the occupation the same people created an 
assembly of  media workers, students, and unemployed that organised 
a series of  actions against layoffs or attempted layoffs at various work-
places, and reported on demos and other activities of  the movement 
in a way that was against the dominant propaganda. Many members 
of  this assembly are former students of  the Faculty of  Mass Media 
and Communication and took part in the students’ movement against 
the university reform in 2006–07. Some of  them had for years at-
tempted to create a new union that would include all media workers. 
Right now workers of  the media industry are organised in fifteen dif-
ferent unions (photographers, journalists, camera operators, clerical 
staff, etc.) The idea is to create a union that will include all workers, 
regardless of  their position, from cleaners to journalists, and their 
labour contract, from full-time employees to “freelancers.” Recently 
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they tried to coordinate their activity with that of  the laid off  workers 
of  the newspaper Eleftheros Typos. 
On 22 December in Petralona, an old working-class neigh-
bourhood in Athens, a Bulgarian immigrant cleaner, Konstantina Ku-
neva, the General Secretary of  the Janitors Union (PEKOP-All Attica 
Union for Janitors and Home Service Personnel), was the victim of  
an attack with sulphuric acid by goons of  the bosses while returning 
home from her workplace, a railroad station of  the ISAP public utility 
(Athens-Pireaus Electric Trains). She was seriously wounded, losing 
the use of  one eye and of  her vocal chords and, at the time of  writing, 
she is still in hospital. It is worth mentioning that she had also visited 
the occupation of  GSEE since her previous activities had led her to a 
confrontation with the leadership of  the confederation bureaucracy. 
The attack on Konstantina took place a couple of  days after the end 
of  the occupation of  GSEE and that was one of  the reasons why there 
was such an unprecedented mobilisation of  people. After the attack 
a “solidarity assembly” was formed. Using direct action tactics, they 
organised a series of  actions (occupation of  the headquarters of  ISAP, 
demos, sabotage of  the ticket machines so that the commuters could 
travel for free). The assembly, despite its internal divisions, played a 
vital role in inspiring a remarkable solidarity movement that expanded 
throughout Greece, demanding not only the prosecution of  the per-
petrators and the instigators but also the abolition of  subcontracting 
altogether. We should add here that outsourcing cleaning services has 
become the norm for public sector companies and that these compa-
nies do not hire cleaners any more: contractors are now the employers 
of  thousands of  janitors, mainly female immigrants, who clean hun-
dreds of  public utilities, hospitals, rail road stations, schools, universi-
ties, and other public buildings. Regarding the character of  cleaning 
sector jobs however, these were always precarious and until recently 
it was regarded normal and natural for a woman to be a janitor or 
home service worker. Moreover by equating subcontracting or pre-
cariousness in general with “slavery,” the majority of  this solidarity 
movement (mainly comprised of  leftist union activists) tried to equate 
certain struggles against precariousness—one of  the main forms of  
the capitalist restructuring in this historical moment—with general 
political demands. These were of  a social-democratic content, under-
standing the state to be a “reliable” and preferable employer to private 
subcontractors and thus putting the question of  the abolition of  wage 
labour per se aside.
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THE DEPRESSION IN NUMBERS, THE STATE STRATEGIES, AND THE 
CLASS 
As we said in the beginning, the signs of  the depression in Greece were 
evident from last year already. In order to have a clearer idea of  the 
signs and the consequences of  the most recent phase of  the crisis, some 
data concerning the situation of  the working class are necessary.
 According to Eurostat, Greece had the highest percentage 
of  the population living in households that had mortgages in arrears. 
According to a study by the Bank of  Greece in 2007, 6 out of  10 Greek 
households had been in arrears with mortgages, 7 out of  10 had been 
in arrears with consumer loans, and 1 out of  2 had been in arrears 
with credit cards. Apart from credit, 7 out of  10 households had been 
in arrears with rent and 6 out of  10 had been in arrears with utility 
bills. The number of  households on credit exceeded 51%, meaning 
that 2.15 million use some kind of  credit. So it is evident that taking 
recourse to credit has started reaching its limits. As far as wages and 
unemployment are concerned, indices are also revealing. 50% of  
waged workers received less than €1,030 gross. The basic wage in 
Greece is the lowest one in Western Europe (50% of  the EE-15 wages). 
Youth unemployment reached 25.7% in 2008 and, as far as women are 
concerned, they are the most hard hit by unemployment in Europe. 
About 800,000 workers fall within the so-called 500 euro generation: 
300,000 of  them are “freelancers;” 295,000 work part-time; 180,000 
were officially unemployed in 2008; and 80,000 people were expected 
to join the state Stage programmes (extremely low paid jobs at the 
public or private sector without social security and which supposedly 
offer training) for the years 2008–09.
 In the first quarter of  2009, Greece’s rate of  growth was just 
above zero because of  a decrease of  investment of  private capital, but 
stabilised there only through state investments. Due to the depression 
160,000 people have become redundant and that number is about to 
increase to 300,000, mainly in small and very small firms.
In certain sectors now the situation is as follows: In the shipping 
trade a lot of  sailors have not been paid while their wages will be frozen. 
The public sector workers will have their wages frozen too. In industry 
and in textile factories, in particular, redundancies of  permanent and 
contract workers, a shorter working week with less pay, and delay of  
payment have both become more and more common. In the construc-
tion sector there is a high rate of  unemployment and a 17% decrease 
in production. Tourism, the sector with the biggest share in GNP, has 
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already been hit with high rates of  unemployment and a 9% drop in 
tourist arrivals.
 Although the situation is certainly bleak, workers’ reactions 
have been less than moderate and certainly too weak to counterattack 
the capitalist restructuring. There have been quite a few mobilisations in 
response to the mass layoffs, to delay payments or closures of  companies, 
mostly in the form of  short strikes or work-stoppages in some factories. 
Quite a few occupations of  factories or companies (in a paper mill, a 
telecommunication company, and a furniture factory) were isolated and 
did not create contacts with other laid-off  workers; the path of  bilateral 
agreements between the workers and the company or the Ministry of  
Labour is preferred instead. It seems that in most cases the management 
of  the depression/restructuring is of  a standard pattern. While 
precarious workers just get fired, those older workers agree to resign 
and wait for early retirement. Thus no mass layoffs are visible while the 
state “guarantees” these social expenses now only to announce again the 
“collapse of  the social security system” later—a recurring state motto 
of  the last twenty years—which would entail “new sacrifices” and so on 
and so forth. Such a trick can prove valuable for the state at the moment, 
since it can save time and postpone a generalised explosion. But for how 
long? And how many can be satisfied with such manoeuvres?
 In fact, while the depression/restructuring is deepening and 
capital and the state reduce the direct and indirect wage while increasing 
precariousness and layoffs, they are trapped in a vicious circle whereby 
they are compelled to let the legitimisation crisis deepen even more. At the 
same time as the “war on terrorism” is still ongoing, trying to deal violently 
with the accumulated problems of  the previous phase of  neoliberal war 
deregulation,6 the Greek state (that has troops in central Asia) is currently 
“raided” with floods of  refugees that it, itself  contributed in creating. 
Faced with the nightmare of  a new December, fiercer this time as the 
crisis prolongs, and with the undesired masses of  thousands of  “surplus 
proletarians” from Asia and Africa, it only has one card to put on the 
table: the strengthening of  its repressive mechanisms that triggered the 
December rebellion and created the dangerous mixture of  both native 
and immigrant riots in the first place! Yet its recourse to discipline and the 
intensification of  its zero tolerance dogma is inescapable since no social 
democratic strategies for the extended reproduction of  the proletariat can 
be proposed any more. Selling “security” to natives against “invading” 
foreigners used as scapegoats has been the only “social offer” on the part 
of  the state. Indeed, new divisions are on the agenda through the creation 
of  new “folk devils” and “moral panics.”
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In the beginning of  March, after a cop got killed during an 
armed robbery, many high-ranking police officers warned about the rap-
id increase of  armed robberies since January (almost forty each month) 
attributing this both to the release of  many convicts (as a measure to 
relieve congestion in prisons) and the “disruption” caused in December.
It was then that the launching of  new repressive laws, passed 
just recently, started being discussed. First, in order to “protect police 
prestige,” an old legislation, introduced during the dictatorship in the 
’30s, was put in practice again against the crime of  “defamation of  
authority.” The famous slogan of  the rebellion, “cops, killers, pigs,” can 
now lead ex-officio up to a two-year imprisonment. A second legisla-
tion targeting the December rebels refers to the “faking of  one’s facial 
features,” meaning practically the use of  hooded outfits. Along with the 
formation of  new police forces and more regular patrols, these acts aim 
at more than a counter-attack on the favourite symbols of  the rebellion. 
The demonisation of  the “hooded rioters,” starting with anti-authori-
tarians and anarchists, increases separations among the rebels and be-
tween the rebels and the rest of  the proletarians who remained passive 
during the rebellion. If  the penalties imposed were not that serious one 
could be tempted to laugh at the furious effort of  the state to deal with 
a social rebellion on the level of  its slogans and dress code! 
Exploiting the generalised sense of  social insecurity that the 
capitalist crisis itself  has created, the second “enemy” fabricated by 
the state are the refugees and illegal immigrants that suffocate in the 
“hybrid ghetto” of  Athens. The repression mechanisms do know that 
a large part of  the revolting multitude that took over Athens streets 
those December days and nights and again in May during a Muslim 
small-scale riot consisted of  immigrants hailing from nearby neigh-
bourhoods. This “ghetto,” mainly situated within the historical inner 
city, resembles the American ghettos in aspects such as the “vertical 
segregation” among inhabitants—in other words the non-uniform so-
cial character, or the policies of  “planned shrinkage.” It also resembles 
the West-European working-class suburbs in aspects such as the multi-
racial/ethnic mixture. The above-mentioned similarities, or better said 
analogies, should of  course be treated with caution especially due to the 
rather large differences in scale. A media barrage full of  passionate arti-
cles and heart-breaking TV reportages, focusing on the environmental 
and financial degradation of  the inner city neighbourhoods, which was 
mostly related to the uncontrolled/unorganised housing of  thousands 
of  illegal immigrants, the presence of  junkies, prostitutes, and other 
“lumpen” proletariat, signalled the first phase of  this new warfare. It 
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should be noted though that this media barrage had started a bit before 
December’s uprising. 
The second phase was a far more direct and violent one. Physi-
cal attacks on immigrants and people supporting them by members of  a 
neo-Nazi group were coupled with massive arrests by the police, which 
led to imprisonments and deportations. Local assemblies of  right-wing 
“indignant citizens” and petit-bourgeois merchants, organised by the 
only parliamentary ultra-right-wing party have protested against the 
presence of  immigrants in their neighbourhoods and have even taken 
direct action against them, as in the blockage of  one local playground 
where lots of  immigrant children used to play while their parents hung 
around. Moreover, under the pretext of  “public health protection,” lots 
of  old and/or abandoned buildings in the inner city area where thou-
sands of  immigrants are lodged had been registered and then evacua-
tion orders were issued. Here, the constant “clean sweep operations” 
against immigrants and “lumpen” in the centre of  Athens must also be 
seen as an effort to gentrify those areas in the “historical centre” that 
still remain “undeveloped” and resist turning into expensive, sterile, 
museum-like non places like in most West-European cities. 
Apart from all this, the Greek government has also announced 
that it plans to construct eleven “concentration camps” all over the 
country, similar to those already established in Italy, where arrested im-
migrants will be detained while waiting for their deportation. It recently 
passed a new legislation whereby the time of  detaining illegal immi-
grants until deportation rises to six or twelve months and any foreigner 
who is charged with committing a crime that carries a prison sentence 
of  three months or more can be deported immediately, classified as 
“dangerous for public order and safety.”
The recent speech of  the Greek prime minister who linked 
“criminality” to “illegal” immigrants and “hooded rioters” points to 
a continuation of  the—already failed—neoliberal management of  the 
crisis; the reinvention and demonisation of  the “dangerous classes” is 
to be used as a weapon for the further division and discipline of  the 
proletariat in order to accept the deterioration of  its living conditions 
because of  the restructuring. However, the list of  “criminals” may 
broaden dangerously and include in the near future those who were 
just “sympathetic” towards the rebels in December. Since the “social 
contract” has been breached but no return to the previous social demo-
cratic strategies appears on the horizon, the capitalist social relation 
cannot be adequately reproduced and maybe those “sympathisers” will 
have a million reasons to prove right the fears of  the planetary bosses 
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about the December rebellion as a prelude to a generalised proletarian 
explosion in the course of  the global crisis of  reproduction. 
TPTG, June 2009
NOTES
1 The Permanent Crisis in Education at http://www.tapaidiatisgalarias.org/?page_
id=105.
2 See our chronology of  the December events at http://www.tapaidiatisgalarias.
org/?page_id=105.
3 Like a Winter with a Thousand Decembers at http://www.tapaidiatisgalarias.
org/?page_id=105.
4 Some of  them—expropriations, acts of  sabotage, etc.—are mentioned in our 
chronology of  the December events, see above. 
5 Like a Winter with a Thousand Decembers.
6 See our text War, Peace and the Crisis of  Reproduction of  Human Capital, Part 
B: The “War on Terror” (2003) at http://www.tapaidiatisgalarias.org/?page_id=105.
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INTRODUCTION
It is not that we want to remember December in this way; it’s just that 
it really was something phenomenal. All of  a sudden, an entire country 
was only discussing and thinking about the assassination of  Alexandros 
Grigoropoulos and the reactions that followed. The wave of  mobilisa-
tions was so strong that it paralysed—quite literally—the heart of  Ath-
ens for days: in the commercial centre of  the city, shops were shut and 
no one at all would wander around aimlessly. Of  course, the images 
were the same in most other Greek cities.
What made this event so special? How can anyone explain why 
Korkoneas’s finger triggered the largest and most explosive mobilisa-
tion (a true revolt) in recent Greek history? Many interpretations have 
been offered already, largely based on the notion that the two bullets that 
killed Alexandros were simply the final straw on the camel’s back. A mob 
that was out of  control took to the streets, first full of  compressed anger 
and then, a few days later, full of  angry creativity. People revolted for all 
the reasons in the world: for the political scandals revealed in a domino 
fashion, for their gross exploitation and muck-around by power… 
In this article, however, we want to put these causes aside and 
look at another aspect, one that, we feel, has been examined to a much 
lesser degree: that is, the mediums of  the revolt. We want to talk about 
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the contribution of  counter-information to the revolt—what we feel is 
the most valuable tool in the hands of  the antagonist movement. We 
also want to discuss the facts introduced by new technologies, facts that 
are new to the antagonist movement as a whole. In other words we 
want to interpret how and to what extent new mediums of  communica-
tion can contribute to our social movements and whether they can alter 
the forms of  struggle, of  coordination, and of  organising and we want 
to do so, of  course, by focusing on the recent Greek example.
We decided to approach the matter collectively and based on 
our personal experiences with the hope that we would put some vivid 
images to paper. Starting with a historical overview of  counter-infor-
mation in Greece, that mostly covers the period from the mid-1970s to 
the end of  the 1990s, we reach year 2002, which is when the first IMCs 
(Independent Media Centres) were launched in Athens and Thessalon-
iki. Everyone would admit that the landscape of  the movement’s com-
munications was radically reshaped that year—regardless of  whether 
they would support the new reality in question. Having painted a pic-
ture of  counter-information in Greece during the past few years we 
then use this as a starting point from which to make some estimates 
about the role of  counter-information during December’s days of  re-
volt. Did the new mediums of  communication contribute to the spread 
of  the revolt? Would mobilisations of  such scale be possible without 
these new technologies? The aim of  making these questions is not of  
course to remain at the level of  pure theoretical analyses, but rather to 
use a lively example as this in order to gain tools and understandings 
that will strengthen our struggle for individual and social emancipation.
COUNTER-INFORMATION IN TIME
It is necessary to sketch a historical overview of  mediums of  counter-
information in order to fully understand how they functioned in De-
cember as well as the needs that gave birth to them. First of  all, the 
term “counter-information” is not an officially recognized one. When 
we say “counter-information,” we mean information “from below.” In 
other words, we mean that on the one hand there exists dominant in-
formation that offers the view of  authority on events—and often even 
shapes them. On the other hand, there are parts of  the society that 
are competitive and hostile toward authority and that organise their 
own channels of  information in order to promote their own, essentially 
class-based interests. There are then two main elements in what we 
name counter-information: first, it is organised from below and, sec-
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ond, it serves the needs of  the movement that is competitive and hostile 
toward authority and by extension, it stands in competition with main-
stream media since the latter serves the interests of  authority. 
The anarchist milieu in Greece started to formulate in an organised 
manner after the fall of  the dictatorship (1967–1974), in the last years 
of  the 1970s. During that time there was a liberal sentiment in the 
Greek society inspired by the French May ’68 but also by the great 
revolt of  the Athens Polytechnic in 1973. At this time the first collective 
attempts for the publication of  magazines and newspapers started 
springing up carrying updates on current affairs from the viewpoint of  
the anarchists, along with translated texts from the anarchist movement 
mostly in Western Europe and North America. These first attempts 
were truly noteworthy and important since for the first time since WWII, 
the anarchist perspective on history and reality made its appearance 
within the Greek antagonist movement. It must be noted that these first 
publication attempts were always short-lived with no regular presence 
and small print-runs. They were aimed primarily at a small readership, 
mostly of  a young age, and in the country’s largest cities.
A core element of  the anarchist milieu was that aside from theo-
retical work, it would try to put its ideas into practice. In the 1980s there 
were the first attempts to occupy abandoned buildings. These sites, apart 
from other intended usages (public events, concerts, etc.) acted as per-
manent nodes of  counter-information. Those attending the occupations 
would be informed about events, discuss and exchange opinions, and 
collectively form positions. At the same time, by putting together many 
open social events, the occupiers would try to reach out to their neigh-
bourhoods, to publicise their opinions, and therefore invert the image 
created by the dominant mass media about anarchists.
Understanding the importance and the necessity for counter-
information the anarchists went one step further. Groups and collec-
tives would publish posters, distribute brochures, use public address 
systems to inform people of  current affairs in crowded public locations, 
and spray paint messages in the streets. In central Athens and other 
Greek cities, many walls are covered with graffiti and stencils portraying 
anarchist and anti-authoritarian messages.
In other words, up until the early years of  the new millennium 
the counter-information of  the anarchist milieu would seep out into 
public discourse through the cracks that its own actions opened up in 
the slick veneer of  dominant propaganda. Despite the repression it 
was subjected to, it repeatedly aimed at social communication while 
at the same time sending strong messages to the political and financial 
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elite. Whenever the level of  violence was increased from the side of  
the state, the anarchist milieu would upgrade the characteristics of  its 
own actions to make its voice heard louder: from symbolic occupations 
of  public buildings and radio stations to mass “hit and run” actions 
of  even 200 people, or simultaneous attacks against multiple targets, 
at day or night, against ministries, financial institutions—the message 
itself  would become the target.
In the Greek territory there exists a strong tradition of  armed 
struggle, one which continues today. This form of  action has not always 
come solely from the anarchists or the far-left; during the dictatorship, 
even social democrats would commit bombing actions. For example, the 
socialist ex-prime minister (1996–2003) Costas Simitis participated in 
armed struggle groups during those years, which aimed at the fall of  the 
regime and the installation of  a bourgeois democracy in its place. Armed 
struggle was therefore used as a medium of  propaganda and counter-
information by many groups despite the sharp critique they received at 
times by parts of  the anarchist milieu, concerning their negative impact.
After each action such armed struggle groups would issue a 
communiqué that was, in most cases, published in the bourgeois press. 
Yet some groups preferred to distribute their texts through a network of  
people, for example the guerrilla group Revolutionary Popular Struggle 
(Epanastatikos Laikos Agonas, ELA), which acted in the country for 
approximately twenty years (1975–1995), and infrequently issued the 
journal Counter-Information (Antipliroforisi).
ANARCHIST MILIEU AND MASS MEDIA
After the restoration of  bourgeois democracy in 1974, bourgeois media 
were divided in two camps, broadly the “conservative” and the “pro-
gressive” ones. The first represented the right, ex-king sympathisers, 
junta sympathisers, and right-wing nationalists. We would undoubtedly 
file Rizospastis (meaning “the uprooter”), the newspaper published by 
the Stalinist KKE under this category. These media treat anarchists as 
“enemies of  the nation,” “traitors,” or even “deviant provocateurs” (a 
favourite expression of  Rizospastis). They ask for the repression and 
imprisonment of  anarchists and, if  possible, their disappearance from 
the face of  the Earth.
For the progressive media that belong mostly to social-dem-
ocrats and the non-Stalinist left, the situation is altogether different. 
Anarchists are often treated with sympathy, sometimes as quaint and 
other times as deviant children. The anarchist milieu has contact with 
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some of  these newspapers. Some journalists personally know anarchists 
and these connections are often utilised—for example in order for an 
anarchist communiqué to be printed, or for a more favourable stance to 
be taken on a particular issue.
Until the end of  the 1980s there were only state-run TV sta-
tions in Greece, for which the anarchist milieu was non-existent. There 
only were minor references to anarchism in periods of  mass turbulence. 
The means for any kind of  non-studio TV coverage were extremely 
limited at the time. Things would start to radically change following the 
emergence of  private TV stations in the late 1980s.
Certain types of  anarchist action, such as the “spectacle” of-
fered by Molotov cocktails and flaming barricades, would quickly be-
come a favourite topic for private television stations. Coverage of  such 
events was extensive and would often reach beyond of  the country’s 
borders; for example, the riots during the visit of  US president Bill Clin-
ton in 1999 were covered internationally. Of  course, this coverage was 
always accompanied by misinformation, slander, and the omitting of  
the true reasons behind the actions. The image of  the anarchists to the 
wider social strata was prey to the mass media. Supposedly “friendly” 
media would turn their back on the anarchist milieu at crucial moments 
in order to serve, as expected, their class interests.
The role and the power of  mass media did not go unnoticed 
by anarchist and anti-authoritarian collectives. Discussions were held, 
analyses of  the phenomenon were written, and for many years the han-
dling of  information, journalism, and mass media was a main topic of  
discussion. Nearly all anarchist collectives were quick to form a common 
stance massively against mass media, refusing any transaction with them 
and criticising the supposed dichotomy of  “good” and “bad” mass me-
dia. This critique was to take a material form in the early ’90s. At that 
time, professional photo-journalists, reporters, and TV camera crews 
switched positions at demonstrations: while before they would stand on 
the side of  those demonstrating when photographing and documenting 
the events, they moved behind the lines of  the police, as their cameras 
had, by that point, become a target of  the demonstrators.
Meanwhile, the end of  the decade saw a spectacular rise of  in-
ternet use in the country as much as abroad. By this fact alone, the an-
tagonist social movement acquired a weapon that was to break through 
many information barriers. At the demonstrations in Seattle the inter-
net was used to the benefit of  the movement, giving birth to the Indy-
media platform. From that point on new paths and capacities opened 
up, rapidly changing the counter-information landscape.
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For a long period, of  course, the use of  the internet as a pro-
paganda medium was ignored or even demonised in Greece, since an-
archists would focus on the directness of  their message and therefore 
choose the streets and neighbourhoods as the sites of  their action. Yet 
slowly, as had happened about a century earlier with printing presses, 
the anarchist milieu would attempt to form its own internet structures, 
which it would operate under its own rules. 
THE FLAGSHIP OF COUNTER-INFORMATION: THE EXAMPLE OF      
IMC ATHENS
In order to explain the role Athens Indymedia held as one of  the main 
informational gateways of  the December revolt, we think it is vital to 
mention some facts about its earlier steps.
The first discussion about forming an Indymedia platform in 
Greece took place in July 2001 on board a ship carrying demonstrators 
who were returning to the country from the anti-capitalist demonstra-
tions in the streets of  Genova, against the G8 summit of  that year. A 
need existed, it was felt, for non-commercial information that would be 
based on a bottom-up, anti-hierarchical, and horizontal mode of  opera-
tion and be free from the manipulation and control of  information by 
established politicians and financial authorities as well as the police. And 
so, in November 2001, the first two independent media centres were 
launched in the two largest Greek cities. In practice, it was shown that 
athens.indymedia.org and thessaloniki.indymedia.org did not aim to re-
place action in the streets but rather, to act in an aiding manner in the 
revealing of  reality through the eyes of  demonstrators and activists—in 
particular, through personal accounts verified by visual material. Gradu-
ally the community of  users that was created acted as a trans-commu-
nicative node of  information, not only for demonstrations, but also for 
other events that would have otherwise been unlikely to come to light.
TURNING INDIVIDUAL SILENCES INTO A COLLECTIVE SCREAM
As the medium was becoming more well known to the anarchists and 
to leftists, mobile phones, cameras, and computers turned into informal 
weapons transmitting real time information, against all attempts for a 
cover-up. Think tanks, mostly state and police-run, were now denied the 
precious time to manage the crisis that follows the revealing of  a truth. At 
the same time this would alert mainstream media to rush to the point of  
the event in order to record images and testimonies.
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The need for counter-information beyond local boundaries 
was so enormous that soon enough the medium started being used by 
individuals and groups from other cities—and so, information coming 
straight from the movement would challenge the myth that there were 
only localised reactions to important events. Often Indymedia com-
prised a pool of  ideas and managed the coordination of  events with 
common themes and toward the same target, resulting in local struggles 
or events causing chain solidarity reactions in different parts of  Greece 
or even abroad by diaspora Greeks in coordination with local activists.
As more and more users and collectives from across Greece 
were compiling their information and political wording on the Athens 
Indymedia platform and therefore creating an assortment/combina-
tion of  political information, the medium was transformed into a main 
node of  interaction and communication with hundreds of  independent 
connecting chains. In this way, the limitations of  physical material were 
largely overcome (e.g. printing costs) and the readership of  communi-
qués, analyses, posters, etc. was dramatically increased.
Over time, various revealing events and original visual materi-
als were posted on IMC, including, for example, those that made public 
the often-occurring torturing of  migrants in police stations. Breaking 
the mainstream media oath of  silence, which would until recently refer 
to Indymedia as “the well-known website of  the anti-authoritarians.” 
Indymedia became known to an even broader audience that had little 
or no connection to anarchism, the left, or activism. With tens of  thou-
sands of  visitors per day, Athens Indymedia is today placed in the ten 
most popular websites in the country.
COUNTER-INFORMATION DURING DECEMBER: WIDENING THE 
CONTRIBUTION OF NEW MEDIUMS
When we talk about counter-information during December’s events we 
do not by any means speak of  a solid or homogeneous flow of  informa-
tion—quite the opposite. What gave shivers of  hope to some and fear 
to others was the fact that the communicative explosion—mirroring the 
explosive reality in the streets—was uncontrollable, with many nodes 
and means of  transmission, different codes, diverse transmitters and re-
ceivers. After all, the people in revolt were not a single, coherent social 
group but rather, a mosaic of  social subjects. The wealth and the width 
of  counter-information was schematically marked by this fact also: on 
the same central Athens street (Patision Ave), three occupations that 
acted as bases of  struggle set different priorities and acquired different 
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characteristics while nevertheless producing a wording that was mutu-
ally complimentary.1 
Overall, in December the entire spectrum of  communication 
mediums was utilised (banners, slogans, stencils, texts, communiqués) 
in initiatives and actions that were “transplanted” with much creativity 
from the streets to many aspects of  public life—schools, radio stations, 
theatres, the Acropolis, and so on. Here we need to add a comment con-
cerning the many communication capacities that have developed on the 
internet: corporate social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, 
YouTube, and Flickr are radically different to collectives of  independent 
media information such as Indymedia or indy.gr and to websites created 
to cover specific events from a political viewpoint (such as occupation-
specific blogs), forums, personal blogs, and so on. The aim of  this article 
is not to record or to examine the communicative ditigal explosion that 
was triggered by the assassination of  Alexis. Rather, we want to focus 
specifically on counter-information, which is first and foremost a politi-
cal act. There exists, of  course, a common denominator in all the ex-
amples above: unmediated communication. Here, the capacity exists for 
independent organising, especially because mechanisms of  authority are 
difficult to form within such network structures, since they are constantly 
evolving and largely based upon anonymity.
PANDORA’S BOX OPENS
Let us take things from the beginning, from the night of  Alexis’s mur-
der. The statistics for Athens IMC are indicative of  the strength coun-
ter-information gained, perhaps for the first time to this extent: the day 
before the murder the website had 601,313 hits; on 6 December the 
number rose to 1,380,551 and on the 7th, it sky-rocketed to 9,089,939, 
transferring 253.24 GB of  data in a single day. The explosion of  posts 
on Athens IMC, and on the Greek internet in general, can lead us 
to two initial conclusions. First, that the mainstream media was ques-
tioned—perhaps even distrusted—by a considerable part of  the Greek-
speaking audience. Second, that despite the occasional criticism against 
online counter-information networks, these had gained the trust of  a 
significant number of  internet users. Consequently, at 9:10PM on 6 De-
cember 2008, the moment young Alexis was shot by cops in the heart 
of  Exarcheia, an undefined network of  hundreds of  people who had 
acquainted themselves with the function, directness, and aim of  this 
medium was already in place. Moments after the first shock and numb-
ness when everyone found difficult to believe what had happened and 
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as rage started building up inside us all, the first news on the actual facts 
were reported on Athens IMC via a phone call—eight minutes after the 
shooting (9:18PM). This was an immediate signal for people to storm 
the streets. In order to conceptualise the counter-information network 
that had been set up, we should mention that first piece of  information, 
a mere eight minutes after the murder, came from the other side of  
Greece—from the island of  Crete.2
The news was quickly posted on several other websites (Twitter, 
indy.gr, etc.) minutes after the incident, and a vast flow of  information 
and cross-checking by witnesses and neighbours followed. In sharp con-
trast, it took no less than forty minutes for the first “breaking news” bul-
letin to appear on a private TV channel—and even this was to transmit 
the state propaganda. News bulletins would, at that point, still report 
that a group of  youngsters had harassed passing policemen by attacking 
them with sticks, stones, and Molotov cocktails and that the policemen 
fired in the air with the aim to intimidate the youths in response. To 
the contrary, eye-witnesses talked about two unprovoked shots aimed 
directly at the boy. By the time the first news bulletin was on, anarchists 
had arrived at the hospital where the boy had been taken, before strong 
police forces cordoned it off, and reported on Athens IMC his name, 
age, and that he was already dead.
People’s need for real information was such that, from that 
point onwards and throughout the revolt, the Athens IMC server would 
crash every few minutes under the burden of  so many simultaneous 
readers, besides the malevolent cyber-attacks. 
The internet however provides many alternatives, and so new 
technological platforms and cyber communication tools helped keep 
the information flowing. New technologies brought to the surface a new 
chaotic non-linear public discourse that intersected in thousands of  in-
ternet nodes: the youngest sibling of  Athens IMC, indy.gr, which has 
a more leftist approach; hundreds—if  not thousands—of  blogs by po-
litical groups and individuals; accounts on Twitter, Facebook, Youtube, 
and Flickr all interacted non-stop in sharing calls for actions, first-hand 
information, photos, and videos. In this way, a multi-dimensional and 
compact network was formed that enabled information to flow inces-
santly, even when some would temporarily crash.
THE EMPEROR IS NAKED
From the very first moments it became obvious that the mainstream 
media was unable to cope with the situation. The political and media 
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elite were quick to read the violent outburst in terms of  some sup-
posedly meaningless reflex reaction by “hooded anti-authoritarians,” 
hooligans, and other deviant groups. The extent to which the state and 
mainstream media cooperated in distorting information however, was 
only revealed in full on the next day, when a video filmed at the time of  
the murder was posted on-line. The video captured the two gunshots 
and the two policemen leaving the site on foot—which practically 
proved that there was no police car around, let alone that it had been 
attacked with Molotov cocktails, as the mainstream story would go.
A series of  texts and pictures continued to unveil the distortion 
of  the truth by the mainstream media in the next couple of  days: school 
students pelting local police stations, the police headquarters (GADA), 
and the Parliament with sour oranges and stones; migrants erecting 
barricades and expropriating stores; people of  all ages taking part in 
demonstrations and clashes; occupations in many cities and in various 
neighbourhoods of  Athens. All around one could see department stores 
and waste containers on fire, streets paved with stones and the remains 
of  Molotov cocktails, rage…
The Greek media, confined to their conventional perspective 
and dependent on systemic information sources (police, state authori-
ties, etc.) largely failed to present and interpret what was going on in a 
comprehensive way. Yet, practically speaking, it would not have been 
possible for them to have so many available cameras to film the numer-
ous simultaneous actions and clashes anyway. Some media went as far as 
to question if  a revolt was even taking place—this, at a time when police 
stations and other government buildings were coming under attack in 
many Greek cities. Their failure was of  historical significance since a lot 
of  people, and especially the newer generation, rejected them and saw 
right through them for what they really are: commercial corporations 
that distort or conceal truth for their own benefit.
As the dominant discourse seemed all the more incoherent, 
vertical information structures started losing ground to horizontal ones, 
in other words to information “from below.” The swiftness with which 
that first-hand, unmediated information and comments were published 
and disseminated affected the pace in which actions were coordinated, 
as well as the breadth of  their impact. 
School students would mainly text each other or use Twitter 
and Facebook, sending messages from friend to friend as if  it were from 
mouth to ear. Social network platforms, which are mainly associated 
with the abuse of  privacy, served as political communication nodes. 
Mobile phones also proved to be a powerful tool since they connect 
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separate networks of  people (i.e. contact lists) quickly and with no out-
sider intervention.
Nobody could have foreseen the organisation and subsequent 
massive participation in the student demonstrations of  the morning of  
Monday, 8 December, during which local police stations were attacked. 
A second example: the demonstration on Sunday, 7 December was held 
in the early afternoon only hours after the murder and had thousands 
of  participants—although it had been organised exclusively through 
the internet, phone calls, text messages, and face-to-face contact. 
Leaving the various social media groups aside, it is interesting 
to examine how counter-information made use of  the internet. The 
ventures that sprang up back in those days—regardless of  how long 
they lasted—would set up a blog and an e-communication channel 
(email, forum) and quickly network with “sibling” e-ventures. Counter-
information in December was decentralised and helped decentralise 
action in return. Each occupation became a counter-information hub 
and all these initiatives came together both on the streets and on the in-
ternet, in the form of  links. This enabled networking and the possibility 
for a massive exchange of  information.
In other words, the internet developed into the informal head-
quarters of  an information war between the “in-line-with-the-state” 
mass media and a new antagonistic subject, internet users.
Throughout the revolt, users regularly posted first-hand infor-
mation, news, and comments and coordinated interventions in the pub-
lic space. Yet when the strength and the speed in which counter-infor-
mation spreads turns from a thorn into a pointed arrow, the regime acts 
promptly to crash it. And so, on 16 January 2009, under the fear of  a 
potential resurgence of  December’s events, the Greek vice-minister of  
education, Spiridon Taliadouros, ordered on behalf  of  the government 
for the Indymedia server be tracked down and deactivated. Athens 
IMC became a favourite subject of  discussion in parliament and mass 
media during the following months. The first complaints were lodged: 
the basic accusation was that the website constituted the operation cen-
tre of  the December revolt, easily proving those in power had not quite 
understood the reasons that gave birth to the revolt. 
COUNTER-INFORMATION HUBS: THE EXAMPLE OF OCCUPIED PUBLIC 
BUILDINGS 
In the face of  the complicity seen between the state, journalists, and 
consumers of  the official propaganda, and against their common ef-
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fort to conceal and slander the struggle, those revolting occupied public 
buildings from the early days of  the revolt. Their aim was to create 
hubs for the exchange of  counter-information and the coordination of  
actions. On the actual night of  6 December, there were calls to gather 
at the central university buildings in various cities around the country. 
When the first police forces attempted to repress them, the occupations 
became permanent. As the first clashes with the forces of  repression 
began, more and more people gathered at these occupations. 
News of  clashes outside these buildings started to circulate 
around the media and the internet. As access to the buildings them-
selves became increasingly difficult, due to the presence of  forces of  
repression around them, people started occupying new buildings in dif-
ferent parts of  the city, thus creating new nuclei of  social antagonism.
The first occupations comprised the connecting threads in the 
consecutive explosions of  social mutiny. They tried to act as points of  
reference, of  equal gathering and discussion, self-organising, and mu-
tual shaping of  ideas and action. After the universities, the wave of  oc-
cupations spread to schools, town halls, labour union and confederation 
buildings, trade councils, theatres, cultural centres, municipal organisa-
tions, etc.—with the eventual aim being the mutual shaping of  words 
and action. The occupations would usually last between a few days and 
several weeks and would spring up one after the other, passing on the 
counter-information relay up until February 2009. They multiplied, 
with the state seemingly unable to quell them.
Along with the days-long occupations of  various public build-
ings, there were numerous hours-long occupations and interventions 
(in public transport buildings and vehicles, radio and TV stations). The 
apogee was the intervention and interruption of  the main news show 
of  NET, a state-run TV station, at the time of  the prime minister’s 
speech.3 The actors and cinematographers who undertook this action 
were holding banners calling for the people to take to the streets and 
demonstrate. There were also moments when, after the attacks by po-
lice against neighbourhood demonstrations, residents would respond 
by occupying the local town hall, with the aim of  highlighting the re-
pression against them and mutually shaping their response.
It is important to highlight that counter-information was not 
limited to the act of  the assassination (which was quite obviously a com-
mon thread across the occupations) but rather, it highlighted a series of  
other subjects, either more theoretical or regarding current affairs at the 
time (the bombarding of  Gaza by Israeli troops, the murderous attack 
against syndicalist migrant cleaner Konstantina Kuneva with sulphuric 
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acid, regional environmental matters, etc.) For many, the revolt was not 
an everyday image on their TV screen, cut off  from the reality each in-
dividual lived; it had social, financial, and political causes that touched 
people’s own lives and neighbourhoods. In a conjuncture where the 
stature of  mass media had been widely challenged, as we previously 
mentioned, people were thirsty for other sources of  information—texts 
would appear in an instant: at the Athens Economics School occupa-
tion alone, approximately 350,000 pages were photocopied in eighteen 
days of  occupation.
The occupations utilised the capacities offered by new media 
as an additional tool. The blogs of  the occupations would aid posters, 
texts, publications, stencils, and slogans on the walls. The events would 
unfold and take shape in their natural location, the street. The inter-
net, on the other hand, offered the capacity for instant communication 
and aided the coordination of  the mobilisations. It offered the medium 
for the word of  the revolted to spread instantly, beyond the country’s 
borders. Of  particular importance here were translation collectives, 
blogs covering the events in Greece abroad and of  course, maintain-
ing contact with comrades abroad. Reversely, solidarity actions abroad 
would inspire Greek mobilisations and would become known instantly. 
The “Greek Solidarity Map”4 marks with black/red stars the numer-
ous actions of  solidarity in Greece and abroad: it is worth noting how 
synchronised these were in such a broad geographical breadth. 
Cyberspace knows no borders and the power of  counter-infor-
mation can hardly be limited geographically. Even when the word of  
the revolted was limited to the Greek-speaking audience (and despite 
the importance placed on the translation of  texts), videos and photo-
graphs would largely cover gaps in information. The images circulated 
in those days were so powerful (for example, the Christmas tree on fire 
on Syntagma Square, by Parliament) that the mediation of  words was 
rendered unnecessary for meanings to be transmitted. Hundreds of  ex-
propriated images from corporate news agencies would be circulated 
around, while solidarity videos posted around were uncountable—it is 
worth mentioning the revolutionary greetings of  Subcomandante Mar-
cos to the “insurgent youth of  Greece.”5
This uncontrollable circulation of  information created fears for 
a possible spill-over of  the revolt into other parts of  the planet. We would 
like to be reminded of  the retreat of  French president Sarkozy during 
those days (who repealed the law for educational reform in high schools) 
under the fear of  generalised mobilisations—this, at the same time when 
Greek authorities would not even admit they were dealing with a revolt. 
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE (REVOLT) MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE
REVOLT AND CRISIS IN GREECE
146
In parallel with the occupations, an important number of  
neighbourhood assemblies were born. These assemblies, in the spirit of  
self-organising, dealt with current affairs as well as local matters. From 
the occupations and local assemblies of  the time, some were later trans-
formed into permanent local or labour collectives with a permanent 
meeting space, and some permanently occupied abandoned buildings. 
Many of  these incentives continue their action today.
ADVANTAGES, WEAKNESSES, AND SOME CONCLUSIONS DRAWN 
FROM DECEMBER
One of  the greatest advantages of  new media, in terms of  the prac-
tices of  the antagonist movement, is interaction—since the roles of  the 
transmitter and the receiver are hereby dismantled. Communication 
with fewer mediators is enabled and anonymity largely frees individu-
als from the forming blocks of  imposed social roles. There is also the 
advantage of  a useful “internet archive”—even if  some websites are no 
longer active, they are still available online. It is also very important to 
mention the formation of  collectives that handle servers belonging to the 
movement, such as espiv.net and squat.gr—therefore allowing for the 
necessary security for the movement use of  the internet to be deployed. 
On the other hand, internet-based communication obviously 
entails some weaknesses. It is impersonal and partial. Under no cir-
cumstances can it replace human contact and the wholeness of  com-
munication (verbal and otherwise), face-to-face. It can give one the il-
lusion of  participating in a group, when in reality the connection with 
others is temporal. On a political level, web communication has been 
criticised for making idle, rather than increasing, reflexes whilst web-
sites such as Indymedia are critiqued for becoming centres that man-
age anti-authoritarian action. Above all, however, the technologies of  
information are not immune to control—on the contrary. The networks 
of  electronic communication are openly available for intense electronic 
monitoring, causing a series of  security issues. Overall, we should not 
confuse the capacities offered by new technologies to the social antago-
nist movement with a de facto positive development. Political and social 
processes are those that define the use of  mediums.
INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION
Looking back at the days of  December, we see that the centres of  co-
ordination were occupations and open assemblies. They are where all 
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mediums came together and where actions, for the most part, were or-
ganised. Counter-information via the internet came to strengthen the 
spread of  the word and the action that was born from direct democratic 
procedures. The new mediums may have reshaped the landscape, but 
did not affect the forms of  action in their essence. Today, as always, the 
streets are where we meet and make history.
It is difficult to make any safe estimates, yet the legacy of  De-
cember is rich here, too: the revolt scored a huge blow against dominant 
structures and carriers of  information, while at the same time widened 
the use of  the internet for the movement and brought dynamically to 
the fore relevant matters and discussions. At the time, when these lines 
were written, espiv.net is also organising an event in Athens on freedom 
of  speech, security, and self-organising and self-management online. 
The use of  the internet as a tool of  social struggle is a reality; what 
remains is for all of  us to utilise it toward the direction we wish. 
There is no use in idealising the mediums nor their capacities, 
nor of  course December itself. A fertile self-criticism concerning the 
limits of  material mediums—in the end, our own selves—is a valuable 
and even necessary prerequisite for the Decembers to come.
THE FIRST POSTS ON ATHENS IMC AFTER THE ASSASSINATION OF 
ALEXANDROS GRIGOROPOULOS
URGENT! SERIOUS INJURY AT MESOLOGIOU STREET (EXARCHEIA)
by ORA MIDEN 9.18 pm, Saturday December 6th 2008
I just received a phone call by a comrade who told me there have been 
some clashes at Mesologiou Street and one kid has been injured by a 
rubber bullet of  a cop and that he is in critical condition. An ambulance 
has arrived and is transferring him to Euagelismos hospital… Those of  
you in Athens please confirm the information.
SOME EYE-WITNESSES DO NOT TALK OF A RUBBER BULLET BUT A PROPER ONE
by Tar 9.32 pm, Saturday December 6th 2008
(meaning the type of  bullet is not as of  yet confirmed)
A police car drove by, it was given abuse, the cop felt like he had much 
authority, tension increased, and then he shot. The kid shot was not 
breathing.
CLASHES IN EXARCHEIA
by nikos 9.38 pm, Saturday December 6th 2008
clashes at the square with the critical condition of  the young comrade 
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now confirmed. We should not let the atrocity go unanswered… anyone 
who can should make it to Euagelismos Hospital whether doctor or 
lawyer.
PHONE CALL WITH
by comrade 9.42 pm, Saturday December 6th 2008
From a phone call with a comrade, who just arrived without having any 
suspicions at Mesologiou. The street is accessible, fires all around, riot 
police in the periphery.
NEW PHONE CALL WITH
by comrade, 9.52 pm Saturday December 6th 2008
up until a few seconds ago sporadic clashes with the cops in a large part 
of  Exarcheia. First they would take the stones “without a complaint” (as 
the comrade put it…)—a little while ago they began with the tear gas. 
Now for the kid: the image that eye-witnesses had was not that 
“optimistic” about its condition. There were a lot of  negative things 
heard (about its condition always) but no-one saying so was a doctor, 
so… 
FROM THE SQUARE
by Phone 9.59 pm, Saturday December 6th 2008
It is said that a police car was crossing a main street of  the area with 
many well-known bars and there was a minor confrontation between 
the injured person who seems to be under-age and policemen in the car, 
one of  whom pulled a gun and shot in cold blood.
HE IS DEAD
by Tar 10 pm, Saturday December 6th 2008
It has just been announced by the hospital and the homicide department, 
he is being transferred for post-mortem, he seems to be a 15–16 year 
old, his name is Alexandros Grigoropoulos.
THE 15-YEAR-OLD IS DEAD
by Anarchist Hammer and Sickle 10:02 pm, Saturday December 6th 
2008
People are heading to the centre. Everyone to Exarcheia, to stop them 
from blocking off  the area… 
DEAD SOS
by nm 10:17 pm, Saturday December 6th 2008
people at the polytechnic, clashes in Exarcheia, patision ave is accessible, 
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the kid is 16 years old, take to the streets everyone, it is confirmed
LATEST INFORMATION
by ORA MIDEN 10.35 pm, Saturday December 6th 2008
the young boy was called Grigoropoulos Alexandros Andreas. When the 
ambulance arrived at Euagelismos Hospital he was already dead. The 
cop shot him in his chest, since before someone had thrown empty beer 
bottles at the police car. The cop is one of  those with the blue uniforms. 
The deceased will have to be transferred to the popular hospital for the 
post-mortem. Riot police units have encircled Exarcheia.
THERE IS ALSO A RIOT POLICE UNIT AT THE EUAGELISMOS HOSPITAL
by ORA MIDEN 10.38 pm, Saturday December 6th 2008
All the above from the phone-call of  a comrade who went to Euagelismos.
GATHERING AT THE LIONS SQUARE NOW (CRETE)
by mercy… 10.42 pm, Saturday December 6th 2008
Gathering at the lions now for the assassination of  the 15-year-old in 
Exarcheia
INFORMATION FROM THE CENTRE
by Tar 10.45 pm, Saturday December 6th 2008
Up until a little while ago there was a riot police van exactly outside the 
metro and the bus stops at Euagelismos. They were checking everyone 
going in or out of  a bus.
3 riot police units, blue and green, at the war museum, 1 riot van at 
Rigilis Street, 1 at Mesologiou Street, 1 at Benaki Str, 2 at Exarcheia 
square 1 at Themistokleous Street, in the small streets surrounding the 
polytechnic.
A while ago people were trapped in the polytechnic by the Riot Police. 
There has been an attack by Riot Police on Tsamadou Street. At Ex-
archeia square stones were hurdled along with chairs against the Riot 
Police and tear gas was thrown [in response]. There are slogans heard 
everywhere, “the blood runs, it seeks revenge.”
CREDIBLE INFORMATION BY AN EYE-WITNESS AND EVANGELISMOS
by until when 10.45 pm, Saturday December 6th 2008
Unfortunately I have the luck to have two friends who are doctors, one 
who was in Exarcheia and one on duty at Euagelismos Hospital.
From the friend at Euagelismos: He is dead shot straight at the heart. 
He is 15 years old. Euagelismos is encircled by riot police units.
From the friend who was in Exarcheia and offered first aid to the 
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injured: The confrontation was verbal. The kids were few in number 
(2–3, maybe a few more, but definitely not 25 [as some media claimed—
trans.]). The policeman got out and shot straight at the heart.
12.00 IN ALL CITIES
by forward 10.52 pm, Saturday December 6th 2008
I propose that gatherings take place between 12 and 1AM in all cities in 
Greece. There are people everywhere. I propose this publicly.
At 12, in cities with anarchist presence, there should be gatherings of  
rage.
FROM PATISION
by euri 10:51 pm, Saturday December 6th 2008
you can enter the polytechnic from patision street, there are 
approximately 200 people there already.
NOTES
1 The occupations of  the university of  ASOEE (Economics School), the Athens 
Polytechnic, and the building of  the General Confederation of  Workers (GSEE).
2 The first posts that were published on Athens IMC are included here in detail.
3 Footage of  the intervention is available at http://athens.indymedia.org/local/
webcast/uploads/katalipsideltiounet.avi.
4 http://greekgreeksolidaritymap.blogspot.com/.
5 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GIYBUCrV534.
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IMPLOSIONS AND EXPLOSIONS
The chessboard is set. All the pawns are in position. The moves are pre-
determined and the strategy will rely upon these moves. The lines are 
the world. Black and white are never confused, never interchangeable 
capacities. White cannot be black, the opposite, the deviant, the unpuri-
fied. A game based on strategies, a civilised game. 
The white pawn moves first, it separates itself  from the white 
row of  pawns by moving from a black square to another of  the same 
colour, two squares ahead. The pawn’s move resembles a disciplined 
effort. Diverging from the natural endeavour of  a body that moves for-
ward in the thrall of  instinct, this pawn embodies the value of  obedi-
ence to specific rules. The answer from the black side is instantaneous. 
The knight follows his routine move and lands on a square of  the op-
posite colour. The game is taking some shape. The bishop, encouraged 
by the opponent’s move, traverses the chessboard from one side to the 
other, sliding in white, as only a bishop is allowed to do. For quite a 
while, both kings remain in the same position, they discern the moves 
of  those pieces of  lesser importance and envisage a glorious victory. 
Coevality. This is a key concept. The pawns never congregate; they 
are always coeval with each other but never coexist in the same square. 
They meet, though, imaginatively, in a point of  intersection between 
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two opposing needs, two confrontational desires to exist. There, in these 
points of  interstices, they meet, but only for a while. Their encounter 
means the end of  existence for one. The other will take its place in the 
square, establishing another narrative but with the same discourse, that 
of  the open battlefield.
A move by the black rook, though, disrupts our concentration. 
The rook has moved diagonally, neither in a vertical nor a horizontal 
line. This is obscene, a rook moving diagonally! Normally the game is 
not played like that. At first we laugh, a laughter revealing an inner un-
derstanding of  the game of  chess; nevertheless, it cannot conceal a slight 
concern, an agony and a doubt. There, between the eyes, lies fear. 
Only after the pawn has learned its moves, only after it has 
been disciplined, can we continue the game. But our laughter is short. 
It drowns in a million hollow sounds. The rook’s obscure move now fol-
lows a white pawn’s unwillingness to hold to the rules, and thus it moves 
diagonally, crossing the board from one side to the other. The rules of  
the game are contested. Something has changed. The battlefield is no 
longer delineated. One abnormal move follows another, making the 
next move indiscernible to the opponent. When the embodied condi-
tion of  game rules no longer applies for the chess pieces, the game’s 
very existence becomes uncertain. 
The objective of  this short allegorical preface is to engage the 
reader with the notion of  rupture in a game. Unable to foresee this 
rupture, the player is forced to engage in the game under new situations 
where the previous rules do not apply. In terms of  the anti-authoritar-
ian community in Greece, December was a situation of  this kind. To 
make sense of  it, the political subject had to resort to a familiar setting, 
the political imaginary.
THE QUESTION
The essential idea of  this paper is that what happened during the days 
of  December 2008 belongs to the site of  the unexpected not only for 
those in power but also for the Greek radical political milieu. By argu-
ing this, I do not claim a lack of  awareness of  the historico-political 
conditions that created the insurrectional events of  December on that 
milieu’s part. Rather, my argument focuses on the new schemes of  ac-
tion that were developed during those days as part of  the insurrectional 
practice which established December 2008 as an event. More specifi-
cally, I examine the modalities of  the relation between subject, time, 
and the social field from the side of  the radical political community. 
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Since I take this relation to be constitutive, I aim to examine how peo-
ple were able to act/react in the emergence of  an unexpected event. 
Before I continue, I would like to make clear what I mean by 
“unexpected.” My knowledge of  the unexpected is based on two differ-
ent versions of  this spatio-temporal frame. The first takes into consid-
eration situations that are moulded by past experiences, in our case, by 
practices that belong to a long political tradition. This conceptualiza-
tion makes a situation more expected than unexpected or, in Hannah 
Arendt’s words, part of  the process of  action that makes a situation the 
“unexpected that can be expected” (Arendt 1998: 178). The other no-
tion of  the unexpected, which I employ here, deals with the unexpected 
as a situation that instantaneously disengages the subject, and thus the 
subject’s relation with action, from the patterned process of  past expe-
riences. Therefore, this constitutional format focuses on the events of  
December as a point of  excess/surplus in time; a moment in time that 
can actually only exist out of  time, beyond the bounds of  time. This is 
interpreted as a formation which functions out of  the domain of  the 
past, the present, and the “forthcoming.” This analytical framework is 
concerned with December ’08 as an unexpected event and its purpose 
is to unfold the modalities of  opposing the rules of  the social game 
within a non-authoritative political frame.
BARRICADING AUTHORITIES, CASTING IMAGINATIONS
On 6 December 2008, Saturday, at 9:18, a post in Greek on the Athens 
Indymedia website informed readers of  a young boy, no more than six-
teen years old, shot by police with a rubber bullet in Athens, Exarcheia. 
I translate:
Emergency! Serious injury in Mesologiou (Exarcheia) 
from ZERO TIME 9:18 p.m. Saturday 6 December 2008
serious injury to a young person
I just received a call from a comrade, stating that clashes took place in 
Mesologiou and one boy was shot by a cop’s plastic bullet, and he is in a very 
serious state, an ambulance arrived and he is being taken to Evangelismos. 
Those in Athens confirm the information.1
What seemed to be another brief  confrontation between two 
police officers and a small group of  youths in Exarcheia ended up be-
coming the origin of  the most formidable radical force that has ap-
peared on the Greek streets in the last thirty-five years.2 The incident 
was caused by the cops transgressing an imaginary borderline that des-
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ignates the line between opposed categories and at the same time an ex-
istent spatial limit imposed on the Greek police. Even though the state 
immediately classified the incident as isolated and accidental, several 
eye-witnesses and even video footage from a mobile phone very soon 
proved them wrong. The 37-year-old policeman calmly extended his 
hand, aimed, with real ammunition, and shot the 15-year-old boy in the 
chest.3 The boy’s death was confirmed a half-hour later. 
This information is not revealed in such detail to provoke emo-
tions or sympathy, far from it. In fact, this detailed description encom-
passes the experiences of  a political field almost thirty years old; the 
place Exarcheia,4 the subject of  deviance—young people, the definite 
“Other”—the police forces/the state/the authorities. Within these 
three very distinctive positions, and in the incident itself, we can iden-
tify a whole series of  forces, discourses, and actions that have come into 
play and been exercised throughout the years.
When Alexandros Grigoropoulos’s murder was confirmed, an 
uncontrollable chain reaction was set in motion. The activities that for-
mulated the chain of  events were of  the same essence. Demonstrations, 
marches, protests, clashes with the police, skirmishes, looting and squat-
ting all together formed a kaleidoscope of  action that nonetheless led 
up to a concrete framework of  political activity. In more than thirteen 
cities in Greece, demonstrations, marches and several other actions 
took place immediately after the murder. These demonstrations had 
primarily an offensive disposition, targeting police stations in their re-
gion. In Ioannina, a city in the northwest of  Greece, a group of  people 
attacked the local police station with stones and flag bats. In Volos, cen-
tral Greece, the demonstration attacked the police station, more than 
twenty banks, a municipal police car, the town hall and other buildings. 
In Chania, Crete, banks and other offices of  prestigious private cor-
porations and companies were targeted and attacked. In Thessaloniki, 
Greece’s second-largest city, in the north of  the country, several people 
marched towards the main police station in the city centre and attacked 
it ferociously.
During the first night of  the events, three University buildings 
had already been occupied in Athens: the Polytechnic,5 the Athens Uni-
versity of  Economics and Business (ASOEE), and Athens Law School 
(Nomiki). These events took place only a few hours after the young stu-
dent’s death. Could this have been a well-organised response? Looking 
at the pattern of  action dispersed all around Greece, the answer might 
be yes. However, my argument is that these practices follow a pattern 
of  radical political action. This pattern is understood and deciphered 
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if  examined through a habitual political disposition that provides the 
subject with a feeling of  participation in a game (here, the political 
game). This sense in the game is what allows the subject to acknowledge 
the pattern that is drawn from her position in the present to a certain 
“forthcoming.” For Bourdieu the notion of  the forthcoming is insepa-
rable from the notion of  the game itself. “The sense of  the game is that 
sense of  the forthcoming of  the game, of  what is to be done (‘it was the 
only thing to do’ or ‘he did what was needed’) in order to bring about 
the forthcoming state of  the game that is visible there for a habitus 
predisposed to anticipate it, the sense of  the history of  the game, which 
is only acquired through experience of  the game which means that the 
imminence and pre-eminence of  the forthcoming presuppose a dispo-
sition which is the product of  the past.” (Bourdieu, 2000: 211–212) 
Elaborating on this idea, Bourdieu acknowledges that the forthcoming 
“is already present in the immediate present and not constituted as fu-
ture.” (Bourdieu 2000: 210) The forthcoming then is part of  the process 
of  making the present. Taking that into consideration the outline of  
action during the first hours belongs to a long tradition of  anarchist/
anti-authoritarian action in Greece. The agent did what “needs to be 
done” as a necessary response to an incident where the state’s oppres-
sive power has been nakedly exposed. Nevertheless, the expansion and 
dynamic of  the socio-political force expressed in such a short period as 
counter-violence against state oppression is of  a unique kind in the his-
tory of  Modern Greece.
During that time, the rapidity of  action and the diversity of  
both method and practice made any attempt at interpretation almost 
impossible. Within these first hours the normality of  the city was dis-
rupted. What is important in this respect is the ultimate attack on au-
thoritative discourses, power relations, systems of  discipline and punish-
ment, and imposed schemes of  perceptions. The state, authorities, the 
prevalent system of  law and order were immediately identified with the 
normality in the city. Therefore, the disruption of  normality had the 
qualities of  challenging all the above altogether. In addition, the targeted 
attack against police is strongly connected with ideas of  emancipation 
and liberation in the course of  action. A twenty-five-year old, second-
generation immigrant told me a few weeks after the insurrection:
This was my first time ever to cast a stone, first time I covered my face. After 
learning about the event it came naturally. I had been before in demonstrations 
and protests but never before I had participated in riots. It was something like 
an initiation for me and I have to admit I felt liberated you know. It made me 
feel like I regained control over myself. I was the one who decided for me.
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One question arises immediately: how does a subject, especial-
ly a political subject, construct reality when “something new is started,” 
here the insurrectional events? Considering the new as always appear-
ing in the guise of  a miracle, Arendt appreciates it as emerging from 
human action in terms of  the “unexpected that can be expected.” In 
this sense, the improbable becomes probable in the realm of  action. 
For her, action always implies a new beginning. Considering that, I ask 
how someone who is nurtured towards a political rebellious attitude 
deals with the immense force (both in terms of  numbers and dynamic) 
of  December. This question, that has dogged me ever since those days, 
will act as a guide here for the analytical interpretation of  those events. 
By no means will I treat this new beginning as an autonomous point in 
time. Instead, I aim to study it as a fabric in process, as a material that 
is woven and interwoven to challenge the laws of  action, and thus the 
rules of  a wider game, the social game.
MAKING THE EVENT
To view the unexpected from the side of  the anarchist/anti-authori-
tarian milieu, I turn to the incidents of  Monday morning (8 December 
2008) as the new beginning that disengaged the subject from any pre-
vious experience. 
On Monday morning, workplaces closed earlier than usual and 
schools were occupied by students. In many cases, 15-, 16-, and 17-year-
old students occupied their schools. They made up slogans, prepared 
banners, and took to the streets. In several districts of  Athens, students 
formed small demonstrations and attacked police stations with stones 
and bricks, smashed police cars, or stood outside shouting slogans. The 
geographical and geopolitical wave of  attack obeyed its own laws. The 
unrest in secondary schools occurred in various places that do not share 
similar class characteristics. Outside the police headquarters what the 
political movement failed to do a day before, the students achieved easi-
ly; the massive building in Alexandras Avenue was besieged. The Greek 
parliament became another distinctive place of  protest gathering for 
students. In their arrival most of  the students would wear their hoods 
and cover their faces and approach riot police chanting slogans. In Pi-
raeus, Greece’s largest port, students attacked the general police head-
quarters and the city’s town hall, overturning several police cars. At-
tacks on police stations and general disruption and unrest spread from 
the city centre to the periphery. Students attacked police stations in Il-
ioupoli, Kifisia, Egaleo, Patision, and Galatsi. Several of  these districts, 
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such as Kifisia, are considered very high upper-class districts, whereas 
others have middle- and working-class profiles. 
The distribution of  information was a major contribution to 
the unwillingness of  this section of  society to return to normality. This 
opened the path for the illegalisation of  the official political scene and 
the destabilisation of  the social stage. SMS and the internet (especially 
social networks such as Twitter and Blogspot) proved to be excellent 
tools for organising action on a large scale. “He was only fifteen years 
old,” “it could have been one of  us,” “1,2,3, Fuck the police,” “cops, 
pigs, murderers,” and even “revenge” were slogans that students shout-
ed repeatedly on that Monday morning. These slogans are the evidence 
of  their anger and state of  mind, as well as, of  the conscious attempt 
to degrade the official mechanism. Some of  these slogans belong to the 
discourse of  the milieu and what is interesting here is their immediate 
assimilation by students. Monday became the passage from one period 
to another, from a specific use of  political action to a generalized critic 
and decomposition of  social values.
That afternoon, several leftist groups and the assembly of  
Nomiki had called for a central demonstration in Athens at one of  the 
most customary points for demonstrations to begin, Propylaia Square. 
The gathering time was set at 6 pm. However, even before then, a 
number of  people had started to concentrate in the area and clashes 
with police had already taken place in the nearby streets. At around 
7 pm, more than 50,000 people were marching towards Omonoia 
(Amity) Square. Even though the march was supposed to cover the 
usual route from Propylaia Square to Parliament, it quickly broke into 
smaller pieces. It soon became obvious that the crowd that made up 
the body of  the demonstration was very diverse. Several small groups 
broke away and attacked either commercial or state targets. When 
smoke appeared on the horizon and the first flames had been set, the 
crowd started to back up. By then, information spread like a gunshot. 
Information about everything and everyone: “The fascist weapon 
store in Omonoia has been invaded and looted.” “The Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs is on fire.” “Police have attacked the demonstration in 
Omonoia.” “The fascists are outside their offices, protecting them.” 
“Nomiki [Athens Law School] is a safe place to be, people are go-
ing there.” Information seemed to have no source and was simultane-
ously everywhere and nowhere. It traversed the crowd and, in its very 
course, changed emotions, attitudes and perspectives. Resembling an 
autonomous system of  knowledge, it seemed to feed on nothing but 
simultaneously fed the surroundings. 
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Almost an hour after the demonstration had begun, the city 
centre was in flames. Several department stores were burning and a 
number of  other buildings were destroyed. When the demonstration 
broke up, some sections of  the crowd continued until they reached the 
Parliament, others found shelter in Nomiki and yet more tried to leave 
the city centre. The atmosphere was suffocating, the familiar noises were 
everywhere; fire alarms, ambulances, police cars, explosions from the 
stores that had been set on fire, shouting, slogans, and the distinctive 
noise of  the police radio surrounded the city. The last image of  the night 
has been symbolically displayed ever since as the main icon of  the mi-
lieu’s disruption of  normality in the city; in Syntagma Square, just across 
from the Greek parliament, the grand Christmas tree was set on fire.
What then goes on to occur in the next few days will be classi-
fied as an insurrection. The dynamics developed in the social field, the 
multiple and diverse political practices performed during those days 
and the destabilisation that these schemes created in the socio-political 
institutions meant hope for change became tangible. Those in radical 
politics, subjects who supposedly had the capacity to recognise the po-
litical value of  a situation, took action at once, but their practice was 
still part of  a habitus of  political reaction. Even though it was very 
dynamic and dispersed, it was not before Monday that the political 
subjects started to talk about “something else,” something that had 
not been there before, the unexpected. At that moment, socio-political 
practices began to be evaluated and reconsidered. Why most students 
took to the streets during those days and what were the elements that 
developed this dynamic counter-force against authorities are questions 
that need further study. Yet, the radical political milieu’s inability to 
foresee the forthcoming political change must be examined through 
these groups’ historical consciousness and the social relations that con-
stitute it. Only a few days ago, the milieu’s critique had talked about an 
uninterested society for the collective issues/koina, about young people 
in the realm of  the apolitical. In the accounts of  “where did they come 
from?” we found, besides astonishment and enthusiasm, an attempt to 
cope with an unexpected reality. Nevertheless, the disjuncture created 
in the event was a burden that the milieu had to carry with it all along 
the insurrectionary path. 
POSITION AND EVENT
In my endeavour to explain how an unexpected situation disengages 
the subject from past experiences, I turn to Badiou’s notion of  the 
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event. Examining the insurrection of  December 2008 as an event es-
tablishes it as a moment of  rupture for the milieu. Therefore, I use 
Bourdieu’s habitus in order to look at the event as seen in the relation 
between subject time and field. In addition, I examine how the event 
which does not belong in the domain of  intelligibility is reconstituted 
through its fidelities.
Badiou argues that the event “is ontologically formalized by an 
extraordinary set…. But the axiom of  foundation forecloses extraor-
dinary sets from any existence, and ruins any possibility of  naming a 
multiple-being of  the event. Here we have an essential gesture: that 
by means of  which ontology declares the event is not” (Badiou 2005a: 
190). In Being and Event, Badiou sets forth an intensive examination 
of  that which does not exist, namely the event for which there is “no 
acceptable ontological matrix” (Badiou 2005a: 190). For Badiou, “the 
event is attached in its very definition, to the place, to the point, in 
which the historicity of  the situation is concentrated. Every event has a 
site which can be singularized in a historical situation” (Badiou 2005a: 
179). This conceptual formula implies that the multiplicity of  historical 
points and signs of  the local determination of  a site in the event are 
simultaneously represented with a singular format. The notional for-
mation that arises from this theoretical framework and concerns us here 
recognises the event as a point in the relation between time, space and 
being that is not expected. In other words it is a moment in time that is 
only recognised as such because it is simultaneously out of  time. This 
means that, in the process of  making sense in the political milieu, the 
event is not recognised as part of  the process that creates the forthcom-
ing, the domain of  expectations.
At this point, Bourdieu’s habitus is helpful in exposing this tran-
sition from the frame of  the expected to that of  the unexpected. If  we 
look at action from the point of  the strategically-informed body, the 
event acquires transparent qualities. The relation between action, time 
and the social field provides us with a solid ground to look at how em-
bodied political practice functions within the unexpected. Habitus as 
an apparatus interprets the event as unexpected because it is not part 
of  the illusion that creates the forthcoming; it is, in its totality, a rupture 
in the relation between illusion (the interest in the game) and making 
sense of  the game, since it is not predicted, because it is not consti-
tuted through the formula illusio–illusion. Here the event cannot be dis-
cerned with this formula. At its core, December ’08 is an event because 
it exists outside this rational formula of  habitual representation. When 
the students took to the streets on Monday morning and besieged sev-
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eral police stations and when thousands of  youths took shelter in the 
Technological Institute of  Athens (Polytechnic) to clash with riot police, 
the site of  political action thus expanded, changing the milieu’s posi-
tion in the events. What has been said many times since is that “events 
surpassed us.” Bearing this statement in mind, I argue that the event is 
exactly what it is not in this formula. In what follows, I shall focus on the 
relation between the subject and action in the field of  the unexpected.
FIDELITIES OF DECEMBER
By applying the theory of  the event as Badiou conceptualises it to ex-
amine the insurrectional situation of  December 2008, my purpose is 
not only to establish it in the realm of  the unexpected but also to look 
at how the milieu makes sense of  the event. Therefore, working with 
Badiou’s theoretical construction, the event is placed further into the 
domain of  intelligibility and into a discernible awareness, making it 
transparent in its non-transparency. Looking at December ’08 through 
Badiou’s theoretical formula, the event has no objective existence. It is 
through what Badiou calls “interpretive intervention” (Badiou 2005a: 
181) that the event occurs as such. It is only in the eyes of  the actors that 
December ’08 acquires an objective nature and can be re-processed as 
the event. The event emerges along with the subject who recognises 
it and classifies it as an event. Thus, the state of  the situation that is 
recognized as an event by the agents is not merely a “reflection of  the 
situation. It is separated from the situation” (Badiou 2005a: 275). What 
concerns us here, then, is the state of  the representation of  the event. 
Having said that, I argue that the state of  the situation exists 
in the metanarratives of  the event where it is formulated. These meta-
narratives dissociate the state from the situation and re-configure it in 
the excess of  the situation: in the void of  the incident and its context. 
It is in the metanarratives that we can see what Badiou calls fidelity to 
the event. It is exactly in this set of  relations between the actors and 
the unexpected where the event is first recognised. “I call fidelity the 
sets of  procedures which discern, within a situation, those multiples 
whose existence depends upon the introduction into circulation (under 
the supernumerary name conferred by an intervention) of  an evental 
multiple. In sum fidelity is the apparatus which separates out, within 
the sets of  presented multiples, those which depend upon an event. To 
be faithful is to gather together and distinguish the becoming legal of  
a change” (Badiou 2005a: 232). At the same time, fidelity is not consti-
tuted in a domain of  abstraction; on the contrary, it is configured where 
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a definite logic is formulated. For example, when on the morning of  8 
December several secondary schools were occupied by students who 
then took to the streets, this worked as the definite sign of  irreversibility 
for the political milieu: “nothing is the same anymore.” Simultaneous-
ly, in the assemblies of  the occupied universities, the question “should 
we continue?” shifted to “how should we continue?” This change was 
the first sign of  recognition of  an event. It worked as the indication of  
adapting to the situation, thus making sense (rationalising) any praxis 
taking place in the situation. For Badiou, the event is not in itself  un-
intelligible; it is unintelligible in regards to the means of  prediction, of  
forecast or of  continuity of  the situation. What creates the intelligibility 
of  December is the fidelity to the event. From this perspective, fidelity 
is essential in the formulation of  the event. In a sense, it is even more 
important than the event itself. It is fidelity that provides the human be-
ing with consistency in a set of  changes. Through fidelity in a situation/
practice/knowledge, the human being becomes an actor in the social 
field Fidelity reaffirms and reconfirms a certain continuity of  thought 
and action. Thus it makes discernible the forthcoming as a future af-
fected by our position in the present and our past experiences. 
These fidelities were also constituted in the realm of  possibili-
ties, at which the connection between December and its fidelities now 
become even more obvious. To go a step further, the event is a rupture 
in time. It belongs to the void created in the excess of  the situation in 
a social field. This rupture has the capacity to violently separate the 
past from the present situation. This does not mean repositioning the 
event in ahistorical and apolitical space. It is understood as the trans-
formation of  the relation between subject and action as identified dur-
ing previous events. That said, December ’08 does not only exist as 
an unexpected situation but simultaneously functions as the apparatus 
making the subject’s position in the present irrelevant, thus trivialising 
any expectations of  the forthcoming. Everything was possible in those 
days. The framework of  possibilities was vast. In the participants’ eyes, 
the limit was the “impossible” (a documentary released after December 
by collectives that had participated in the insurrectional events bore 
the title “the potentiality of  storming heaven”6). This can be seen in all 
the practices displayed and performed during those days. In particular, 
several of  the actions could not even have been conceptualised if  it was 
not for the existence of  excess in the December situation.
However, even though the excess is not measurable, it can be 
recognised in its effects. From this point of  view, the excess emerged 
from the situation where the state revealed its oppressive power: “when-
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ever there is a genuinely political event, the State shows itself. It reveals 
its excess of  power, its repressive dimension. But it also reveals a mea-
sure for this usually invisible excess. For it is essential to the normal 
functioning of  the State that its power remains measureless, errant, un-
assignable. The political event puts an end to all that by assigning a vis-
ible measure to the excessive power of  the State” (Badiou 2005b: 145). 
It is in the relation between state, subject, and action that the excess first 
becomes intelligible when looking back in the insurrection of  Decem-
ber 2008. From this point of  view acting in the excess of  the situation is 
like surpassing the laws of  the situation. The event is simultaneously in 
place and out of  place/in excess of  the situation. That is because it is 
disconnected from all the rules of  the situation. In the course of  acting 
outside the rules, the fidelity of  the new situation re-positions it within 
the field of  the legality, making the change of  the situation official and 
“grounded in law.” Therefore, when I say that December, as an event, 
exists out of  the situation, it means that the transition from another 
reality/situation has been legalised. Thus December can function as a 
concept able to formulate political consciousness.
This being said, the event, being an excess in time, tore away 
the normative logic of  practice from the habitus of  action, re-posi-
tioning it on the level of  the radical political milieu’s social imaginary. 
Therefore, all actions that appeared in the event or through the event 
are constitutive of  the event itself. Otherwise these actions could not 
have existed if  the past experiences had still applied in the present situ-
ation. These potentialities of  December are clearly recognised in its 
fidelities. The fidelity of  December contributed to this subversion of  
power symbols, thus contributing to the construction of  the Event as 
the ultimate change; from the values of  the norm to the values of  an in-
surrection. It is in this function that we recognise the event as the topos 
of  challenging the laws of  the social game as much as it challenges the 
process of  action in the radical political field. 
CONSTRUCTING DECEMBER ’08 AS A POLITICAL CONCEPT
It is noteworthy that, as time went by, the discourse produced by the 
milieu about the events of  December ’08 was less conflicting and con-
tradictory than in other cases. If  one were to try to formulate a unified 
discursive line that could be the following: full of  rage in the very begin-
ning, then excited and passionate with the new reality (counterworlds), 
explorative of  the new field in latter stages, only to finally transform into 
the rhetoric of  “December leads the way.” This last rhetorical forma-
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tion is anything but accidental. Two layers in this discursive form must 
concern us. First, the sentence “December leads the way” is actually 
based on “November leads the way” in the context of  Greek radical 
politics. This former discourse refers to the rebellious events that took 
place in November 1973 during the military coup d’état (1967–1974) 
at the Technological Institute of  Athens (Polytechnic). My argument is 
that this discourse reveals a continuation in the radical political milieu’s 
consciousness rather than a substitution. However, this continuation 
can only happen if  the fidelities of  the past event have been saturated 
only to re-emerge exactly as fidelities to the new event. These fidelities 
interleave with a past situation to which the political subjects are no 
longer faithful, yet it has not been rejected. This can be seen in other 
discursive formations during that period: “Fuck May ’68, fight now”7 
and “We are an image from the future.”8 Both slogans, written during 
December, connote a rupture with the past. 
If  examined from Austin’s point of  view, these utterances, and 
many others produced during December, imply, encourage and denote 
action in the context of  December. Since, according to Austin, every 
one of  these utterances is constructed within a specific context that for-
mulates the kind of  action (Austin 1975: 100), these slogans acquire a 
certain meaning only within the context in which they are being ut-
tered. Yet, if  studied from a semiotic perspective, the signified concept 
that completes the political sign is identified in the relation with the 
past; first, as a connotation that recognises a certain significance in an-
other past event (May ’68), even in referential analogies, and second, in 
the notion of  the image from the future. This, it could be argued, refers 
not so abstractly to a revolutionary forthcoming. Having said that, what 
is interesting here is political subjects’ attempt during that time to create 
an image which is neither motionless (we-the-subjects-of-an-uprising) 
nor is its message concrete (the future). How, then, is the message con-
veyed if  the image is not detected? The only way to see the image, 
then, is to understand it as a representation not of  an image from the 
future but of  an image from the past. The “image from the future” is 
created upon a long tradition of  radical political events. In other words, 
this “image” encompasses and corresponds to what Lowy frames as the 
“oppressed of  the past” (Lowy 2005: 90). This is because when Benja-
min makes the distinction between historical time and clock time (On 
the Concept of  History) he reveals a structural link between past and 
present that is obvious when revolutionary events take place. There-
fore, the future is not the faraway but rather the process of  invoking 
the “oppressed of  the past.” In Lowy’s words the oppressed of  the past 
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are those who have come back to haunt the future. Only then does the 
word “we” make sense, because it encompasses all those who recognise 
in the image from the future the “oppressed of  the past.” 
What emerges through these discursive formations is the ab-
solute fidelity to the event. In the process of  the milieu to discursively 
establish December 2008 as The December, or in other words establish 
the insurrectional events of  December ’08 as an event, the insurrection 
is assimilated into the long tradition of  radical political events. Decem-
ber, then, takes its place in a long list of  events referred to by the name 
of  the month in which they occurred: Dekemvriana (December 1946), 
Iouliana (July 1965), and of  course November (November 1973). In this 
process, December loses its autonomous essence and through fidelity is 
assimilated into the historical structural process of  political matter. Al-
together, December becomes a concept. Stating that “December leads 
the way” or December did this, that, or the other is to give it as a con-
cept “the power to act in history as the words that designate them act in 
the sentences of  historical narrative, it personifies collectives and makes 
them subjects responsible for historical actions” (Bourdieu 1990: 37). 
Through that analytical framework, I consider all later forma-
tive political multiples after December 2008 to have been influenced by 
the event. From this perspective, the event was a rupture in Greek radi-
cal politics both because it affected radically all later socio-political re-
lations constituting the milieu and because for a moment it disengaged 
the subject by his/her past experiences. Identifying the rupture, both 
for the milieu and the general social sphere, is to contextualise what 
one person said at a main assembly in mid-January 2009: “[During 
December] it had become so difficult to find targets to attack or actions 
to perform, since when we were discussing doing something, this some-
thing was already happening or had already happened at the hands of  
students and young people.” By being a rupture, the event established 
in the social the essence of  the political. Altogether, December 2008 
became the space where every aspect of  daily life was inseparable from 
political attitude. 
NOTES
1 The first post created on the site http://www.athens.indymedia.org informing readers 
of  the death of  the 15-year-old boy in Exarcheia, Athens. The translation is mine. 
Source: http://athens.indymedia.org/front.php3?lang=el&article_id=933042.
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2 After the Athens Polytechnic uprising in November 1973 Greece has been the terrain 
for multiple incidents of  social unrest. However, these incidents were only of  interest 
to particular sections of  society (for example, education workers in 1998, the student 
movement of  2006–07) that never found points to intersect with other agents in the 
social field. What is distinctive in the case of  December is the diversity of  subjects, 
agents and individuals that participated in the events.
3 Source: http://tvxs.gr/news. This is the description that the witness Lito Valliatza has 
testified on the court in the course of  the ongoing trial.
4 Exarcheia has been the space of  Greek radical politics for more than 25 years. At the 
beginning of  the 1980s, the formulation of  radical practices was still in an experimental 
stage and various political actions and protest techniques were being re-evaluated, re-
adjusting to changes on both a political and social level. Exarcheia, being the most 
primordial space of  these configurations, which ranged from the squatting of  buildings 
to violent clashes with the police, was straightforwardly classified and distinguished as 
imperium in imperio. “The main square of  Exarcheia is an Anarchist kernel.… They 
have occupied the district. As if  the problems of  the residents are not enough, they 
now have to deal with corruption, with the ‘anarchists,’ drug dealing, prostitution.…” 
(Rizospastis, 16 December 1980. A description of  the district by the official journal of  
the Greek Communist Party). In another newspaper in 1984 we read “Exarcheia: After 
the drugs and the anarchists came the punks with shaved heads” (Ethnos, 14 September 
1984). In this discursive formation of  the imaginary of  the district, the state had an 
active role, not only in trying to control the neighbourhood but also by introducing 
abstract narratives to the public. In 1986, the former General Drosogiannis, the new 
Minister of  Public Order, stated in the media: “I will not tolerate a state of  anarchists 
or any others in Exarcheia. The main square will become like any other and everybody 
will be able to walk freely” (To Vima, 18 May 1986).
5 Built in stages from 1862 to 1957, the National Technical University of  Athens 
(Polytechnic), one of  the most significant Modern Greek architectural constructions, 
bears the elusive signs of  Modern Greek history, since it is connected with the uprising 
(14–17 November 1973) that stood up to the military Junta (1967–1974). Since then, 
the building has symbolically connoted more than a revolutionary past, since its space 
is still used as the primary place for major assemblies by different political groups. In 
addition, the building’s use during the latest uprising of  December 2008 indicates the 
revolutionary imagery that is imposed on such spaces.
6 A video presentation of  the December insurrection through the deeds and discourse 
of  the participants. The video was made in Thessaloniki on January 2009 and was 
shown for the first time in an assembly at the occupied public library of  Ano Poli.
7 Slogan on wall, December 2008, Athens.
8 Slogan that first appeared at ASOEE (Athens School of  Economics and Business).
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The days of  December 2008 seemed like a long—extremely long—mo-
ment of  rupture that deeply and entirely shattered our normality. We 
saw before us the possibility of  things happening: thousands of  people 
taking to the streets every day, writing hundreds of  calls to protest, oc-
cupying public buildings and interrupting theatre and music spectacles, 
participating in severe acts of  civil unrest and violent rioting that shat-
tered spaces and symbols that had been taken as firm and eternal re-
alities. We shared space and anger and became engaged in a common 
fate. For a few days we saw our life as it is and we even saw ourselves 
taking part in it. 
For instance, we saw the Athens Christmas tree, the “tallest 
and most beautifully lit tree in the whole of  Europe,” standing in Syn-
tagma Square like every year. But this time it was guarded by heavily 
armed police in order to hold angry citizens back from burning it down 
or throwing rubbish at it. We realized, then, that the police were not 
guarding the tree. They were protecting us from facing the image of  
our reality denaturalised. We could now see what this represented and 
who those besieging it were; we could see the order of  things naked, the 
terms of  the game unmasked and instantly reverted.
A massive student protest was handled as a problem of  “order” 
by police; the rage of  thousands of  citizens was labelled as violence and 
extremism, social conflict was trivialised as irrational, and we, protest-
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ing, became the outcasts to be thrown out of  the urban frame. On the 
other hand, police repression and the brutal treatment of  immigrants, 
a failing educational system and rising unemployment, degenerated in-
stitutions, injustice and corruption, nonexistent social security, and ris-
ing economic crisis—all those were perfectly legitimated, presented as 
“common sense,” the pillars of  our living democratic experience. The 
blissfully-illuminated tree became a battlefield of  stones and meanings. 
Collective action versus lawful peacefulness, nihilism versus democracy, 
citizens versus police and institutions, evil versus good.
And he is good who does not outrage, who harms nobody, who does not attack, 
who does not requite, who leaves revenge to God, who keeps himself  hidden as 
we do, who avoids evil and desires little from life, like us, the patient, humble, 
and just.…2
If  that is the frame of  understanding, then, what is to be done? 
What is to be said?
Well, nothing, really.
THOSE DAYS (DECEMBER IN OUR LIVES)
1) LANDING WHILE CREATING OUR LAND…
We interrupt a live state TV news broadcast and silently raise a banner 
to silence this representation of  reality.3 We call on people to stop be-
ing viewers, to step out of  their homes, to take to the streets, to resist. 
The black and white banner that some of  us held for eighty seconds 
articulated no claim, no plan and no certainty. No indication of  where 
to go, what to do, at what time, with whom, and for what. Against the 
anxiousness to explain, against the guilt of  failing to predict and fore-
tell, to plan and rationalise and fit in, to summarise and nicely narrate 
violence, we opposed our living thrill of  collective and direct action 
against an absurd but confident reality and said nothing, really.
All Different, All Together
Because, at the moment, we did not ask ourselves who all those 
people next to us were. We just knew that they were our comrades—the 
thousands of  frustrated secondary education and university students, 
unemployed graduates and employed boys and girls of  the €600 gen-
eration, and then the leftists and the anarchists, of  course it was them, 
but they seemed so many, didn’t they? But we could also see some pen-
sioners, and for the first time we could see immigrants out in the streets 
next to us, and also some middle-aged couples (they must have been 
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parents worried about their kids, or simply people fed up with every-
thing)—there was also the lady who cleans our offices and the guy who 
works in the bank opposite our school, and this old woman on the bal-
cony crying out against the cops, it was everybody, wasn’t it? During the 
demonstrations, the sit-ins, the looting, while shouting slogans and writ-
ing texts, attacking policemen, throwing stones, burning and disrupt-
ing movement, during every single moment we felt that we were part 
of  a collective that did not have to ask of  its members anything more 
than being there, because they and everyone together actually were the 
event. And this was massive, extraordinary, beyond imagination, and, at 
the same time, the only thing that made sense. 
Before December, each one of  us belonged to a certain group, 
had a role, a function, a place, and all of  those well-defined parts formed 
an ensemble that also arranged things into the common and the pri-
vate, the visible and the invisible, the permissible and the unthinkable, 
where properties, responsibilities, opinions, and disputes were ascribed 
to specific socio-economic identities or age groups. This way of  count-
ing at the same time implied the available ways of  being, doing, and 
speaking and their appropriate limits. But once we took to the streets, 
we had no need to include ourselves within any group, to move closer to 
the ones who resembled us in terms of  skin colour, income, dress code, 
or ideology, no need to explain, or even imply, who we are. No one was 
representative of  any group, but everyone was represented; nothing of  
what we asked for could be articulated in the language of  political de-
mands, but everything was said. Our need for belonging somewhere 
that had made us part of  a whole dissolved in a few seconds and we 
immediately stopped feeling dispersed and alone. We formed neigh-
bourhood assemblies, primary unions, groups of  solidarity with people 
we would have never imagined standing next to us. Being different was 
not a reason to stay separate, but to mount a multiple collective not re-
ducible to the strands that brought us together. By living an egalitarian 
moment, we changed in one night the terms of  inclusion and exclusion. 
We were transformed from invisible solitary figures rambling around in 
our urban misery into political subjects who managed to challenge, not 
the solutions that had to be applied to a situation, but the situation itself. 
New Spaces
And then, there was nothing to say, because in that moment 
we did not ask ourselves where to go, with whom, and for what. We 
just had to take to the streets with other people, even if  there was 
no fixed meeting, no prearranged destination, no gathering point. We 
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simply felt impelled to start marching with our classmates towards the 
nearest police station, destroy the ATM outside our offices, smash the 
CCTV camera placed above our cars, shout against the policeman 
standing every night at the corner of  our homes, remain immobile in 
the middle of  the avenue when police forces were ordering us to move 
away, paint the ugly wall next to our friends’ house in colours that did 
not match, and not feel repelled by the sight of  those cars in flames. 
We just had to talk to people from our neighbourhoods we had never 
spoken to, to those young parents who live opposite us, to the math 
student who rents the house at the corner, and the lady who used to 
be a famous actress, to speak with urgency about what is to be done, 
about the park that is about to be demolished and that abandoned 
public building outside of  which homeless people are sleeping, and 
break the door down and intrude and feel responsible and start writ-
ing a text and create a web page and send messages and receive others 
from other places and communicate with everyone in the city in order 
to be a part of  them and for all of  them to be a part of  us. All of  a 
sudden, we were there, next to other people, and it was the only thing 
that could have ever happened.
Before December, each one of  us lived in one place and 
worked in another and we were all divided into groups that formed 
clear networks of  representation that would address themselves to other 
groups higher in the hierarchy that would decide when to vote, where 
to demonstrate, and how schools, workplaces, malls and bars, airports 
and supermarkets will be distributed around the country. This urban 
arrangement ascribed places to regular possibilities and prohibited 
others, structured our movement in a legal way, and put surveillance 
mechanisms in place to protect our cities that were ever more besieged 
by individuals in need of  drugs, money to survive, a place to stay, or 
a country to live in. But once taking to the streets and feeling part of  
a living community of  people, we couldn’t but occupy our cities in a 
different way. This experience of  socialisation could not fit inside our 
offices and TV screens, coffee shops, shopping avenues, and secured 
square metres designed for us to live in. Our coming together violently 
spoiled the façades of  all those urban places that actually cancel out 
our possibility of  interaction and chain us to the role of  a non-citizen; it 
gave birth instantly, instead, to self-organised groups, non-hierarchical 
gatherings, community events, fluid networks of  people and horizontal 
counter-information, a multiplicity of  small new personal relations of  
trust, commitment, and direct action that had to invent new localities 
so as to materialize and develop. During the days of  December, we did 
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not transform the spaces given to us, but we created new ones where we 
could also let ourselves be created.
Stateless Words and Actions
And there was nothing to say, after all, because in that moment 
we did not ask ourselves what to do, what to ask and from whom, who 
was leading us and why exactly we were doing what we were doing. 
There was no way to predict or classify this fluid and violent wave of  
people, no political organisation to lead the mobilisation, no uniform 
ideology to set its tone, or a political demand to put forward so as to be 
negotiated or rejected by the government. Our sole reaction was this 
sense of  bewilderment of  being together in the streets and an urge to 
do and write thousands of  meaningful things that made no sense. We 
saw ourselves acting in ways we could not imagine, we became illegal, 
inaudible, unacceptable, ineligible, ferocious, and wonderful. It was not 
despair or disillusionment—we were never allowed to believe in some-
thing after all. It was acting beyond ourselves and what has made us so 
far understand the world around us. During those days we experienced 
the feeling of  our coming together, of  fighting for and not against, and 
for the first time we could make a difference. Everything was possible, 
as it should have always been. 
Before December, we knew it already—no one was to be trust-
ed, politics was corrupt, things were getting irreversibly worse all the 
time and there was nothing to do about it. But then we took to the 
streets, we found each other, and there was actually no need to read 
what other people wrote and do what other people had arranged to do 
and wait for others to think about what we want, no need to articulate 
demands and ask for marginal benefits so that they could understand, 
no need to adopt argumentative strategies and representative ethics so 
as to reach a rational consensus, no need to have a meaning within 
this frame, because we had no need of  this frame, we created our own 
meanings. Our relating to each other in an equal way and the spaces, 
words and actions we formed rejected common sense, because they 
were not just directed against the state; this was a politics of  resistance 
and solidarity that was bluntly stateless.
For a few days we set out on a voyage to a land where we were 
all different, but all together. The moments of  this brief  encounter form 
the story of  December—a story that could not have been predicted 
and which cannot be unravelled. The before and after became indis-
tinguishable, the effects caused causes and put together words, images, 
places and people so as to produce this true utopia, this utopian reality, 
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a living madness, the wordless evidence of  the thing given in itself, the 
exact coincidence of  word and thing.
2) FOREIGNERS TO OUR LAND
Journalists, politicians, intellectuals, academics, and citizens attempted 
to identify the groups that participated in those moments of  revolt, and 
relate the events to both local and international contexts and trace the 
reasons for them (see Sotiris 2010; Gavriilides 2010).4 
a) So there were some, certainly not the majority, who tried to 
understand and come to terms with the events, or even express solidar-
ity with the protesters. Attempting something close to social analysis, 
they insisted on the conditions of  globalisation and neoliberalism that 
produce rising inequalities, a crisis of  values and youth insecurity, while 
others attributed the causes to the fallacies of  Greek state corruption 
and political clientelism, an underdeveloped civil society, problems in 
the educational establishment, an institutional crisis, and the loss of  
state legitimacy.5 There were those who, aided by social movement the-
ory, looked for the organisational basis and membership of  the protest 
events, and for any predetermined strategies that would possibly aim at 
the expansion of  the political context or the institutionalization of  the 
movement itself.6 After December, some foresaw the “end of  politics” 
brought about by mass individualism and nihilism and gave up their 
analysis; some others, led by revolutionary emotionalism, did exactly 
the same, but this time in the name of  this sublime Event that will itself  
automatically lead to change and to the “return of  politics.” 
All these explanations insisted on the centrality of  politics and 
saw December as a movement meant to mobilise part of  the population 
that felt more or less socially excluded. By confirming already exist-
ing inequalities, however, they proved unable to go any further than 
constantly rediscovering them.7 This world is unequal, but this is an 
intangible given. It is as if  those interpretations called on people to 
provide capitalism and existing state structures with a radical and more 
humanistic content.
b) But then there were those who stated in a much more vo-
ciferous way that what took place in the streets of  the country during 
December was certainly not a “revolt,” but something that paved the 
way to more violence and illegality. The protesters, each one led by a 
different motivation, had nothing in particular to say or to ask for. Their 
anger was short-lived and did not reflect or give birth to anything new. 
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In any case, things went back to normal immediately afterwards. As for 
the youngsters performing “a chain of  irrational and openly anomic” 
acts of  violence, they felt legitimated by a public discourse of  resistance 
against authority that has become justified, if  not glorified, in Greece 
since 1975. This was not a social movement, not an insurrection of  the 
youth, not even a reflection of  any deeper social, political, or ideologi-
cal causes; it was only a culture of  violence with which the state had 
proved incapable of  dealing. It comes as no surprise, then, that Greece 
remains a pre-modern, primordial, and underdeveloped country.8
What was repeatedly asked for was zero tolerance to all forms 
of  violence, nihilism, and abuse so as to maintain regime normality. As 
a result, consensus, law and order, as well as the Athenian Christmas 
tree, must be safeguarded and the cities cleansed of  trash, vandalism, 
and extremism. 
c) At the same time, the demonstrations and riots obviously 
became headline news for every single newspaper, TV, or radio station 
in the country. Media coverage stated that this was one of  the most 
massive events taking place in the country, which was not the respon-
sibility of  the “usual suspects,” but of  much broader groups of  people. 
The pattern of  treatment for those “unique” events, however, was the 
same as ever: everything was framed around the issue of  “violence,” as 
conducted by both police and protesters; no attempt was made whatso-
ever to understand why such protests were taking place at this specific 
moment and on the streets, why they were embracing so many and such 
different people and taking this form and with such intensity. Media 
attention was directed to the teenagers protesting; those young people 
bearing no conflictual or politically-charged memory could easily ap-
pear as the only innocent and thus true political subjects of  a world in 
disarray.9 Vivid images of  the city in flames and of  citizens being beaten 
by security forces generated an urgent need to protect the country both 
from an abusive state power and from anarchist violent practices. Social 
tensions were obscured, neutralised, and depoliticised so as to let the 
national community emerge as a suffering body, united in its need to 
resist “violence” of  all sorts. 
The analyses offered by state representatives, public intellec-
tuals, and the media attempted to link the events in a linear way so 
as to reach a point where the relation of  cause and effect would be 
clear enough to explain them. In this way, they failed to offer an un-
derstanding of  what happened. They managed, however, step-by-step 
to strip this voyage of  ours of  its content; we were told we were not 
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there, because we were too many and we were too dispersed to be seen; 
we were denied a vital space, because we had burnt down what could 
possibly make sense; we were given no political role in the game, be-
cause we did not play according to the rules. In pronouncing December 
to be non-existent, or a failed appointment, this exhaustive series of  
possible explanations managed to come to terms not with the dynam-
ics and the contradictions of  the events per se but with preconceived 
realities already at hand. Most analyses were rational, confident and 
often aggressive, others paternalistic but also nervous to explain, while 
some were benevolent or even comprehensive. But, at the very end, this 
“prose of  counter insurgency” (Guha 1983) was fearful of  December 
as something that could not be grasped, that was not supposed to have 
happened, as something that was an exception to the rule.
What about life after December, then?
THESE DAYS (OUR LIFE AFTER DECEMBER)
3) DEPARTING FROM THEIR LAND OF CRISIS
The King is Naked
It was soon revealed, however, that it was not the exception to 
the rule that was to be feared, but the rule itself. A violent crisis, first 
financial and then all-encompassing, surfaced in the months following 
December, effectively shattering all the arrogant confidence of  the sys-
tem. During the last twenty years, the two major political parties in the 
country—right-wing and socialist—had been attempting to construct 
a central space beyond ideologies, where politics would be performed 
by sceptical liberals and responsible technocrats. This consensual uni-
verse was supposed to appease grievances and avoid conflicts. Howev-
er, it had been gradually pushing to the margins a growing majority of  
people who could no longer expect to be incorporated or represented 
within its limits. Hitherto latent social antagonisms were revealed and 
became polarised, while their negotiation through established institu-
tions was unmasked as a dead-end endeavour. The political establish-
ment started to tremble and collapse, as did any alternative or dissent-
ing options within its context, in either their reformist or leftist political 
form. And while the social fabric is being torn apart throughout the 
country, massive numbers of  immigrants and refugees are waiting be-
yond or within its borders to be either naturalised or repatriated, while 
neither can happen. Cities around the country had been besieged 
throughout the last ten years by an ever-growing number of  individu-
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als in need; their disquieting presence had unsettled transport and edu-
cation habits, workplace environments, housing, and urban normality. 
This has become an everyday reality that now directly relates to the 
overall deformation of  the given frame of  life, as it grows ever harder 
for people to be represented within it.
It was revealed, thus, that there was no life after December, 
because it was our own life that brought about December. People all 
over the country started realising that, however different their anxiet-
ies might be, their problem is common—the unequal way in which 
structures have been erected around them—and thus can no longer be 
tackled through the usual form of  politics. Citizens emerge, not divided 
into different parts, but as one group subject to an institutional struc-
ture and power distribution that threatens their existence in different 
ways. Due to this crisis of  representation, every opinion, criticism, or 
protest directly challenges the core issue of  power and becomes instantly 
politicised. There is no longer space left for a commonplace student or 
anti-racist mobilisation to develop, or for a syndicalist demand to be put 
forward; truck drivers blocking avenues and workers fired from publish-
ing houses, contractual employees of  the Ministry of  Culture occupying 
the Acropolis, and basketball players on strike—all those groups have 
single-issue claims that unavoidably acquire broad political connotations 
and challenge the overall framework in an explicit way. Meanwhile, the 
cities are inundated by growing numbers of  asylum seekers, homeless 
people, drug addicts, and many more individuals that simply do not fit 
in, revealing the unequal way the state has until now defined the spaces 
assigned to its citizens. Interrupting the normal flow and spatial arrange-
ment of  things, people start becoming self-organised alongside those 
around them by occupying public spaces, mounting community events 
and forming neighbourhood assemblies. Local communities, which have 
been erased of  any political content since the very foundation of  the 
Greek state, appear now as an alternative political agent.
In the months following December, we, along with many peo-
ple next to us, have started to acknowledge the surplus refugees that 
we ourselves are within our country (Agamben 1995: 119), within 
our towns and districts, and while the structures sustaining the world 
around us still remain intact we gradually become radically predisposed 
to understanding ourselves beyond their cognitive frame. 
Dismantling Opposition
In stripping the system of  its normality and legibility, this crisis 
made what we experienced throughout December all the more visible 
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and real. And, for this reason, our words and actions became dangerous 
for the maintenance of  a system feeling insecure. 
In the late modern conduct of  affairs, conflict is declared to 
be finished, or impossible, and departs from politics in the name of  
rationally-achieved consensus. Any dissenting voice or communitarian 
attempt that shatters this contract seems like a relic from the past, or 
a temporary regression, so as to remain fragmented. But antagonisms 
and inequalities do not vanish and when conflict returns, as it recently 
did in a vulgar way in Greece, it can only be understood as radical evil 
and can only take the form of  irrational violence or intolerance of  the 
culturally different. Thus, the only remaining alternative way to repre-
sent and understand non-capitalist resistance is to push it to the margins 
and equate it with the label “extremism”; devoid of  political content, 
which can equally be filled in with racist attacks, religious fundamental-
ism, or ultra-right-wing violence. Such pre-political violence can only 
be fought with repression, by introducing laws against “extremism,”10 
allowing for more police impunity, enhancing security forces and sur-
veillance mechanisms around the country, and criminalising critical 
thinking and hitherto permissible protest activities, such as syndicalist 
protests and demonstrations. At the level of  public opinion, state and 
media discourse violently attack protest mobilisations on a daily basis in 
an attempt to discredit and negate radical action and collective ethics as 
a political option. Power mechanisms must become more authoritarian 
so as to purge extremist forces and prevent the financial, institutional, 
and moral collapse of  the country. 
For the present order of  things to be maintained, however, 
power also must respond somehow to the actual problems of  the people 
suffocating within its contextual constraints. In any case, that is how 
capitalism managed to face the radical critique at the end of  the 1960s 
and 1970s. Demands for autonomy and liberation of  creativity, critique 
of  hierarchy and bureaucracy—these were oppositional themes articu-
lated during the “May events” that the system managed to recuperate. 
By mobilising pre-existing protests whose legitimacy was guaranteed, 
opposition was disarmed, initiative regained and a new dynamism dis-
covered (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005). In today’s crisis, the critique 
of  the state as an apparatus of  domination and oppression is gradually 
becoming a legitimate discourse written, heard, and communicated by 
many. Moreover, the demands for decentralisation and self-organisa-
tion emerge as a sound alternative to institutions that are corrupted 
and politicians who fail in making our lives any better. From right- and 
ultra-right-wing parties, socialist spokesmen, and NGOs to mainstream 
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newspapers, free press, arty fanzines, and TV talk shows, public dis-
course gives birth to a new citizenship culture; while the boat is sinking, 
you must take things into your hands and do not expect anything from 
the state; defy governments and politics, mobilise beyond public institu-
tions, challenge them by believing in yourself  and friends, stop criticis-
ing others, “do it yourself,” make your neighbourhoods look cleaner 
and safer, organise your own workplace, disgrace old-style ideologies, 
scientific analyses and revolutionary promises, act now, look alternative, 
be disobedient, be marginal.11 
So, while direct action and political protests are persecuted and 
stigmatised at the level of  political and social demands, anti-authoritari-
anism becomes at the same time a lifestyle in everyday culture endorsed 
and promoted by authorities themselves. 
If  that is the brave new world of  wild possibilities and mortal 
challenges, then what is to be said? What is to be done?
4) OURSELVES BECOMING FOREIGNERS TO OUR LAND 
During December, After was turned into the Now and we were faced, 
as they were, with the Real. For years we, the anarchist, anti-authori-
tarian, or libertarian movement, had been talking and shouting, acting 
irrationally, and believing passionately in self-organised communities of  
people and imaginative creativity in human relationships, in unmedi-
ated participation and committed action in everyday life, in decentrali-
sation and re-occupation of  vital urban spaces, in emancipation and 
solidarity, in violent resistance and never-ending revolt. It was due to 
our radical critique of  everyday life that we had been cruelly criticised, 
marginalised, and persecuted for a long time and at every moment, it 
was due to our radical actions that we had been left alone. And then, 
December erupted. There it was—reality denouncing the vanity of  
words and just what the words led us to expect. Beyond the analysis of  
the oppression or the feelings of  duty towards the oppressed, there it 
was. The signs by which a gaze comes to recognize reality as exemplary 
of  the idea and the idea comes to incarnate itself  in a living landscape, 
the lines and shadows of  which created a new imagination for a world 
hitherto without images.
After December, we were faced, as they were, with what we had 
been aspiring towards for so long. And what we did at this liminal point 
is return to normal. This is not because the post-December realities dis-
illusioned us; it is because we started gradually to link the landscape we 
had experienced with our habits of  belief, because we persisted in our 
gaze and reworked the way we knew all along to put together words and 
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images. After all, all those people around us were not critical enough, 
they did not have the experience and radicalism required to persist and 
the courage and commitment to go on, some of  them had made com-
promises we detest and opted for ways of  life we had been fighting, the 
majority of  them are participants, after all, in the system we mean to 
demolish. Things did not happen as they should have and will not de-
velop as they must, because, at the very end, they, and the others, can-
not understand what we have been doing for so long. And we already 
knew they would not. 
And so, we gradually lost what had bound us together with the 
rest of  the people and we returned to the place we had always been. 
We kept on mounting individualised struggles that did not manage to 
touch upon overall political and economic conditions, when we had to 
relate to new realities and reinvent our tactics. We even kept on believ-
ing in manifestos for the reorganisation of  society that failed to relate 
to society itself, when we had to communicate our principles and re-
late with people around us, we never ended up forming relations. We 
kept on rediscovering inequalities and never stopped speaking about 
an omnipotent present that contains no positivity other than an imag-
ined negation, and failed to convince ourselves and others that we can 
do something more than be defeated. We started again to direct all 
our energy in fighting against the cops and the state, reoccupying the 
role of  the marginalised and socially excluded that the system itself  has 
prepared for us, a space reserved also for extremists and fascists work-
ing alongside the state. We destroyed and acted in symmetry with our 
repressors, when we had to move beyond the frame set by them. We 
kept on proclaiming self-organisation and decentralisation as our goals, 
when we had to make them our presupposition. We thought they did 
not see us, when they were already absorbing our critique and effacing 
our political agency. We vociferously shouted that we were against the 
system, when we had to create and reinforce non-capitalist, non-hier-
archical, free and equal relationships, and multiply our stateless spaces 
and practices. We distrusted everybody, when we had to be in solidarity 
with everyone. 
But we did not really care; we were used to being on the mar-
gins, after all. We believed that December and ourselves were both an 
exception to the rule.
But December emerged not because of  us. It revealed, instead, 
that in an unjust universe the repressed learn to communicate without 
speaking, to step forward without moving, to resist without resisting. 
Throughout those days, all of  us discovered ways to imply, to bewilder, 
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and to be part of  a whole, not to put into words, not to fit into words, 
ways to choose the margin and act in the centre, not to catechize or 
offer a paradigm, but to (re)open the eternally open and living area of  
possibilities, to be equal and to feel free. December, far from being an 
exception, contained the only normality that makes our living possible. 
This eternal present showed us the path towards a land not of  fear and 
problems to be resolved but of  collective illusions to be realised. Under 
our gaze, to the rhythm of  our steps, the images of  the new world came 
into being and passed into the distance. Now, it would be better to re-
member how it was to be ready to win everything and lose nothing, to 
be no longer invisible, to relate endlessly with each other, how it was to 
set out on this voyage of  moments never to return, hanging until the 
final leap on the improbability and unpredictability of  an encounter, 
‘the union of  a long sentence with a bit of  reality that is not.’ Local and 
contingent, mad and real, this land of  ours is on the point of  disappear-
ing and, thus, perhaps also on the point of  reappearing.
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10 See for instance the declaration “Fight against Extremism: Achievements, Deficiencies 
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October 2010, in which racist violence, religious fundamentalism, the anti-globalisation 
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Greece in 2009) are all labelled as “extremism.” For a full text, see: http://assembly.coe.
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the law into their own hands and organise local assemblies so as to “clean” districts of  
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that buying their products is so cool that “governments will hate you.” 
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Four burnt cars, browned by flames, grayed by soot, are each stacked 
parallel; side by side by side by side, passenger doors laying face down 
on the pavement, driver’s windows supinely watching the sky. The night 
before I arrived in Athens, the cars were overturned from their normal 
resting places and set ablaze to barricade the riot police from the gated 
entrance of  the National Technical University. In a group of  three we 
stood alone in front of  the Polytechnic, granted with a rare and unchar-
acteristically quiet moment for that December, where only the sun, in a 
pitched battle with the clouds, gave any hints of  a conflict. To finally settle 
on a mood, the day slowly deliberated upon a victor, and I took the same 
time to stare at the sedans, standing in a row perfectly equidistant from 
one another, resting like dominoes ready to fall with a child’s nudge, and 
decided that the symmetrically aligned wreckage seemed more like an 
outdoor art sculpture commissioned for a city park than the aftermath 
of  a revolt. Instead of  black clad insurgents, I imagined druids—maybe 
the real-hooded ones, the koukouloforoi, reported by the Greek me-
dia—forgoing massive boulders for scorched cars and working unnoticed 
throughout the night to construct some sort of  Brutalist Stonehenge. In 
my daydream these “known unknowns” labour carefully but efficiently, 
leaving the night undisturbed, to ensure the city will wake surprised in 
the quiet morning to an automobile monument devoted to the rebellion. 
Savouring the fleeting calm, we’re betrayed by our path, as the 
walk up Stournari street on a carpet of  stones and shattered glass makes 
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silent steps impossible. Drifting into Exarcheia, carried by something 
outside of  myself, the spray-painted slogans and the colourful posters 
decorating what’s left intact of  the remaining architecture lose the com-
petition for my attention to the charred skeleton of  what was once a 
five-story building. Like a cancer spreading so fast its growth is visible, 
dark embers invade the remnants of  the multiplex’s walls. Last night’s 
inferno robbed this former computer megastore of  its façade, swallow-
ing its silicone merchandise, replacing the edifice with a gaping, hollow 
cave. As caves will be caves, whether natural or man-made, playing out 
their role since antiquity, transmitting allegories, delivering messages, 
with blinding lights I came to recognize the foolishness in imagining this 
scene as a product of  meticulous craftsmanship. Clearly, this was, and 
could only be, the unmistakable result of  fury. 
An excessive fury, an unremitting fury, a fury that cuts through 
space, crumbling windows, plucking throwing-stones from the concrete 
and finally burrows into people; shaking their inner-core like hands 
after a fist-fight. Once inside, the fury alters as it’s altered, becoming 
wholly different while reciprocally evolving its inanimate host, molting 
its off  dead, rotten layers, revealing new life. Abiding by a rationality 
unto itself, it travelled on a seemingly sporadic course, entering and es-
caping bodies, seeping into everything it encountered as the scent of  sex 
soaks into whatever is present in a lover’s hot summer bedroom. The 
swallowed razors, force-fed from birth, which regardless of  our wish, 
we all painfully harbour inside us, from work, to school, to prison, and 
back to a home that’s almost indistinguishable from the latter, were at 
last placed firmly in our hands. And that which was exempt from our 
slashes, those fragments of  this filthy, miserable world we didn’t hack to 
bits, were left to be enveloped, as the evil passions burrowed their way 
into the very substratum of  reality, violently making changes at the level 
of  pure substance, effacing each and every thing from the inside out. 
In this context of  absurd and insupportable communication in which each is 
fatally held as in the trap of  a paradoxical injunction—to ‘speak’ one must 
renounce ‘communicating’ and to ‘communicate’ one must renounce ‘speaking’!
—Curcio and Franceschini (The Historical Founders of  the Red Brigades)
Insurrection enters as much into people as into the depths of  
society. In their urgent task of  demolition, the insurgency succeeds in 
taking the static, immutable nature of  man as one of  its many victims. 
Humanity is then approached as a real creation, a potential to be ful-
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filled in the constructed present. With the unfolding of  new forms of  
life blossoms new ways of  experiencing; of  perceiving the environment 
and time, and new relations between people; interactions and commu-
nication. Displacing objects from their names, the signified from their 
signifier, rebellion empties out the things, which reality, in its perpetual 
surge, throws at our feet like the useless remains of  shipwreck. Rather 
than re-establishing deeper meanings and alternative reference, new and 
unprecedented modes of  human expression develop to coincide with the 
manifold changes, by instead, opening onto a field of  possibilities.
Corralled back into the debilitating normality of  everyday life, 
undermined by the armed peace that continually degrades legitimate 
experience and levels communication into flat information, I’m now 
nearly unable to recount what I witnessed during that warm December 
in Athens. Each attempt unfailingly descends into flowery hermeticism 
and jargon, coupled with unwanted verbal chiaroscuro effects: superla-
tive and anecdotal exaggerations. To put this glossolalic condition in a 
far more blunt manner, one could say that the taste of  freedom can 
never be articulated in a tongue accustomed to boot-licking. 
Nevertheless, after countless unsuccessful efforts, what follows 
are a few more pale renderings of  the images, emotions, and memo-
ries, which may have only been adequately depicted, during that all too 
brief  period in my life, when I, amongst others, believed that anything 
could actually happen. Like stained emulsions held to dim light, each 
story intends to describe negatively the ineffable transformations in 
people, by detailing the inessential to somewhat delineate the essential. 
Unavoidably, this method produces inverted representations, where the 
light must appear dark and darkness appears as light. Thus due to the 
damage of  time, the inevitable outcome of  my offeringis now the blur-
riest of  portraits, pictures that could have only been seen clearly, while 
undergoing similar changes, from within those same lost moments.
The time has come to reinstitute
the morally just as the ultimate praxis.
To make life into a poem.
And life into praxis.
—Katerina Gogou
Unable to keep pace with the speed at which the events un-
furled, my memories tend to blend and sometimes even collide with 
one another; as an effect, erasing from my mind instances I wish I 
could recall. And so, I can’t remember exactly when I met him, yet 
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thinking back to the demonstrations, the assemblies, and the gather-
ings I can often place him there. He was handsome, with a height 
that crouched slightly when he spoke to you, and like Orwell’s Italian 
anarchist in Homage to Catalonia, his striking features told stories, 
detailing his personality; so swelled with candour there was no room 
left for ferocity. Without any of  the fabled Italian’s justified viciousness, 
his face was likely more moving and it also made you immediately like 
him. More importantly, I wanted him to like me; because he had a dis-
tinct way of  greeting you with a smile that made you go inside yourself  
to recognize your very own uniqueness. Far too humble to command 
it, respect was instead willingly bestowed, not only due to the way he 
carried himself  but likely because everyone else wanted a smile from 
him also.
During the last large demonstration in December, after the 
procession had ended, a clash had predictably erupted, only to be 
momentarily ceased by the riot police’s Israeli tear gas searing open a 
sizeable space between them and us. From within the crowd, at a safe 
distance from the cops’ batons, I could faintly make out something, that 
seemed like it was a universe away, moving in every direction except 
in line-formation with the MAT. You can suspect me all you want of  
over-embellishment, even condemn me of  the charge, but I swear, this 
almost indiscernible object appeared to my two tear gas burned eyes 
as a star, enmeshed in all the instability and chaos of  a ternary system. 
Given the complex dynamic between the MAT, the boulevard, and this 
nebulous mass, the way in which they repelled and attracted each other, 
emitting and exchanging waves of  force, I cannot be convinced other-
wise that what I observed was none other than the disorderly interac-
tion of  celestial bodies. 
It wasn’t until the triplet moved closer that I recognised him, 
alone. Rather than flashing his sought after smile, he instead, through a 
gas mask, bared his teeth at the line of  riot cops like a careering ram set 
upon by bees. With more bestial qualities than human, he head-down 
crashed into their shields with the impact of  a wild herd, and instantly 
after the collision, with a slight pivot, veered to the side and thrust him-
self  into a bank with the same power, only to continue repeating the 
entire motion again and again. 
With his back turned to the group of  onlookers, he inched 
toward us after each smash, and from where I stood, I came to under-
stand the Greek expression “gallons on his shoulders,” as it became ob-
vious he could carry us all in his backpack, unburdened by the weight, 
and continue fighting with the same intensity. Along with a few other 
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internationals, I made a futile attempt at rushing in behind him only 
to be immediately pushed back, not by batons or concussion grenades, 
but by the energy the police let off  as they moved in forward. Now only 
a few steps away from him, I could see that he was somehow granted 
with an extraordinary ability to relinquish any worn, rigid designa-
tion and transform into whatever suited him and his purpose at the 
moment. And after what proved to be a very careful selection, with 
the strength and agility of  an athlete he charged into a bus-stop ad-
vertisement, and once it cracked to bits, with the beauty and grace of  
a dancer, he drifted past the riot polices’ lunges and swings, to other 
side of  the street. He then proceeded to hammer open the driver-side 
window of  a sedan fortuitously parked at his destination, and while 
others came up to join him, his hand confidently reached into the car 
to yank it into neutral. 
Now, look. I can go from city to city, or traverse the whole 
earth, by foot if  necessary, surveying original works of  art and seeing 
first-hand the monuments and wonders that entice us to reconsider the 
heights of  mankind’s aptitude. I can let my imagination place me in 
the audience of  Théatre de Champs-Elysées to experience the original 
shock of  a scandalous Nijinsky performance, or simply, lie down and 
dream the most fantastic dream. Yet measured against what occurred 
in that demonstration, the effective blurring of  possibility and actual-
ity, the powerful unification of  what we are with what we can do, each 
of  these, in comparison, would appear languid, uninspired, and even 
a bit hideous; merely subordinate images of  beauty coloured by the 
subordinate existence assigned to us. Henceforth, from that day on, I 
can hereby state, with an unrivalled certainty, that all else is rendered an 
utter disappointment when judged next to the true experiment of  liv-
ing, where for him “the streets became brushes, and the squares became 
palettes”; the maximal dimension of  human creativity which can only 
be conjured by invoking the Shiva-ite dance of  destruction. 
And to everyone’s amazement, and with perfectly choreo-
graphed execution, the car was shifted into the middle of  street, and 
with one sure heave, toppled at the line of  equally astonished riot po-
lice, who finally stopped dead their advance only a few feet away. 
We’ll be new, love,
we’ll wash away what is old and depraved,
the putrid petty-bourgeoisie tendencies and vices
with blood. 
— Giaconda Belli
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After almost two years of  reflection and several return visits, 
I’m only now becoming capable of  sifting through everything I wit-
nessed to separate it into either cross-cultural phenomena, the specifi-
cally Greek, or relegating it to the bizarre happenstances wholly pecu-
liar to insurrection. Since my introduction to Greece happened to also 
coincide with my very first uprising, some reflections still manage to be 
intractable combinations of  the three, like for example, hearing for the 
first time the epic howls of  Antartika, Greek Civil War music, blaring 
from the speakers of  the occupied GSEE. Ceasing the passive reception 
of  the senses which were instead felt intensely and antagonistically, the 
pulse of  insurrection has the effect of  amplifying commonplace cir-
cumstances that would normally fall into the former categories: I to this 
day still long, with an almost burdensome nostalgia, for the taste of  the 
collectively looted food, and for the warmth, the odour, and the sound 
of  dozens of  exhausted insurgents, huddled together, sleeping in the 
first quiet place they could rest.
As for the rally that took place in front of  the central Athens 
police station, it refuses to be classified amongst the others I’ve attended 
both past and present, standing as an example unto itself; not only be-
cause of  what happened at the gathering but more importantly due to 
who showed up to it. That is to say, I’m completely sure that I’ll never 
again see a rally with that many children, and I mean, literally, children, 
some as young as 10 or 11. And of  all kinds, different attitudes and 
subcultural allegiances, including styles that scream apathetic and apo-
litical no matter the country: emo-kids, high-school football stars, prom 
kings and queens. From a distance, you could barely notice the leftist 
blemishes in the sea of  kids, as the old paper-peddlers were almost in-
discernible from the taller seniors of  equal height. The rebellion had 
joyously lifted all the seriousness from the usually solemn ritual, and 
while some, in tiny groups laughed, chatted, and gossiped in that way 
that only school children can do, others took to playfully humiliating 
the cops, pelting them with eggs, tomatoes, and oranges. 
After looking backwards to ensure that their friends approvingly 
watched, the braver ones lobbed stones at the police guarding the station. 
Once the trend caught on, the MAT, unable to bear the smallest reprisal 
for their daily behaviour, fired a tear gas canister into the crowd. After the 
shot, a riot ensued and people dispersed and scattered without any preset 
plan or direction, in and out of  the side streets and back and forth from 
the main boulevard. The shuddering explosions of  concussion grenades, 
the heat from the flames, the shrieking, screeching snaps of  the riot police 
shields split by stones, each vying for pronunciation within the chaos. 
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Given the randomness of  the situation, we made a totally ran-
dom turn onto a seemingly deserted street, which would have been 
completely isolated had it not been for the presence of  an adolescent 
boy, around the hard-to-pin-down age of  thirteen. We almost failed to 
recognize him, as the only part of  his little frame that appeared to us 
were his feet dangled inches above the ground. The remainder of  his 
body was swallowed whole in the mouth of  a large garbage dumpster. 
Likely due to inexperience, it was taking him an unexpectedly long time 
to light the contents of  the bin on fire. The consequent frustration to-
tally absorbed him in his task, which at the same time, made him un-
aware of  anything happening in his periphery. Thus, he failed to notice 
a woman, dressed in a business-casual suit typical for her age, slowly ap-
proaching him from behind. The woman, who could have easily been 
his mother, had taken shelter in a shop once the riot began, yet assum-
ing the worst of  the storm had passed, she ventured into the desolate 
road. Very gently, she reached her hand into the dumpster to place it 
on the boy’s shoulder. We were too far away to hear exactly what she 
said to the startled boy, who abruptly turned toward her quite surprised 
by the touch, so we rushed in towards them, only to gradually slow our 
pace once we realised the woman was only interested in chastising the 
child with the same maternal affection a young mother scolds her own 
adorable, yet troublesome, toddler. 
If  the jolted boy had been a seasoned militant, grasped from 
behind by someone he didn’t immediately recognize, especially while 
in the process of  committing a crime, he would have responded to her 
reprimands with a firm crack to the jaw, in order to clear a path for 
escape. Instead, he stared confidently into her eyes, unresponsively; the 
words aimed at him each time missing their impassable target. His new-
found self-assurance did not arise from the affectations of  a hardened 
militant, yet neither did he react with the disposition of  a normal child, 
who commonly shrinks under the castigation of  a superior. Declining his 
fixed role in the usual exchange between authoritative adult and minor, 
the boy remained in a subtle limbo, rejecting the attribution of  another 
character. Furthermore, it became obvious he was unwilling to accept 
any other imposed mode of  conduct or behaviour. Swelling with dis-
obedience, you could practically see his person fraying at its edges. The 
power released by his rejections began to mount a tension. So confusing 
and uneasy was the tension that I couldn’t decide whether I wanted to 
it continue or end. Never cowering or releasing the now baffled and dis-
turbed woman from his stare, he finally broke the suspense, and told her, 
very matter-of-factly, “Fuck you and your capitalist dreams.” 
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Briskly turning his back to the woman, who so rudely inter-
rupted him, he instantly set back to work trying to ignite that all too 
stubborn trash on fire. 
Class struggle… is a fight for the crude and material things without which 
no refined and spiritual things could exist. But these latter things, which are 
present in the class struggle, are not present as a vision of  spoils that fall to the 
victor. They are alive in this struggle as confidence, courage, humour, cunning 
and fortitude, and have effects that reach far back into the past. They constantly 
call into question every victory, past and present, of  the rulers. As flowers turn 
toward the sun, by dint of  a secret heliotropism, the past strives to turn toward 
that sun which is rising in the sky of  history. The historical materialist must be 
aware of  this most inconspicuous of  all transformations. 
—Walter Benjamin
As often as I’m asked to share my experiences from Decem-
ber, I’m just as frequently asked to give some sort of  explanation as to 
how and why it happened. Yet to provide an adequate response, similar 
problems once again arise. For insurrection, by its very nature, refuses 
to be situated or interpreted: it is the unforeseen inception of  the new 
that can never be translated back into the terms which preceded it. The 
event itself  is a splitting off  from, a fracture, a total break with causality. 
The shocks of  its rupture multiply into a crescendo of  lawless swerves 
counteracting any preconceived forms of  determinism, circumventing 
placement in mechanistic models. Its effects are wholly irreducible to 
the previous conditions—and so, all the mindless €700 generation talk 
is an exercise in nonsense. Attempting to restore linearity after the fact 
amounts to nothing more than a plot to rob the uprising of  its novel-
ty—a plundering of  what made it singular and unique. Any worth-
while explanation undoubtedly must rely on a notion as conceptually 
untameable, uncategorizable, and idiosyncratic as the rebellion itself; 
that being, the struggle.
“What strikes me in the Marxist analyses,” Michel Foucault 
once noted, “is that they always contain the question of  ‘class struggle’ 
but that they pay little attention to one word in the phrase, namely, 
‘struggle’.” And the same can be said for all pacified answers to the 
social question; that is, when communism rusts into people’s republics 
and anarchism retreats into bland anti-authoritarianism, each tendency, 
in their ossified form, will focus mainly on defining class, its boundaries, 
membership, and composition, leaving aside the far more important 
complexities brought forth by the antagonistic confrontation between 
the opposing classes. Following the icy road laid by abstraction, the 
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ideologists, regardless of  their intention, cross over into the enemy’s 
ranks, joining the other courtly scribes of  democracy’s kingdom. The 
host of  specialists, the psychologists, the sociologists, the journalists, etc. 
(all more aptly described as morticians), each in their own servile way, 
quench Power’s need, on both a macro and micro level, to continually 
produce, convey, and disseminate its truths. This process of  systematisa-
tion, on the one hand, works to represent order and its institutions as 
a functional requirement, a natural necessity: “What appears is good; 
what is good appears.” On the other hand, it disqualifies incompatible 
modes of  understanding; sanitising rebellion, reconciling the irreconcil-
able, rendering the ever present possibility for resistance unthinkable. 
An explanation of  insurrection demands a very different meth-
od of  inquiry: a militant research that does not simply interpret and 
analyse reality, but modifies it; the excavation of  truths that not only 
dismiss those ordained and sanctioned, but also undermine their pro-
cedures of  legitimisation; knowledges that are not simply attained, but 
instead strategically and tactically deployed. The struggle itself  there-
fore becomes a matrix of  intelligibility deriving its explanatory capacity 
incisively from the life and death combat between the oppressed and 
the oppressors, the dominated and dominators, the exploited and the 
exploiters. Through the lens of  aggression, tension, and hostility, the 
evolutionary vision of  history dissipates, replacing the illusions of  prog-
ress with a new frame of  reference, which instead views the past as an 
uninterrupted and permanent war that rages even in seemingly tranquil 
periods. From the standpoint of  the engaged conflict, the previous eras 
are then correctly conceived as a succession of  victories and defeats in 
an ongoing war where, ’til this day, the winner still remains undecided. 
This actively-elabourated coalescence of  theory and practice 
enables one to understand the past, present, and future, as well as the 
secret bond between them. Thereby, the relation between today and 
yesterday ceases to be unilateral: in an eminently reciprocal process, 
the present illuminates the past and the illuminated past becomes a 
force in the present. The past is lit by the light of  today’s battles, by the 
sun rising in the firmament of  history. In the above quote, Benjamin 
employs a double metaphor about the sun, to elude to it also as the 
traditional image of  the German worker’s movement, as in the anthem 
of  the Social Democratic party: “Brothers, to sun, to freedom!” But 
instead of  a flower, in regards to the Greek experience, we would find 
a more ligneous plant with “a dint of  a secret heliotropism.” Mimick-
ing insurrection’s bifurcation of  society, the binary division which fol-
lows the open declaration of  civil war, the striving flower should thus 
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be replaced by the tree described in a poem by Yiannis Ritsos, which 
“never produced flower or fruit, only a far-stretching shadow that split 
the garden in two…”
An ancient olive tree, with a trunk with many rings and much 
history: here the German invasion, and here the Civil War and after 
that the regime of  the Colonels. Here the partisans led by Velouchio-
tis, and here the first Dekemvriana [See Glossary] and the Polytechnic 
Uprising, and here the Resistance, and more Resistance, and more and 
more Resistance: terror, civil strife, the mountain of  Gramos, the islands 
of  detention, and the death camps. Victories and defeats. Year by year 
a glorious history, a whole history, and throughout the years, the starv-
ing and the dispossessed, the disabled and thoroughly dead. And here, 
among the finer rings, are the riots of  ’85 and ’86, the student unrest 
and murder of  Nikos Temponeras, the dismal mass arrest at the Poly-
technic, and the past decade’s revitalised movement. Amidst the finest 
rings, the lean years are the children, all the young antartes [partisans], 
taken away to Tashkent, the Queen’s “Children Cities,” and the deten-
tion camps, and others left to die; here we find Michalis Kaltezas and 
Alexis Grigoropoulos, never to grow up to go grey, and to wrinkle, and 
to shrink, but to be fifteen forever—never to outgrow their heroic age.
To stretch this metaphor somewhat more, I might add that the 
bulk of  the trunk is mostly comprised of  a lighter wood, a negative 
space separate yet adjacent and bordering on the annual rings. And 
if  we liken the rings to the efforts of  historians, scribes, archivists, and 
even the memories affably shared by friends, then that lighter, less pro-
nounced area in the bole that surrounds the concentric circles ought to 
coincide with everything that has escaped our memories, the records, 
all the books and news reports, and with that which has even exceed-
ed our collective consciousness. This is exigency; it is that which must 
remain unforgettable, even if  no one remembers it. It consists of  the 
heroics of  the far too modest comrade who now, after the fact, refuses 
to trade boastful December stories; the wild and rebellious, yet month-
long, life lived by the shy school child who, pressured by society, has now 
returned to her desk and back within herself; and the presence of  the 
unknown immigrants who were arrested, and subsequently, deported 
back to their native countries without legal process or court identifica-
tion. We’ll, of  course, never “know” them, but without them, we would 
have never known a December 2008. 
Furthermore, if  every instant of  that month were to be cata-
logued down to the very last second, there would be that which would 
nonetheless evade capture, fleeing into the shapeless chaos of  the 
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forgotten which is neither inert or ineffective, but rather, persistently 
follows reality; surrounding it, tracking it, haunting it. This exigency 
encroaches on the normal state of  affairs, demanding its proper pos-
sibility, awaiting the revelatory moment when civilisation is once again 
exposed as one long, extended and barbaric catastrophe, to then reap-
pear with all the destructive vengeance of  a biblical storm. No way does 
this entail patiently waiting for the day of  reckoning when the repressed 
return, in fact, it dictates the opposite; an active and inextinguishable 
fidelity to the mass of  the forgotten. That is, a responsibility to respond 
to exigency by allowing it to shape each of  our pursuits, whether indi-
vidual or collective. 
In the case of  human communication, the faithful response 
does not simply mean commemorating the forgotten by bringing that 
which was lost back to life in words, or rather, constructing alternative 
histories and traditions to restore the memory of  the oppressed and 
defeated. These attempts at reviving the forgotten are as futile as the 
earlier mentioned attempts to recount their welcomed re-emergence 
during revolts, uprisings, and insurrections. Conversely, history and tra-
dition as such are only possible and transmissible due to exigency itself  
as it founds, determines, and underlies the status of  all knowledge and 
understanding. It persists in the infinitely greater value found in what 
is left unsaid by what is said, by what is ineffably shown as opposed to 
what has been clearly articulated in any essay, poem, or page of  sheet 
music worth the tree from which it came. To position the unspoken re-
mainder, surrounding the enunciated letters and sounds, inside the text 
is both impossible and improper. The only importance of  that which is 
spoken relates to the mass of  the forgotten indirectly, as a contribution 
to the preparation for their return: a push towards the full comple-
tion of  the revolutionary project through the destruction of  the realm 
they refuse to inhabit. If  I have here fallen short of  this responsibil-
ity, because my powers are insufficient to cope with the task, then, to 
paraphrase Titos Patrikios: let each of  these pages be converted into 
paper rifles used to overthrow regimes. With lips sealed and pens serv-
ing only as lances, let silence dominate. Until then, on the eve of  every 
general reshuffling of  society, the last and only words will be: “Combat 
or death: bloody struggle or extinction. It is thus that the question is 
inexorably put.”
Kirilov
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To our friends in Greece,
We’ve been meaning to write to you for some time, to answer your call. 
We’ve never managed to. In fact, we’d never really tried—until now. 
The truth is, we haven’t been doing too well. We realized we don’t have 
a lot to say about what happened in Greece. Nothing happened here. 
It is not that people weren’t watching, thinking, and talking 
about those days of  fire, yet it seems to us now that the uprisings and 
occupations brought into focus our own impotency. We questioned our 
faith, we stared at our own banality. It is embarrassing, the degree to 
which nothing happened here, and in fact, the degree to which noth-
ing happening has become the norm. A norm we reproduce with each 
tired demonstration, each rush towards the cops, each poster promising 
something else which has no footholds, no traction on the real terrain 
in which we live.
What were we doing in 2008 when Greece was on fire? In an 
airport lobby, one of  us wanted to switch flights, hop on the plane to 
Athens. A few others kept a blog, translated, and spread updates. Still 
others made posters and graffiti. There was talk. Greece echoed against 
the spontaneous riots that happened in Montreal two months earlier 
after cops killed a young man, Fredy Villanueva. We thought that some-
thing might be about to ignite here too. 
NOTHING HAPPENED:
A LETTER FROM ACROSS THE ATLANTIC
Some of Us
11
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A support demonstration for Greece was organized, people 
“attended.” We were there too; we walked, we shouted slogans. People 
were throwing shoes at an image of  Bush outside the American consul-
ate just down the street from the Greek consulate on the day of  the 
solidarity action. Truth be told, it was depressing. We became part of  
a charade in which all meaning was void before action had even be-
gun. While Greece was burning and being re-occupied, we passed text 
messages of  what was happening during an event organized for Fredy 
Villanueva. At the Villanueva demonstration, we took part in a simu-
lated game of  dice, what the kids were playing when the cops killed the 
fifteen-year-old boy. It was surreal. A stage-play in which no one knew 
anymore who were the actors and who were the stage-managers. We 
became lost in the labyrinth of  our lack of  faith.
The crisis deepened. We felt the rupture and we felt the conti-
nuity. We were still surrounded by the banality.
WE WERE SURROUNDED BY OUR OWN BANALITY
We wondered what it felt like there. Did it feel less banal? Were the 
fires in the streets warming the relations between people, were there 
real cracks opening in the possibilities of  democracy, of  anarchism, of  
communization? 
When we think of  you now, we remember that the news from 
your side of  the world did resound with meaning, gave us shivers and 
gusts of  hope, made sense to us, resembled us, spoke a language we 
knew and wished to speak. 
Watching the insurrection and the occupations unfold that De-
cember was pure joy. A genuine anti-capitalist rebellion was underway 
with a serious critique of  social relations, of  the commodity, and the 
state. We watched attentively as sites of  state domination and capital 
accumulation were attacked, as normality was ruptured, as objects and 
spaces were subverted, reappropriated. Banks on fire. Cops, police de-
partments, ministries, department stores, state buildings. The enemy 
was everywhere and everywhere under attack. Universities, workplaces, 
and public buildings occupied. New networks forged, alliances made 
and acted upon. Lines of  communication opened, popular assemblies 
flourished. Things had meaning, actions connected to concrete reali-
ties. At least temporarily, the state seemed uprooted from absolute pow-
er. It seemed to us, even if  only in small ways, that the world was being 
re-inhabited by people who shared our love and our rage. We know it 
was not simple or easy, those days, but these tangible solutions and ar-
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ticulations ignited our imaginations and inspired us. It was a force that 
we had never experienced here, and before that time, we must admit, a 
myth we hardly believed in anymore. Yet that December we felt a part 
of  it. It felt like us, our time. 
Since then, we have also watched the recapture. “Austerity,” 
imposition, debt, fiscal terrorism, recession, strike, class struggle, op-
pression, division. These are our times too. 
Back here, we try to hold onto those concrete inspirations. But 
every space is colonized by absence, every image a numbing device, ev-
ery word a prison. The response to our sad gestures is a terse, “too bad,” 
or a swift dousing by large amounts of  cops, infiltrators, surveillance 
systems, and violence. Quebec Prime Minister Jean Charest reacted to 
the outcry against drastic cuts in social spending with a “they’ll have to 
live with it.” At the G8/G20 in Toronto, the predictable smashing of  a 
few shop windows justified the largest mass arrest in Canadian history. 
This was only the culmination of  a long process, leaving us 
stranded, exhausted, and clearly under tight surveillance, amplifying 
the sense that we, too, are living under a fast-growing fascism. Twenty 
thousand riot cops for three thousand demonstrators. A billion dol-
lars spent on summit “security.” Over a thousand arbitrary arrests and 
detentions, sexual and physical threats and abuses towards those that 
were arrested. Prominent social justice activists from across the country 
charged with conspiracy against the state. All this won the movement 
little outside a few open letters and editorials in the press, now duly pro-
cessed in recycling facilities. Left movements to wage costly, arduous, 
and only modestly useful legal battles. 
THERE IS NOTHING NEW HERE
We recognize that you are no less constrained than we are by these pow-
erful global forces. We know you live in this desert too. We are not mak-
ing excuses for ourselves, just trying to speak honestly to make sense of  
where we find ourselves, now.
We would love to provoke eruptions of  life, material or sym-
bolic perturbations of  the ambient normality. Yet it seems suicidal to 
throw ourselves into the mega-violence of  the state, or vain, likely to be 
re-territorialized by the yuppie art scene, the municipal government, 
or the like. Often, actions that do happen end up feeding the spectacle 
that salivates for the next anarchist threat, or worse, providing a ready-
made, creative “solution” to urban “problems” for institutional plan-
ners. Either hardly constitutes a force. While writing this we were inter-
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rupted with phone calls about more ongoing secret security visits to the 
homes of  our friends. Even the traditional anti-summit demonstrations 
in which we still sometimes feel a duty to participate are met with a 
large-scale military apparatus and energy-consuming criminalization.
More and more what we understood as social death looks like 
social killing. It is an active machine. Living in the desert of  social death 
is hard enough; now any actions in contestation to the state are met, 
anticipated even, with killing devices.
THESE KILLING DEVICES, THEY MAY BE NEW
Even the liberals are starting to understand as they too are parcelled 
out, denied, abused, and discarded. But we still avoid facing our impo-
tence. We feel lost. Is the terrain shifting or static?
We must start from where we are. A landscape riddled with 
foreclosed homes, environmental genocide, and corporate violence, 
where every aspect of  bare life must be paid for. The problems are so 
transparent that the targets should be obvious. Yet how to engage?
We know the impotence we see is not strictly our fault, or the 
fault of  the movements we often participate in. It is not only because 
they should have been better, quicker, faster, or more militant. This im-
potence is merely the shadow we throw as we stand in this desert, and it 
grows as the desert extends, and the desert sun saturates us.
We are the crisis, but we are also in crisis. We reproduce the 
time and space of  an increasingly crazy capitalism, organizing flash ac-
tions around the flavour of  the day. We run after emergencies, act out 
spectacles. The crisis has many faces.
Some of  us rush towards the ascetic, becoming the priests and 
nuns in the high church of  a purified ethical living: wearing the black 
costume of  the righteous, fleeing from affective connection, afraid to 
touch one another, to infringe upon one another, guarding a liberal 
individualist space. Where your freedom ends, mine begins. We know 
that activism is its own virulent liberalism, that it recreates the isolation 
we fled from in the first place, why do we keep forgetting? We recoil at 
its tyranny. We become indignant or indifferent.
Some of  us chase ambulances—follow the violent eruptions of  
capital and the state, accumulating and appropriating oppressions, un-
able out of  the sheer fatigue from our running to create a real centre, a 
focal point, beyond the march, the meeting, the controlled protest. We 
chase some of  these ambulances just in the hopes of  meeting each other 
again before returning to our lives. We even sometimes feel excited to 
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say, “Let’s meet at the barricades.” We report again with outrage the 
latest injustice from the sidelines. Tire ourselves demanding small con-
cessions that the state gobbles up, sometimes spits back at us.
THIS IS THE ONLY SITUATION; THEREFORE THERE IS NO SITUATION
From this absence, we watched you irrupting into dreamtime—the 
insurrectionary moment. We felt so disempowered, if  inspired. These 
days, we don’t dare hoping for an epic insurrection. It is not coming 
here. We have entertained this myth, this understanding of  insurrec-
tion as the moment of  possibilities with no before, and a hazy after. It 
will not emerge from our Hail Marys. Neither from our theatrics. Our 
insurrection must be de-sanctified.
What did you do after the fires had gone out? In asking this, we 
ask ourselves, too, what do we find in our quiet days, in the shadows of  
resistance, which still inspires and renews us?
We need a code, a genealogy, connecting insurrection to our 
everyday. Revolutions cannot be reduced to the moment of  culmina-
tion and release. Rather a continual breaking from the absence and a 
rupture from normality. It is the moment when something happens and 
subverts, but also, that persists. A mode of  being that grows, a commons 
that disposes us towards action.
And so, amidst the desert and the killing, the flattening out and 
strangling of  life, we must wonder how to resurrect, create, protect, and 
enrich our dispositions and possibilities. 
We can no longer participate in propping up this absence, 
maintaining the minimal “necessary” adaptations and changes that re-
store our faith, but only help manage the abstractions that govern our 
lives. We want to find our faith in the present. We want to inhabit it. To 
push these multiple and intersecting crises towards their limits. 
Within the desert, there is no dialogue to entertain, no roads 
to be paved, no future to expect, no choice to make, not even a refusal 
to hide behind. And beyond it all, we still want to share our dangerous, 
beautiful gifts. To elaborate a way of  being together. 
Communization, a whisper of  revolution. Even here we feel 
shyness, an embarrassment. But no, we will not “collectivize the means 
of  production” or recreate the totalizing community. If  we hear words 
as signs, potential sites where we can meet, commons and communiza-
tion point towards a way out. Dis-objectification, de-subjectivisation, 
sensualisation, singularisation. The sensuous world cannot be pos-
sessed, be it by one or many, but only bears histories, memories, affects. 
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There are no singular beings that are definable, categorisable, predict-
able, or commandable. There are only sites where memories, histories, 
feeling, affects, and potentials converge as a force that manifests. This is 
the language, the gestures, we have recognized in your actions. Perhaps 
this is what we share—what we want to share. 
WE ARE LEFT WITH MANY MORE QUESTIONS THAN RESPONSES
Maybe we shouldn’t have taken up the pen at all, tonight. We have 
failed, we are failing. But we hope we are not too far-gone into the heat 
and toxicity of  the desert to be of  use. We need to intensify the com-
munication. We want to seize something we will not surrender. Can we 
cross borders, or does this un-ground us from the places and ways we 
must re-inhabit our lives and our territories? Are territories themselves 
imaginable anymore? We will push our translations across these fron-
tiers. This will un-ground us. We will re-ground. We will de-inhabit and 
re-inhabit. For now, perhaps we can only be honest about our positions, 
failings, dreams, and desires. Try to build strength among us that might 
create the conditions for firmer, more fertile ground. 
Ignite, friends,
Some of  Us
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During December’s revolt a single phrase was being repeated in smaller 
or larger groups of  people, in assemblies, forums, and amphitheatres. 
What is happening here exceeds us. What did this phrase describe? 
Who would expect to process the revolution, who could ever expect to 
have complete control over a concurrence such as December?
What traversed this question was the dominant masculine and 
bourgeois ideology of  having control even of  a revolt. What traverses 
this stance in return is the belief  that the revolt expresses you to the 
fullest extent. No rupture or crack, no doubt or hesitation can question 
the justness, the truth of  the revolt—neither, in return, your belief  in 
it. Even the way in which one might view the dynamics of  social rela-
tionships cannot help but be affected by these taken-for-granted beliefs. 
In an article referring to an occurrence parallel to that of  December 
(without going into much detail, since this does not concern our present 
subject) the comrade, writing straightforwardly, concluded he did not 
see any fear in the faces of  those who stood next to him in struggle.1 Of  
course, feelings are expressed to the extent they are allowed to be. And 
for them to be allowed means they are de-fetishised —that is, that the 
social relationships producing them are unveiled. The importance of  
their subjectivisation rests with the fact that they are not limited to the 
private sphere but rather, they are produced, accrued, reproduced, and 
fulfilled in the public sphere, where we live ourselves and our relation-
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ships as they are and as we would not know them to be until we got in 
touch with others. After all, what we are describing here is not a phobia 
(even though we would not mind such reactions too). 5 May was a sad 
proof  that fear is objective, that there are indeed risks and dangers for 
which no one wants to claim responsibility. Quite the opposite: at that 
moment, after the shock of  the deaths in the Marfin bank, we rushed 
from different viewpoints to distance the means from our goals, to ques-
tion the unity of  the movement, to wonder about the monsters the rage 
of  the revolted can ferment, to target the spectacular misanthropy, ni-
hilism, and antisocial stance—all of  which become ideological and, 
without being analysed, are uncritically headed in inexplicable direc-
tions. That moment comprised a sad occasion to put forth critiques and 
analyses that prioritise the socialising of  our premises, the formation of  
structures of  self-organisation, and the importance of  social liberation.2
After 5 May we can say that even if  there was no fear during 
December there probably should have been. Yet masculinity, which de-
scribes the dominant imaginary of  the revolt of  the metropolis and the 
violence with which this is expressed, knows how to take risks without 
claiming responsibility.3 And this is probably the reason why there was 
no fear in the faces of  the revolted.
On 15 December 2008, the Haunt of  Albanian Migrants 
published a text on assassinations preceding the one of  Grigoropou-
los which did not see this kind of  mourning in response.4 Its title was 
“These Days Are Ours, Too” and it said the following:
These days are for the hundreds of  migrants and refugees who were murdered 
at the borders, in police stations, workplaces. They are for those murdered 
by cops or ‘concerned citizens.’ They are for those murdered for daring to 
cross the border, working to death, for not bowing their head, or for nothing. 
They are for Gramos Palusi, Luan Bertelina, Edison Yahai, Tony Onuoha, 
Abdurahim Edriz, Modaser Mohamed Ashtraf  and so many others that we 
haven’t forgotten.
These days are for the everyday police violence that remains unpunished and 
unanswered. They are for the humiliations at the border and at the migrant 
detention centres, which continue to date. They are for the crying injustice of  the 
Greek courts, the migrants and refugees unjustly in prison, the justice we are denied. 
Even now, in the days and nights of  the uprising, the migrants pay a heavy toll —
what with the attacks of  far-righters and cops, with deportations and imprisonment 
sentences that the courts hand out with Christian love to us infidels.
Another group that appeared during the days of  December 
were the “Purple hoodies.” In a text read out during a public concert in 
Athens they wrote that they also add to the list of  victims of  state ter-
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rorism and police violence (brought to the fore by the assassination of  
Alexandros Grigoropoulos) the twenty women assassinated, after 1980, 
by their policemen husbands and lovers—in most cases in honour kill-
ings and without the assassins facing any consequences whatsoever.5 
December’s gender is analysed in detail in an article by the group Ter-
minal119, “Did December Have a Gender?”6 and for this reason we 
will not elaborate further here. Yet as this analysis shows, December 
was masculine and therefore it was neither the same by all nor for all. 
Our rage then, the rage of  the revolted, was from the start a 
product of  what the revolted would “impromptu” destroy. “Women” 
and the “foreigners” are both often and in a stereotypical way distanced 
and categorised as partial and thematic issues for some of  the tenden-
cies of  our movement. And it was they, in other words, who came to 
identify the partiality, the limits, the contradictions and commonality 
of  December’s events. Without meaning to write off  the importance of  
this revolt, its beginning might have signalled its end, since its meanings 
were entrapped in a given normality—and therefore faced their own 
limitations in return. On the other hand, December was the ground 
upon which such a critique and self-critique could stand; some ground 
that does not polemically isolate two parts but instead stretches the lim-
its of  the existing and conceived space of  our movement. 
The importance of  December, after all, is confirmed by this 
endurance of  its meanings, which were so strong as to exceed even the 
conjuncture itself  and its subjects, without shaking either to the ground. 
Without these politics being competitive, they are forced to compete 
with a politics that has priority and, since it claims for itself  the univer-
sal, excludes all those for whom we were not enraged enough, neither 
we smashed everything up. December exceeded us as many things do—
just like its evolution, its result and even its beginning also did. Because 
this beginning did not entirely depend on “us.” Its result and its analysis 
however stand in correlation—if  not some direct connection—to our 
action and contents.
Many creative initiatives followed the days of  December. 
Thankfully so, since the slogan-chanting and the clashes in the streets 
seem inadequate to open up new horizons in the movement, unless 
they are complemented or preceded by structures of  reproduction, the 
imagination and socialisation of  which can potentially widen the move-
ment’s fields of  action and creativity in directions that street action and 
current affairs alone can’t—apart from a social mark and the neces-
sary commitment to existing and urgent conditions of  power. A beloved 
writer would say that she writes by letting her subconscious run free 
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while keeping control at the same time.7 This seems to be a recipe true 
for every temper, for creativity that is not limited to a single moment 
but commits itself  and takes the responsibility not to control things but 
to offer them meaning—that is, to radically change their condition. Or 
else: “If  Marxism is a direction, anarchism is life. Even if  we know (be-
ing the adults that we are) that we must give direction to our lives, we 
should also remember, since we want to become children whilst matur-
ing, never to stop giving life to the direction.”8
Bourgeois propaganda attempted to claim December as its 
own and will continue doing so for as long as the politics of  human 
rights keeps aestheticising “revolution,” having the means, the words, 
the armies, and the weapons, and above all, the consciousnesses on 
its side. We saw December become Greek and masculine. We saw the 
plexus of  the bourgeois continuum claim the revolt, talking of  the in-
nocence of  the assassinated child, depoliticising the explosions of  the 
social war.9 We saw the people in revolt imaginarily inscribe the culture 
of  spectacle with and upon its body, we saw it limit itself  within given 
ways of  life, action, practice, politics and relationships which set limita-
tions to, (anti-)normalising our lives. 
If  there is one qualm we have with the lucrative response of  
the comrades from Canada, it would be the fetishising of  December. 
That nevertheless beautiful December, which by now signals not some 
distance in space and time (for which we second the sadness or nos-
talgia) but a loss, some void highlighting the decontextualised present. 
December became that which we had not thought possible to live. And 
we were there in order to change ourselves and December at the same 
time. With our privileges, our inequalities, our contradictions, our loot-
ed subconsciousnesses, our authoritarian behaviours. Since the relic not 
recognised by the authoritarianism of  dialectics is the space of  sub-
jectivity—that is, the only opportunity offered to us, to an extent, to 
exercise our freedom. And for as long as it happened, December would 
keep becoming something more twisted, more scared—and it keeps 
constantly becoming something else, something less known, the more 
it becomes distant and we continue reading it. It becomes the “other” 
December we have yet to live.
NOTES
1 http://lapositiondutireurcouche.blogspot.com/2010/11/rocky-road-to-dublin.html 
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[in Greek].
2 Without accepting the style nor the self-referentiality of  the text “The morbid 
explosion of  Ideology,” the analysis of  the treatment and functions of  violence from 
parts of  the antagonist movement seem to us to be extremely accurate: http://www.
occupiedlondon.org/blog/2010/05/11/289-the-morbid-explosion-of-ideology/.
3 See “Masculinities: Stories of  the Gender and Other Relationships of  Authority,” 
issue 4, page 12, http://www.qvzine.net [in Greek].
4 http://www.occupiedlondon.org/blog/2008/12/15/these-days-are-ours-too/.
5 http://katalipsiasoee.blogspot.com/2008/12/blog-post_1744.html [in Greek].
6 http://www.terminal119.gr/show.php?id=524.
7 We refer to Margarita Karapanou and what she said in a TV interview.
8 http://radicaldesire.blogspot.com/2011/01/blog-post_12.html [in Greek].
9 Regarding the political character of  the assassination of  Alexis and the attempt to 
de-politicise it see the article “I Seek You in the Shiny Abattoirs of  the Streets,” http://
katalipsiasoee.blogspot.com/2008/12/blog-post_1343.html [in Greek].
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A year after everyone in Athens was talking in terms of  an uprising, 
today everyone is talking in terms of  a crisis. A concept that seems only 
natural by now, crisis has in fact been an exceptionally complex medico-
juridical invention of  Western civilisation. As Michel Foucault (2006: 
237) taught in his 23 January 1974 lecture at the Collège de France, 
in Greco-Roman medicine and in much of  medieval alchemy and its 
related medical practices “there is always a moment for the truth of  the 
illness to appear. This is precisely the moment of  the crisis, and there is 
no other moment at which the truth can be grasped in this way.” The 
contribution of  Foucault here is crucial: if  we are used to seeing the 
term crisis within economic or political discursive contexts, the fact that 
its position there seems natural or even intrinsic and inescapable is due 
to a much older cultural familiarisation with the term as a phenomenon 
of  human physiology and pathology. Crisis, as it appeared for the first 
time during the classical age, comprises the opportunity [kairos] par ex-
cellence of  truth, the time when all phenomena and illusions give way 
before a momentary and fully recognizable explosion of  the true sub-
stance of  the human condition. In other words, krisis, both crisis and 
judgement, is a concept that brings to the surface a new kind of  truth, 
a new series of  techniques of  capturing the truth, and, of  course, a new 
subject of  securing the truth. As Foucault (2006: 237) noted, according 
to the classical medical model this “truth is not lying there waiting to be 
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grasped by us; it passes, and it passes rapidly, like lightning; it is in any 
case linked to the opportunity, to the kairos, and must be seized.” This 
truth is rare precisely because it appears exclusively as an evental truth 
(or a truth-event chez Foucault); because it “belongs not to the order of  
what it is, but to the order of  what happens, a truth, therefore, which 
is not given in the form of  a discovery, but in the form of  an event” 
(ibid: 237). As a consequence this truth “does not call for method, but 
for strategy,” which Foucault (2006: 237) elaborates on as a belligerent-
predatory and at the same time ritual relation to the ailment under 
examination. Crisis is that event which at the same time forces us and 
allows us to structure a strategic fidelity with regard to a general-historic 
truth that it underlines and which is nothing less than the void of  the 
previous situation responsible for the crisis: the structural weakness, the 
anomaly or pathology that is the symptomal kernel around which all 
the truth of  the patient is structured and sustained.
As Alain Badiou has demonstrated, an event is never an auton-
omous incident independent from the struggle of  decisions that unfolds 
on the basis of  the imaginary field of  its causes and effects. Slavoj Žižek 
(1999: 140) writes in The Ticklish Subject, in explication: “A true Event 
emerges out of  the ‘void’ of  the Situation; it is attached to its element 
surnumeraire: to the symptomatic element that has no proper place in 
the situation, although it belongs to it.” Badiou’s formula posits the con-
nection of  the event with that “for which” it comprises an event, as the 
void of  the previous situation: “What do we mean by that? We mean 
that in the centre of  every situation, there lays, as its foundation, an 
in-place void, an element around which is organised the fullness (or the 
stable multiples) of  this situation” (Badiou 2007: 76). Thus, according 
to Badiou, the formative characteristic of  an event is that it is “simulta-
neously in-place, it is the event of  this or that situation—and in-excess, 
thus totally separate or disconnected from all the rules of  the situation” 
(ibid: 76). This in-place void is no less than the habitus of  the decision 
that constitutes the event as such. For as Žižek (1999: 136) argues, “the 
undecideability of  the event means that an event does not posses any 
ontological guarantee: it cannot be reduced to (or deduced, generated 
from) a (previous) situation: it emerges ‘out of  nothing,’ the nothing 
which was the ontological truth of  this previous Situation.”
The event is thus “always recognised as such retroactively, 
through an act of  Decision that dissolves it—that is by means of  which 
we already pass over it” (ibid: 137–138). In other words, it is constituted 
via the struggle regarding the void, the imagined fundamental truth of  
the preceding situation leading to its constitution. Likewise, in classical 
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medicine crisis as a physiological event was not some objective moment 
in one’s medical history, but the result of  a decision, or more correctly 
of  the struggle of  decisions that constituted the preceding situation as 
a field where no substantial decision could be made as the revelatory 
evental truth remained latent or dormant: “Prior to Decision, we in-
habit a Situation which is enclosed in this horizon; from within this 
horizon, the Void constitutive of  the Situation is by definition invisible; 
that is to say, undecideablility is reduced to—and appears as—a mar-
ginal disturbance of  the global System. After the Decision, undecide-
ability is over, since we inhabit the new domain of  Truth” (ibid: 138). 
Thus the crisis must be seen, with Lukács (2000: 55), as “a situation 
whose duration may be longer or shorter, but which is distinguished 
from the process that leads up to it in that it forces together the essential 
tendencies of  that process, and demands that a decision be taken over 
the future direction of  the process.” Hence, classical medicine was or-
ganised around the truth of  the crisis, as the liminal state of  the illness 
where all that is potential becomes concrete: “The crisis is the reality of  
the disease becoming truth, as it were. And it is precisely then that the 
doctor must intervene” (Foucault 2006: 243). 
In this perspective, the crisis is not merely some acute moment 
in a linear development of  deterioration of  a pathogenic condition, 
but a real moment of  battle, a moment where the outcome of  battle is 
decided: the battle of  the body with its own pathogenic elements, the 
battle of  solids with humours, or in today’s post-Fordist terms the battle 
of  the immune system with the disease (Foucault 2003: 242). And like 
every battle, the crisis can be necessary or simply possible, but it always 
comprises an intrinsic characteristic of  illness or of  war. This is then 
the true discourse around crisis that at the end of  the 18th century 
found itself  more and more marginalised in medicine and yet in an 
ever more central position within political economic thinking, so as to 
acquire a power of  exegetical hegemony in the writings of  Karl Marx, 
as exemplified in the third volume of  Das Kapital, which in the last few 
years has become the prayer-pillow of  every good capitalist. Reflecting 
the power-knowledge of  classical medicine, Marx held crisis to be a 
structural trait of  the economy with its own particular rhythm which 
one should study and listen to in order to intervene effectively on the 
very truth of  any given economic pathogeny, including capitalism qua 
capitalism. Based on the belief  that “when the crisis occurs, the disease 
breaks out in its truth… appears in its own truth, its intrinsic truth” 
(ibid: 242), the only way to seize the opportunity [kairos] presented by 
a crisis was in Marx as in Hippocrates through the study of  the rhythm 
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of  pathogeny which can allow one to predict the crisis so as to reinforce 
the power of  nature (the organism, the economy, the political system) 
against the disease. This however must not happen before the crisis, 
for then the disease will not express itself  and will endure (in a most 
Lacanian sense), possibly leading to even worse results in the future 
or even to a chronic state. The classical doctor as much as the mod-
ern economist must thus predict the crisis and arrange things in such 
a way that it will appear at the right moment, at the right opportunity. 
Bearing in its heart the predicting technologies of  power-knowledge, 
this truth discourse, so piously reproduced in the political economic 
thinking of  the 19th century onwards, said that the crisis can arrive on 
a favourable day, but can also arrive at on ominous day, and this differ-
ence is crucial for the battle with the disease: “the role of  the crisis, is 
both intrinsic feature and, at the same time, the obligatory opportunity, 
the ritual rhythm, to which event should conform” (ibid: 243). We can 
thus provisionally conclude that the transformation of  any event into a 
crisis presupposes a decision of  a most sovereign nature, which renders 
it thinkable and intelligible, and at the same time a field or object of  ac-
tion, in terms of  a rhythm in the most classical sense of  the term: as a 
stasis, a formation of  manageable stable schemata out of  an ungovern-
able flow of  movements (Kuriyama 1999). 
Having reviewed in brief  the truth-effect disseminated by 
classical medical and modern political economic discourses on crisis, 
glimpsing how it functions so as to render the event actionable and 
thinkable by objectifying its trace and thus freezing it in time, we can 
return to the heart of  the problem today. If  December 2008 was ex-
perienced as a totally-unexpected-event, an event that in all its force 
(beautiful or horrible, but certainly a force) shook all the conceptual, 
imaginary, political, economic, and desiring chains of  social formation 
in Greece, in the spring of  2010 we stand before an officially sanctioned 
and governmentally organised Economic Crisis, a structural-counter-
event that we always-already anticipated. A counter-event that, if  it fails 
to explain December 2008, certainly manages to substitute it as the true 
field of  decision, as the real crisis, imposing its rhythm on the social. In 
other words, the organisation of  today’s Economic Crisis objectively 
comprises a governmental fidelity to the December Uprising, a fidelity 
which, rather than problematising December itself, rises against it as an 
apparatus of  problems that demand immediate solutions, emergency 
measures, and sacrifices under the star of  national unity as the neces-
sary rhythm of  the social, as the general and always enduring debt/
guilt towards society.
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The rising Economic Crisis, with an already ominous body 
count on its bills, in the form of  the three bank workers killed by anti-
capitalist militarism on 5 May 2010, has caused a ground-breaking 
deterritorialisation away from the social imaginary of  political agency 
(the root of  December, its hopes and miscarriages) and towards the 
realm of  a social imaginary of  survival. If, in other words, December 
was a real undiscernable event in the sense that it introduced in a radi-
cal way a non-decideable relation at the heart of  the social, the Eco-
nomic Crisis renders every decision always-already pre-emptively de-
cided and unambiguously discernible. This return to the pre-decided 
is the role of  neoliberalism as a strategic field and process that secures 
the “uniformity of  effect” (Badiou 2007: 105). Through a prohibi-
tion of  the contradiction which is the social, its effect is to render the 
latter unthinkable as what it really is, as the gap between the actual 
parts counted by the governmental enclosure and the “integrality of  
the one-effect” (ibid: 109) represented by it. It is precisely this debt/
guilt towards uniformity which is the work of  the counter-event called 
Economic Crisis. All the more, as the above mentioned prohibition 
becomes a condition for the reproduction of  the state-relation as a 
security state under the light of  December which temporarily short-
circuited the relative autonomy of  the state as a mode of  class domi-
nation, forcing it to create the ground for new class alliances, for new 
strategic-hegemonic relations, for new governmentalities.
According to the currently ruling social-democratic discourse, 
both the event of  December and the Economic Crisis stem from the 
same void of  the previous situation: the anomic condition of  the post-
junta transition to democracy, the so-called metapolitefsi. It is this gen-
eralised anomie institutionalised in the founding of  the Third Greek 
Republic in 1974 that has supposedly led on the one hand to a “culture 
of  violence” amongst the masses and, on the other, to a “culture of  cor-
ruption” amongst the ranks of  the state. Here the social-democratic en-
closure of  really existing problems facing Greece is typically crafty. By 
simultaneously pointing at two real symptomal wounds of  Greek social-
formation, and paradoxically constructing its legitimacy on the prom-
ise of  a “liberation from the metapolitefsi” (i.e. from what is largely its 
very own socio-political child), the Greek social-democracy mounts an 
operation of  governmental reformation based on notions of  unmask-
ing, purification, and purging, a constant theme in what Nikolai Ssorin 
Chaikov (2003) has described as the technology of  the deferred state 
characteristic of  Soviet-type totalitarian regimes; a narrative of  persis-
tent state-failure, which constantly reproduces state-formation as the 
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key to solving all social problems. Within this context, the real innova-
tion of  the current social-democratic administration is that, rather than 
simply reproducing this fundamental mechanism of  governmental au-
topoesis, it attempts for the first time to negate all traditional promises 
of  an ideal relation between civil society and the state as always-already 
doomed, as the very source of  today’s sorry predicament. The work of  
the social-democratic administration is, in other words, the rupture and 
disrepute of  the very social contract of  the metapolitefsi era which had 
until now functioned as the measure of  state present failure and future 
success, as the means of  the very reproduction of  the Republic. 
If  Greece were France, surely this would have been achieved 
through the pompous announcement of  a Fourth Republic. Yet in the 
case of  Greece, the numeric upgrading of  republican polities is achieved 
by means of  long dictatorial intervals, and this is not a likely outcome 
in the present liberal democratic European environment. Thus the pro-
claimed end of  the metapolitefsi and of  the sum of  rules of  negotiating 
civil autonomy vis-a-vis the state is largely conceived and talked about 
in terms of  culture rather than in terms of  a juridical or constitutional 
transformation. According to the social-democratic discourse dissemi-
nated through the media, what both December and the Economic Crisis 
have demonstrated is that Greece is permeated by an “anti-democratic 
culture,” which posits individual and group interests against the General 
Good, thus endangering the good function of  the state and the very 
cohesion of  society and its economy. Drawing on the very origin of  the 
myth of  the Greek state and its supposed “struggle” with local/clan-
nish interests—when in reality the Greek state has always been a board 
of  strategic balance between those and never an autonomous agent—
social-democracy thus attempts to portray a totally chimeric reciprocal 
relation within the semi-feudal political reality of  Greece, “discipline-
obedience to the state—respect-security from the state,” as a pragmatic 
goal and at the same time as the only way of  combating the void that 
has led to both the violence of  December and the insecurity of  the Eco-
nomic Crisis. In other words, what the social-democratic governmental 
enclosure is doing, perhaps without realising it, is tempting the social 
imagination to conceive, rather than simply dream or fear, of  a political 
and economic reality which works as an organic whole rather than as the 
sum of  fragmented struggles of  local and particular interests: the final 
arrival of  modernity. It must thus be granted that the debt/guilt com-
plex which forms the kernel of  civil relations to the state during the pres-
ent Economic Crisis is conditioned on a genuine if  illusive promise for 
a new social contract, for a moment of  salvation from the really existing 
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anomic state of  affairs in Greece and of  delivery to a state of  benevolent 
reciprocity; a kind of  social utopia that will abolish the causes of  the 
fundamental contradictions leading to civil strife and economic suffering 
in Greece in the last two centuries. 
It is easy for the opposition, conservative or radical, to compete 
in condemning this promise as false, as a decoy or even as leading to a 
totalitarian nightmare. What is more difficult is to provide a meaningful 
and workable model as an alternative. Entrenched in its Welfare State 
protectionist nostalgia, the Left has proved incapable of  providing just 
that. Stunned by the international woes of  neoliberalism, the conserva-
tives are splitting in ever more obscure parcels of  populist obscuran-
tism. And blinded by the rituals of  invoking the return of  the event-
God by means of  ever more grotesque and acts of  wanton violence, 
the anarchists and other assorted radicals are equally impotent to face 
any real social, political, or economic challenge, let alone to attempt 
responding to it. Perhaps then this is the real end of  the metapolitefsi: 
a time when the discourse of  the state appears for the first time as the 
only thinkable and intelligible solution, as the only word whose effect 
has any pragmatic resonance and practical scope. 
Christos Lynteris, May 2010 
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INTRODUCTION
Greece at the crossroads. Geographically an outer border of  the Eu-
ropean Union, economically the worst student of  the monetary union 
experiment, historically living through the transformation from an out-
dated rigid public-sector-dominated capitalist economy to a modern 
flexible capitalist haven. 
Greece at the crossroads between two events: the revolt follow-
ing the killing of  a 15-year-old schoolboy and the country’s entrance 
into the era of  the IMF/EU/ECB memorandum. Two periods inter-
mingling with each other, not due to an organic link between the two 
events and not just due to pure chronological sequence. More than any-
thing, these two events illuminate important ruptures in contemporary 
Greek history that simply cannot be ignored.
When the Greek youth demonstrated en masse in the streets 
for weeks in December 2008, commentators, journalists, analysts, ac-
ademics, and politicians were unable to come up with answers and 
explanations for the revolt. Some of  them talked about the rising ten-
sion between police and youth, others about the problems faced by the 
Greek education system, or the crisis of  the political establishment, 
while some talked about the political culture of  the Left and the anti-
authoritarian movement in Greece that goes back to the 1970s and 
the uprising of  the students against the Greek junta.1, 2 Finally, eco-
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nomic interpretations were also discussed, for those who are keen on 
this kind of  analysis. However, when the December revolt was sparked 
in 2008, the Greek economy was generally perceived as performing 
well, with rates of  growth above the EU average and declining rates of  
unemployment. The international financial crisis had not yet hit hard 
in Greece and its only apparent weakness had to do with its banking 
sector, which the Greek government generously supported with a €28 
billion gift package. But it is not necessarily the growing pie that mat-
ters, but also the slices of  the cake. And the slice of  the cake for the 
€700 generation was shrinking, as was the slice of  the cake that goes to 
labour in comparison to capital.
It was only a year later, in December 2009, that the Greek 
economy entered an unprecedented crisis, with its credit reliability de-
teriorating into junk and the Greek government having to borrow at 
ridiculously high prices in order to refinance its debt.
All attempts by the government to boost its credibility, control 
the growing budget deficit, and meet its debt repayments by borrowing 
in the open market failed miserably. It was then in May 2010 that the 
Greek government signed the so-called “Memorandum of  Coopera-
tion” with the IMF the ECB and the EU (the so-called “troika”). As the 
memorandum laid out, Greece would borrow €110 billion from IMF 
and EU countries at a high rate of  5%, which was below the market 
rate but still quite high. At the same time the Greek government com-
mitted itself  to imposing new economic austerity measures that would 
enable it to drastically reduce its budget deficit and restructure its econ-
omy along the lines of  its lenders. General strikes and mass protests, 
called by the unions, the left, and the anti-authoritarian movements, 
brought thousands to the streets to oppose the memorandum and can-
cel its ratification by the Greek parliament. 5 May 2010 saw the peak of  
the protests and many felt it could be the start of  a new uprising as the 
memory of  the December riots was coming to haunt the present. Was 
the new “labour December” that did not take place when the crisis first 
started to evolve in late 2009 and the first austerity packages evolved in 
the early months of  2010 about to start?
The death of  three bank employees that day by the irrespon-
sible (if  not criminal) acts of  a nihilist group meant a freeze of  the mo-
mentum that protesters had gathered that evening. Hundreds of  thou-
sands of  them had surrounded the Greek parliament and only just fell 
short of  storming inside.3 This was one of  the largest demonstrations in 
the metapolitefsi (post-dictatorial) era not only in terms of  the numbers, 
the rage, and the variety of  backgrounds of  those who participated, but 
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also in terms of  the stakes on offer. After the tragic events of  the day, the 
Greek government was given a great opportunity to extricate itself, and 
police embarked on a full-scale attack on radical political groups and 
social centres while the demonstrators retreated from the parliament 
after the confirmation of  the sad death of  the three bank workers. How 
things might have evolved if  these events had not happened is difficult 
for anyone to estimate. It is also hard to understand when, how, and 
why revolts take place—they definitely do not take place by default, 
upon the deterioration of  economic conditions (as the post-script of  
this book discusses). But does the economy matter, and to what extent?
A deterministic approach would expect social unrest, protest, 
and rise of  class struggle in periods of  austerity, deterioration of  eco-
nomic conditions, and suppression of  workers achievements.4 Judging 
from the period since the ratification of  the memorandum in May 2010, 
this has not been the case, at least not to the extent that the worst re-
taliation on labour in the post-war era would lead somebody to expect. 
We had the killing of  a 15-year-old boy and the “accidental” revolt of  
thousands of  people with no apparent economic reasons driving them 
out to the streets. And now there is a full scale assault by the Govern-
ment on wages, pensions, and whatever is left of  the welfare benefits 
with relatively little reaction—at least when these lines were written in 
autumn of  2010…
But let’s take things one at a time. In the next section, I give 
a brief  overview of  the Greek economy in the last decade and argue 
that things were not at all rosy even before the recent debt crisis. Then 
I try to see how, if  at all, economic conditions might have fuelled the 
December revolt. Coming to the more recent situation, I briefly exam-
ine the economic transformation that the Greek state undertakes at the 
moment and discuss its importance for the antagonist movement.
GROWTH, BUT FOR WHOM?
The general perception as promoted by the official reports is that since 
the mid-1990s and until hit by the crisis, the Greek economy experi-
enced a sustained path of  growth and exhibited great economic suc-
cesses. First, it grew with an average annual rate of  4.2% in the period 
1998–2007, which was well above most European economies’ growth 
rates and only second to Ireland’s. Furthermore it managed to reduce 
unemployment from around 12% to 8% over the same period. In 2001, 
Greece satisfied most of  the criteria of  entry (except that of  the public 
debt) and entered the European Monetary Union (EMU), something 
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that was welcomed across nearly all the political parties. Entering a 
rich man’s club like the EMU made the economic and political elite 
of  Greece celebrate, and while the majority of  the population initially 
seemed to share the general euphoria, it was quite soon that they would 
realise they were once again the ones to lose out. The adaptation of  
the Euro meant a gradual equalisation of  the prices in the Eurozone 
area and as we can see throughout the last decade, inflation rates in the 
peripheral countries like Greece, Spain, and Portugal were higher than 
the average. And although it might be true that average real wages for 
these countries rose in the same period, large segments of  the public 
ended up being worse off  in the end. Average real wages do not take 
into account the wage distribution and the large inequalities prevalent 
there, as well as that inflation is not the same for all economic groups. 
When adjusting for these factors the gains of  the workers are mediocre 
at best (see the INE Report 2010 for a relevant discussion), and it is not 
a surprise that a common slogan that people used is “we are becoming 
European in terms of  the cost of  living but not of  the wages.” Further-
more, it is very remarkable that the fall of  the share of  income that goes 
to labour has been declining steadily since the early 1980s (roughly by 
10% in the period 1983–2008; INE 2010). This share takes into ac-
count the ratio of  real remuneration per worker over real productivity, 
and although real remuneration increased over that period, the work-
ers’ productivity rose even further and thus they now gain less overall.
Focusing on the last decade, workers lost income shares with 
respect to capital for almost all countries of  the Eurozone (with the 
exception of  Ireland) and this can be attributed largely to the labour 
market policies that were pushed forward and the wage setting bargain-
ing processes (RMF, 2010a). Germany experienced the largest decline 
in the share of  income that goes to labour and this comes at no surprise 
since there was an important wave of  labour market reforms imple-
mented by chancellor Schröder in 2003 (Agenda 2010) that also gained 
the consensus of  mainstream unions for minimal wage demands. This 
point is particularly relevant today when, under the guidance of  the 
troika, the Greek government implements wage reductions in order for 
the economy to gain competitiveness compared to its economic part-
ners and therefore follows Germany in a race to the bottom.
The best single measure to compare competitiveness in the 
Eurozone is the nominal unit labour cost. The trend for Germany is 
noteworthy, as it has remained almost flat throughout the period since 
the mid-1990s. However, nominal unit costs for peripheral countries 
(the so-called PIIGS: Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain) have 
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been rising steadily for the same period.5 Then it might come as no 
surprise that Germany became an export champion and started to run 
high current account surpluses after the introduction of  the Euro, while 
the current account deficits of  the peripheral countries significantly de-
teriorated during the same period (RMF 2010a). This can also be seen 
when examining the bilateral trade balances of  Germany with each of  
the periphery countries, which always show gains for Germany in the 
last decade (Dadush and Eidelman 2010).
There are other important elements of  the Greek economy 
that contribute to the view that things had not been all that rosy during 
its years of  growth. First of  all, although in those years the unemploy-
ment declined (from 12% in 1999 to 8% in 2008), this general statistic 
might disguise other important processes that have been taking place in 
the labour market. It does not take into account the quality of  the new 
jobs that have been created, regarding both the terms of  the employ-
ment and also their remuneration. There has been a lot of  commentary 
in Greece that the decline in unemployment was inflated by promoting 
training courses and internships for the youth (the so-called “stagiaires”) 
and a general rise in precarious forms of  employment (temping, part-
time, undocumented employment, low-pay). There has been a system-
atic policy by successive governments to cover organic positions in the 
public sector and local government by hiring youth under traineeship 
programmes, often funded by the European Union, without insurance 
and with wages as low as €500–600. The stagiaires were employed in 
short-term fixed term contracts, but a significant proportion continued 
in successive stage programmes and ended up working more than two 
years as trainees. Since first initiated under the PASOK administra-
tion of  Kostas Simitis (1996–2004), stage programmes offered an ideal 
solution for all governments of  the period to cover their needs at the 
lowest possible cost as well as reduce unemployment. It was never clear 
how many people were employed in such programmes at the public 
sector, but estimates vary from 30,000 to 80,000.6 It has also been com-
mon practice for the governments to use such programmes in order to 
satisfy clientilist relations with their electorate; the Conservative “New 
Democracy” recruited as many as 7,000 new stagiaires in the weeks just 
before the last general election of  2009.7
Besides the stagiaires, there are also around 35,000 workers 
employed by employment agencies to work for other companies (usu-
ally with terms and conditions inferior than if  they had been hired di-
rectly by that company) and 80,000 employees who work under sub-
contracting arrangements, where a company has outsourced business 
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functions to another company in order to reduce costs (Kouzis 2009). 
Sub-contracting has been quite prevalent in low-paid service work such 
as cleaning. Large public companies, like the Athens Piraeus Electric 
Railways (ISAP, the Greek overground), Hellenic Organization of  Tele-
communications (OTE, the Greek telecom giant), or even the universi-
ties and ministries manage to minimise their administrative costs by 
outsourcing cleaning to specialised companies which then hire workers 
at low-wages and poor working conditions (hourly paid schemes with 
no benefits/leave, unpaid overtime, no unionisation, etc.).8 But even 
jobs that we would not associate with precarity might fall under this 
category since there are many workers who are officially considered to 
be self-employed but are essentially employees who have to pay their 
own insurance and work with flexible arrangement conditions (e.g. this 
is the case for many engineers and architects).
Flexible forms of  employment have been prevalent during the 
2000s in Greece: by 2009, the proportion of  temporary employment 
had exceeded 12.1% (Eurostat). Looking at different demographic 
groups, it is found that women and young people disproportionately 
work as temps, with percentages 14% and 27% respectively and rising 
trends in the last decade (Kaplanis 2010). A striking figure regarding 
job creation is that 70% of  all new jobs in 2006 were part-time (Mo-
nastiriotis 2009). A trend for rising employment polarisation might not 
be a Greek specificity, as it has also been documented at the European 
level as well as in the US (Goos et al. 2009; Autor et al. 2006; Kaplanis 
2007). Recent research has shown that besides growing numbers of  
professionals and technicians in Greece, the next fast growing occupa-
tion category is that of  low-pay service jobs (Kaplanis 2010). Of  course, 
these statistics do not take into account the informal economy that is 
suggested to form up to 30% of  the GDP and constitutes an important 
element of  the low-pay sector overall.
Temping, part-timing, and sub-contracting constitute flex-
ible forms of  employment that have been promoted systematically 
by the European Union and the Greek government in order to mi-
nimise costs, combat unemployment, and stir an otherwise stagnating 
economy. Besides flexibility in the employment conditions, employers 
in Greece have relied for a substantial period on low wages in order to 
increase their profitability. Even before the most recent wave of  crisis, 
Greece had the second lowest average wages in the EU15 (only second 
to Portugal) with wages at 82% of  the European average (at current 
prices). And while the average wages had been rising over the last 15 
years and converging slowly with the European average, these figures 
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still hide what had been happening at the lower tail of  the wage distri-
bution. Specifically, almost a quarter of  full-time workers earned less 
than €1,000 a month, and thus are officially classified as low-paid (i.e. 
earning less than 2/3 of  the median wage; INE 2010). And although 
the General Confederation of  Workers of  Greece (GSEE) claimed to 
have managed to increase the minimum wage in real terms, this figure 
takes into account neither the higher inflation lower income groups 
face nor the rise in inequality. The minimum wage rose substantially 
less than the average wage, which is driven up by the high flying salaries 
of  the high-earners, and thus their ratio deteriorated from 54% to 45% 
over the period 1990–2006 (INE 2010).
Indeed when looking at the income inequality (as the ratio of  
the richest 20% to the poorest 20%), Greece comes fourth after Latvia, 
Portugal, and Lithuania out of  the EU25 (INE 2008). There is also 
21% of  the Greek population that lives below the poverty line,9 while 
the respective figure for the EU25 is 16% and only Latvia performs 
worse than Greece. When examining the working poor, the proportion 
out of  all workers is 14%, which is double the EU15 figure and places 
Greece at the worst position in the EU25 league. It should be noted 
that these official European figures (EU-SILC 2006) refer to the year 
2006 alone, well before the world financial crisis and the Greek sover-
eign debt crisis. Overall, during this period of  sustained growth for the 
Greek economy the poor remained poor (with stable poverty rates over 
1995–2006), and the well-promoted case for prioritising the enlarge-
ment of  the pie, with the expectation that the increased income will 
“trickle down” to the lower income classes never seemed to take place.
The high-growth years of  the Greek economy were not based 
on great advancements in technology and infrastructure and well-
planned developmental policies. Rather, they have been commonly sug-
gested to come from credit expansion, the construction of  public works 
and the boom of  real estate. Generous funding under the European 
Community Support Frameworks along with rising public investment 
to serve the 2004 Olympic Games sustained high growth rates for the 
period starting in the mid-1990s and lasting until the recent economic 
crisis. Furthermore, the large influx of  migrant workers from the Bal-
kans and Eastern Europe in the 1990s enabled Greece to keep its wages 
low, increase its effective labour supply, strengthen the consumer de-
mand and boost the economy. Many of  these migrant workers worked 
without any insurance, with low wages, and under poor working condi-
tions in agriculture, construction or services. Employment under the 
“galley” conditions in the Olympic sites was particularly notorious, with 
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154 reported work accidents and eleven dead workers in a period of  
just three years (2001–2003)—five of  them were migrants (Georgakis 
2003). “Legalisation” of  earlier waves of  migrants who have worked in 
Greece for some years gave them the opportunity to gain access to in-
surance and pension systems, improve their working conditions and to 
not live in fear of  deportation at any moment. However, any attempts 
to integrate into Greek society have been very slow, with pronounced 
discrimination in the labour market and their daily transactions with 
the state alike.10
This brief  overview of  the economic situation up to 2008 pres-
ents a different image than the rosy one that was carefully portrayed by 
the officials and the media during the same period. According to official 
discourse there are a number of  accomplishments that all Greek citi-
zens should feel proud. Besides economic successes like the high growth 
rates, the entry in the Euro zone and the expansion of  Greek businesses 
in the Balkans, we are supposed to believe that pride should also derive 
from the successful organisation of  the 2004 Olympic Games. The Ath-
ens 2004 Olympics added a high economic burden to the public purse, 
since a small country managed to host the most expensive games ever, 
costing at least nine billion euros. This figure was later revised to 11 bil-
lion euros (around 6% of  the GDP) by the crediting agency Standard 
& Poor’s. If  we were to include the extra cost coming from the inten-
sification of  the works to meet the deadline for the opening day of  the 
games, the figure would be substantially higher. The estimated figure 
for the cost of  the security of  the games stands at one billion euros, for 
purchasing high-tech equipment and the deployment of  thousands of  
policemen and agents in the city. The notorious scandal of  the security 
CCTV system C4I that cost €255 million but never operated is a char-
acteristic example; and questions are raised not only for the usefulness 
of  such systems but also for the contracts and commissions to obtain 
them. Although C4I never worked, the thousands of  police stayed in the 
streets11 as well as the CCTV cameras so as to justify the money spent 
for them. And both were of  great use to the authorities during the De-
cember 2008 revolt. But let’s go now back to the future—to the revolt!
THE “ACCIDENTAL” REVOLT
The events of  December 2008 [Dekemvriana] surprised many with 
their massive participation, intensity, and length, and with the sense of  
collective belonging that was shared amongst the people in the streets, 
and ingenious tactics of  the movements participating. A further sur-
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prise was that the “accidental” killing of  a 15-year-old school boy could 
spark the largest civil unrest in Greece since the years of  the dictator-
ship, which was not directly rooted in a political, economic, or labour 
struggle. The picture was also blurred by the fact that the events of  
December did not put forward any specific demands nor was there any 
central committee, political party, or radical group to act as a main 
driving force. An extensive debate has evolved amongst commentators, 
analysts, journalists, academics, and politicians about the essence of  
December and its underlying causes.12 Was it a riot, civil unrest, a re-
volt, a social movement? What caused that explosion of  people to take 
to the streets, and especially the youth, after the killing of  the 15-year-
old Alexis Grigoropoulos on 6 December 2010 in Exarcheia?
The massive participation, its scale, and particularly its length 
suggest that the events of  December were more than an explosion, a 
riot, or civil unrest. If  that were the case, they would have calmed after 
the first two or three days. However the protests, occupations, general 
meetings lasted for over a month, while the massive violent confronta-
tions on the streets with the police lasted for about two weeks and spo-
radically continued over the rest of  the period. Furthermore, the De-
kemvriana could not probably be characterised as a social movement, 
although they had a remarkable self-organisation of  the struggle and 
initiatives like occupations of  universities, of  town halls, of  the offices 
of  GSEE, direct actions on the streets, markets, theatres, and media 
stations that constitute forms of  organised struggles that we could as-
sociate with social movements. What probably distinguishes them is the 
spontaneity and intensity of  the struggle at the same time that there was 
no single demand, group, collective, party, or force behind that drove it 
forward. The events surpassed the people who participated in them and 
belonged to organised radical political groups or collectives from the 
anti-authoritarian scene and the far left as well as the political parties 
(smaller or bigger). In that respect, the question of  what was December 
had been answered in the streets by the same people who participated 
in it—December was a “revolt.”
Looking for the causes that would enable us to understand bet-
ter this “accidental“ revolt, various hypotheses have been suggested. 
Namely, the crisis of  the political establishment, the spectre of  unem-
ployment and the emergence of  the €700 generation, the shortcom-
ings of  the educational system, the increased brutality of  the police 
forces, and the rising tension with the youth or the political culture of  
the metapolitefsi era. There is no simple way to examine which of  the 
above factors might have contributed to fuel the revolt and how. And 
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although somebody might be persuaded from the earlier review that 
the economic conditions have been deteriorating over that time period, 
there is still not a straightforward way to suggest that they caused or 
fuelled the revolt. 
One important point is given by the many accounts offered 
by participants that talk about the sharing of  a common identity and 
belonging that was prevalent in the streets and that cut across employ-
ment and educational backgrounds. Students, stagiaires, unemployed, 
precarious workers, and young people, both natives and migrants, unit-
ed in the streets of  December crossing boundaries and backgrounds. 
As Sotiris (2010) argues despite the different social backgrounds, the 
youth in Greece share a common present and future—the deteriora-
tion of  their employment prospects; and this unifying element was 
reflected vividly in December. Indeed, it is not only the high youth 
unemployment rate in Greece—which stood at 22.9% in 2007 and 
was the highest in the EU25 group of  countries (Eurostat 2010). It is 
also the case that unemployment does not fall with educational quali-
fications, as it is the norm in most countries, but for those aged 20–29 
the higher qualified ones face higher unemployment rates (Karamesini 
2008; Sotiris 2010).13
The youth, the unemployed, the working poor, and the mi-
grants were the ones who had nothing to lose and were giving the pro-
tests their particular character. The emergence of  a new “precariat“ at 
the dawn of  the 21st Century might well be the outcome of  the recent 
transformative processes of  capitalism that advance deregulation, flex-
ibility, and precarity. How the workers organise under such conditions 
is still to be answered. However, already from the mid-2000s, grass-
roots syndicalist unions emerged, especially in service sectors with poor 
working conditions and pay. Two notable examples are the Base Union 
of  Workers Motor-Drivers that was created in 2006 and the Union of  
Waiters, Chefs, and Catering Workers that was created in 2007 and 
individuals from them were also active in the occupation of  the GSEE 
offices during December 2008. There are also older unions with impor-
tant syndicalist activism like the Union of  Bookshop and Paper Work-
ers (1992) as well as the Pan-attic Union of  Cleaners & Domestic Staff  
(1999), whose general secretary, migrant worker Konstantina Kouneva, 
got attacked with sulphuric acid by employer-hired mafia in retaliation 
for standing up for cleaners’ rights. That attack took place during De-
cember 2008 and was crucial in enriching December’s discourse with 
the recent developments in the de-/un-regulated labour markets and 
the latest path of  capitalist advancement.
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Furthermore, another point worth considering is that it was the 
first time we saw a new emerging “underclass” participating in acts of  
civil unrest in Greece. This is not characteristic of  the revolt overall, as it 
was mainly prevalent for one day, but still powerful and visible: Monday 
8 December, day three of  the revolt, was the day with the most massive 
participation in the protests and the most violent actions against the 
police forces, banks, and shops in Athens. By the night, the riots had es-
calated covering a very large part of  central Athens, and there was large 
destruction of  property and looting. The police were clearly unable to 
control the situation and the government held an urgent meeting to 
discuss its response and the possibility of  calling a state of  emergency. 
On that day, the poor sub-proletariat was actively involved and became 
visible for the first time in the recent political history of  Greece. While 
expropriation of  property might have been ideologically promoted by 
some radical groups, and while consumerist tendencies might have in-
flated the incidents, nobody can deny that poor fellow citizens that day 
had the opportunity to help themselves to a nice meal and some good 
quality clothes. There are many personal reports about elderly men and 
women who took food from smashed supermarkets or poor migrants 
who got meat from butcher shops.14
AFTER THE REVOLT… THE CRISIS! AND NOW?
If  deteriorating economic conditions might have fuelled the revolt, why 
then do we not see a similar revolt or civil unrest nowadays that the 
sovereign debt crisis has unfolded fully and the effects of  the harsh aus-
terity measures have squeezed large segments of  the population even 
further? Put simply, because history is not deterministic and the eco-
nomic conditions do not spark revolts by default. It is the responsibility 
of  the political subjects and movements to move things forward. Follow-
ing the discussion so far, I can only hypothesise that due to the nature 
of  employment of  precarious workers (high turnover, short-period of  
employment, not fixed workplace, etc.) as well as the fact that only a 
tiny proportion of  them are active in a union, it might be harder for 
them to mobilise and engage in organised labour struggles that would 
attract larger numbers of  people. On the other hand, the fractions of  
workers that are hit the most so far from the government’s measures like 
the public sector workers have probably lost most contact with radical 
mobilisations over the years of  being under the auspices of  state; while 
it would be naïve to expect the pensioners to lead the mobilisations. 
Taking into account the role of  the media and the main trade unions 
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(GSEE-ADEDY) into building the necessary consensus desired by the 
government, it should be less surprising to see the relative social calm 
amidst Greece’s financial storm. In this perspective, 5 May 2010 might 
have been a missed opportunity. Will there by any more opportunities? 
Only the future can tell. 
In the meantime the third revised version of  the memorandum 
is being prepared, where collective wage agreements and workers rights 
are thrown, almost without a blink of  an eye, into the dustbin of  history. 
The 2011 budget proposes further reductions to spending on education 
and health (in addition to the 2010 cuts) and an increase in heating oil 
tax rate, while there is a reduction of  the tax rate for corporate profits 
from 24% to 20%. At the same time, the deregulation of  the labour 
market would also now affect wages in the private sector, with expected 
cuts between 10–40% (depending on the different sectoral pay agree-
ments that are being now subordinated to firm agreements). The latest 
figures show temporary work to have risen from 11 to 12.5% in the 
years between 2007–09 (Eurostat 2010) while the total unemployment 
mounts to 12.2% for August 2010 and is expected to reach 15% or so 
in year 2011. The revised estimates for the budget deficit provided by 
the Eurostat place it at 9.4% (higher than the target of  8.1%), while the 
public debt has soared to 144% for 2010. Such high debt is not sustain-
able, as the government would have to pay around 7.5% of  its GDP 
each year just for interest on its debt. There are two ways the govern-
ment follows in order to consolidate its debt and avoid default. The first 
is selling public assets and the second is a restructuring of  its debt. The 
former means an unprecedented scale of  privatisations and large sell-
out of  public property under the banner of  “utilisation of  the public 
land”. Regarding the latter, since restructuring most likely would hap-
pen under the terms of  the lenders,15 a deep and prolonged recession 
period for the Greek economy has just started, under the “economic 
dictatorship” of  the government, the IMF, and the EU. The economic 
crisis creates a permanent condition of  emergency, and the opportunity 
for the government to pass unpopular structural reforms and austerity 
measures that it could not have done otherwise. In that respect, if  the 
crisis did not exist, it would be in the interests of  the establishment to 
create it. The Greek Prime Minister said it very succinctly on 3 May 
2010, one day after the signing of  the memorandum with the troika, 
the “crisis is an opportunity.” It is not only an opportunity for curbing 
corruption and tax evasion (as they claim to be doing), but also an op-
portunity to deregulate the labour markets, cut labour costs, restructure 
the pension system, reduce the provision of  welfare, and expand the 
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private market to sectors such as energy, transport, health, and educa-
tion. It is a class-based restructuring that serves the interests of  the “big 
capital,” both the local and its international partners. How the people 
and the movements will react and mobilise is an open question…
Yiannis Kaplanis, November 2010
NOTES
1 The peak of  the resistance to the military dictatorship in Greece (1967–1974) was the 
uprising of  the Athens Polytechnic in November 1973, which was crashed by the army 
on the early hours of  17th November.
2 For a more detailed discussion on various standpoints to the December events, see 
Kouki, this volume.
3 For a more detailed analysis of  the impact of  the events of  May 5th, see Boukalas, 
this volume.
4 Though the political direction of  the unrest might not necessarily be progressive; 
the rise of  fascist regimes in the bankrupted Europe of  the 1930s can show that all too 
loudly and dramatically.
5 As noted earlier, this does not mean that the workers in these countries faired better in 
terms of  living conditions, since the nominal unit labour cost does not take into account 
inflation and distributional aspects.
6 Georgakis I. “Public Ending for the Stage: The Government Prepares Relevant 
Programme Exclusively for the Private Sector” Ta Nea, 20 October 2009 [in Greek].
7 Christou, M “Clarifying the Issue of  Stage,” Eleftherotypia, 20 October 2009 [in 
Greek] http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=93902.
8 As this book was about to go to print at the end of  2010, we heard the story of  
Emad Aziz, a 44-year-old Egyptian worker, who died while cleaning the windows of  the 
Ministry of  Labour in Athens. He was working there uninsured and unregistered on a 
Sunday, under a sub-contracting scheme, with poor safety conditions.
9 According to the official definition for 2006 that estimates the “risk of  being poor,” 
the threshold was annual income of  less than €5,910 for an individual or less than 
€12,411 for a four-member household (of  two adults and two children).
10 Furthermore, since the crisis started affecting the real economy in Greece, migrant 
workers have found increasingly difficult to secure work in order to renew their 
resident permit and not become “illegal” again. And of  course, the more recent waves 
of  migrants that came in the last five years to Greece were not covered by the last 
“legalisation” legislation of  the government and thus have to work as undocumented 
workers in the informal economy.
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11 It is not clear how large the police force is in Greece, but a low estimate would be 
55,000, i.e. one police officer for every 200 residents.
12 At the same time, the participants of  December who were supposed to give the 
answers to such questions were meeting elsewhere, at the occupied universities, town 
halls, schools, at the town’s squares, neighbourhood gatherings, at the self-organised 
spaces, parks, and squats. They were discussing how to move the movement forward, 
how to deepen it, how to involve more people, more neighbourhoods, more groups, 
how to self-organise, how to communicate with each other, how to express themselves. 
For them, “December was a question…” and one still to be answered. 
13 Karamesini, M. (2009) “Difficulties of  Youth Employment in Greece,” 
Epochí 18 January [in Greek] http://www.epohi.gr/portal/?option=com_
content&task=view&id=2043.
14 For example see VIMAgazino, “Days of  rage—December 2008—Athens,” 21 
December 2008 [in Greek].
15 Whose main concern is to protect the money of  the German and French banks that 
was lent to the Greek state; thus the necessary writing off  of  the debt (aka “haircut”) 
would be minimal and restructuring would mainly take the form of  extension of  its 
debt repayments.
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In the corporate media, the Greek crisis is usually represented almost 
as a revolt of  spoiled children: a population living beyond its means, 
rising up in a tantrum when forced to face the fiscal discipline it has 
for so long, and so unrealistically, resisted. This seems rather an ex-
traordinary condemnation for a nation with one of  the least developed 
welfare states in Europe, but it is the only narrative the corporate media 
really has to tell. After all, is not debt simply the rational measure of  
fiscal morality? And in geopolitical terms, is there any other morality 
that really matters? A nation in debt must have done something wrong, 
just as a nation with surpluses must be doing something right (no one 
seems to notice that you cannot have one without the other, so that for a 
German, for instance, to chide a Greek for his country’s supposed fiscal 
irresponsibility is the equivalent of  a heroin dealer chiding his client for 
having become addicted in the first place). 
Curiously absent from these discussions is the one area where 
the Greek government, so penurious with its health and pension poli-
cies, seems remarkably open-handed: that is, in matters of  military 
spending, or anything, for that matter, connected to what we like to call 
the “security services.” Greece has the largest number of  military per-
sonnel per capita of  any NATO country (at 119 per 10,000, more than 
twice that of  Bulgaria, the second runner-up), and the second highest 
ratio of  police (33 per 10,000, or 1 cop per every 303 people).1 Such a 
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high level of  securitisation is extremely expensive: of  all NATO coun-
tries, Greece also spends the highest proportion of  its budget (5.5%) on 
the military, a remarkable 3.1% of  GDP. And this is almost certainly a 
low estimate. Real military spending numbers are just about everywhere 
shrouded in mystery, since governments tend to go to great lengths to 
obfuscate the real numbers, and as a result we have no idea if  the case 
of  Greece runs parallel, for instance, to that of  the USA, where the size 
of  the total military budget corresponds almost exactly with that of  the 
federal deficit. However the role of  the Greek government’s interest in 
expensive German and French military equipment (jets, submarines), 
and its financing through money borrowed from German and French 
banks, has been well-documented. 
Most commentators explain Greek military spending as the re-
sult of  ongoing tensions with fellow-NATO member Turkey, as if  the 
continued existence of  these tensions is itself  in no need of  explanation. 
This is superficial. Sabre-rattling, as we all know, is a traditional tech-
nique for defusing social tensions at home; and if  the Greek government 
does an unusual amount of  it, it’s because there are such an unusual lot 
of  tensions to defuse. It’s the same reason that the Greek police force is 
so large—the second largest in Europe—despite the fact that the crime 
rate is so low. Rates of  most forms of  violent crime (rape, murder, that 
sort of  thing) are among the lowest in Europe, but the rate of  political 
crimes (burning or looting banks, attacks on corporate or government 
offices) is veritably off  the charts.2 Clashes between police and leftists of  
one sort or another are an almost daily occurrence. In a very real sense, 
the Greek civil war, usually said to have lasted from 1946 to 1949, never 
ended. And while only a minority actively support the now largely an-
archist-inspired resistance, the existence situation could never continue 
unless significant portions of  the population at the very least passively 
acquiesce, seeing teenage squatters and even Molotov-throwing insur-
rectionists as at least as legitimate a political force as the police—who 
are, in fact, widely viewed as indistinguishable from the followers of  the 
old fascist colonels. In many urban neighborhoods, police continue to 
be seen as occupying forces, and they often act as such, trashing social 
centres and cafes in leftist neighborhoods in the same way as gangs of  
right-wing thugs, who also exist, and with whom they actively collabo-
rate. What has bankrupted the Greek government, in other words, is 
the cost of  popular rejection of  its basic institutions of  rule; it has been 
forced to pour borrowed money into maintaining an endlessly expand-
ing apparatus of  coercion for the very reason that many of  its citizens 
refuse to accept that apparatus as inherently legitimate. 
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The Greek situation is of  course unique but I think it raises 
some very interesting questions about the connection between debt, or-
ganised violence, rebellion, and the state, because this connection has 
been a perennial feature of  human history for at least five thousand 
years. To keep the focus on Greece—and this is by no means meant to 
imply any direct historical continuity, just as a particularly telling and 
well-documented example—in the late sixth century BC, at exactly the 
moment ancient city-states began to be incorporated into a larger com-
mercial world, the immediate effect was a series of  debt crises. The one 
in Athens, in which, according to Aristotle, “the poor became enslaved 
to the rich”—and many defaulters came to be literally sold abroad as 
slaves—led to the famous Solonian reforms, and set off  a chain of  social 
struggle that culminated first in the populist “tyranny” of  Peisistratus, 
and ultimately in the establishment of  Athens’s democratic constitu-
tion. But similar things were happening everywhere: the new military 
classes, hoplites, sailors, whatever they might have been, were not will-
ing to put up with debt peonage imposed by the former aristocrats and 
either supported populist coups (as for instance in Corinth), or made 
debt relief  the principle focus of  radical agitation, as in Megara, where 
the demos passed the famous palintokia, a law which not only banned 
all loans at interest, but did so retroactively, demanding all interest ex-
tracted over the principle on existing loans be immediately returned 
to the debtor. These debt crises appear to have been the main impulse 
beyond constitutional reform.
Neither—and this is an area where earlier scholars appear to 
have been largely mistaken—did they vanish during the rest of  Greek 
history. In Athens, while the most abusive practices were banned, most 
citizens remained in debt, and the democratic state’s solution was es-
sentially military: to use the Athenian navy to establish an empire, and 
its economic power to acquire slaves overseas—most famously, the 
thousands set to work in the Laurium silver mines—and to simply dis-
tribute the spoils liberally enough (for instance, in public works proj-
ects, and fees for attending meetings at the agora). This was typical. 
While ancient Middle Eastern kingdoms had long been in the habit of  
pronouncing universal debt cancellations—starting with the Sumerian 
“freedom” proclamations of  King Enmetena of  Lagash in 2400 BC, 
where new monarchs would tend, on coming to the throne, to cancel 
existing consumer debts and allow debt peons to return home, and con-
tinuing through institutions like the Biblical jubilee—Greek city states 
almost never engaged in outright cancellations. Instead, they threw 
money at the problem.
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This is important when one looks at the history of  coinage, 
which, in the ancient world, was invented not for commercial purposes 
but largely for the payment of  soldiers (probably, in the very earliest 
times, mercenaries) and secondarily, for taxes, fees, civic payments, and 
so on. Rather than being the cause of  the early debt crises—which be-
gan before coins were widely in use—coins were really part of  the solu-
tion, a way of  detaching ordinary people from their traditional attach-
ments to aristocratic patrons, who had converted their old allegiance 
into “debts,” and instead linking them directly to the public institutions 
of  the state.
As a result, most political crises in ancient Greek cities really 
turned on this sort of  distribution of  spoils. Here is one incident re-
corded in Aristotle (cited in Keyt 1997: 103 [1304b27–31]), who pro-
vides a (typically) conservative take on the origins of  a coup in the city 
of  Rhodes around 391 BC: The demagogues [i.e. leaders of  the de-
mocracy] needed money to pay the people for attending the assembly 
and serving on juries; for if  the people did not attend, the demagogues 
would lose their influence. They raised at least some of  the money they 
needed by preventing the disbursement of  the money due the trireme 
commanders under their contracts with the city to build and fit triremes 
for the Rhodian navy. Since the commanders were not paid, they were 
unable in turn to pay their suppliers and workers, who sued the com-
manders. To escape these lawsuits the trireme commanders banded to-
gether and overthrew the democracy.
Rome, significantly, was to pursue almost identical policies: af-
ter experiencing a series of  bitter conflicts over debt in the early Repub-
lic, which periodically brought things very close to a mass defection of  
the plebs, and constitutional reforms. Yet debts were never quite can-
celled, or the principle of  debt was never challenged. Instead, Rome’s 
rulers relied on a policy of  the redistribution of  spoils to keep the plebs 
from falling off  the edge—which worked well enough in the late Re-
public and early Empire, though it began to fall apart again in the later 
Empire when citizenship became universal. 
As a result, as the great Classicist Moses Finley (1960: 63) 
pointed out, in the ancient world, there was basically one single revolu-
tionary program, voiced whenever the rural poor rose up: “cancel the 
debts and redistribute the land.”3
Neither was this program limited to the ancient Mediter-
ranean. Mesopotamian and Hebrew debt cancellations were clearly 
based on the fear of  mass defection—“exodus,” in the original sense 
of  the term—where indebted farmers and labourers would flee to the 
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desert fringes, away from the cities in the river valleys, joining pastoral 
nomads who threatened to eventually overwhelm the cities themselves. 
From the earliest times for which we have records, through the Middle 
Ages, and throughout the age of  European colonial empires, when-
ever one finds people rising in rebellion one finds questions of  debt first 
among the first of  the grievances. This seems to be true everywhere—
or everywhere where interest-bearing debt had not already been made 
illegal as a result of  pressure from below. It is as true of  peasant revolts 
in Japan as of  colonial rebellions in India or Mexico. The burning of  
ledger books and legal records is usually the very first act in a success-
ful uprising (with the storming of  castles, mansions, and destruction of  
property cadastres or tax records only afterwards.) Certainly, far more 
rebellions have begun over debt than over slavery, caste systems, or the 
depredations of  landlords, plantation foremen, or factory owners. 
One might well ask why. What is it about debt, in particu-
lar, that sparks such endless indignation, and resistance? One could, 
perhaps, answer the question on a philosophical level. Caste, slavery, 
feudalism—all these are based on a presumption of  inequality. Debt, 
alone, is not. A debt is a contract, an agreement, between two par-
ties who stand—when they originate it—in a relation of  legal equality. 
True, the terms of  the contract are that one (the debtor) is in a position 
of  subordination until the loan is repaid; but still, the entire point of  
the contract is that a debt should be repaid, and therefore, that the two 
parties ought to be restored to their original position of  equality. If  they 
are not, it’s because the debtor is, in a certain sense, at fault. This is why 
words for “debt” and “sin” are, in so many languages—from Sanskrit to 
German to Aramaic to Quechua—originally the same word. Religious 
concepts of  sin actually seem to derive from debt rather than the other 
way around (in fact, many of  the key concepts in what are now consid-
ered sacred texts, from the Vedic notion of  life as a debt to the Gods to 
the Biblical notion of  redemption, were clearly framed in reference to 
arguments about debt and debt forgiveness that were at the very centre 
of  political debate at the time). This then is the reason debt is so infu-
riating. It is one thing to tell a man or woman they are simply inferior. 
It is another to tell them they ought to be equals, but they have failed. 
On the one hand, it seems like an obvious way to tell those one has sub-
ordinated—usually through violence—that their troubles are their own 
fault. This is why conquerors and Mafiosi almost invariably tell their 
victims they owe them money—if  only in the sense that they owe them 
their lives for not having simply murdered them. But these assertions 
almost invariably rebound if  only because they do, ultimately, imply 
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a certain potential for equality. It’s inevitable, once things are framed 
that way, that the victims will begin asking “But who really owes what 
to whom?” 
This is, as I say, the philosophical explanation. There is also another 
one, which highlights the structural link between war, state power, and 
monetary policies that lead to mass indebtedness. 
To understand this, however, I must pull back slightly and pro-
vide a few words about the history of  money—the reality of  which bears 
little relation to its representation in economic textbooks. We’re all used 
to hearing the standard line: first there was barter, then came coinage, 
eventually, this led to the creation of  elaborate credit systems of  the sort 
which play havoc with economies like Greece today. In fact this history is 
precisely backwards. Credit, and even debt crises, came first. 
I. AGE OF THE FIRST AGRARIAN EMPIRES (3500–800 BCE)
DOMINANT MONEY FORM: VIRTUAL CREDIT MONEY
Our best information on the origins of  money goes back to 
ancient Mesopotamia, but there seems no particular reason to believe 
matters were radically different in Pharaonic Egypt, Bronze Age China, 
or the Indus Valley. The Mesopotamian economy was dominated by 
large public institutions (Temples and Places) whose bureaucratic ad-
ministrators effectively created money by establishing a fixed equivalent 
between silver and the staple crop, barley; debts were calculated in sil-
ver, but silver was rarely used in transactions: payments were made in 
barley or in anything else that happened to be handy and acceptable. 
Major debts were recorded on cuneiform tablets kept as sureties by 
both parties to the transaction. 
Markets, certainly, did exist, but most actual acts of  everyday 
buying and selling, particularly those that were not carried out between 
absolute strangers, appear to have been made on credit. The habit of  
money at interest also originates in Sumer (it remained unknown, for 
example, in Egypt), and it led to continual crises, as in bad years farm-
ers would grow hopelessly indebted to the rich and would begin having 
to surrender their farms and ultimately, family members, in debt bond-
age, forcing governments to announce general amnesties. (It is significant 
that the first word for “freedom” known from any human language, the 
Sumerian amargi, literally means “return to mother,” since such declara-
tions of  debt freedom would also mean that debt peons would also be al-
lowed to return home.) Such policies appear to have been commonplace: 
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from the Biblical Jubilee, whereby all debts were cancelled after seven 
years, to Chinese traditions indicating that coinage themselves were in-
vented as part of  government efforts to redeem debt pawns. 
II AXIAL AGE (800 BCE–600 CE)
DOMINANT MONEY FORM: COINAGE AND METAL BULLION
From the Warring States period in China, fragmentation in In-
dia, to the carnage and mass enslavement that accompanied the expan-
sion (and later the dissolution) of  the Roman Empire, it was a period in 
most of  the world of  spectacular creativity, but of  almost equally spec-
tacular violence: of  large, aggressive empires which combined the main-
tenance of  standing armies and the mass use of  war captives as slave 
labour, and an abandonment of  old protections for debtors. 
Remarkably, it also saw the simultaneous invention of  coinage 
in China, India, and the Eastern Mediterranean—in each case inde-
pendently, but in each case also, in almost exactly the same times and 
places that also saw the rise of  the major world religions. This could 
hardly have been a coincidence. Coins, which allowed the actual use 
of  gold, silver, and copper as media of  exchange, even in ordinary day-
to-day transactions, also made possible the creation of  markets in the 
now more familiar, impersonal sense of  the term. These appear to have 
arisen largely as a side effect of  military operations, and coins were 
first used mainly to pay soldiers. It certainly was not invented to facili-
tate trade—the Phoenicians, consummate traders of  the ancient world, 
were among the last to adopt it; the very first coins, issued by rulers of  
Lydia, were probably issued mainly to pay their Greek mercenaries. 
The result was what might be called—following sociologist Geoffrey 
Ingham—a “military-coinage-slavery complex,” since the diffusion of  
new military technologies (Greek hoplites, Roman legions) was always 
closely tied to the capture and marketing of  slaves, and the other major 
source of  slaves was debt: now that states no longer periodically wiped 
the slates clean, those not lucky enough to be citizens of  the major mili-
tary city-states—who were usually protected from the clutches of  lend-
ers by the distribution of  spoils—were fair game. The credit systems 
of  the Near East did not crumble under commercial competition; they 
were destroyed by Alexander’s armies—armies that required half  a ton 
of  silver bullion per day in wages. The mines where the bullion was 
produced were generally worked by slaves, captured in war. Imperial 
tax systems were consciously designed to force their subjects to create 
markets, largely to provision soldiers.
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III. THE MIDDLE AGES (600 CE–1500 CE)
4
RETURN OF VIRTUAL CREDIT-MONEY
 If  the Axial Age saw the emergence of  complementary ideals 
of  commodity markets and universal world religions, the Middle 
Ages was the period in which the new religions, mostly born as peace 
movements—forms of  popular opposition to Axial Age militarism—
effectively took over regulation of  the market systems, with the result 
that coinage was largely abandoned, and the world moved back to 
virtual credit money (from tally sticks in Western Europe, to checking 
accounts in the Middle East, to the invention of  paper money in 
China). It also saw, almost everywhere, the dissolution of  the great 
empires with their standing armies,5 the abolition or at very least 
extreme attenuation of  chattel slavery, and the creation of  some kind 
of  overarching protections against the depredations of  debt. Islam and 
Christendom of  course banned lending money at interest entirely, along 
with debt peonage and related abuses; in China, this was the heyday of  
Buddhism, and Buddhist temples popularised pawnshops as a way of  
offering farmers an alternative to the local usurer (even as Confucian 
administrators enforced periodic debt relief). To get some sense of  the 
degree to which things had changed, the Greek principle of  palintokia, 
of  the restitution to the debtor of  all money extracted that exceeded the 
original principle—considered the utmost in extremist demagoguery by 
all existing Greek sources—was official Catholic doctrine by the 12th 
century; anyone identified as a usurer who did not make such restitution 
was to be excommunicated, could not receive communion, and could 
not be buried on sacred ground. 
 All this is not to say that this period did not see its share of  
carnage and plunder (particularly during the great nomadic invasions), 
but money, for the most part, was delinked from coercive institutions. 
Money-changers, one might say, were invited back into the temples, 
where they could be monitored; the result was a flowering of  institutions 
premised on a much higher degree of  social trust.
IV. AGE OF CAPITALIST EMPIRES (1500–1971)
RETURN OF PRECIOUS METALS
With the advent of  the great European empires—Iberian, then 
North Atlantic—the world saw both a reversion to mass enslavement, 
plunder, and wars of  destruction, and the consequent rapid return of  
gold and silver bullion as the main form of  currency. The delinking of  
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money from religious institutions, and its relinking with coercive ones 
(especially the state), was here accompanied by an ideological rever-
sion to “Metallism.” Internationally, the British Empire was steadfast 
in maintaining the gold standard through the 19th and early 20th cen-
turies, and great political battles were fought in the United States over 
whether the gold or silver standard should prevail. All this is in dramatic 
contrast with the Middle Ages, where it was mostly simply assumed that 
money was a social convention that could be created or transformed 
more or less at will. This was all the more important since, in fact, 
the new capitalist hegemons (starting with Venice and Genoa, then the 
Dutch Republic, and finally the British and US empires) were driven at 
least in part by credit systems based on negotiable paper, and eventu-
ally, paper money. This paper money was a very peculiar form of  credit 
money, consisting almost exclusively of  government war debt, that is, 
wealth borrowed by governments to purchase the means for organised 
violence; a capacity for violence that was then used, in a kind of  mag-
nificent circularity, to enforce the claims of  central bankers that that 
money those states now owed it could be lent out again, and used as 
legal tender in all commercial transactions. 
V. CURRENT ERA (1971 ONWARDS)
RETURN, AGAIN, OF VIRTUAL CREDIT MONEY; OTHERWISE, UNKNOWN
The current age of  virtual money—which might be said to have 
officially begun on August 15, 1971, when US President Richard Nixon 
suspended the convertibility of  the dollar into gold—is thus nothing 
dramatically new. The financialisation of  capital, the efflorescence of  
consumer debt, global debt crises, and of  course the great meltdown of  
2008, all appear in this long-term perspective as the likely birth-pangs 
of  a new age whose form we could not possibly predict.
Still, some historical trends are obvious enough. Historically, as 
we have seen, ages of  virtual, credit money have also involved creating 
some sort of  overarching institutions—Mesopotamian sacred kingship, 
Mosaic jubilees, Sharia or Canon Law—that place some sort of  con-
trols on the potentially catastrophic social consequences of  debt. So far, 
the movement this time has been the other way around: starting with 
the 1980s we have begun to see the creation of  the first effective plan-
etary administrative system, operating through the IMF, World Bank, 
corporations, and other financial institutions, largely in order to pro-
tect the interests of  creditors. However, this apparatus was very quickly 
thrown into crisis, first by the very rapid development of  global social 
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movements, which effectively destroyed the moral authority of  institu-
tions like the IMF, and left many of  them very close to bankruptcy, then 
by the current banking crisis and global economic collapse. The shape 
of  what eventually emerges—and presumably, some new overarching 
system or systems will emerge—depends largely on the effectiveness of  
social movements. Those that arose at the end of  the Axial Age largely 
managed to eliminate slavery across the Eurasian continent. Will it be 
possible to do the same with wage slavery? What sort of  institutions 
will arise within the new virtual credit systems to prevent creditors from 
running completely amok?
 What about the role of  war and militarism in all of  this? Well, 
for the moment, the world economy is still operating under the aegis 
of  the US empire, whose financial system is organised in much the 
same way as earlier capitalist hegemons. Just as the Bank of  England, 
for instance, was an ostensibly private institution given permission by 
the Crown to lend money that the King owed it in the form of  paper 
money, so is the US system organised around the Federal Reserve—
actually a consortium of  private banks—which has the unique right 
to monetize the US debt. This is again, a war debt (as mentioned 
earlier, size of  the US deficit corresponds almost exactly to the size of  
its military spending), the price of  its coercive power, which is global in 
scope—there is no place on earth where the US military is not able to 
strike with relative impunity—just as there is no place on earth where 
the US dollar, which is essentially a promise for repayment by the US 
government for the means to maintain that military system, does not 
serve as the basic reserve currency. 
The US empire does have one historically unique feature: it 
is the first empire to hold the official position that it is not an empire 
at all. This introduces a few peculiar kinks. Historically, aside from the 
Federal Reserve, the major purchaser of  US Treasury bonds (financers 
of  the US deficit) are foreign institutional lenders, which over the last 
forty years, have been US military client states: Germany (originally 
West Germany), Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
and so forth. All are either covered with US bases, or directly under the 
US military umbrella in one form or another; all are in the habit of  
purchasing US bonds that never, in fact, mature, but are endlessly rolled 
over, creating a kind of  indirect tribute system dressed up as US interna-
tional debt (Hudson 2003). (Matters have become slightly murkier now 
that China has got into the game, since China is obviously by no means 
a US military client state, but if  one examines Chinese policies in deep 
historical perspective, too, one finds that have long been used to playing 
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this sort of  game: Chinese imperial tribute systems always worked in 
reverse, showering wealth on foreign dependents (in fact, many of  the 
same ones now maintained by the US—Japan, Korea, Taiwan—in ex-
change for political loyalty; which implies the long-term aim is reduce 
the US itself  to a military client state of  China; a military enforcer for 
East Asian capital. It’s in no way clear if  this will actually work.) 
The result of  this peculiar approach to empire is that debt ends 
up meaning different things to different people. US “debt” need never 
be repaid, in fact, in a certain sense, it cannot be repaid, since if  the 
US did not maintain deficits, the international monetary system would 
cease to exist in exactly the same way that the British monetary system 
would no longer exist if  the Queen actually paid back the original loan 
to the Bank of  England. The debts of  weaker nations, in contrast, are 
treated as absolute moral imperatives, tantamount to religious obliga-
tions, with the IMF in particular enforced to maintain the principle 
that no creditor, no matter how bizarre or foolhardy their original loan, 
should ever be forced to write down a single dollar. The recent bailout 
of  the US financial system, even after they were caught engaging in 
transparent fraud, has revealed how this is now true on every level: 
banks, and any other corporations with a financial division, are allowed 
to basically make up money out of  thin air through the manipulation 
of  debt; ordinary citizens, who are obliged to backstop these efforts 
with their tax money whenever the bubble bursts, are under no condi-
tions allowed to do the same: their debts are sacred obligations, matters 
of  elementary morality, and should never be allowed the privilege of  
rescue or default. 
The utter moral bankruptcy of  such a system (to employ a 
metaphor that’s almost not even a metaphor in this case) has now been 
revealed to all. The result? So far, it has been surprisingly weak: a kind 
of  startled cynicism, or rage without direction, directionless above all 
because most people can no longer imagine what an economic system 
that wasn’t morally bankrupt would even be like. The most common 
reaction perhaps is to simply reject the notion that morality exists on 
any level: as in the increasingly common habit, in the US, of  homeown-
ers simply walking away from “underwater” mortgages even if  they do 
technically have the means to continue paying them. This does seem a 
logical reaction to the death-pangs of  neoliberalism: “If  we are all sup-
posed to think of  ourselves as tiny corporations, now, why can’t we all 
be financial corporations? They can just make up money and, if  they 
get in trouble, welsh on their debts. Well so will we.” But it’s hard to see 
how it could have much traction as a form of  resistance to capitalism.
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From the longer-term perspective I’ve been developing here, 
however, we can see that what we are witnessing is also a crisis in the 
redistributive function of  the old capitalist empires—empires which are 
now, most likely, coming to the end of  their 500-year historical run. Like 
the ruling classes of  the Axial Age empires before them (e.g. Athens and 
Rome), the rulers of  these more recent empires resisted earlier poli-
cies that challenged the very nature of  debt. Such states, built above all 
on vast standing armies and navies, do not tend to indulge in jubilees, 
debt moratoria, or prohibitions against usury. Instead, they tend to in-
sist on the sacred nature of  debt, but at the same time, cushion certain 
privileged sections of  the popular classes—above all, those that provide 
them with their soldiers and able-bodied seamen—by setting up sys-
tems to distribute the spoils of  empire, directly or indirectly. Greek or 
Rhodian jury fees, Roman grain distributions (the “bread” part of  the 
famous “bread and circuses”), and their innumerable Indian or Chinese 
equivalents, were designed above all to keep the military classes out of  
the clutches of  the loan sharks. It’s easy to see how North Atlantic so-
cial welfare policies of  the post-War period operated in much the same 
way. They continued to operate with money that was, effectively, sim-
ply government debt, or debt created by private banks, and continued 
to insist that ordinary mortals treat the stuff  as if  it were some sacred 
moral trust, but then, at the same time, pursued redistributive policies 
that ensured that most citizens managed to keep themselves more or 
less above water. The new age of  virtual money, starting in the 1970s, 
involved both stripping away those social protections, eliminating any 
remaining vestige of  usury laws, and allowing the old North Atlantic 
working classes to essentially borrow their way into something like their 
old levels of  prosperity (if  not security). The solution was, clearly, a stop-
gap—not really a solution at all. Empires simply cannot be maintained 
by destroying their core citizenry, and the crisis in Greece—with its 
tin-plated militarism, its perpetual posturing against Turkey, a kind of  
miniature comic-opera version of  the grand US-EU imperial “war of  
civilisations” against Islam (whose militants, of  course, reject the prin-
ciple of  interest-bearing debt entirely),6 its dilapidated and inadequate 
welfare state run by a hostile and reluctant bureaucracy—all serve as a 
dress rehearsal for the likely fate of  the global imperial system when it fi-
nally reaches its limits and the era comes definitively tumbling to a close.
And what shall follow? In a way, that’s rather up to us. This 
is not the place to offer prescriptions. But it might help to suggest a 
few words of  warning. Henry Ford—who as we all know was a fas-
cist warmonger of  the worst sort—once remarked that if  ordinary 
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people figured out how the banking system really worked, there would 
be a revolution overnight. He was referring, no doubt, to the fact that 
banks—and not only central banks—have been granted the right to, ef-
fectively, create money by lending it into existence. Perhaps so: but the 
objection is founded in a kind of  false materialism that is itself  a large 
part of  the problem. Materialist ages, when it is assumed that gold and 
silver simply are money, and that money itself  can be seen as a scarce 
commodity, are always scandalised by the fact that credit systems do not 
really operate this way, and never have. Consider for instance the words 
of  Plutarch, on the depredations of  usurers in Athens in the second 
century AD:
And as King Darius sent to the city of  Athens his lieutenants with chains and 
cords, to bind the prisoners they should take; so these usurers, bringing into 
Greece boxes full of  schedules, bills, and obligatory contracts, as so many irons 
and fetters for the shackling of  poor criminals …
At the very delivery of  their money, they immediately ask it back, taking it up 
at the same moment they lay it down; and they let out that again at interest the 
money they have charged in interest for what they have already lent.
So that they laugh at those natural philosophers who hold that nothing can be 
made of  nothing and of  that which has no existence; but with them usury is 
made and engendered of  that which neither is nor ever was.
—Plutarch, Moralia 828f-831a
Compare that to this quote—almost certainly apocryphal, but 
extremely popular on the internet—attributed to Lord Josiah Charles 
Stamp, sometime director of  the Bank of  England, from a talk said to 
have been delivered in 1923:
The modern banking system manufactures money out of  nothing. The process 
is perhaps the most astounding piece of  sleight of  hand that was ever invented. 
Banking was conceived in iniquity and born in sin. Bankers own the earth; take 
it away from them, but leave them with the power to create credit, and with the 
stroke of  a pen they will create enough money to buy it back again…. If  you 
wish to remain slaves of  Bankers, and pay the cost of  your own slavery, let them 
continue to create deposits.7
The very fact that money is a social convention—a fact that 
was, as I’ve noted, simply taken for granted in the more enlightened 
Middle Ages—is now seen as itself  intrinsically scandalous; and not, for 
instance, the fact that only some people are given the power to create 
and destroy money by mutual agreement, and other people are not. 
Not to mention that this power is ultimately rooted in privileged access 
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to the instruments of  violence. In a world that was not so organised 
around violence, such powers of  creation would have to take a radically 
different form. Would we even be able to talk about money, debt, or 
credit in such a world? If  nothing else, the meaning of  all such words 
would change dramatically. In the final analysis, after all, a debt is noth-
ing but a promise; and a promise, a form of  social creativity, is a way of  
bringing something into being by agreeing it is there. 
At the moment, we live amidst the rubble of  a thousand bro-
ken promises: the promise of  capitalism, the promise of  technological 
progress, the promise of  nationalism, the promise of  the state. But if  
revealing the arbitrary nature of  the power to create money out of  
nothing can lead to anything of  ultimate worth, it should reveal the 
arbitrary nature of  all these imaginary debts that our rulers claimed to 
owe us, and then, whenever it suited them, abruptly yanked away. Then 
we could begin to ask what kind of  promises would genuinely free men 
and women make to one another, in a society where those structures of  
violence are finally yanked away. It is at moments of  historical juncture 
like this one that we have the greatest chance of  finding out. And the 
stubborn refusal of  so many Greeks to accept the logic of  any of  these 
existing promises suggests that Greece is exactly the sort of  place most 
likely to begin suggesting answers. 
NOTES
1 Italy is number one. Encyclopedia “Where We Stand” data for 1997. The 2006 
population was 10,688,000, of  whom roughly a third were males between 14 and 65. 
This means one of  every 50 adult males are actively serving in the security forces; if  one 
counts army reserves, the numbers jump to one in twenty.  
2 Statistics for specifically politically motivated crime are unfortunately unavailable, 
but consider the following, from the US government’s “Greece 2010: Crime and 
Safety Report”: “Statistics suggest that violent crime in Greece is considerably less 
prevalent than in other European countries. Athens is safer in terms of  violent crime 
than comparably sized metropolitan cities. However, there has been a dramatic 
and steady increase in security related incidents involving improvised explosive and 
incendiary device attacks, as well as small arms, grenades, and other infantry style 
weapons. A majority of  the increased attacks are politically motivated incidents that 
usually have a specific target of  interest” (https://www.osac.gov/Reports/report.
cfm?contentID=114049). 
3 Mose Finley work was the earliest I managed to track down, but there are many. 
What he says for Greece and Rome would appear to be equally true of  Japan, India, 
or China. 
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4 I am here relegating most what is generally referred to as the “Dark Ages” in Europe 
into the earlier period, characterised by predatory militarism and the consequent 
importance of  bullion: the Viking raids, and the famous extraction of  danegeld from 
England, in the 800s, might be seen as one of  the last manifestations of  an age where 
predatory militarism went hand and hand with hoards of  gold and silver bullion.
5 It is a peculiarity of  the age that, apart from China, which dissolved and was 
reconstituted several times, the only great empires of  the period were created by 
nomads: from the Caliphate, to the Mongols, to the Tatars and Turks. 
6 A word of  clarification, lest the reader fall into the mistake of  assuming that I believe 
the term “the West” in its conventionally accepted sense is in any way a meaningful 
concept. Some would challenge the idea the rivalry between Greece and Turkey is 
reflective of  an “East/West” divide by arguing that both are, in effect, Oriental societies. 
My own preference is to go the other way. If  “the West” means anything, over the last 
two centuries, it refers to that intellectual tradition that has tries to square Abrahamic 
revealed religion with the conceptual apparatus of  Classical philosophy. But this means 
that Christianity, Judaism, and Islam were all equally Western, and that their current 
secularly-oriented epigones (such as for instance, Turkey) are equally so. The Greece-
Turkey quarrel is very much a division within the West, and always has been.
7 Said to have been given at a talk at the University of  Texas in 1927, but in fact, while 
the passage is endlessly cited in recent books and especially on the internet, it cannot be 
attested before roughly 1975. The first two lines appear to actually derive from a British 
investment advisor named L.L.B. Angas: “The modern Banking system manufactures 
money out of  nothing. The process is perhaps the most astounding piece of  sleight of  
hand that was ever invented. Banks can in fact inflate, mint and unmint the modern 
ledger-entry currency” (Angas 1937). The other parts of  the quote are probably later 
inventions—anyway Lord Stamp never suggested anything like this in his published 
writings. A similar line “the bank hath benefit of  all interest which it creates out of  
nothing” attributed to William Patterson, the first director of  the Bank of  England, 
and is likewise first attested only in the 1930s, and is also almost certainly apocryphal.
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The only part of  the so-called national wealth that actually enters into the 
collective possession of  a modern nation is the national debt.
—Karl Marx, Capital vol. 1
Have these genealogists of  morality up to now allowed themselves to dream, 
even remotely, that, for instance, that major moral principle ‘guilt’ [Schuld] 
derived its origin from the very materialistic idea ‘debt’ [Schulden]?… Where 
did this primitive, deeply rooted, and perhaps by now ineradicable idea derive 
its power, the idea of  an equivalence between punishment and pain? I have 
already given away the answer: in the contractual relationship between creditor 
and debtor, which is, in general, as ancient as the idea of  ‘legal subject’ and 
which, for its part, refers back to the basic forms of  buying, selling, bartering, 
trading, and exchanging goods.… In order to inspire trust in his promise to pay 
back, in order to give his promise a guarantee of  its seriousness and sanctity, 
in order to impress on his own conscience the idea of  paying back as a duty, 
an obligation, the debtor, by virtue of  a contract, pledges to the creditor, in the 
event that he does not pay, something else that he still ‘owns,’ something else 
over which he still exercises power, for example, his body… or his freedom or 
even his life….
—Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of  Morals
Through the constant terrorism of  the media for almost a year now con-
cerning “our” debt, the modern moralists, the preachers of  the word 
of  capital and money are trying violently to convince us, the “debtors,” 
that in order to pay back “our” debt to “our” creditors we are obliged 
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to take up our cross of  torture and sacrifices, to place our faith in the 
orthodoxy of  the Memorandum of  Economic and Financial Policies 
and the Stability Pact, and are filled with awe to anticipate, in the full-
ness of  time, the post-deficit life.
For months now, fiscal terrorism attempts to become more ef-
fective at targeting, through the collective responsibility of  the debts, 
our own subjectivity. The storm of  the imminent threats against 
“our” national economy aims at the internalisation of  the crisis as fear 
and guilt: “our” debts [Schulden] should become our collective guilt 
[Schuld]. Thus, the original sin recurs even more violently to make 
us, paraphrasing Nietzsche, pledge our already low wages, our already 
labour-intensified life, our very expectations for a world where capital-
ist domination will be history. They want us to pledge our own claims 
for a life liberated of  debts and guilt now and in the future; to become 
indebted with the burden of  a depressingly insecure present so that we 
eliminate even from our imagination any possibility of  abolishing this 
old, burdened with guilt and debt, world.
The terror of  deficits now aims at creating an emergency in 
Greece, transforming it into a laboratory of  a new shock-policy imple-
mentation. Certainly, this does not only reflect the aggravation of  the 
global crisis and the particularity of  its manifestation in Greece (as we 
will see below). It also reflects the catalytic effect of  the December 2008 
rebellion, which made the crisis even more acute, causing the delegiti-
misation of  the previous government and the subsequent delay in tak-
ing the necessary pro-capital measures. In this sense, fiscal terrorism, 
along with police repression, could be considered to be a part of  the 
ongoing counter-insurgency campaign that takes up—even in a preven-
tive way—global dimensions. 
Of  late, Greece has been located at the heart of  the continuing 
global capitalist crisis. The outbreak of  the “debt crisis” and the imple-
mentation of  a “shock-therapy” by the PASOK government in coopera-
tion with the European Union and the International Monetary Fund have 
drawn internationally the attention of  both capitalists and proletarians, 
since many people believe that the outcome of  class struggles in Greece 
will greatly influence the outcome of  the crisis on a global level. From 
this perspective, we believe that it is necessary to put the developments 
in Greece into a broader framework of  analysis of  the capitalist crisis; 
moreover, we should draw conclusions from the experience of  the ongo-
ing class struggles against the austerity measures in Greece since it has 
now become clear that similar “adjustment” programmes have already 
begun to be implemented in other European countries as well.
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The global economic recession of  the previous years is nothing but the 
most recent manifestation of  the permanent crisis of  reproduction of  
class relations which started in the 1970s, a crisis that was never truly 
resolved. 
The strategy followed by the “Capitalist International” since 
the mid-1970s was aimed at addressing the original cause of  the repro-
duction crisis in the developed countries, i.e. the indiscipline and insub-
ordination of  the proletariat which in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
was extended to all spheres of  everyday life, as the class struggles in the 
workplaces “came together” with the emergence of  a multitude of  new 
proletarian struggles (by women, minorities, the unemployed, etc.) in the 
sphere of  distribution leading both to an exploitability crisis of  labour 
power and to a legitimacy crisis of  the capitalist state and its institutions. 
This strategy has assumed many different forms in the course of  the 
years. A variety of  different methods to restore profitability have been 
employed leading to recoveries which were proven to be only temporary:
W The real direct wages have been reduced in order to 
increase the rate of  exploitation, and social expenditures 
have been restructured in order to discipline the workers 
through the imposition of  workfare and the promotion 
of  separations and atomisation. However, statistics show 
that even if  the real direct wages have been reduced 
in the developed countries, this is not the case for the 
real compensation per worker which includes health 
care benefits and employers’ shares of  social security 
contributions.1 At the same time, the labour productivity 
growth rates have decreased over the past four decades 
even if  they have been higher than the growth rates of  real 
compensation per worker.2 
W In the capital-intensive sector of  the economy, apart 
from the relative deindustrialisation that took place in 
the West and the relocation of  a part of  the production 
to developing countries, labour-saving technological 
innovations have been introduced aiming at the breaking 
up of  the historical centres of  working-class power 
and the disorganisation and control of  the insurgent 
proletarians. As a consequence, these tactics faced the 
CHAPTER SIXTEEN: BURDENED WITH DEBT
REVOLT AND CRISIS IN GREECE
248
necessity of  economising on the employment of  constant 
capital so that the organic composition of  this part of  
capital would not be increased. But this process depends 
on many interrelated factors of  the global accumulation 
circuit which have constituted a whole range of  different 
terrains of  struggle. These factors include the intensity of  
the labour process, the productivity of  labour employed in 
the production of  means of  production, the concentration 
of  the means of  production, the length of  the working 
day, the growth of  employment, the education, skills, and 
discipline of  the workers, the efficiency of  organisation 
of  the production process, the combination of  “industrial 
labour” with “creative labour” in the services, the reduction 
of  wastes, the prices of  raw materials, etc. For example, 
educational struggles that have broken out in a number 
of  different countries have undermined the reproduction 
of  skilled labour power and the discipline of  the collective 
worker; environmental struggles and peasant struggles 
against the expropriation of  lands rich in raw materials in 
the so-called Third World have weighed down on the cost 
of  raw materials and means of  production; the relatively 
low identification of  temporary workers with their job has 
had adverse effects on the intensity of  the labour process 
as well as on productivity growth. Therefore the increase 
of  the rate of  exploitation in relation to the increase of  the 
cost of  the constant capital employed has been, in total, 
rather mediocre.
W After the mid-70s, the surplus capital that could 
no longer find a profitable outlet in production was 
transformed into money capital that was directed to the 
financial sector leading to its gigantic expansion and to 
the liberalisation of  capital flows on a global level, playing 
also the role of  the “watchman” of  the global capitalist 
profitability, directing the flows of  capital into locations of  
profitable investment. A significant part of  this capital was 
employed in speculative investments betting on the future 
extraction of  surplus value. At the same time, the removal 
of  restrictions on the international flows of  capital has 
become a basic instrument of  the neoliberal strategy, 
accelerating processes of  classic primitive accumulation in 
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the periphery that have taken the form of  the enclosures 
of  communal land and of  the violent proletarianisation 
of  millions of  people in South-East Asia, Latin America, 
and Africa.3
W A key driver of  the above-mentioned process has been 
the “sovereign debt” as noted by Marx already since the 
19th century.4 However, the politics of  the expansion 
of  “sovereign debt” was not limited to the periphery. 
According to statistical data provided by OECD, since the 
end of  the 1970s, the “sovereign debt” doubled or even 
tripled in all the developed countries in the West5 for two 
reasons: one reason has been the successive reductions 
in the taxation of  capital to prop up its burdened 
profitability; the other reason has been the inability to 
restrain government expenditures despite the restructuring 
which aimed at directing expenditures towards productive 
investments through the privatisation and monetisation of  
a significant part of  the forms of  reproduction of  labour 
power.
W The welfare state has been partially transformed from an 
institution for the extended reproduction of  labour power 
into an institution for the control of  the marginalised 
proletarians and the imposition of  low wages and poverty. 
The reforms of  the welfare state have been also directed 
against the weakest parts of  the working class—young 
workers, women, ethnic minorities, etc.—reinforcing 
the separations within the proletariat. However, this 
transformation has proven expensive and difficult to 
implement because of  the high administrative and policing 
costs related to the control of  the surplus population and 
due to the cost of  the unemployment benefits which 
fluctuate according to the rate of  unemployment. Despite 
the subordination of  the state to the rule of  money and the 
growth of  relative surplus population, the national state still 
has to stabilize and secure the expanded reproduction of  
domestic capital and its integration into the accumulation 
of  capital on a world scale. At the same time, the state 
has to guarantee the physical and social reproduction of  
the working class and the maintenance of  social coherence 
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and control. The rise of  surplus population in a period of  
crisis does not exclude a rise in the absolute number of  
labour power which is valorised. So, the state still increases 
its social expenditures, but at a slower rate and in a more 
selective way.
W In parallel, the central banks’ policies of  low interest-rates 
and easy credit after the mid-1980s led to the expansion 
of  every form of  private debt—consumer, business and 
mortgage loans. As a result, some commentators started to 
talk about the appearance of  “privatised Keynesianism” 
aiming at the promotion of  effective demand on the level 
of  society. The ephemeral boom of  the mid-1980s was 
based on the decomposition of  the working class and on 
the explosion of  credit. Both the debt expansion and the 
restructuring of  public expenditures have been used in 
order to promote the decomposition and disorganisation 
of  the working class. The “socialisation” of  the debt has 
integrated the better educated/specialised/productive 
part of  the working class through a credit-sustained boom. 
The mirror image of  credit-driven prosperity has been 
the exclusion of  the weakest parts of  the working class 
from consumer credit leading to their impoverishment 
and marginalisation. This had another effect as well: those 
proletarians managing to “participate” in this “prosperity” 
are disciplined by the fear of  exclusion. However, the 
disciplining/divisive role of  the debt expansion was 
seriously undermined in the years before the 2007 subprime 
mortgage crisis when the autonomisation of  speculative 
investments in the derivative markets connected with 
consumer and mortgage debt led to a total relaxation of  
the rules and criteria for providing credit: in Greece even 
precarious workers could acquire cars with no advance 
payments, not to mention what happened in the United 
States with the housing loans, where even unemployed 
black families were able to get mortgage loans.6
The combination of  an insufficient increase of  the rate of  ex-
ploitation with the failure to effectively economize on the employment 
of  constant capital has led to a protracted crisis of  overaccumulation. 
Despite temporary recoveries, the rate of  profit has never returned to 
 251
its “golden age” levels. Moreover, in the West, the liberal-democratic 
character of  the integration of  the proletariat into the capitalist state 
after the WWII has prevented the only definitive way out of  the crisis: 
a wide devaluation or even physical destruction of  unproductive capital 
through a generalised war for a fresh start of  the capitalist machine of  
accumulation. All the more so, because in the beginning of  the 1970s, 
when the crisis had first broken out, the capitalist state and its insti-
tutions faced a deep legitimisation crisis which made such an option 
totally unthinkable. Despite the promotion of  separations within the 
proletariat in the decades that followed, the legitimisation crisis has not 
been weathered and this model of  the integration of  the working class 
into the capitalist state has not been abandoned. As we showed before, 
the decomposition of  social relations and the deepening of  separa-
tions within the proletariat, promoted by the debt expansion and the 
partial transformation of  the welfare state into a penal state, have not 
proven adequate for the reconstitution of  the circuit of  social capital. 
This reconstitution entails the transformation of  money into productive 
capital which presupposes the subordination of  labour to an expanded 
extraction of  surplus value: the exploitation of  labour must deliver rates 
of  profit high enough to redeem debt and allow for an expanded and 
accelerated capitalist accumulation. The fact that this has not been pos-
sible shows that the strength of  the proletariat even at the moment of  
retreat has to be considered.
However, since debt and speculation cannot be used ad infini-
tum to boost capitalist development faster than it is warranted by the 
underlying flow of  new value generated in production, the bubbles cre-
ated by the excessive run-up of  debt burst one after the other resulting 
in recurrent crises. In the beginning of  the previous decade, the bubble 
of  the so-called “new economy” burst in the United States. The result-
ing recession was dealt with on the one hand through the creation of  
a new bubble in the market of  mortgage housing loans7 and on the 
other hand through the burgeoning of  the speculative investments in 
the markets of  derivative financial products such as the Collateral Debt 
Obligations and the Credit Default Swaps (CDS), whose original func-
tion was the reduction of  individual investment risk through its spread-
ing within the market.8 Ironically, the spreading of  risk throughout 
the whole economy had disastrous consequences for financial capital. 
The bursting of  these new bubbles in the beginning of  2008 brought 
the global banking system to the verge of  total collapse and the global 
economy into deep recession. It seems that the financial sector played 
with money which didn’t command labour, money which has lost its 
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grip on labour. Credit represents abstract labour in the form of  a claim 
on future exploitation, of  surplus value that has not been produced yet. 
This fictitious surplus value appears to be a gamble. It is uncertain if  it 
is produced.
All the governments of  the developed capitalist states chose 
to deal with this situation through the even greater burgeoning of  the 
“sovereign debt” with the provision of  astronomical sums of  money to 
bail out banks and boost capitalist growth. Naturally, this choice led to 
the transformation of  the crisis into fiscal crises in a number of  differ-
ent countries: the first stop was Dubai with Greece following next and 
the rest of  the PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain) waiting in 
the line. It seems that since the end of  the 1970s, the monetarist dialec-
tics of  credit/debt sustained accumulation remains the principal way 
through which capital tries to maintain its domination.
The political choice to deepen the “sovereign debt crisis” ex-
hibits great advantages for capital: the bogeyman of  bankruptcy be-
comes a useful tool for a new cycle of  violent primitive accumulation, 
in a similar fashion to what had happened in the countries of  the pe-
riphery in previous decades. In the periphery the process of  primitive 
accumulation takes the form of  open looting, of  enclosures of  com-
munal land and water resources, of  the plundering of  raw materials 
and resources resulting in the separation of  millions of  people from 
their means of  production and subsistence, creating new, cheaper, and 
available for exploitation proletarian populations. On the other hand, 
in the West it takes the form of  an attempt at the complete integra-
tion of  the relatively decommoditised forms of  social reproduction into 
capitalist valorisation as well as the form of  labour power devaluation 
and disciplining: wage and pension cuts, reduction of  the expenditures 
of  public services and utilities, increase of  the taxation of  the working 
class, privatisations, reforms of  social security, deepening of  the separa-
tions between young and old workers, between permanent and tempo-
rary workers, between “idlers” and “industrious” workers. There is also 
crude violence and media propaganda against strikes and protests.
[C]rises of  capitalist accumulation find a temporary resolution in the imposition 
of  conditions of  primitive accumulation upon new populations, including the 
creation of  new markets, discovery of  new raw materials, and new and cheaper 
proletarians. Dispossession and expropriation are means of  overcoming crises 
of  capitalist reproduction. The werewolf  hunger of  capital for surplus labour, 
appropriating social labour time without an equivalent, develops through the 
expanded reproduction of  dispossessed labour.9
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Primitive accumulation is a constantly reproduced accumulation, be it in terms 
of  the renewed separation of  new populations from the means of  production 
and subsistence, or in terms of  the reproduction of  the wage relation in the 
“established“ relations of  capital. The former seeks to bring new workers under 
the command of  capital and the latter to contain them as an exploitable human 
resource—the so-called human factor of  production.10
At the same time, the privatisation of  public services and utili-
ties (public health, social housing, public transport, telecommunica-
tions, energy, water, etc.) leads to the release of  a set of  resources and 
assets at a very low cost, providing outlets to the surplus capital for 
capital-saving profitable investments. Finally, private investment in state 
bonds ensures profits which are extracted from the direct and indirect 
taxation of  the workers aiming towards interest repayments. 
Therefore, the “debt crisis” intends to become a productive 
crisis: a driver of  primitive accumulation, dispossession and proletari-
anisation, a linchpin for the terrorising, the disciplining and the more 
effective exploitation of  the proletariat through the curbing of  class 
conflicts, proletarian desires and expectations.
Without a doubt, the selection of  Greece as a laboratory for the imple-
mentation of  a “shock-therapy” policy is related to the big problems 
which the imposition of  neoliberal restructuring faced throughout the 
last 25 years due to the persistent eruptions of  class struggles; in Greece 
the crisis of  exploitability and disciplining of  the proletariat is more 
intense than in any other country in Europe. This was explosively dem-
onstrated by the rebellion of  December 2008 which broke out simul-
taneously with the unfolding of  the global economic recession. Even 
if  only a proletarian minority participated in the rebellion, it however 
brought about a complete delegitimisation of  the previous government 
and, as we mentioned before, a delay in taking the necessary restructur-
ing measures for capital.
Apart from the consequences of  the reduction of  global eco-
nomic activity during 2008 to the exports of  Greek capital, especially 
in the shipping and the tourist sectors, the profitability of  capital in 
Greece has been continuously slowing down in the last years because of  
the slow growth of  productivity in relation to wages.11 It is surely a fact 
that Greek capital and its state have made continuous attempts during 
the last twenty years to deal with the crisis of  exploitability through re-
peated reforms of  the welfare state; through the flexibilisation of  labour 
relations of  young workers; through continuous legal interventions for 
the imposition of  discipline among immigrant workers and for the con-
trol of  the flows of  migration; through the cuts of  allowances, wages, 
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and social benefits in combination with the expansion of  consumer 
credit.12 In spite of  the significant successes achieved by Greek capital 
in the period between 1996 and 2004 when the rate of  exploitation 
and profitability rose, the crisis was not definitely resolved in favour of  
capital. As indicated by statistics, the rate of  increase of  productivity of  
labour has been continuously slowing down since 2004 to reach a nega-
tive growth figure of  -0.5% in 2009, while real wages have been going 
up since 2007.13 Productivity has risen in the period between 1995 and 
2008 because of  the public investments related to the Olympic Games, 
the influx of  EU structural funds leading to the increase of  constant 
capital investments and imports of  capital goods, as well as the prolifer-
ation of  a specialised work force through the rapid increase of  workers 
with a university education. However, according to the report prepared 
by the Bank of  Greece, the boost provided by these factors is exhausted. 
This is attributed by the capitalist think tanks to the relatively big size of  
the agriculture, trade, construction, and public administration sectors. 
The first three sectors are characterised by low capital/technological 
intensity, while the third one is attributed with a chronically low pro-
ductivity performance. Also, they refer to the relatively small size of  
Greek enterprises, the limited connection of  wages to productivity in 
individual workplaces as well as the “failures” of  the education system. 
Furthermore, they do not hesitate to openly assert that the profitability 
slowdown is caused by our “maladjusted attitude” towards the aims of  
“national development,” in other words by our indiscipline, by the “ex-
alted” wages in the public sector and by the “excessive” raises agreed to 
by the Greek General Confederation of  Labour (GSEE) and the Hel-
lenic Federation of  Enterprises (SEV) in 2008. The same reports also 
add that the privatisations of  public utility companies, and deregula-
tion, in general, have not proceeded as they should have, as well as that 
the labour market remains “rigid,” aggravating the economic situation, 
and what’s more, in a more permanent way. On the other hand, pub-
lic expenditures related to wages in the public sector, health care, and 
so-called social protection (that is money for benefits and pensions) are 
continuously increasing in the last decade.
As a result, profitability started to fall from 2006 onwards, until 
it collapsed in the first half  of  2009 by 51.5% in relation to the same 
period of  2008, because of  the global recession. The fall of  the turn-
over and of  the profitability of  private enterprises led in turn to a sig-
nificant reduction of  investments because of  the increasing inability of  
private enterprises to get credit from the banks. Moreover, banks were 
directly affected since their profits dramatically declined because of  the 
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significant increase of  losses stemming from the overdue loans or even 
from the non-repayment of  loans, having, in addition, a more general 
liquidity problem because of  the global financial crisis. 
Naturally, the state did not stay idle. It hurried to confront the 
problems that emerged because of  the outbreak of  the crisis by increas-
ing its expenditures by 10.9% in 2009 in order to support capitalist ac-
cumulation, thus contributing to the GDP by 1.7%. At the same time, 
the state provided banks with funds of  €28 billion, which is an amount 
that corresponds to 11.5% of  the GDP of  2008, in order to save their 
profitability. This policy was continued by the government of  PASOK 
which provided recently an additional amount of  €40 billion. Besides, 
public expenditures were increased for other reasons as well, such as, 
for example, the payments of  unemployment benefits since the num-
ber of  unemployed workers has increased, while revenues from taxes 
and contributions decreased because of  the recession, i.e. the decline 
of  GDP (and what’s more because of  the consecutive decreases of  the 
rate of  taxation of  profits in the last twenty years). Unsurprisingly, the 
result was that both public deficit and debt rose steeply to reach 15.4% 
and 126.8% respectively as a proportion of  the GDP, according to the 
latest figures from EUROSTAT.14
However, the “debt” noir literature is an old affair in Greece, 
even if  the hack writers of  the ruling class try to present the “necessary 
sacrifices” for its reduction as something new. In fact, debt skyrocketed 
during the ’80s. Until the end of  the ’70s, the government had man-
aged to limit public expenditures related to wages and pensions. This 
tendency would be completely reversed in the beginning of  the ’80s, 
since the “socialist” government of  PASOK was forced to increase both 
the direct and the indirect wages of  the workers under the pressure of  
class struggles of  the previous decade. Bound to balance between two 
basic, but contradictory state functions, the reproduction of  capitalist 
accumulation and the legitimisation of  exploitative social relations, the 
governments of  that period agreed to “generous” wage increases in the 
public sector that also swept along the wages of  the private sector. At 
the same time, they made investments in social welfare without securing 
new revenue through increased taxation of  private capital or trying to 
reduce the shadow economy and tax evasion. Thus, the income policy 
and the creation of  a rudimentary “welfare state,” contributed to the 
expansion of  public debt from 22.9% of  the GDP in 1980 to 57.8% in 
1985 and to 79.6% of  the GDP in 1990.
Despite the increase of  public expenses and debt, one can-
not argue that the formation of  social capital was carried out in the 
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same way as in the developed capitalist countries. It seems that the aim 
of  the welfare state during the 1980s was not so much the guarantee 
of  the social conditions for the expansion of  capitalist accumulation, 
but the management of  the “social costs” of  the reproduction crisis 
of  the capitalist relation caused by the reduction of  external revenue, 
the increase of  social demands and class struggles and advancing dein-
dustrialisation.15 The low increase of  productivity in relation to wages 
during the 1980s forced the PASOK government to change direction 
initiating an austerity programme in 1985 that was combined, on the 
ideological level, with a frontal attack against the “excessive demands” 
of  wage workers, denouncing the workers of  public utility companies as 
a “labour aristocracy,” and trying to impose separations by blaming the 
workers of  the public sector for enjoying “fat salaries” at the expense of  
the low paid workers of  the private sector.
Initially, this policy led to a wage reduction of  12.5% and to a 
profit increase of  150% in the period between 1985 and 1987. Never-
theless, this policy was confronted by intense struggles of  the supposed-
ly privileged parts of  the working class (teachers’ strikes, strikes at public 
utility companies, bank employees’ strikes, etc.) that continued to have 
offensive demands pushing the whole class upwards. These struggles 
forced PASOK to take back the austerity programme, leading, thus, to 
a reduction of  the wage cuts by a half  of  their initial size. Although the 
“national unity” government in 1990 and the subsequent neoliberal 
governments took on the responsibility of  the capitalist counter-attack, 
the “debt dynamic” was not checked, leading thus, to further debt in-
creases. By the mid-1990s, debt had climbed to a figure of  97% of  the 
GDP and was stabilised until the end of  the decade around 95–100% 
of  the GDP. In 2000 debt climbed to 103.4% of  the GDP and in the 
following years it fluctuated around 100% of  the GDP. It doesn’t re-
quire much effort to recognize the common motto that politicians and 
journalists have repeated during the last twenty years every time they 
ask us to work more for less in order to “save the country from bank-
ruptcy.”
But let us return to the present developments. Since 2008, 
world financial institutions have decided to invest mainly in govern-
ment bonds, which almost everywhere have multiplied because of  the 
global state policies of  bailing out banks. After the sovereign debt crisis 
of  Dubai in October 2009 and the failure of  the credit rating agen-
cies in forecasting it, these agencies frantically downgraded Greek gov-
ernment bonds. This led in its turn to the rise of  the CDS prices and 
spreads. The fact that the European Central Bank initially planned to 
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raise the minimum credit rating for the eligibility of  government bonds 
as collateral in liquidity provision from the start of  2011 encouraged 
the financial institutions holding Greek government bonds to dump 
them, precipitating the “debt crisis” and raising the interest, which in 
its turn raised the cost of  debt refinancing.16 Thus, public expenditures 
related to the payment of  interest as well as forecasts for the increase 
of  public deficit and debt have risen. The so-called “financial stabilisa-
tion mechanism” created by the EU and the IMF to “support” Greece 
through the provision of  loans with a lower interest rate than the one 
that is determined in the market in “exchange” for the imposition of  a 
strict structural adjustment programme should be seen in this context.17 
It must be noted that the proportion of  wage labour in Greece 
hardly reaches 65% of  the economically active population, with self-
employed people reaching a proportion of  22%,18 while more than 
90% of  businesses employ less than ten workers. Therefore, the fact 
that 19,000 small businesses closed down in 2009, with a forecast that 
45,000 small businesses will close down in 2010 and 60,000 in 2011, 
shows that the so-called “fiscal consolidation” assumes in Greece char-
acteristics of  a typical process of  primitive accumulation with the pro-
letarianisation of  tens of  thousands of  self-employed people and profes-
sionals as well as small business proprietors.
In conditions of  economic recession, businesses which are not 
adequately profitable and productive are forced to close down; the inef-
ficient part of  capital is destroyed so that a rising capitalist accumula-
tion may start again. Of  course, it is questionable whether this destruc-
tion of  capital is adequate when the state provides astronomical sums to 
bail-out banks, which are “too big to fail.” But, here we can also detect 
capital’s tendency to concentrate: bank, transport and hospital merging 
negotiations are up and running.
An overview of  the measures that the greek government tries to 
impose through the stability programme is sufficient to reveal the 
extent of  the attack against us:
Repeal of  13th and 14th salary in the public sector. They are replaced by a 
€1,000 benefit but only for workers with gross salaries less than €3,000 per 
month. 7% pay cuts on the regular wages in the public sector. Pay freeze for 
three years for all public and private sector workers. 20% total cut down on the 
benefits in the public sector.
Repeal of  13th and 14th pension in the public and private sector. They are 
replaced by a €800 benefit. Pension freeze for three years in the public and 
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private sector. 3% to 10% cut down on pensions of  over €1,400 net.
Cut down on layoff  compensation and increase of  the number of  workers that 
can be laid-off  every month per workplace (especially in big companies).
Reduction in overtime costs. 
VAT increase at all levels with the maximum reaching 23%. VAT base 
broadening. Increase of  indirect taxes by 10% (fuel, alcohol, and cigarettes).
“Liberalisation” of  closed-shop professions.
“Liberalisation”/privatisation of  public transportation (buses, trains, etc.) and 
energy.
Pension system reform
Since the early 1990s the Greek government has made successive 
reforms of  the pension system. One of  the main aims of  these reforms 
was the splitting up of  workers in various categories with different ages 
of  retirement, different minimum contribution periods for retirement, 
and so on. This has been further intensified by this reform.
Thus, despite the fact that from 2015 the age for retirement will be 
increased to the age of  65 and the minimum contribution period to 
40 years for all the workers (equality between women and men), on 
the other hand there is a designation of  a series of  subcategories of  
workers with different requirements in order to get and determine 
their pension. Of  course, the retirement age for these subcategories 
is also increased gradually to the age of  65 which will be applied for 
everybody from 2015. Apart from the workers officially hired before 
1983 who are not affected by the new law, workers who have been 
officially hired up to 1993 are gradually assimilated to the new status 
from 2011 with an annual increase of  the relevant requirements, while 
the workers that have been officially hired after 1993 are immediately 
subjected to the new pension limits.
Regarding the determination of  the pension, there are also several new 
categories: for workers officially hired from 1983 to 2011, the pension 
amount will be calculated for the years of  work until 2010 with the old 
law and for the years of  work after 2010 with the new law. Here we must 
note that, according to the new reform, there is a significant reduction 
of  the replacement rate for every category. Finally, the workers that will 
be officially hired from 2011 onwards will be subjected only to the new 
law. This situation leads inevitably to an individual determination of  
pension with obvious consequences on the potential collective workers’ 
struggles in the field of  social security. 
From 2011, the amount of  pension will be determined based on the 
wages throughout the work life and not on the best five years of  the last 
decade before retirement, as it was until today.
Within the next two years, there will be a reduction of  the supplementary 
pensions according to the economic status of  each auxiliary fund. 
A further reduction of  pensions of  7% on average is planned, both in 
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the public and the private sector.
Significant reduction of  the professions that are ranked as heavy and 
health-hazardous occupations.
Revision of  the framework for awarding disability pensions aiming at 
their reduction. 
From 2020, there will be automatic adjustment of  retirement age to 
life expectancy.
Suspension of  all recruitments in public sector in 2010 and from 2011 
implementation of  the rule: one recruitment for every five retirements. 
Establishment of  lower wages than the minimum wage for entrants and the 
long-term unemployed.
Legislative regulations for the promotion of  temporary and part-time contracts.
Legal predominance of  labour contracts at enterprise level over contracts at 
sectoral level. 
Cut down on public investments by €2 billion during the next two years.
Creation of  a Financial Stability Fund with state financing (€10 billion) for the 
stability of  the Greek banking system.
Reform of  the “anti-terrorist” legislation. While in the previous “anti-terrorist” 
law there were some clauses whereby certain offences were not considered to be 
“terrorist acts” if  they were done for the “protection of  the democratic regime” 
and as an “exercise of  fundamental individual, political and labour rights,” in 
the new reformed law they have been repealed. Such offences (like “disturbance 
of  the safety of  transportation”) are obviously related to an attempted stronger 
repression of  class struggles and proletarian or political violence.
Restructuring of  Higher Education. On top of  the previous reforms (2006–
2007), which proved unsuccessful to a certain extent because of  the student 
movement, a series of  new restructuring measures have been announced: 
Reduction of  expenditures through mergers, closures of  institutions in the 
periphery and layoffs which will lead to a reduction of  the number of  students.
“Financial self-sufficiency”: funding will be provided by the state on 
the basis of  specific contracts with terms related to assessment of  
quantifiable targets such as research performance and the absorption 
of  graduates in the labour market. In this manner, universities are 
being pushed to introduce student fees and to reduce their workforce.
Reform of  the administrative structure of  the universities: the 
participation of  students’ and professors’ representatives in the 
administration will be abolished in effect through the establishment 
of  a “Board of  Trustees” organ which will be appointed by the 
government and will consist of  CEOs and other representatives of  the 
private capital in order to promote further entrepreneurialisation and 
commodification of  studies. In parallel, it is obvious that this will lead 
in effect to the abolition of  the academic sanctuary.
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Further intensification of  student labour through the imposition 
of  examinations acting as “filters” in the first year of  the studies, as 
well as intensification of  employee and teacher labour through the 
introduction of  further assessment procedures and external evaluators.
Individualisation and fragmentation of  the academic diplomas through the 
division of  studies into units in order to measure the academic performance of  
students and to align studies with business needs in a more effective way.
We must note that these measures are not taken once and for all 
but will be expanded (e.g. further VAT base broadening, further 
increase of  indirect taxes, further reduction of  recruitments 
in public sector etc.) during the next years as the Greek state 
continues the implementation of  the “stability programme” and 
gets the scheduled payments of  the instalment loan from IMF 
and ECB.
W
 
What follows below is an outline of  the response of  the working class 
since the beginning of  the “debt crisis” which reached its climax in the 
strike demonstration of  5 May in Athens but has remained inadequate 
to the size of  the attack that we are facing and the ferocity of  the mea-
sures. (Indicative of  the retreat of  the response was the very small par-
ticipation of  10,000 people in the general strike demonstration on the 
8 July, which was the day that the pension reform act was passed in the 
parliament affecting almost all workers).19
Given the range of  the attempted restructuring under the gen-
eral name of  the “austerity measures,” apart from several “general 
strikes,” a series of  24-hour, 48-hour strikes or work-stoppages have 
taken place in different key sectors (electricity, public transport, ship-
ping sector, etc.) almost each month since February, as separate and 
sectional mobilisations, though, without any kind of  coordination and 
communication among them.
The first general strike was called on the 24th of  February 2010 
with a participation ranging between 70–100% in the private sector and 
between 20–50% in the public sector. Two were the main features of  
the demonstration in Athens on that day: first, the noticeable participa-
tion of  many immigrants not only “under the command” of  left-wing 
organisations but also diffused in the body of  the demonstration (the 
immigrants’ presence was related to the new law for “the citizenship of  
immigrants,” which creates divisions among them by categorising them 
into those few eligible for citizenship and those thousands condemned 
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into the no-man’s land of  illegality). The second feature was the street 
fighting that took place between riot police and protesters who did not 
necessarily come from the anti-authoritarian/anarchist milieu as well 
as violent attacks against capitalist institutions like banks and stores 
and some looting. Although such incidents were not generalised, they 
certainly gave a quite different tone to what one might expect from 
the usual GSEE-ADEDY strike demos and showed the great impact 
of  December 2008 revolt on the way of  protesting. Despite the left-
wing calls for “peaceful protest,” there was certainly a general feeling 
of  joy in releasing indignation against the cops and thus expressing the 
anger against the recent onslaught, so in this sense the strike and the 
demonstration functioned as a powerful antidepressant, although with 
a temporary effect.
On the 5 March, two days after the socialist government had 
announced the first new measures for the “salvation of  the country,” 
ADEDY (the umbrella organisation of  the public sector unions) and 
GSEE (the corresponding organisation of  the private sector unions) 
called for a three hour work stoppage, while other unions (both pri-
mary and secondary teachers’ unions, public transport unions) called a 
day strike. Anti-authoritarians and younger people had a more visible 
presence that time and the atmosphere was tense from the beginning 
at Syntagma Square near the parliament where the Socialist Party was 
going to vote for the new measures. When the head of  GSEE, Pana-
gopoulos, made the mistake of  trying to speak, he was attacked by the 
crowd (where certainly anti-authoritarians and leftists were in the ma-
jority), chased and beaten all the way to the entrance of  the parliament 
where he took refuge among the riot police. Soon an angry crowd 
gathered just below the building and some fighting started between 
the enraged people and the riot squads which was generalised. About 
three hundred or more people were throwing stones at them (mostly 
anti-authoritarians but not only) and the rest remained there shouting 
and cursing for some time until the riot police made a heavy attack 
trying to disperse the crowd. The demonstration then started march-
ing towards the Ministry of  Labour (a clear effort on the part of  the 
unionists to release the tension near the parliament) and although po-
lice presence became heavier, there were some incidents of  smashing.
On the 11 March GSEE and ADEDY called for another 24-
hour strike, in response to the climate of  a general yet passive discontent 
with the announced austerity measures, attempting to retain a grain of  
legitimacy. The participation in the strike was higher than the previ-
ous one and the number of  demonstrators was almost double than the 
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demonstration on the 24 February. The composition of  the crowd was 
also slightly different since there were more university students, a few 
high school students and more young workers while immigrants were 
absent this time. Moreover, a large number of  demonstrators coming 
from almost the entirety of  the anti-authoritarian milieu participated, 
too, dispersed into the whole body of  the demonstration. That time 
both the police and the leadership of  the union confederations were 
far more prepared: the riot squads tried to prevent an escalation of  
proletarian violence by closely following the demonstration from both 
sides using a more offensive tactics and the confederations unionists 
not only cooperated openly with the police but they actually gave spe-
cific commands to the riot squads to stop the demonstrators from the 
start in order to take the lead of  the demonstration and avoid possible 
conflicts with the rank and file and a repetition of  the events of  the last 
demonstration. Thus, despite several confrontations with the police at 
various points, relatively fewer people not coming from the anarchist-
antiauthoritarian milieu supported the street-fighting or actively par-
ticipated in clashes with the police, something that may also be related 
to the more extended (and thus more conservative) composition of  the 
demonstrators.
Until the 5 May the composition of  the demos was different 
from the December 2008 demos. High school students did not show 
up at all, at least in recognizable blocks, except for a few ones on the 11 
March demonstration, but university students began to participate as 
more and more general assemblies were called. In general, apart from 
the students, the precarious, “lumpen,” marginal segments of  the class 
which was the dominant subject of  the riots was not present yet. 
However, this changed on the 5 May demonstration. Although 
fiscal terrorism was escalating day after day with constant threats of  
an imminent state bankruptcy and cries for “sacrifices to be made,” 
the proletariat’s response on the eve of  the voting of  the new austerity 
measures in the Greek parliament was impressive. It was probably the 
biggest workers’ demonstration since the fall of  the dictatorship, even 
bigger than the 2001 demonstration which had led to the withdrawal 
of  a planned pension reform, with strikes in almost all sectors of  the 
(re)production process. But what was even more impressive was the 
fact that a proletarian crowd similar to the one which had taken to 
the streets in December 2008 (also called derogatorily “hooded youth” 
by mainstream media propaganda) was also there. Although there 
were instances when hooded rioters were booed when they attempted 
or actually made violent attacks on buildings, in general they fit well 
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within this motley, colourful, angry river of  demonstrators. The slo-
gans ranged from those that rejected the political system as a whole, 
like “Let’s burn the parliament brothel” to patriotic ones, like “IMF 
go away,” and to populist ones like “Thieves!” and “People demand 
crooks to be sent to prison.” As the demonstration was approaching 
the parliament, crowds of  workers (electricians, postal workers, munic-
ipal workers, etc.) tried to invade the building from any access available 
but there was none as hundreds of  riot cops were strung out all along 
the forecourt and the entrances. Despite the fact that the riot police 
made a massive counter-attack with tear gas and stun grenades and 
managed to disperse the crowd, there were constantly new blocks of  
demonstrators arriving in front of  the parliament while the first blocks 
which had been pushed back were reorganising themselves. There was 
extensive destruction of  property in the nearby streets and constant at-
tacks against the cops. The fights lasted for almost three hours but soon 
the terrible news came about three or four people dead in a burnt-
down bank! Although the accurate facts concerning this tragic incident 
are still relatively unknown, what seems to be closer to the truth is that 
at this particular bank, right in the heart of  Athens on a general strike 
day, about twenty bank clerks were made to work by their boss, got 
locked inside “for their protection” and finally three of  them died of  
suffocation. Initially, a Molotov cocktail was thrown through a hole 
made on the window panes into the ground floor and after some time 
the building got ablaze. The reversal was successful. Soon a huge oper-
ation by the riot police followed: the crowds were dispersed and chased 
away, the whole centre was cordoned until late in night and the prime 
minister would announce the news in the parliament condemning the 
“political irresponsibility” of  those who resist the measures taken and 
“lead people to death” while the government’s “salvation measures” 
on the contrary “promote life.”
The consequences were visible the very next day: the media 
vultures capitalised on the tragic death representing it as a “personal 
tragedy” dissociated from its general context (mere human bodies cut 
off  from their social relations) and some went so far as to criminalize 
resistance and protest. The government gained some time changing 
the subject of  discussion and conflict and the unions felt released from 
any obligation to call for a strike the very day when the new measures 
were passed: just a few thousands gathered outside the parliament at an 
evening rally called by the unions and left organisations.
The sickening game of  turning the dominant fear/guilt for the 
debt into a fear/guilt for a (violent) resistance against the terrorism of  
CHAPTER SIXTEEN: BURDENED WITH DEBT
REVOLT AND CRISIS IN GREECE
264
debt had already started. In the case of  the 5 May demonstration, a 
tragic event and the state propaganda that escorted it made this rever-
sal possible: a huge and spontaneous violent crowd, ready to escalate 
the struggle, was pushed back and sent home, since spontaneity is ex-
tremely dependent on the feeling of  the moment. Ever since there has 
been no massive response and on the contrary the trend of  isolated 
strikes got stabilised without any indication that the thrust of  the initial 
counter-attack could be revived. 
In June, a three-day strike took place in the Athens metro 
against layoffs, but it stopped after some vague promises given by the 
Minister of  Transport to the metro union, which is controlled by PA-
SOK, that the workers would be rehired in other public organisations. 
Other strikes also took place in the transport sector. The employees of  
the OSE, the state-owned railway company, declared a 24-hour strike 
on 10 June against the wage cuts imposed by the government and the 
planned privatisation of  the company as part of  the broader attempts 
at cuts in the public sector. As a first step, the government decided to 
cut down on the operating costs of  the company by abolishing railway 
routes that were not profitable. A 48-hour strike was decided by the em-
ployees of  the suburban railway, a subsidiary company of  OSE, on 22–
23 of  June. The employees of  ETHEL, the state-owned bus company 
in the city of  Athens, declared a 24-hour strike on 3 Juneand a 5-hour 
work-stoppage on 17 June against wage cuts and the government’s plan 
to reduce the state subsidy to the company. Another 24-hour strike was 
declared on 1 July when the company failed to pay the salaries and the 
holiday pay to its employees on time.
The secondary school teachers who were going to mark the stu-
dents’ exams for the admission to the Universities decided to abstain 
from work, protesting against the decision of  the Ministry of  Education 
to cut down on their compensation for correcting the candidates’ tests. 
In the end, OLME, the teachers’ union, decided to show a “sense of  
responsibility” and put an end to this mobilisation. Since entrance to 
the university still has a major importance in the Greek society, OLME 
justified their decision by claiming that they did not want to “punish” 
the students.
In July, hospital doctors went on a five-day strike against the 
new reform of  public health which aims at cutting down on public hos-
pitals’ expenditures, promoting the privatisation of  some health servic-
es and adjusting the work conditions of  doctors (especially the entrants) 
to a more flexible and precarious status. The strike was called by the 
Federation of  Unions of  Physicians (OENGE).
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Bank employees went on a 24-hour strike against the oncoming 
takeover of  the Agricultural Bank of  Greece, which was the only Greek 
bank that failed the European “stress test.”
The mobilisation of  lorry-owners was the longest one and it 
also had a great impact on transports. In the end of  July, the owners of  
public transport lorries announced a strike against the imminent law 
for the “liberalisation” of  public transport. The main consequences of  
that law are (a) the devaluation of  their licenses, which could be sold 
at a very high price until now and (b) the setting up of  companies and 
the minimisation of  self-employment. Some professions, such as lorry 
owners, pharmacists, lawyers, architects, and others are “closed shop” 
ones. For example, only a pharmacist can obtain a license to open a 
pharmacy and not an entrepreneur or a company without a pharma-
cist’s specialty. Of  course, in some “closed shop” professions, like lorry-
owners, lawyers, or architects, companies already exist. But, at the pres-
ent moment, capital is less concentrated in “closed shop” professions. 
Lorry owners’ profession is the first one to be “liberalised” and the oth-
ers will soon follow. In this sense, we can say that this “liberalisation” 
constitutes a crash test for the government’s ability to implement such 
a measure. The insistence of  the IMF, the European Central Bank, the 
European Commission and the Greek government on abolishing the 
“closed shop” status particularly of  the Greek transportation shows the 
importance they lay on the concentration of  capital in this particular 
sector increasing thus its profitability. We could say that the essence 
of  the “liberalisation process” is the destruction/devaluation of  small-
scale capital, self-employment, and petit-bourgeois private property. 
Nothing is being “liberalised.” On the contrary, capital is “tightening” 
itself  in order to expand even further.
The road transport strike caused big problems for the distri-
bution of  commodities, especially fuel, and since it was called in the 
holiday peak, the government managed to isolate the lorry owners con-
demning them as “enemies of  the public interest.” On the fourth day of  
the strike the government made use of  the “civil conscription” method 
on vehicles and drivers. Lorry owners defied the order and continued 
their strike and road blockades. The state decided to mobilize army ve-
hicles and naval vessels to ensure the supply of  fuel in “critical sectors” 
and break the strike. Private companies’ fuel lorries were used in the 
same way, too. It is interesting to mention that most of  the lorry owners’ 
union representatives own transport companies although the vast ma-
jority of  lorry drivers are self-employed. After nine days of  strike, their 
leaders announced that they were going to cancel the strike, negotiate 
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with the government for side issues of  their profession (insurance and 
taxation policy) and consider further action in September, when the law 
was going to be voted in the parliament. It is also important to men-
tion that except for the combative attitude of  this sector (clashes with 
riot police outside the Ministry of  Transport in Athens, outside an oil 
refinery in Thessaloniki, road blockades, and scab beating), the social 
content of  their struggle was totally sectional and not without national-
ist features (Greek national flags and famous ancient Greek battle cries 
were used by the strikers!). 
In the end of  September the law was voted, while the “civil 
conscription” was still active. Lorry-owners were on an eighteen-day 
strike at that time and they continued even after the law was enacted. 
The state’s response was the mobilisation of  a scab-mechanism: the 
police escorted convoys of  lorries, some drivers were arrested and the 
riot police cleared the road and port blockades. An aggressive propa-
ganda against the strikers had been systematically used by the media. 
On top of  that, the lack of  any concrete social alliance led the strikers 
to become isolated and demoralised. Eventually, they were divided be-
tween a majority who went back to work defeated and a small minority 
of  angry and desperate strikers who were labelled “extremists.” Their 
actions (slashing the tyres of  scab lorries and in some cases even shoot-
ing against them or burning them) and the formation of  a strike com-
mittee were undermined and condemned by their own representatives. 
Finally, the strike was over. 
In the public sector, many civil servants were on a kind of  slow-
down strike, delaying the function of  their services. Especially those 
who work in ministries and civil services slowed down their work pace, 
creating problems and delays in the function of  the state. An example 
of  such a reaction was the air traffic controllers’ mobilisation who ini-
tially announced a strike on 24 July which was ruled illegal (as it was in 
the peak of  the tourist period in Greece). They chose to go on a work-
to-rule strike using the strict international regulations for air traffic in 
order to block or delay airplane departures. Another example was the 
primary and secondary teachers’ local unions’ decision to reject the 
self-assessment process imposed by the Ministry of  Education as the 
first step of  the attempted disciplining assessment of  both teachers and 
school units. Despite that, we could say that the overall response of  the 
civil servants, who are excessively affected by the government’s policy, 
has been rather lukewarm. 
The mobilisation of  temp workers in ERT (the national radio-
television company) against the non-renewal of  their contracts met with 
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the complete indifference of  their permanent co-workers. The occupa-
tion of  the ERT headquarters ended ingloriously after a negotiation 
between the PASOK-controlled temp workers’ union and the manage-
ment, without blocking the function of  the TV stations and without 
exploiting the opportunity to take over the control and broadcast their 
demands all around Greece. 
On 24 September, 2,000 temp workers from all over the public 
sector demonstrated outside of  the Hellenic Supreme Court of  Civil 
and Penal Law premises in order to press the court to issue a favourable 
judgement on the conversion of  fixed term contracts of  two cleaners 
working in a public company (OPAP, the official organisation of  betting) 
into permanent ones since this judgement would be a res judicata for 
all similar future disputes. The recommendation of  the rapporteur was 
negative for the workers but after a request by the union representatives 
the court decided to postpone the judgement until 20 January 2011 in 
an attempt to let off  steam since the attitude of  the demonstrators was 
rather combative. Afterwards, the demonstrators marched towards the 
parliament. When the demonstration passed outside of  the Ministry 
of  Interior, some eggs were thrown and some minutes later a bunch 
of  temp fire fighters tried to invade the building after the main part of  
the demonstration had already reached Syntagma square. Their ac-
tion was unsuccessful since only a hundred of  them were there but it 
gave the opportunity to their union representatives to enter the building 
and deliver a resolution. At the same time, in Syntagma square, some 
right-wing unionists in a spectacular move got to the front and urged 
the demonstrators to chant the national anthem. Much to our dismay, 
many demonstrators joined in the chanting.
During September, the workers of  OSE (the Hellenic Railways 
Organisation) went on a series of  strikes and work-stoppages against 
the oncoming restructuring. The rationalisation process of  OSE is a 
key matter for the restructuring and privatisation policy of  the public 
transport sector in general. Using as an excuse the large deficit of  OSE 
(about €11 billion), a deficit which was created by the previous state 
policies, the government is trying (a) to reduce labour and functional 
costs (cutting down on wages, overtimes and benefits, minimising the 
number of  workers, closing down unprofitable lines), (b) to maximize 
OSE revenues by selling or using assets of  the organisation (infrastruc-
ture) which remained idle until now and by increasing ticket prices, 
and (c) to create the conditions for the privatisation of  parts of  the 
organisation’s services and functions. All these are accompanied with 
a new internal regulation and reorganisation of  OSE’s work relations 
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and conditions. We should mention that the leadership of  the union 
of  OSE is controlled by PASOK and until now we have not seen any 
rank and file initiatives to create links with the “users” of  the railway, 
i.e. other proletarians. The law for the restructuring of  the national 
railways was voted in principle in the parliament in October. 
W
Although these struggles have created significant problems for Greek 
capital and its state in the course of  the last eight months, they never-
theless seem to have followed a general pattern: so far all the responses 
against the new measures have remained fragmented, unconnected, 
defensive, and totally controlled or sabotaged by unions. A typical ex-
ample of  how unions undermine the strikes is what happened during 
the general strike of  8 July when the union of  the Metro employees, 
controlled by PASOK, contrary to what had happened during previ-
ous strikes, decided on a complete blocking of  the metro, preventing 
thus many strikers from demonstrating because they couldn’t access the 
centre of  the city. 
The paralyzing and mediating role of  the union apparatuses is 
best seen in the activities of  the union confederations which are totally 
controlled by the socialist government and do their best to avoid any 
real resistance against the recent offensive. 
The fact that GSEE has called six 24-hour strikes in the previ-
ous eight months, while ADEDY has called, in the same period, eight 
24-hour strikes and a few stoppages. A few stoppages should not be 
interpreted as a real effort on their part to promote struggles nor as an 
indication of  a mighty working-class response. It must be noted that the 
declaration of  these strikes was not accompanied by an effective union 
or other mobilisation in the workplaces. Without any preparation for 
the strikes, the percentages of  the strikers gradually diminished after 
May and the demos degenerated, exhausting people, mainly function-
ing in most cases as a “steam releaser.” Thus, at the moment, it seems 
rather improbable that the crisis and the pressure exerted to those di-
nosauric bodies by the rank and file will lead to major changes in their 
structure and function, if  we consider the almost lethargic behaviour 
of  the low in hierarchy union cadres of  the socialist party who still 
win most of  the votes in most workplaces. Although the “debt crisis” 
increasingly undermines their already weak function to guarantee the 
improvement of  the conditions of  the reproduction of  the proletariat 
as labour power, still the power of  the unions resides in the sectional 
and even individualistic use the proletarians make of  them: the particu-
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lar history of  political clientelism in Greece is also evident within the 
unions, especially in the public sector, as voting for the socialist or right-
wing unionists usually meant either climbing up the social ladder or at 
least some kind of  legal advice. Thus, even if  such material gains are 
limited now, they are not drastically cut yet; union cadres can still rely 
on social inertia and political clientelism that creates a relatively loose 
hierarchy and discipline in the public sector so as not to feel threatened 
and attempt major reforms in the union apparatuses.
As for the small, rank and file unions that have multiplied in the 
last years, whether leftist or anarchist, they are too impotent to mobilise 
workers in general apart from their politically affiliated members. Their 
militant practices (blockades of  firms, taking part in demos) rely mostly 
on the active participation of  anti-authoritarians who do not in fact 
belong to them. 
As far as PAME’s activities (the “labour front” created by the 
CP) are concerned, they probably seem impressive, taking into account 
the fact that in many cases PAME was the first one to call mobilisa-
tions, obliging GSEE and ADEDY to follow. It is possible that a plan 
for splitting GSEE and ADEDY and creating a third “independent” 
union confederation lies underneath this strategy. PAME has organised 
a number of  spectacular moves, such as occupations of  ministries, TV 
stations, the stock market, blockades of  the port of  Piraeus, etc.—in 
one case, PAME’s members had blockaded the port in order to defend 
a strike of  the shipworkers that was ruled illegal by the courts. However, 
these mobilisations were under the complete control of  the party with-
out a grain of  initiative from the rank and file and it is certain that if  
the struggles escalate, the CP will again assume the role of  the police re-
pressing any radical initiative or action, as it has done many times in the 
past. Besides, this is clearly shown by its permanent tactics to prevent 
any contact and communication of  its members with other strikers, or-
ganising separate and, above all, peaceful demonstrations. The present 
conjuncture constitutes an ideal terrain for the activities of  the CP since 
the propaganda of  the government itself  and of  the mass media about 
the alleged imposition of  the tough measures by EU, international mar-
kets and speculators seems to confirm its rhetoric about “exiting from 
EU” and “resisting to monopolies and the big capital,” which keeps 
repeating with religious devotion since the ’80s. As one of  the main 
political representatives of  the working class (as a class of  the capitalist 
mode of  production and communication) inside the Greek state and its 
institutions, the CP proclaims the establishment of  a nationalist “popu-
lar” economy where the working class will enjoy the merits of  a social-
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democratic capitalism with a flavour of  Stalinism. As a matter of  fact, 
the actions of  the CP ensure the entrapment of  struggles into the limits 
of  capitalist institutions, and what is more, into the most fetishised of  
them, elections and the parliament since for the CP, voting for the party 
and getting organised in it constitutes the culmination of  class struggle. 
But, apart from the role of  all kinds of  unionist policing me-
diation, there is an almost total lack of  autonomous proletarian action 
and of  openly expressed radical contents of  struggle going beyond the 
union/sectional demands. It is maybe frustrating, but the truth is that 
those strikes and demos that have attracted worldwide attention have 
been called and organised from above, be it the union confederations 
or federations that determined their time and content. The response 
of  the greater part of  the working class has remained to a considerable 
extent passive. It is true that the class combativeness of  many strikers in 
the streets, against the cops and the trade union leadership, their joy in 
mixing with strikers of  other sectors and in occupying the centre of  the 
city (in the case of  the first demos in February and March and on 5th 
May) reveal a deeper rebellious content which is however latent and has 
not been expressed in an autonomous and co-ordinated organisation of  
the struggle within the workplaces or in the neighbourhoods.
 W
Partly, an explanation for the inadequate response of  the proletariat 
to the attack called “debt crisis” can be traced back in the state’s effec-
tive propaganda to legitimize it. In order to work more for less money 
we have to accept that we face a “problem” that is beyond our reach 
and control, something that needs our sacrifices. Thus, the cause of  the 
crisis is attributed to an almost metaphysical but inescapable world of  
markets, statistics, rating agencies, speculators, and so on. This mys-
tification veil is used in order to conceal the real cause of  the crisis: 
the convulsive but persistent refusal of  the global proletariat to become 
totally subordinated to capital and the circulation of  its struggles, how-
ever limited it is. 
Thus, in a period of  acute crisis, capital’s obsession with regain-
ing control over the proletariat—especially when the command of  capi-
tal and its state was recently questioned and delegitimised in a violent 
way—is transmuted into the invisible dark omnipotence of  “economy” 
and the “markets” working above us, causing a generalised feeling of  
weakness and impotence. The hard austerity measures, this clear decla-
ration of  class war, has to become “naturalised”: crisis has assumed the 
character of  a natural catastrophe that cannot be reversed until it will 
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come full circle after some years, as the economists-weathermen keep 
telling us in their forecasts.
The Greek state, under the PASOK administration, together 
with its European partners and the media scum, intensified the ideo-
logical terrorisation by also using a traditional but all-weather powerful 
“weapon”: national unity. During crises, the partners turn into com-
manders and rivals; the unified European village whose inhabitants live 
harmoniously and co-decide democratically falls apart while a matter 
of  utmost importance, the defence of  the nation—this perennial decep-
tion—comes to the fore. In a few words, they try to persuade us that we 
will not work for our bosses but for the country’s good. 
The “debt crisis” offers the capitalist state a unique opportunity 
to re-impose the unification of  the proletariat around the nation-state 
form and through that its disciplining, in the hope of  an increasing pro-
ductivity and higher profits. In the words of  the Greek prime minister 
“…it is clear that the way in which we dealt with our finance affairs led 
us to lose a part of  our national sovereignty. We have to take that part 
back by means of  our credibility, our political programme and every-
one’s self-sacrifice.” His “sacrifice” to “give away a part of  the country’s 
sovereignty” entails “our self-sacrifice” in order to “take it back.” But 
we have to pay for this “part” with more work, less money, deeper divi-
sions, and competition among us in the face of  the increasing numbers 
of  the reserve army of  unemployed. 
National unity is reinforced as a surrogate “collective” iden-
tity when, at the moment of  economic and social disintegration, indi-
vidualist roles within the reified social relations are shattered. In the 
last two decades, trade unionism and politics, which are both typically 
characterised by the use of  collective means for individualist ends, 
tended to be less attractive and effective compared to the use of  in-
dividual or household loans. The “sovereign debt crisis” and the im-
minent bankruptcy could entail a disaster on an individual and fam-
ily level that most proletarians are not prepared to reverse in a class 
autonomous way. Passivity then under the flag of  “national unity” 
can serve as a refuge and a rationalisation for those who, not willing 
to protest against their devaluation now, put their hopes for a future 
increase of  the value of  their own labour power in the increase of  the 
competitiveness of  the Greek economy. The non-strikers might even 
make verbal attacks against their fellow workers whose strikes would 
destroy this endeavour. 
Since crisis is experienced as a multitude of  personal failures 
bound together (“living beyond our means” summarizes the individual 
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“excesses” and “malfunctions” that led to a “national failure”), self-
blame and guilt can take such epidemic dimensions, that certain de-
fence-mechanisms are needed. Those defence-mechanisms are activat-
ed through the projection of  the feeling of  guilt onto the witch-hunted 
“extravagant” civil servants, tax evaders or even selected scapegoated 
“corrupt” politicians who “failed” to perform their high functions. The 
state ideologues, on their part, who know that in periods of  crises capi-
tal and its state are no longer trustworthy since the “rewards promised” 
never came, they are all too willing to channel anger and fear to a path 
safer for the system.20
Nationalism and populism, however, can also emerge through 
another route as well: through the struggles themselves mainly because 
of  the influence of  the dominant left and leftist discourse and activity 
on them. Nationalisation of  banks, self-management of  key sectors of  
the national economy, different suggestions for the renegotiation of  the 
debt by (this or another) government, emphasis on the “corruption” 
issue, ideas for a “productive” reorganisation of  Greece are the most 
popular slogans of  the left in these days—in sum, a capitalism confined 
within the borders against the three foreign evils (IMF, ECB and EC) 
and the “Quisling” Greek government.
Finally, to the “irresponsible” strikers who betray the “nation-
al cause” through struggle, the prime minister was clear when he de-
clared: “Sacrifices are needed; we cannot afford blockades and strikes.” 
It is obvious that the government and the capitalists are afraid of  a 
social unrest which can burst out if  all mediations and mechanisms 
prove ineffective. The ideologues of  the system try to eliminate even the 
memory of  the December 2008 rebellion as a nightmare that should 
not be repeated. When they demand social peace they know that they 
are walking on thin ice: their arsenal—be it union apparatuses and 
functions, individualism or doses of  fear and guilt—may be exhausted. 
That’s why while the government puts on its humanist-antiracist mask 
and speaks the language of  the “common good,” it holds the cop’s blud-
geon at the same time. Social consent must prevail by any means. No 
wonder the streets are full of  cops that try to control every space that 
could become a field of  struggle and clash. To return to Nietzsche: “this 
world deep down has never again been completely free of  a certain 
smell of  blood and torture”—something that the Minister of  Labour 
reminded us when, some months ago, during the announcement of  the 
new “hard but necessary measures” he declared: “there will be blood.” 
Maybe, he unconsciously presaged the storm which is coming. A storm 
which may bring the recomposition of  the struggles and will send the 
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“public deficit” to the dustbin of  history, together with the “life deficit,” 
the only real one.
TPTG, August–October 2010
NOTES
1 See OECD Employment Outlook 1998, OECD Employment Outlook 2007 and 
America’s Dynamic Workforce 2007 report by the U.S. Department of  Labour.
2 L. Skoczylas and B. Tissot, Revisiting recent productivity developments across OECD 
countries, Bank for International Settlements Working Papers No. 182, October 2005, 
OECD Employment Outlook 1998 and OECD Employment Outlook 2007. One 
of  the main reasons for the productivity slow-down has been the relative expansion 
of  temporary and unskilled labour through the implementation of  casualisation and 
flexibilisation policies mainly for the entrants in the labour market.
3 For example, primitive accumulation in China has provided a cheaper labour power 
than in the “West,” which resulted in cheaper commodities for private consumption 
and also in cheaper means of  production. Since the beginning of  the ’80s, the model of  
capitalist development in China has been based precisely on the gradual dissolution of  
the Maoist welfare state and on the permanent devaluation of  labour power. China’s 
economy has been completely dependent on extensive foreign investments of  (cheap) 
labour-seeking and export-oriented global capital and, consequently, not on the 
expansion of  domestic consumption. Rapid export growth led to ballooning foreign 
reserves which boosted debt-financed overinvestment in export-oriented sectors of  the 
economy, whose maintenance hangs on the even greater export expansion. Thus, idle 
capacity has been soaring ever since the mid-1990s and it is estimated that 75% of  
China’s industries are plagued by overcapacity. In parallel, over the past decade there 
has been a shift from exports of  labour-intensive consumer goods to capital-intensive 
capital goods, parts, and components. Such a shift has made China’s economy far more 
dependent on foreign demand as well as on the real effective exchange rate, which 
depends on the relation of  wages to productivity. A drastic fall of  foreign demand 
stemming from an economic recession due to the overaccumulation crisis in the West 
may have catastrophic results leading to an intense outbreak of  enterprise bankruptcy 
and a destabilisation of  the banking sector, which in its turn would hugely aggravate the 
global crisis of  overaccumulation by directly influencing the credit stability of  the United 
States. On the other hand, wage increases gained through class struggles or through 
“income redistribution programmes,” labour legislation and a relative strengthening 
of  the Chinese welfare state would prop up domestic consumption and would reduce 
both the dependence of  China on foreign demand and the danger of  a total collapse. 
Also, wage increases would provide a vast market for foreign capital, especially from 
the United States, supporting growth and employment overseas. Nevertheless, if  such 
an option is not accompanied by a faster rise in productivity through higher worker 
retention rates, increased efficiency and higher skills—which is totally unsure given 
the spreading of  industrial unrest throughout China’s factories in the previous years—
it would also lead to a reduction of  exports as well as to an increase of  the cost of  
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constant capital in the global economy, worsening the overaccumulation problem from 
a different route. If  this situation seems like a dead end—which is reflected in articles 
and studies by organisations such as the “Financial Times” (e.g. Tables turn on Chinese 
employers, FT 4 June 2010)—it, however, originates from the character of  the neoliberal 
project which is based on “spatial-temporal” fixes to global overaccumulation which do 
nothing more than switch the crisis from one territory of  the planet to another territory 
of  the planet—turning the recipients of  surplus capital (in this case China) to exporters 
of  surplus capital—or from one point of  time to another point of  time—through the 
reallocation of  capital into financial and real-estate investments that delay the moment 
of  profit realisation. In other words, neoliberal politics have not been able to constitute 
a new regime of  accumulation, all the more so that this would require an extended 
devaluation and destruction of  the non-productive capital. See Ho-fung Hung, Rise 
of  China and the Global Overaccumulation Crisis, Review of  International Political 
Economy, vol. 15, no. 2, 2008; Li Cui, China’s Growing External Dependence, Finance 
& Development—A Quarterly Magazine of  the IMF, vol. 44, no. 3, 2007 and David 
Harvey, The Limits to Capital, Oxford: Blackwell, 1982. (By the way, in the latter title 
as well as in a recent book by the same author, A Companion to Marx’s Capital, some 
terms and themes of  the present text are discussed more fully and thus they may be very 
useful to those who are not versed in Marxist lingo). 
4 “The public debt becomes one of  the most powerful levers of  primitive accumulation. 
As with the stroke of  an enchanter’s wand, it endows barren money with the power of  
breeding and thus turns it into capital, without the necessity of  its exposing itself  to the 
troubles and risks inseparable from its employment in industry or even in usury. The 
state creditors actually give nothing away, for the sum lent is transformed into public 
bonds, easily negotiable, which go on functioning in their hands just as so much hard 
cash would.” K. Marx, Capital vol. 1, chapter 31.
5 OECD Economic Outlook, No. 59, 1996; No. 71, 2002.
6 That was the case with the notorious Ninja loans (no income, no job, no assets) 
whereby the banks tempted the low income households. These Ninja loans offered the 
possibility of  completely deferring the payment of  principal during the first five years. 
In addition a “teaser rate” which was often below the market rate was agreed initially. 
However, it was replaced by an adjustable rate after some years. 
7 Household debt in the United States has increased from around 68% in 1997 to 
around 98% of  the GDP in 2007. It must be noted that non-mortgage loans as a share 
of  disposable income remained relatively constant at 31–35% between 1998 and 2007 
whereas mortgage loans as a share of  disposable income ballooned in the same period 
from around 60% to 104%. In total, household liabilities rose from around 92% in 1997 
to 135% in 2007 as a share of  the disposable income. Moreover, the share of  income 
devoted to servicing mortgage debt payments rose in the same period from 8.3% to 
11.25%. If  we look at the distribution of  the household debt by income quintile in USA, 
the lowest fifth of  households doubled their borrowing from 2000 through 2007 and 
the total value of  their outstanding debt rose from 198 to 376 billion dollars. However, 
in absolute terms, the total borrowing by low-income households is relatively small, 
since the lowest first quintile accounted for just 4% of  the total growth in all household 
debt, the second quintile for 5%, the third quintile for 14%, the fourth quintile for 28% 
and the fifth top income quintile for 49%, near half  the growth in all household debt 
during this period. Furthermore, if  we look at the percentage of  families holding home 
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secured debt by income quintile in the period between 1998 and 2007, the proportion 
of  families in the first quintile rose from 11.2% to 14.9%, in the second quintile from 
23.9% to 29.5%, in the third quintile from 63.5% to 69.7%, in the fourth from 73.6% to 
80.8%, and in the fifth top quintile from 73.0% to 76.4%. Last but not least, the average 
debt to income ratio is much higher in the lowest income quintile (around 260% in 
2007) than in the other quintiles, which means that the poorest households have a far 
more difficult time in servicing debt payments. To a lesser extent the second, the third, 
and the fourth quintiles as well as the 9th decile face also difficulties in servicing their 
debt payments since the respective ratios are quite high around 150 to 180%, with the 
only exception of  the top decile with a corresponding ratio of  around 87%. Surely, 
these figures show why household debt has become unsustainable, putting the banking 
system of  USA in jeopardy. The data were drawn from the following sources: Federal 
Reserve Survey of  Consumer Finances 2007; OECD Economic Surveys 2010 United 
States; M. Baily, S. Lund and C. Atkins, “Will US Consumer Debt Reduction Cripple 
the Recovery?,” McKinsey Global Institute Report, March 2009; G. Horn, K. Droege, 
S. Sturn, T. van Treek, R. Zwiener, “From the Financial Crisis to the World Economic 
Crisis. The Role of  Inequality,” Macroeconomic Policy Brief, October 2009.
8 Apart from the reduction of  the individual investment risk, the derivatives market 
was supposed to have another prominent function: the universal supervision of  the 
extraction of  surplus value and the “disciplining” of  individual capitals. Derivative 
financial products provide a measure of  the efficiency of  individual capitals through the 
calculation of  the “discount” of  surplus value corresponding to the individual capital 
stocks and securities. Therefore, in addition to contributing to the near collapse of  the 
banking system, the burgeoning of  speculative investments and the autonomisation of  
derivative markets also undermined this supervising and rationalising function.
9 W. Bonefeld, Primitive Accumulation and Capitalist Accumulation: Economic 
Categories and Social Constitution, draft working paper, CSE TransPennine Working 
Group. 
10 W. Bonefeld, The Permanence of  Primitive Accumulation: Notes on Social 
Constitution, Commoner, no. 2, 2001. Besides, Marx as well noted the incessant 
character of  primitive accumulation: “The capitalist system presupposes the complete 
separation of  the labourers from all property in the means by which they can realize 
their labour. As soon as capitalist production is once on its own legs, it not only maintains 
this separation, but reproduces it on a continually extending scale.” (Karl Marx, ibid.)
11 According to the European Economic Forecast—Spring 2010 official publication 
of  the European Commission, “Widening competitiveness losses over the recent years 
[in Greece] are also reflected in the sizeable appreciation of  the real effective exchange 
rate (REER) based on unit labour costs. The rapid rise of  wage costs and mark-ups in 
excess of  productivity growth, as well as the persistence of  the inflation differential with 
the Eeuro area, has contributed to a wage-price spiral and resulted in high real-wage 
growth, well above productivity growth. The disconnection between wages and labour-
market and productivity developments, including the still weak response of  wages 
growth to the downturn, are set to come to an end in the short term, with positive 
impact on country’s competitive position. Appropriate wage developments, in line with 
the moderation of  public wages, would help to regain part of  the lost competitiveness”
12 According to the Economic Bulletin of  the Bank of  Greece of  May 2009, household 
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credit has increased in the period between 2002 and 2007 by a rather high annual rate 
of  28% because of  the relaxation of  the liquidity constraints of  Greek banks due to 
the entrance of  Greece in the European Monetary Union. Despite the fact that the 
rate of  increase has slowed down since 2005, the total household debt (including both 
consumer and mortgage loans) has risen from 34.7% in the end of  2005 to 47.5% in 
the end of  2008 as a proportion of  the GDP. It must be noted though that this figure 
is still lower than the average in the Eurozone, which amounted to 59.5% in 2008, as 
well as the average in OECD, which amounted to almost 80% in 2005. Nevertheless, 
according to Eurostat, the highest shares of  the population living in households that 
had been in arrears with mortgage are found in Greece. According to another research 
conducted by the Bank of  Greece in 2007, 6 out of  10 Greek households had been in 
arrears with mortgage, 7 out of  10 had been in arrears with consumer loans, 1 out of  
2 had been in arrears with credit cards. The number of  households on credit exceeded 
51% in 2007 and that means 2.15 million are on some kind of  credit. If  the average 
household debt relative to disposable income per income quintile is considered, it can 
be seen that the poorest households have a much harder time in paying the installments 
of  their loans. In the first quintile (the lowest one) the rate of  debt relative to income is 
around 150%, in the second quintile almost 100%, in the third quintile about 80%, in 
the fourth quintile about 70%, and in the fifth quintile about 50%.
13 The average real gross wages have risen by 1.8% in 2008 and by 3.8% in 2009. This 
increase is mainly due to the rises in the public sector and the public utilities. Even if  
the annual average increase of  the nominal regular wages was only 2.8% in the period 
between 2007 and 2009 for workers in the public sector, there have been special wage 
regulations (benefits, back pays, etc.) for juridical employees, military personnel and 
cops, doctors, nurses and teachers that have led to an annual average increase of  the 
nominal gross wages by 5.9%. Furthermore, the workers in the public utilities managed 
to get annual raises of  their average nominal regular wages in the same period of  
6.2%. In the private banking sector the average nominal gross wages have stagnated 
in 2008 whereas in 2009 they have been increased by 6.8%. On the contrary, even if  
in the non-banking private sector the collective contract of  2008–2009 provided for 
annual raises of  the average nominal regular wages by 5.8%, in 2009 the nominal 
wages paid fell below 2% because of  the recession that led both to the reduction of  
overtime and of  the average labour time (with a corresponding reduction in the wages) 
and in some companies to an outright reduction of  regular wages. Nevertheless, this 
does not constitute an argument for the propagandists of  separation, since the capitalist 
institutions themselves admit that in the period between 2001 and 2009 the increases of  
wages in the public sector and utilities swept along the wages in the private sector (see 
Bank of  Greece, Monetary Policy—Annual Report, 2009–2010).
14 Relative figures for 2009 in other European countries for deficit and debt are 
respectively the following: UK 13% and 68.6%; Spain 11.25% and 54.3%; Ireland 
10.75% and 65.8%; Italy 5.3% and 114.6%; and Germany 3.5% and 73.1%. The 
average figures of  deficit and debt in Eurozone were in 2009 6.5% and 78.2% 
respectively with a tendency of  increase.
15 With a paucity of  public services for very small children, the lack of  financial support 
for families—in Greece the family benefits are very low and the maternity benefits are 
the lowest of  all EU countries—and the limited amount of  provisions for “reconciling” 
family and employment, it is plausible to argue that to a large extent the Greek family 
substitutes for the welfare state in Greece. A situation which is unlikely to change as, 
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according to data, there has even been a strong increase in living with parents until 
about the age of  35 (in 1986 52% of  men and 29% of  women in the 25–29 age group 
were still living with their parents while in 1996 the proportion for the same age group 
were 65% for men and 44% for women) and it is certainly going to be stronger after 
the onset of  the debt-crisis. 
16 It is interesting to examine the distribution of  the Greek sovereign debt among debt 
holders. According to the official data of  the Greek government, 29% of  the Greek 
sovereign debt is held by Greek investors, around the half  of  which is held by Greek 
banks. The rest 71% is held by foreign investors: to be more specific 60% of  the Greek 
sovereign debt is held by EU financial institutions (23% UK/Ireland, 11% France, 
9% Germany/Austria/Switzerland, 5% Netherlands, etc.). In this case as well, almost 
half  of  this part of  the debt is held by EU banks. However, this estimation is provisory 
since these data refer to the moment of  bond issuance and cannot grasp the current 
situation since bonds are exchanged in the financial markets. In any case, these data 
show that the nationalist propaganda spread by the Greek media about the role of  the 
greedy foreign speculators is totally unfounded and fabricated since Greek banks and 
other Greek capitalists hold a significant part of  the debt and, therefore, the imposed 
measures are also defending the interests of  local capitalists. Recent developments 
reveal the mechanism that is employed by the EU and the European Central Bank to 
protect the stability of  the European banking system (including Greek banks) and to 
avoid a possible contagion to other highly indebted European countries. During the 
last months the ECB has bought around €40 billion of  Greek government bonds by 
French and German banks and in addition it has accepted as collateral €40 billion of  
bonds held by Greek banks to provide them with liquidity reaching about €90 billion. 
Furthermore, it is expected that the ECB will buy more Greek government bonds from 
other financial institutions dumping them and, therefore, it is estimated that soon it will 
hold around 35% of  the Greek sovereign debt. In other words, the ECB has undertaken 
the risk reducing the exposure of  the European banking system to the Greek sovereign 
debt. This is completely reasonable since the ECB can manage the risk in a much more 
efficient way than the isolated capitalist institutions, principally through its role in the 
imposition of  the structural adjustment programme.
17 An overview of  the measures is presented in the table that follows.
18 In some cases, in Greece, “self-employment” is the disguise of  proper wage labour; 
it’s a labour relation where, except for the direct wage, the cost of  the reproduction of  
labour power has been shifted from the capitalists onto the “self-employed” workers.
19 For a more detailed analysis of  strikes and demos since the beginning of  the “debt 
crisis,” one can have a look at our texts “There’s only one thing left to settle: our 
accounts with capital and its state” and “In critical and suffocating times.” Both can be 
found on our site http://www.tapaidiatisgalarias.org/?page_id=105 
20 Another aspect of  the general feeling of  “weakness” in the face of  the enforcement 
of  the austerity measures and the “alien forces of  economy” that control our lives 
can be traced in the rise in the number of  people who ask for help from psychiatrists 
and psychiatric institutions. According to some specialists, specific mental disorders 
like depression, panic crisis, or anxiety disorder are explicitly connected with the rise 
of  unemployment, individual indebtedness and the general feeling of  uncertainty. 
Reports from two of  the major Mental Hygiene Centres in Athens show a significant 
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increase of  the number of  people who asked for help in 2009 compared with 2008 
and an additional rise in the first three months of  2010. Unfortunately, there are no 
overall data or public researches for the general mental health in Greece. But this 
rising tendency is also confirmed by the increase in the sales of  psychiatric medication, 
especially antidepressants, anxiolytics and hypnotic pills since January of  2010. We 
should also add a slight but not insignificant rise in the number of  suicides, during the 
last ten months, often because of  an inability to repay debts.
 279
The first word of  the face is the “Thou shalt not kill.” It is an order. There is 
a commandment in the appearance of  the face, as if  a master spoke to me. 
However, at the same time, the face of  the Other is destitute; it is the poor for 
whom I can do all and to whom I owe all. 
—Levinas 1985: 892
ANARCHY, A KILLER?
Supposing for a moment that the indispensible condition for society is 
that, upon the meeting of  two faces, a simple communication is mu-
tually understood: do not kill me! Until recently, Greek Anarchy has 
been respecting this primordial convention. It is well known: (neo)lib-
erals kill the poor and the idle; fascists kill the foreigner, the mad, and 
the perverted; large sections of  the left kill the delinquent, the lumpen, 
the heretic; conservatives kill assortments of  all previous categories—
and so on. While the existential core of  every political force involves 
both symbolic and actual killing, the exclusion/extermination of  some 
otherness, Anarchy is bereft of  such bloodlust. Thus, in the 35 years 
that Greek Anarchy has been the political force that persistently and 
systematically includes among its practices low intensity violence, con-
frontation with the police, and property destruction, its actions never 
resulted in loss of  life or in the symbolic death of  a social category. 
NO ONE IS REVOLUTIONARY UNTIL THE 
REVOLUTION! 
A LONG, HARD REFLECTION ON ATHENIAN ANARCHY 
THROUGH THE PRISM OF A BURNING BANK1
Christos Boukalas
17
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It is no surprise that political forces that perpetually evangelise social 
peace are ceaselessly producing hecatombs of  victims—given that their 
“peace” is an order that depends on the death of  those who do not fit 
in. Similarly, there is no paradox when a political force that promotes 
the escalation of  social antagonism—Anarchy—proves to be innocent 
of  homicide or genocide: its order knows no misfits. So, when Greek 
Anarchy does finally kill, and kills the people it was always expected 
to fight with and for, the resulting aporia is devastating, the questions 
raised rip at the core of  Anarchy’s existence.
Explaining, at this point, what I am talking about is likely to 
benefit the reader—especially as the incident may not be widely known 
outside Greece, and some historical distance is bound to set in between 
the time this is being written (September 2010) and the time of  it being 
read. In mid-April 2010, due to an allegedly unsustainable public debt, 
the IMF and the EU took over Greek economic policy in exchange for 
making future lending available to the Greek state at reasonable rates. 
True to Freedmanite form, the IMF takeover launched a massive attack 
on the material conditions of  the population: drastic reduction of  public 
expenditure, expansion of  working life, shrinking of  the public sector, 
reduction of  wages and pensions by over 20%, privatisations, and rapid 
increases of  indirect taxation combined with lowering the taxes for big 
(international) capital. Practically every government since 1990 has tried 
to introduce elements of  this neoliberal agenda, and they have invari-
ably been met with resistance by affected sectors of  the population. Now, 
in a typical “shock doctrine” move,3 the full treatment is introduced all 
at once, in the wake of  months of  market-orchestrated, media-amplified 
panic. Still, the paralysis and disorientation anticipated after generous 
“shock” inductions did not materialise: within a fortnight, the scattered 
gestures of  resistance were already combining into a massive force, cul-
minating with the general strike and the Athens demonstration of  5 
May. The demonstration was attended by 200,000 people, and its defin-
ing feature was the rage displayed by those attending: despite extremely 
heavy treatment by the riot police, the march spent most of  its course 
“out of  control,” putting the parliament building and those inside it un-
der immediate threat, and injuring a large number of  police personnel, 
clearly suggesting to everyone (participants, cops, Greek and European 
politicians, technocrats, and peoples) that an insurgency was forthcom-
ing. Anarchy participated in the march with several blocks, congregating 
a few thousand people. A few splinter groups were moving alongside the 
march, damaging banks’ and shops’ facades. They attempted to burn 
down a bookstore and a super-market that where doing business during 
 281
the strike, but were physically prevented by other anarchists, worried 
about the fate of  the people inside. One of  the splinter groups managed 
to approach a Marfin Bank branch, which was also open. They attacked 
it with Molotov cocktails, indifferent to the presence of  people within. 
The building caught fire and three workers died. It was later established 
that the building had neither a fire-extinguishing system nor an emer-
gency exit and that the workers were forced to work on the day of  strike 
under threat of  immediate dismissal. 
Still in order to know what we are discussing, I must explain 
what I mean by “Anarchy.” To provide a faithful and concise description 
of  it would be next to impossible. Its configuration is such, that anar-
chist/anti-authoritarian people, organisation, and activity are referred 
to neither as a “movement” nor a “scene,” but a “space” [χώρος]. It 
can indeed be seen as a space of  flows, (inter)action, and belonging, 
defined and reproduced by, and containing, a multitude of  individu-
als, organised into looser or tighter groupings, formed on the basis of  
a combination of  personal bonds, locality, and confluence of  theory 
and/or action, that are in turn linked together selectively, in a looser 
or tighter fashion. While this sounds more or less like the condition of  
Anarchy everywhere, perhaps it should be noted that in the Athenian 
case the theoretical framework that shapes its analyses and informs its 
practices, has never been purely anarchist. From its onset in the late 
’70s, the “space” was theoretically forged not only by anarchist thought 
(from Bakunin, say, to Bookchin) but also by select radical-revolutionary 
Marxist thought. The Situationists have been a permanent and hugely 
influential fixture in the theoretical landscape, and so has Autonomy, in 
different configurations among its three main strands: the French (esp. 
Castoriadis), the Italian (e.g. Negri) and the German. So, the designa-
tion “Anarchy” is from my part a somewhat artificial and arbitrary con-
struct that puts in the same bag a multitude of  groupings ranging from 
anarcho-communists to anti-authoritarians, to autonomous. 
It must also be added that, due to its inclusive character, An-
archy has been the political force in which people (especially youth) of  
what the sociologists would call “delinquent” or “anomic” behaviour 
(i.e. those who their inadequate fit into the social order is reflected in 
their daily behaviour) could participate and/or organise in a political 
framework—provided they wanted to do so. Over the years, Anarchy 
consolidated almost like a natural hub for this section of  society. As 
a result, low-impact delinquency was typically present in Anarchy—it 
was in fact one of  the features that co-defined it. Anarchy was never all 
smooth sailing: since there is no hierarchy, no legislators, and no police 
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to impose order, the latter was always determined through the interac-
tion among people prescribing to some general principle and delimited 
by the order of  a broader society which they do not accept. Every politi-
cal organisation is a socialisation platform, and same goes for Anarchy. 
Except that here “socialisation“ acquires an unusually strong sense: in 
the absence of  cathexis, the very society in question is created by its 
participants. In reference to the perpetrators of  the 5 May incident, 
there is no question of  this function being discontinued or registering 
a “failure.” This would imply that an amount of  people, proclaiming 
themselves as anarchists, have managed over a period of  time to co-
exist in the same places with thousands of  anarchists from all kinds of  
tendencies, and never talked to or collaborated with any of  them. The 
socialising function of  Anarchy continues as well or as badly as always; 
the question is what does this socialisation consist of  or, in other words, 
what are the dominant meanings and tendencies in Anarchy today, into 
which newcomers become socialised. 
Finally, it should be noted that there are important reasons for 
consideration with Greek Anarchy in the current conjuncture. Not only 
does it constitute one of  the most populous forces anywhere in Europe 
and North America, and one with great impact on overall society; but 
it is also the first radical force to experience the ravaging of  society by a 
full-blown capitalist attack, and mobilise against it. In this sense, Greek 
Anarchy is the first to confront issues that will become the immediate 
concern of  all comrades throughout the “western” world in the imme-
diate present. 
WITH SO MANY REVOLUTIONARIES… WHO NEEDS A REVOLUTION?
The killing on 5 May, a specific action of  a tiny (sub-)grouping at the 
fringes of  a large, varied political “space,” is neither accidental nor iso-
lated, but refers to long-developing, deeply rooted, dominant tenden-
cies in large parts of  Anarchy. It is symptomatic of  the present condi-
tion of  Athenian Anarchy, and it therefore involves it in its entirety. Not 
a folly by some crazed youth, but the high (or low) point in a trajectory. 
Some of  its main trends (e.g. hatred towards the middle class; a “serves 
you right” attitude towards dispossessed groups; the “critique” of  “de-
mocracy”) have appeared at different moments in the last two decades 
and, since the December 2008 uprising, they have combined and crys-
tallised in form. By now, they effectively describe what Greek Anarchy 
is about: a fetishisation of  the “revolutionary” identity, precisely at the 
moment when Anarchy ceases to be a revolutionary force. 
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Something unique happened during December 2008: Anarchy 
de facto found itself  at the leadership of  an ample and hugely varied 
sector of  society, set to create situations that often challenged the social 
institution. While most of  the practices employed by the uprising4—its 
organisational forms5, its demands6, its discourse, etc.—have all been 
practiced by Anarchy for decades, they suddenly become the property 
of  wide parts of  the population and viewed with aspiration, awe, and/
or empathy even by people not involved in the uprising. A marginalised, 
persecuted, and defamed political force triggered the release of  forces 
beyond its wildest dreams (and, it is now clear, beyond its comprehen-
sion), and became their point of  reference and aspiration. It thus gained 
an historical opportunity to open up to society: to explain, propose, mo-
bilise, organise, discuss, understand, convince, change, and be changed, 
thus helping to widen and deepen the fronts of  resistance, and prepare 
the real (i.e. the social) conditions for a revolutionary counterattack. 
Presented with this unique opportunity to make a deep, lasting, and 
game-changing impression on society, Anarchy reacted by rapidly sev-
ering all, actual and tentative, ties with it. 
The accounts of  the uprising by almost all anarchist publica-
tions, including the most advanced,6 were dominated by a radical di-
vision of  the participants between “insurgents” and “non-insurgents,” 
where the latter category included leftists, democrats, slackers, union-
ists, etc.—i.e. everyone who was not anarchist. To be sure, in many 
instances where the course of  action had to be determined, these dif-
ferences were both pronounced and important. Yet, in most instances 
these differences were a prefabricated pattern for self-indulgence and 
ego-tripping. But what matters here is that, (a) these differences were 
elevated to the status of  ontological categories, where the positions of  
the subjects are fixed, there is no possibility for criss-crossing and/or 
overlapping, no room for reversals; (b) the power to make this categori-
sation is exclusively reserved for the “insurgents,” and with it the capac-
ity to call into being subjectivities and attribute (fixed) qualities to them, 
regardless of  their self-perception or potentiality; and (c) the employ-
ment of  “revolutionary violence” became, with time and grace, the sole 
criterion informing this categorisation. At the crucial moment when 
an historical opening was within grasp, Anarchy closed itself  down to 
fortify its purity. 
A possible explanation for this is Anarchy’s reluctance to en-
gage in “hegemonic” politics.8 Understood (mistakenly) as a mode of  
domination based on a blend of  force and subterfuge, Anarchy would, 
of  course, steer clear from it. Yet, the (healthy) aversion towards this 
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(distorted) notion of  hegemony may have had the side effect of  hollow-
ing out the social address of  Anarchy altogether. Thus, when a chance 
to genuine (counter-)hegemony is thrown to it by society, the chance 
to establish (variations of) its practices, objectives, and meanings at the 
heart of  the agenda of  broad social forces, Anarchy is not only reluctant, 
but plainly incapable of  responding. A different explanation is that, as 
the anarchist/insurgent/revolutionary becomes an existential identity 
certified through “confrontational practices,” when ample parts of  so-
ciety employ such practices, then, in order to save his/her identity the 
revolutionary can only escalate the degree of  confrontation.9 These two 
explanations converge on the crucial point of  Anarchy becoming an 
ontological category and an existential identity differentiated from the 
rest of  society; they essentially point to a relation of  alienation between 
society and the anarchist/Anarchy.
From thereon, we have experienced a robust fetishisation of  the 
“insurgent” (i.e. ourselves) and an automatic, self-evident, justification 
of  whatever we may come up with: from a rich and varied fauna of  
behaviours showing open disregard towards residents at the “free-zone” 
of  Exarcheia; to armed robberies that—when involving grenades—
may cause indiscriminate injury; to bombings not always planned in a 
manner that makes injury to others impossible. It seems that our self-
categorisation as “revolutionaries” not only constitutes us as “different” 
and “special” vis-a-vis the rest of  society; it also ascribes us to a differ-
ent, more lenient and permissive, moral code—it situates us not only 
apart, but also above society. It also seems that, in practice, the category 
is premised on the capacity to use “revolutionary violence.” And, as 
“more violent” equals “more revolutionary,” the fetishisation of  our 
political identity reaches paroxysm when it comes to armed guerril-
las. This is hardly surprising since the hard coin for the distinction 
between “revolutionary” and “reformist” is the employment of  “con-
frontational” practices, rendering an observable and tangible charac-
ter to the distinction. Observable and tangible also mean measurable: 
the “more” confrontational the practices, the “more” revolutionary the 
subject that adopts them. There is thus an implicit hierarchy of  status 
within the people and entities that comprise the “revolutionary” camp. 
In this context, Anarchy not only expressed full and unconditional soli-
darity to comrades effectuating “armed struggle,” but also, in its desire 
to approach the hefty heights of  revolutionarity scaled by the armed 
comrades, it expressed this solidarity in historically novel forms. In all 
previous cases of  comrades accused of  “armed violence,” Anarchy re-
sponded that those comrades were targeted because of  their prolific 
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activity in social struggles, and that they were being morally/ideologi-
cally defamed and physically exterminated on the pretext of  accusa-
tions that were false, because the comrades were innocent. This time 
(April 2010), solidarity was expressed on the basis that the comrades are 
guilty of  armed struggle, they are indeed “terrorists,” and so are all of  
us. Given that Anarchy has been meticulously vague about its stance in 
relation to armed guerrilla struggle for over 30 years, mounting expres-
sions of  solidarity in terms of  affirmation of  it tends to conclude an is-
sue that has not been discussed.10 It is, of  course, understandable that a 
political force that has faced the most brutal repression from left, right, 
and centre and which has only the bonds of  solidarity to count upon 
would be reluctant to leave anyone from its ranks on their own. And it 
is categorical that Anarchy never abandons the practice of  solidarity: 
solidarity, as both an ontological and normative condition of  social re-
lations, is Anarchy’s very essence. Yet, certain characteristics of  specific 
gestures of  resistance should be considered. Indeed, what occurs here 
is a reflex-solidarity that endorses a practice post-festum and only on 
the grounds that some comrades undertook it. In this manner, Anarchy 
comes to endorse armed guerrilla struggle, even when the vast majority 
of  comrades would never contemplate such means and/or reject the 
practice. The dangers generated by such a haphazard stance should be 
obvious: from infiltration by agents-provocateurs, to signalling encour-
agement for younger comrades to undertake a “heroic” practice that no 
one cared about to begin with, to a critical mutation of  the values and 
purposes of  Anarchy, to—lo and behold!—Wednesday, 5 May 2010. 
While the solidarious comrade accumulates revolutionary cap-
ital along these lines, the rest of  society becomes simply indifferent. 
Anarchy’s reply to the existential agony of  the middle class under the 
ongoing, intensifying capitalist attack has been “it serves you right.” 
From posters (“Maybe You Went Bankrupt During the Nineties?”) 
blaming the middle class’s contemporary hardships on the greedi-
ness they displayed two decades earlier; to slogans like “butchers of  
peoples/petit bourgeois/you look a treat/drowning in debt” shouted 
by the anarchist blocs throughout the December marches; to the end-
less—and so ironically dated!—association of  the petite bourgeoisie 
with the “neo-rich” in most analyses, the hostility to the middle class 
is both pronounced and self-flattering. The origin of  this trend can be 
traced to Autonomy (especially with the rise of  the German influence 
in its Greek circles in the mid-1990s), as part of  an analysis to which it 
remains consistent to date. This is somewhat ironic: the analysis whose 
(mis)appropriation by Anarchy provided a platform for the building of  
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN: NO ONE IS REVOLUTIONARY
REVOLT AND CRISIS IN GREECE
286
a certain mentality that contributed to loss of  life, was provided by a 
force (Autonomy) that, for many years now, is in fierce disagreement 
with the rest of  Anarchy precisely regarding street violence. But, of  
course, direct lines of  causality/intentionality in social dynamics are 
rather rare; and, in any case, this piece does not attempt an evaluation 
of  theoretical analysis, but an identification of  how certain appropria-
tions thereof  have contributed towards a given outcome. Put extremely 
schematically, the “German” Autonomy analysis is based on locating 
the relevant position of  each class in the framework of  the contempo-
rary configuration of  capitalist relations of  production. On this basis, 
it identifies a revolutionary subject—an actual or potential subjectivity 
whose existence constitutes the negation of  the social framework. All 
other social classes and forces are considered integral to the system. In 
this context, the crucial task is to safeguard the autonomy of  the revo-
lutionary subject—of  its material conditions, its logic and ideology, its 
forms of  organisation and practice—so that it remains uncorrupted 
and un-co-opted by capitalism, and therefore retains and advances its 
revolutionary potential. The indispensable contribution of  this analysis 
is that, through its grounding in the social relations of  production, it 
can overcome the fragmentation, isolation, self-referentiality, mutual 
incompatibility, and utter integration-ability that “post-structuralism” 
attributes to instances of  “resistance”; it can unify them and give them 
a truly transcendental dimension. Furthermore, it can help evaluate 
our and others’ struggles, estimate their potentiality, and, on this ba-
sis, map out a field of  interventions and coalitions. Finally, it provides 
an important emphasis on the need for constant critical assessment of  
our relations and actions at the “micro-social” level. It is nonetheless 
immensely problematic inasmuch its subjectivities are determined by 
and “locked” on the structure of  the relations of  production: it ignores 
the inner contradictions, dynamics, and clashes resulting to/from the 
placing of  each subjectivity in the capitalist structure; it ignores inter-
nal differentiation and struggle within each subjectivity (are teachers 
and policemen the same—middle class—thing?); it ignores the differ-
ence between class-origin and class-relevance (how come so many an-
archist/autonomous comrades are of  middle-class origin?); and it does 
not permit any room for meaningful intervention, not even by revolu-
tionary elements, not even in the context of  socially explosive conjunc-
tures (leaving Anarchy open-mouthed to the reality of  shop-owners 
and taxi drivers smashing banks alongside the December marches). In 
this manner, the thrust of  the analysis can lead to terrifying misunder-
standings. First, the antisocial one: discounting people due to the struc-
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tural position of  their class, starting with the petit-bourgeois, continu-
ing to workers’ aristocracy, small farmers, qualified workers, and so on, 
until it is determined that over 95% of  the population are reactionary 
scum. And, second, the trap of  narcissism, given that our main duty is 
to safeguard the purity of  mind and the uncompromised character of  
the action of  the revolutionary subject.11
What seems to underlie this double antisocial/narcissist move 
is what some comrades very aptly call “an incomplete understanding 
of  the mechanisms of  the molecularisation of  power.”12 In this sense, 
the petit-bourgeois is not the—always contingent and traversed with 
contradictions—outcome of  the complex reproduction of  relations 
of  power and resistance at a social and personal level, but merely a 
local micro-despot. Similarly, the revolutionary is not the contingent 
outcome of  dynamic social relations, but the Avenger from the Fifth 
Dimension. Precisely on the interface between narcissism and the anti-
social mindset, the posters issued by different collectivities to honour 
an armed comrade murdered by the police, show Anarchy declaring 
in all tones the supremacy of  the “revolutionary,” culminating in the 
conviction that everyone else “might as well have not existed.” There is, 
then, no cause for wonder when the “revolutionaries” engage in reck-
less acts, form search-and-destroy splinter groups, or, eventually, kill a 
few forced-labourers inside their gulag. These people might as well have 
not existed. 
So far so good—if  you are a “revolutionary.” The trouble is that the 
thinly veiled animosity and the proudly paraded contempt for society 
cause some unexpected problems regarding the “revolutionary” iden-
tity. Namely, if  “revolutionaries” face the rest of  the population with 
indifference, scorn, and hostility, then with whom do they hope to make 
the revolution? For whom do they hope to make the revolution? And, 
what kind of  revolution will that be, with the entire society excluded 
and marginalised from the get go? We are not dealing with an attempt-
to-“vanguard” here: society is not seen as masses to be led by the en-
lightened; we are dealing with an identity whose main aspiration is to 
entrench and fortify itself  in order to adore it. We are dealing with 
socio-political self-indulgence. 
Furthermore, Anarchy has abandoned “democracy” not only 
as an objective, but also as a form of  social and internal organisation. 
This process is about ten years old. It is difficult to trace it back to the-
ory given that no known theorist of  anarchism, anarcho-communism, 
or autonomy has taken a similar stance. Their analyses typically uphold 
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democracy both as a desired point of  arrival (whether as “direct-” or 
“inclusive-” democracy, and/or as “council communism” or “commu-
nisation”), and as a platform for launching an attack against capitalist 
“democracy” as a mockery of  the real thing. In short, the standard 
positioning of  antiauthoritarians in relation to democracy is a rejection 
of  capitalist (pseudo-)democracy as a politico-ideological mechanism 
of  incorporation, combined with an urgent, constitutive aspiration for 
genuine democracy. That was very much the case in Greece too, until 
the early ’00s when the first “against democracy” posters and brochures 
equalised democracy with the capitalist-democratic regime, permitting 
no other meaning to the notion.13 Since then, variations of  this ap-
proach have taken root in most tendencies of  Anarchy, to the extent 
that in their assessments of  December 2008 just a handful of  collectivi-
ties14 would mention the direct-democratic aspects of  the uprising as 
something positive.15 
While the sanity of  leaving the concept of  “democracy” to 
the exclusive use of  the bourgeoisie without contestation is certainly 
questionable, what happened post-December was the abandonment of  
direct democracy as an organisational form. During the uprising, the 
“insurgents” lost a couple of  assemblies, given that their open character 
allowed all sorts of  riffraff  from society to come in and have a say. In 
these “contaminated” assemblies, the identity of  the “insurgent/revo-
lutionary” was forged in opposition to that of  the “democrat.” Rather 
than reflecting on their (occasional) failure to convince under extremely 
favourable conditions, large segments of  Anarchy chose to ditch demo-
cratic procedures altogether in favour of  “initiative” action, decided 
in the context of  closed “affinity” molecules. Leaving aside the high 
originality of  the concept of  the anarchist as anti-democrat, created for 
the first time in Athens 2009, this new-found dichotomy causes another 
round of  problems for the “revolutionary” identity. Namely, by drop-
ping democracy, Anarchy has no organisational model to propose to 
society—before, during, or after the revolution. The idea that any social 
process can continue for any length of  time organised solely on con-
spiratorial principles and do-as-you-please initiative is laughable—but 
it is the only model Anarchy has got left. So, the “revolutionaries” have 
no answer regarding not only the “by whom” and “for whom” of  the 
revolution, but also regarding the “what” and “how” of  it. 
In short, by constructing a “revolutionary” socio-political iden-
tity as separate and above society, Athenian Anarchy has effectively ex-
cluded itself  from any kind of  revolutionary process, thus voiding the 
very identity it had so lovingly constructed. 
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Finally, a note regarding tactical acumen. We know that they 
knew that the 5 May march would be a “difficult” one; we know that 
they know that banks are a prime target for demonstrators; then, right 
in the path of  a huge, wild march, we see a bank belonging to the 
upcoming champion of  Greek (i.e. international) capital, open for busi-
ness. How on earth is it possible that we swallowed this bait? How could 
we fail to immediately consider the implications of  an attack for the 
broader course of  social antagonism? Indeed, at the time when capital 
imposes a savage and deep restructuring of  society through a process 
that will evolve over a length of  time, are we certain that “instant insur-
rection” can be an effective counterstrategy—even if  we could force/
will society into an insurrection? This is not a cynical assessment of  
tactics and strategy on the backs of  three dead people. It points to the 
same violent disjunction between identity and practice, between social 
reference and lack thereof. The virtual disappearance of  Anarchy from 
the frontline of  social antagonism since 5 May clearly shows that there 
is a stock of  social conscience—and shame—among the bulk of  our 
comrades. But it also points out the utter bankruptcy of  the “revolu-
tionary” identity and its assorted “militant” tactics. The end result is 
that, precisely at the moment that society needs its Anarchy the most, 
the latter has no choice but to recede and engage in a long, bruising, 
and uncertain struggle against itself  in order to redefine it. 
ANARCHY REFLECTS CONCLUDES
The events of  5 May have sent ripples through Anarchy. A host of  
collectivities publicised their reaction to, and reflections on, them. A 
small number of  texts focuses exclusively on the magnitude and fierce-
ness of  the march, and merely mention the lethal arson as an acciden-
tal event that mobilised the state-capital-media complex to a massive 
crackdown and an orgy of  propaganda.16 Of  course, the vast majority 
of  the texts do discuss the arson to some considerable extent. These 
can, very schematically, be divided into two broad categories: those 
who seek to separate the position of  the collectivity from the practices 
and/or attitudes seen as provoking the incident; and those that see it as 
the contingent outcome of  a trajectory involving—to varying extent—
Anarchy as a whole. 
The texts that seek to differentiate their authors from the dy-
namics leading to the incident can again be divided in two sub-cate-
gories. The first consists of  a tiny number of  texts that devalue Anar-
chy in its entirety. These originate from some “post-” tendencies, and 
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blame anarchists as ideologically fixated into a grand-narrative, which 
constitutes them as an authoritarian, (crypto-)fascist vanguard claiming 
exclusive possession of  an absolute truth.17 On this basis, they set to 
associate the anarchists with a strange assemblage of  events, ranging 
from past assassinations of  comrades by the Greek police, to the Soviet 
invasions in Hungary and Prague. These accusations hold testimony to 
the seriousness of  the analysis informing them: they are symptomatic 
of  a mechanistic application of  a dogma into a lived reality they seem 
to know nothing about—and to which they hardly refer to. Indeed, 
the analysis contains nothing else than a resounding affirmation of  the 
authors’ dogma, and moralistic indignation expressed in dramatic over-
tones. As contributions to a meaningful dialogue, these texts are abso-
lutely inconsequential. 
On the contrary, the second sub-category includes texts by 
some of  the largest, most active, and most influential collectivities in 
Greek Anarchy—the anarchist “mainstream.” These texts portray the 
perpetrators and their informing mentalities as in collision with An-
archy itself.18 The groupings responsible for the incident are seen as 
sliding into a separation of  violence from its political rationale and ob-
jectives, constituting it thus as a fetish, and introducing it firmly in the 
universe of  the spectacle. De-politicised and self-referential, this vio-
lence is inherently nihilistic and anti-social. It becomes a dynastic force, 
the diametrical opposite of  Anarchy (and its counter-violence) that con-
stitutes the par excellence liberating force in/of  society. The groupings 
responsible for the arson act in the name of  Anarchy, but never discuss 
or inform others about their tactics and intentions. They are therefore 
acting parasitically, exploiting Anarchy while distorting its worldviews 
and practices into their complete opposite. Most of  these collectivities 
acknowledge some responsibility for the 5 of  May. It consists in admit-
ting to having tolerated the hatching of  such mentalities in their prox-
imity over the years; and in rooting them out from now on. Essentially, 
these texts try to draw a bold separation of  Anarchy into unconnected, 
uneven, and hostile camps, with real and proper anarchy on one side, 
and pseudo-anarchist, nihilist thuggery on the other. In a typical “bad 
apple” move, the responsibility they pretend to acknowledge is firmly 
fixed on the other side. Reflection on whether problematic practices 
and attitudes have—occasionally or systematically—crept into the rep-
ertoire of  the groups now throwing anathemas is ruled out, and self-
reflecting is eclipsed by self-congratulating. Here, Anarchy proceeds to 
a rare and significant move: it identifies and ostracises its own heretics 
and misfits. This symbolic extermination of  someone within one’s own 
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ranks was pertinent to leftists, liberals, conservatives, etc.—the forces 
identified early in this piece as having a clear, specifying difference with 
Anarchy, precisely on this regard. 
By contrast, there is a multitude of  texts that consider the inci-
dent an outcome of  deeper, persistent trends within Anarchy, implicat-
ing it therefore in its entirety. Yet, while making this acknowledgment, 
and stressing the imperative of  a searching self-critique, most texts do 
not specify said responsibilities or suggest a direction for self-reflection.19 
The texts that attempt to do so tend to identify the same ills that the 
“bad apple” approach does, with the crucial difference that they do not 
attribute them to imposters, but acknowledge their bearers as genuine 
and bona fide comrades. Hinging on the use of  political (counter-)vio-
lence, the criticism is addressed to its fetishisation/spectacularisation, 
that inserts techniques of  popular (counter)violence to the bourgeois 
value framework. This trend is attributed either to a disregard for dem-
ocratic processes and political communication, which has taken root in 
ample parts of  anarchy in the course of  years; or to Anarchy’s failure 
to instil its values in the sudden, mass influx of  people during and after 
the 2008 uprising.20
Starting from the later point, one of  the most impactful texts on 
the events21 retorts that the failure to introduce the youth to an anarchist 
value framework lies neither with the youths themselves, nor with the 
comrades that approach and help them organise. It lies squarely with 
the anarchist leaders (“anarcho-fathers”) that monopolise the time in 
assemblies, inhibiting and discouraging newcomers to have a say. In an 
astonishing reversal, the entire list of  accusations mainstream Anarchy 
fired against its misfits is now squarely laid on its doorstep. The anti-
political character of  many youths’ groupings is a direct result of  their 
exclusion by Anarchy, its reluctance to permit them the capacity to co-
determine its shape and character through dialogue. Furthermore, the 
presence of  “wild youth” in Anarchy is not a sudden apparition, but a 
constitutive element of  the latter for thirty odd years. And, it is not these 
elements that exploit Anarchy, but vice versa: Anarchy has historically 
been content to approach the “wild youth,” use them as muscle power 
and watchdogs, and introduce them under the “anarcho-fathers” com-
mand into the constellation of  feuds that map out its territory. Finally, 
the responsibility that weighs upon Anarchy is not its tolerance towards 
the mindless violence of  the wild youth or the “warlords” that organise 
them, but its protracted tolerance of  its commanding “fathers.” 
While the above text unleashes an attack to the anarchist main-
stream and seeks to defend the groupings directly responsible for the 
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arson without defending their strategies, tactics, or worldview, a couple 
of  other texts attempt exactly this. Here, an “individualist-nihilist” cur-
rent tries to establish itself  as a legitimate tendency within Anarchy.22 
Their operative word is “war.” Social struggle is conceptualised exclu-
sively as open war—a condition that is both omnipresent and should 
be brought about by the revolutionary forces. The enemy is not just the 
abstract entities of  state and capital, but is located in society, especially 
in the “neo-rich” middle classes (in a similar vein, the dead workers of  
Marfin bank are post-mortem baptised “bank executives”). Given the 
revolutionary duty to bring about social warfare, the necessary tactic 
for Anarchy is to agitate mass events, pushing them to the direction of  
uprising and violent upheaval. Indeed, anarchist action is understood 
in very tight association to armed guerrilla struggle. Furthermore, the 
actuality of  warfare renders democratic procedures “unproductive.” 
Instead, the objective is the organisation of  a “revolutionary milita-
rism,” on the basis of  groupings intervening confrontationally in social 
life. My argument in the previous section anticipates many of  these 
declarations, so there is no use repeating it here—except to add three 
quick points. First, my dialectic capacity is not developed enough to 
conceptualise a condition (open social war) as both impending and ac-
tual. I still see it as an either/or situation, in which case a good part 
of  the justifying basis of  the comrades collapses. If  open warfare is an 
actuality, then what is the purpose of  all these tactics for bringing it 
about? If  it is a potentiality, then how are we so certain that everyone 
is an enemy, and that we are in such an emergency as to cancel demo-
cratic procedures and organisation? Second, the logic for cancelling or 
“limiting” democracy because of  its restricted “efficiency” is stereo-
typical of  dictatorial and liberal regimes. Seeing it invoked by anar-
chists is a very unpleasant surprise—and possibly symptomatic of  an 
ascription to a bourgeois value-framework. Furthermore, the designa-
tion of  the murdered clerks as “executives” provides a glimpse into the 
seriousness of  the process of  enemy-designation. Interestingly, it also 
parrots neoliberal discourse (where every Starbucks waiter is termed 
as a “manager” of  some description) and is equally convincing with it. 
Finally, since even the vast majority of  the ruled and the exploited are 
enemies, who is there to be awakened by confrontational interventions 
and dynamic escalations? Or does this not matter, the latter practices 
being necessary in/for themselves?
All in all, it seems that the 5 May incident has forced Anarchy 
to confront all kinds of  issues that have, for many years, been hast-
ily hidden under the carpet. Its organising structures, its relations to 
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democratic decision making and/or initiative-based action, its attitudes 
and practices towards the broader society, its designation of  enemies, 
the means of  its struggle and their appropriate employment, the legiti-
macy of  de facto hierarchies, the accommodation and socialisation of  
newcomers, its socio-political objectives, the strategies and orientations 
of  its struggle—a swarm of  crucial issues that were left to take their 
course, are now, under the double pressure of  a critical event within 
a critical conjuncture, demanding urgent resolution. This can be seen 
as a hopeful sign, an indication of  a healthy political force that, even 
in the last minute, dares to engage in painful self-reflection. Yet, these 
same texts show that what passes as “self-critique” or “reflection” is in 
most cases an entrenchment of  each collectivity in their own worldview, 
coupled with attempts to deny the legitimacy of  opposing understand-
ings of  anarchy. It is like the 5 May never happened: each collectiv-
ity—even those whose tactics directly caused the incident—proceeds 
to a robust confirmation of  their principles and action (with all cringes 
and contradictions ironed out), and engages in “public dialogue” only 
to eulogise itself  and castigate others. On this basis, and given the ab-
sence of  democratic forums and culture, civil war looks more likely 
than dialogue, and this is as depressing as the event itself. It shows An-
archy incapable of  comprehending the importance of  5 May for it, as 
an event that threatens to dramatically decimate its ranks and cut it off  
from any goodwill from the broader society; and its own importance 
for society in the current conjuncture. While Anarchy is the only force 
that can convincingly suggest meaningful alternatives to/for society; 
and while most groupings seem to realise that the current struggle will 
be long-term, and hence uprising tactics should play second fiddle to a 
widening and deepening of  ties with social forces and their struggles; it 
is more than likely that, due to 5 May, said social forces will avoid Anar-
chy like the plague. Perhaps this realisation has dawned upon the collec-
tivities whose texts do not attempt to salvage or confirm a “party line.” 
The numbness of  their reaction—their vague calls for self-critique, 
their pleas against certain mentalities—seems to indicate such realisa-
tion, but also an impotence to act on it. The short- to mid-term future 
of  Greek Anarchy seems bleak. Yet, if  there is to be a future at all, this 
will lie with precisely these presently depressed comrades that seem to 
take their responsibility for 5 May to heart, as part of  their responsibil-
ity towards society. Similarly, if  Anarchy’s ranks are decimated over the 
next months, this will result in a diaspora of  comrades in other spheres 
of  social activity: workplace, neighbourhoods, shop-floor unions, etc. 
It wouldn’t be surprising if  in the long run they came to constitute the 
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critical mass for radical organisation and struggle, “away from the flag.” 
In any case, this is a crossroads. It seems to me that the first decision that 
every individual and collectivity must make is whether anarchy exists 
primarily in, by, and for society; or for its own integrity, reason, and 
purpose. Whether it is an integral part of  social dynamics (implying 
that its direction and meanings may shift in conjuncture thereof, even 
in ways we cannot fully determine), or a platform for our personal 
gratification and self-fulfilment. Crucially, whether our gratification and 
self-fulfilment can be achieved regardless of  their relation to, and their 
impact on, social dynamics. I think that agreement on this decision—
and the commitments that follow it—will largely determine whether 
Anarchy will manage to re-establish itself  as a social and political force, 
or be castigated to a marginal existence as an ever-shrinking, universally 
detested, and socially irrelevant niche.
NOTES
1 Not yet published, and this piece has attracted intense (but friendly) criticism. It has 
been accused of  over-generalising, and of  lacking sensitivity towards its subject. Both 
criticisms are, in a sense, correct. The text is (over?) generalising. This is because its 
purpose is not to “accurately” attribute “responsibility,” or to establish a grade-system 
that will show the extent to which each group partakes in mentalities and practices I 
consider problematic. Its purpose is to expose the general line of  force that the multitude 
of  ideas, attitudes, and actions were combining into on the eve of  5 May. Each group 
or comrade can—however partly—recognise themselves in some of  the tendencies I 
describe, and either agree or disagree on whether they are problematic. Possibly, Greek 
comrades may use this piece as a platform for self-reflection, while comrades in other 
countries as a call for caution. 
     The piece also lacks sensitivity. It nowhere acknowledges the tremendous importance 
of  keeping a genuinely different vision and practice of  society visible in the Greek 
political agenda—or the heavy personal cost that each comrade has to pay daily for 
doing so. Yet, it is my conviction that, in the present conjuncture, the only anarchist 
sensitivity that matters is that of  the anarchist towards the broader society; anarchist-to-
anarchist sensitivity at a time when Anarchy displays palpable symptoms of  arrogance 
is a dangerous self-indulgence—to which I decline to contribute. 
     On this note, I hope that Telemachos Antonopoulos, Stefi Christidou, and Chris 
Witter (who have offered the above criticisms and much more help) will forgive me for 
thanking them for their contribution: it not only enabled the production of  this piece, 
but also made writing it worthwhile. 
2 Emmanuel Levinas “Ethics and Infinity,” p.89; Duquesne University Press, 1985.
3 For a description of  the capitalist strategy in question see: Naomi Klein The Shock 
Doctrine, Allen Lane 2007. 
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4 From “free public transport” to occupations of  buildings, from savage clashes with the 
cops to high-voltage “happenings.”
5 General assemblies in neighbourhoods and occupied buildings.
6 No demands—meaning, among others, no negotiation.
7 E.g. TPTG-Ta Paidia tis Galarias [Τα Παιδιά της Γαλαρίας],vol.14, October 2009; 
Blaumachen vol.3, July 2009. In fact, the only exceptions to this trend seem to be 
Babylonia [Βαβυλονία] issue 51, January 2009; and Eutopia [Ευτοπία], vol.17, June 
2009. 
8 For an interesting discussion see: Richard Day “Gramsci is Dead,” Pluto Press 2005.
9 Fabrica Yfanet Occupation “Social Revolution or Barbarity?” [Κατάληψη Φαμπρικα 
Υφανέτ “Κοινωνική Επανάσταση ή Βαρβαρότητα;”], 24 May 2010. Autonomy had 
given timely warning about such a post-December escalation of  violence (Serajevo, 
vol.25, January 2009).
10 To my knowledge, the autonomous are the only groupings that have taken a clear, 
consistent, public—and negative—position in relation to armed struggle. 
11 Characteristically, the autonomous (Serajevo, vol.41) dismiss the 5 May 
demonstration as a “regime”-march, and the demonstrators as nostalgists of  the 
“prosperous past”(?). Compare with Katsiaficas, whose analysis not only designates 1/3 
of  the population as outside the capitalist relations of  production, permitting it thus 
some revolutionary potential; but it is also permeated by a deep need for dialogue and 
synthesis: political, theoretical, philosophical. (George Katsiaficas “The Subversion of  
Politics,” Humanities Press 1997).
12 Fabrica Yfanet, ibid (note 9). The text (possibly the best analysis of  the 5 May event) 
applies this explanation regarding only the “antisocial” tendency. I am responsible for 
its extrapolation to the “narcissist” one.
13 Characteristic of  this consistent equation of  democracy to capitalist rule: in the 
1,700 words under the title “Democracy: There Is No Escape” [“Δημοκρατία: Καμία 
Διέξοδος”] (Blaumachen, vol.4, July 2010) the word “democracy” does not appear 
once. The word “capital” and its derivatives appear 23 times. 
14 Collectivity possibly sounds somewhat strange in English. While collective is used to 
refer to a particularly structured association, and therefore designates a defined entity, 
collectivity can refer even to very loose, temporary, and fluid associations. I prefer it, 
therefore, as a common denominator, when referring to anarchist groupings. (The 
distinction is clear in Greek: “συλλογικότητα” and “κολεκτίβα”). 
15 E.g. Babylonia and Eutopia (see note 6). 
16 E.g. Skaramanga Occupation “The Assassins ‘Mourn’ their Victims” [Κατάληψη 
Σκαραμαγκά “Οι Δολοφόνοι ‘Θρηνούν’ τα Θύματά τους”], 5 May 2010; Elea 
Occupation “Text about 5/5” [Κατάληψη Ελαία “Κείμενο για τις 5/5”], 11 May 2010; 
Naxos’s Autonomous Initiative “Bulletin on Crisis and 5 May” [Αυτόνομη Πρωτοβουλία 
Νάξου “Προκήρυξη για Κρίση και 5η Μάη”], 15 May 2010; Serres “Serres’s Anarchists’ 
Announcement on the 5 May Events” [Σέρρες “Ανακοίνωση Αναρχικών Σερρών 
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για τα Γεγονότα της 5ης Μάη”], 11 May 2010; Baruti-Veroia “Plain Announcement 
Regarding the Incidents of  5/5” [Baruti-Βέροια “Λιτή Ανακοίνωση για τα Περιστατικά 
της 5/5”] , May 2010; Kouvelou Mansion Occupation “Wednesday 5 May” Κατάληψη 
Έπαυλη Κουβέλου “Τετάρτη 5 Μαΐου”], unknown date. 
17 See: Autonomy or Barbarity “About the Dead in Marfin” [Αυτονομία ή Βαρβαρότητα 
“Για τους Νεκρούς της Μarfin”], 7 May 2010; Flesh Machine “The Sickening Explosion 
of  Ideology” [Flesh Machine “Η Νοσηρή Έκρηξη της Ιδεολογίας”], 10 May 2010.
18 E.g.Syspeirosi “No Haven and No Tolerance to the 5 May Assassins, their Logics 
and Practices!” [Συσπείρωση “Καμία Υπόθαλψη και Ανοχή στους Δολοφόνους της 
5ης Μαΐου, στις Λογικές και στις Πρακτικές τους!”], 11 May 2010; AK/Athens 
“Antiauthoritarian Motion’s Announcement on the Events of  the 5 May March” [ΑΚ 
Αθήνας “Ανακοίνωση της Αντιεξουσιαστικής Κίνησης για τα Γεγονότα της Πορείας 
της 5ης Μαΐου”], 6 May 2010; AK/Thessaloniki “Announcement of  Thessaloniki’s 
AK about Marfin,” [ΑΚ Θεσσαλονίκης “Ανακοίνωση της ΑΚ Θεσσαλονίκης για τη 
Marfin”] 11 May 2010; Thersitis, Resalto, Anarchists from the Western Quarters of  
Athens and Piraeus, Assembly of  Insurects from Perama, Keratsini, Nikaia, Korydallos, 
Piraeus, Anarchists from Piraeus, Egaleo Anarchists’ Initiative “On the Events of  5 
May and the Tragic Death of  Three People” [Θερσίτης, Ρεσάλτο, Δυτικά, Συνέλευση 
Εξεγερμένων από Πέραμα, Κερατσίνι, Νίκαια, Κορυδαλλό, Πειραιά, Αναρχικές/οι από 
Πειραιά, Πρωτοβουλία Αναρχικών Αιγάλεω “Για τα Γεγονότα της 5ης Μάη και τον 
Τραγικό Θάνατο Τριών Ανθρώπων”], 12 May 2010; Patrai “With or Without Salary, 
Some are Working for the State” [Πάτρα “Με ή Χωρίς Μισθό, Κάποιοι Δουλεύουν 
για το Κράτος”], 15 May 2010; Black Flag “Anarchy is Struggle for Life, Freedom, 
and Dignity” [Μαύρη Σημαία “Η Αναρχία είναι Αγώνας για τη Ζωή, την Ελευθερία, 
και την Αξιοπρέπεια”], 11 May 2010; Occupation Rosa Nera “The 5 May March 
and the Three Dead” [Κατάληψη Rosa Nera “Η διαδήλωση της 5ης Μαΐου και οι 
Τρεις Νεκροί”] unknown date; Herakleio “On the Events of  5 May” [Ηράκλειο “Για 
τα Γεγονότα της 5ης Μάη”], 12 May 2010; Common Solidarity Action “About the 
Strike’s Demonstration and the Events of  5/5” [Κοινή Δράση Αλληλεγγύης “Για την 
Απεργιακή Πορεία και τα Γεγονότα της 5/5”] , 7 May 2010; Vogliamo Tutto “Social 
Counterviolence or Countersocial Violence?” [“Κοινωνική Αντιβία ή Αντικοινωνική 
Βία;”], 24 May 2010; Cybrigade “The ‘work accident’ in the ‘revolutionary’ factory” 
[“Το Εργατικό Ατύχημα στο Επαναστατικό Εργοστάσιο”], 11 May 2010; Self-
administered Place at the Old Chemistry Faculty “About 5 May 2010,” 13 May 2010; 
Steki Antipnoia “Moronic Murderers, the State Would Have Paid You For This Work!”
19 Autonomo Steki “We’d Better Not Remain Silent!” [Αυτόνομο Στέκι “Καλύτερα 
να μη Σωπάσουμε!”], unknown date; Editions/Journals: Panopticon, Xenon, Stasei 
Ekpiptontes, Exarxeia, Mauro Piperi tou Euboikou, Nyxtegersia “Anarchy is Struggle 
for Life, Not Death” [Περιοδικά/Εκδόσεις: Πανοπτικόν, Εκδώσεις των Ξένων, Στάσει 
Εκπίπτοντες, Το Μαύρο Πιπέρι του Ευβοικού, Νυχτεγερσία “Η Αναρχία είναι Αγώνας 
για τη Ζωή, όχι το Θάνατο”], unknown date; Saltodoroi-Chania “On the Political Strike 
of  5 May, the Three Dead, and the Struggle” [Σαλταδόροι-Χανιά “Για την Πολιτική 
Απεργία της 5ης Μάη, τους Τρείς Νεκρούς, και τον Αγώνα”], 19 May 2010; Occupied 
London “Really, What do we have to Say about Wednesday’s Event?” [“Αλήθεια, Εμείς 
τί έχουμε να πούμε για το Γεγονός της Τετάρτης;”]unknown date.
20 Libertarian Place Pikrodafni “Announcement” [Ελευθεριακό Στέκι Πικροδάφνης 
“Ανακοίνωση”], 16 May 2010; Anarchists for Social Liberation “Announcement by the 
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Collectivity for the Events of  5 May” [Αναρχικοί για την Κοινωνική Απελευθέρωση 
“Ανακοίνωση της Συλλογικότητας για τα Γεγονότα της 5ης Μαΐου”]; Rioter “On the 
March of  5/5 and the Three Dead Bank Clerks” [“Για τα Γεγονότα της 5/5 και τους 
Τρείς Νεκρούς Τραπεζοϋπαλλήλους”], 13 May 2010; Fabrica Yfanet Occupation, ibid 
(notes 8, 11); Terra Incognita Occupation “About the Events of  5 May” [Κατάληψη 
Terra Incognita “Για τα Γεγονότα της 5ης Μάη”], 12 May 2010; Apatris Street 
Newspaper “Opportunism is Oil in the Grind of  Power—About the Three Dead in 
Marfin” [Εφημερίδα δρόμου Απάτρις “Ο Τυχοδιωκτισμός είναι Λάδι στα Γρανάζια της 
Εξουσίας—Για τους Τρείς Νεκρούς στη Marfin”], 12 May; Counter-information Team 
Kaka Mantata “We Do Not Stop Here…We Have the Entire World to Gain!” [Ομάδα 
αντιπληροφόρησης Κακά Μαντάτα “Δεν Σταματάμε Εδώ… Έχουμε Ολόκληρο τον 
Κόσμο να Κερδίσουμε!”] 19 May 2010.
21 Some Anarchists from Thessaloniki “Fables and Nightmares” [Κάποιοι Αναρχικοί 
από τη Θεσσαλονίκη “Παραμύθια και Εφιάλτες”], 17 May 2010.
22 A Group of  Comrades that Contributed to the Destructive Activity in the Centre 
of  Athens During the 5 May March “On the 5 May Events, and the Stance of  a Part 
of  the Anarchist Space” [Μια Ομάδα Συντρόφων που Συνέβαλε στην Καταστροφική 
Δραστηριότητα στο Κέντρο της Αθήνας κατά τη Διάρκεια της Πορείας της 5ης Μάη 
“Σχετικά με τα Γεγονότα της 5ης Μάη και τη Στάση ενός Κομματιού του Αναρχικού 
Χώρου”], 14 May 2010; Conspiracy of  Cells of  Fire “Announcement Regarding the 
Recent Events of  5/5” [Συνομωσία Πυρήνων της Φωτιάς “Ανακοίνωση Σχετικά με τα 
Πρόσφατα Γεγονότα της 5/5”], 19 May 2010.
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Sky News ran into difficulty about five minutes ago when they attempted to go 
live to one of  their reporters on the ground. She appeared to lose her temper as 
students standing around her began to pitch in with comments like “Ladies and 
gentlemen, the insurrection has started.” 
—Paul Lewis, Guardian coverage of  London protests against austerity 
measures, 10 November 2010.
We are surrounded by the picturesque ruins of  all explicitly political 
ideas: schools at which no one learns, families bereft of  love, banks whose 
coffers are empty, armies that only lose wars and laws that are merely 
expressions of  “anti-terrorist” paranoia. What does this mean for any 
kind of  new politics—if  “politics” is even a suitable word? This ques-
tion must be answered because strangely enough, insurrection against 
the entire social order is increasingly the only option left on the table. 
After all, everyone knows nothing works. To be realistic, a system in 
the midst of  both global resource depletion and a global fall in the rate 
of  profit could not possibly concede any sort of  demand even if  it was 
in its best interest to do so. In election after sorry election, people are 
throwing out their so-called representatives—¡Que se vayan todos!—
yet they are not really voting for anyone, but they vote against politics 
itself  using the only feeble expression of  politics remaining to them, 
the ballot. The youth know better, as the absenteeism that increases in 
every election shows. Even though the vast spectacular machine of  the 
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empire will never admit its own litany of  failure— a failure self-evident 
since the financial crisis of  2008 – for the first time in generations, from 
Greece to France to even Britain, the kids of  the planetary bourgeoisie 
are getting hip to this truth. 
The entire imperial apparatus is no longer held together on a 
mass scale by objective evidence or even faith in “progress,” but only by a 
certain mixture of  depression and repression. The bitter fruit of  the end 
of  history is the lack of  any horizon even in the face of  the collapse of  
our present. So what occult forces maintain this world? In an inversion 
of  Hobbes’s classic argument, only fear can maintain the present order, 
and there is no fear more terrifying than the fear of  an untimely death. 
The murder of  Alexis Grigoropoulos was precisely the kind of  untimely 
death necessary to prop up a failed state, a human sacrifice intended by 
the police to restore a respect for their elders in the increasingly rest-
less youth. The Greek police did not invent this recipe: the formula of  
state-sanctioned murder of  those who refuse to assimilate has been re-
peated with miraculous results in other more “civilised” states. When an 
African-American youth is murdered by the police in the United States 
of  America, the murder is not even mentioned in the back pages of  
newspapers unless somehow the act itself  has been caught on film and 
released on the Internet, as befitting the most spectacular society on the 
planet. It should be no surprise that eventually police murder as an act 
of  social control would come to Greece, and it is not even surprising that 
riots would follow, as very intense rioting also happened after the death 
of  Michalis Kaltezas there in 1985. What was new about the murder of  
Alexis Grigoropoulos was that what began as a riot soon was on the road 
to becoming an insurrection against the totality of  capitalist life that 
generalised throughout high-school students to immigrants in Greece. 
Just in time for Christmas, the spectre of  insurrection haunted Europe 
yet again. Putting a few people in prison in France, murdering a youth 
in Greece, declaring all anarchists to be “terrorists”—all of  these acts by 
the state are unable to restrain the rising tide of  insurrection. Even if  the 
most pacified of  countries like Britain and the United States, buildings 
are occupied, demonstrations run riot, and tears are wept by politicians 
over broken windows. And they all know, a broken window is just a sign 
of  disorder—and soon the real disorder may arrive.
Around the world, anarchists of  the previous generation are 
puzzled. Why, after such a long absence, are the People—who we were 
never sure we even believed in—back? Even more puzzling, two years 
later in Greece, in the very the country that seemed closest to the brink 
of  collapse after the financial crisis, the anarchists have (at least tempo-
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rarily) foiled their own insurrection after the accidental killing of  three 
people in the burning of  the Marfin bank. While it is true that such 
an accident could have easily occurred in earlier protests, the timing 
of  this event was almost tragic on a world-historical scale (and all too 
convenient for the Greek state), for it happened just at the very moment 
that the insurrectionary process was generalising even to Greek work-
ers. In the months after this event, it was as if  the momentum has been 
knocked out of  the coming Greek insurrection.  
Perhaps what is missing in these times is no longer action, but a 
certain collective intelligence that can both surpass the previous height 
of  insurrection in 2008 and push through its nadir mid-2010. So in 
addition to the practice of  Molotovs and barricades, a collective revo-
lutionary theory that can account for both the current concepts and 
actions in terms of  an insurrectionary process is necessary for any in-
surrection to avoid simply fizzling and dying. What we mean by this 
strange term “theory” is a certain strategic debate amongst those on the 
front lines of  the global social war, the war in which the death of  Alexis 
was merely one attack by the state and the insurrection of  December 
but a single social response. 
 A THEORY OF SOCIAL WAR
Hitherto the murders and seditions had been internal and fragmentary. 
Afterward the chiefs of  factions assailed each other with great armies, 
according to the usage of  war, and their country lay as a prize between them… 
the Senate, fearing lest they should be surrounded by war, and unable to protect 
themselves, garrisoned the sea-coast from Cumae to the city with freedmen, 
who were then for the first time enrolled in the army on account of  the scarcity 
of  soldiers. The Senate also voted that those Italians who had adhered to their 
alliance should be admitted to citizenship, which was the one thing they all 
desired most. 
—Appian, The Civil Wars
In an era when the global economy is so intertwined that the primary 
conflict between nation-states involves demolishing their borders for “free 
trade,” a military war on the scale of  the Second World War is simply a 
financial impossibility. Increasingly, such traditional military war is re-
duced to the periphery of  empire, while a different kind of  war is waged 
inside the centre of  empire. What is this new kind of  war, and is it actual-
ly just the return of  a forgotten form of  warfare? What is the geneaology 
warfare? Historically, the Greeks recognize two different kinds of  war, the 
civil war [emfylios] and the social war [koinonikos polemos].
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The civil war, emfylios, is the primordial taking of  positions 
that binds together opposing collectivities. From the perspective of  the 
state, civil war can be a war interior to itself, such as the English Civil 
War or the French Revolution of  1789, but it can also be a war before 
and beyond the existence of  the state, ranging from the various reli-
gious wars that came before the formation of  the modern nation state 
to the Commune of  Paris in 1871 or the revolt in Oaxaca in 2006. It is 
this last kind of  civil war that gains increasing importance as the form 
of  the nation-state mixes with the universalised state of  empire. Inside 
empire, civil war polarizes an otherwise uniform citizenry, forcing them 
to take either the side of  the partisans or the side of  the empire itself. 
Let us remember that a civil war is between any collectivities 
that may be latent within a state, and these collectivities may very well 
be counter-revolutionary, as the phenomenon of  political Islam in the 
Middle East shows all too well. Even in Greece, as the possibility of  
the actual dissolution of  the Greek state became increasingly possible, 
counter-revolutionary fascist collectivities like the Golden Dawn arose, 
who are trying to create an ethnically clean stronghold in Ayios Pan-
teleimonas,1 not too far from Exarcheia. Luckily, the first civil war in 
Europe since the financial crisis of  2008 was not between a quasi-fascist 
nationalism and a neo-liberal state (a very real possibility glimpsed in 
the revolt of  2008 in Bulgaria), but between anarchist-inspired revolu-
tion and the state in Greece. As no individual nation-state stands as an 
island due to their interlocking into the global state of  empire, so the 
insurrection in Greece also naturally raises the possibility of  global civil 
war against empire. The true nightmare of  empire is revealed: The 
seeming historic abnormality of  civil war is always present even within 
the so-called “peace” of  capitalist representative democracy, and global 
civil war will return to the stage of  history as that very image of  “peace” 
rapidly unravels in the wake of  the financial crisis. 
While in the era of  the formation of  modern capitalist nation-
states—ranging across the American Civil War to the emergence of  
the Greek state in the 1940s—civil war is primarily military, in the era 
of  empire civil war takes a more subtle form. The insurrection of  De-
cember in Greece is a perfect example of  such a post-militaristic civil 
war, in which previously isolated collectivities such as students took a 
position with anarchists and immigrants to form a new kind of  partisan 
war machine. This new kind of  form is revealed even in how civil wars 
are brought to their end by the state. While earlier civil wars such as the 
Paris Commune were destroyed through military massacre, something 
changed after World War II. Remember that DeGaulle defeated the 
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civil war of  May 1968 in France by ordering the police to not fire a shot, 
and then ordering an election instead. The same sequence emerges in 
Greece: the brutal military repression of  the original Polytechnic revolt 
reduced the popular tolerance of  the military junta, which was one 
of  the factors that eventually led to its collapse in 1974—a fact not 
lost upon Karamanlis. So in the footsteps of  DeGaulle, Karamanlis 
did not order traditional military (or even police) repression against the 
insurrection of  December. How is it that civil war can now be averted 
without military repression, by only deploying generalised “counter-
terrorist” arrests and elections? The answer may yet be another kind 
of  warfare.
In Greek, koinonikos polemos means the social war. Koinonikos 
polemos is separate from civil war, although in other languages there is 
only a single word for both kinds of  war, like Burgerskrieg in German. 
Although the term “social war” is often thrown around in a sloppy and 
confused manner in anarchist propaganda, yet the history of  this term 
reveals that a certain powerful concept is being deployed, a concept that 
can help us understand a distinct transformation in the form of  war-
fare since the Second World War. The concept of  “social war” should 
directly address the repressive side of  the transition from the localised 
nation-state to the global state of  empire—as the function of  counter-
insurrection is too often ignored by certain ivory-tower theorists, but of  
immense and immediate concern to practising revolutionaries.
In contrast to civil war, which signifies the breakdown of  the 
apparatus of  the state, social war is the low-intensity war by the state 
against the social relationships of  its own population in order to main-
tain its continued existence. The social war then encompasses the to-
tality of  everyday life: To be alive today is to be at war, to never sleep 
properly, to awaken at odd hours to work, to be constantly surrounded 
by surveillance and police. A further recital of  the various symptoms 
is unnecessary. Unlike in military war, demands of  any kind are futile: 
demands would only make sense as long as the social war was limited 
in time and space, yet the capitalist form of  life today encompasses the 
entire globe and imagines its reproduction extending into the infinite 
future. Another response is to pretend the social war doesn’t exist—per-
haps the most popular option. More so than in any other moment in 
history, the temporary relief  that bread and circuses provide the popu-
lation from the social war has been transformed into an entire global 
industry. One does not win a war by pretending it does not exist. One 
does not even survive a war in that manner. One wins a war by under-
standing the terrain and acting accordingly. So a theory of  social war 
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will be our weapon against the social war itself, allowing us to recognize 
our common terrain and devise a strategy to end this state of  affairs. 
Historically, social war emerged during the same time as the 
concept of  empire itself. The first mention of  “social war”—the war 
between allies (socii in Latin, also denoting companionship and hence 
related to social in English)—occurred when Athens failed to trans-
form its confederacy of  allies into an empire. So let us not forget that 
Athens, the long-reputed originator of  democracy in the West, none-
theless was also the first aborted empire of  Europe. When Athens cre-
ated a confederacy of  city-states in its war against Persia, it was the first 
among equals, the proto-imperial capital of  the Delian League. The 
true intent of  Athens became crystal clear to the other city-states after 
the Athenians massacred the islanders of  Milos, who had in “good 
faith” believed that they could preserve their independence from the 
Athenian Confederacy. Increasingly threatened by Athenian domina-
tion, the former allies of  Athens revolted to preserve their equal stand-
ing in the confederacy, and so shattered the prospects for a unified 
Athenian empire. However, the fall of  Athens destroyed only a possible 
materialisation of  empire, not the concept of  empire itself. A genera-
tion later, the same ambitions re-emerged with Alexander the Great’s 
failed universal empire. What Alexander realised too late was that mili-
tary war is not enough to establish an empire: Empire can only be cre-
ated by universalising a form of  life, which Alexander took too literally 
by having his Greek soldiers marry Persians. Again, Greek attempts to 
become empire-builders were foiled by their adherence to the concept 
of  citizenship as a blood-right, rather than understanding citizenship 
as a form of  life involving language and customs regardless of  ancestry.
The first true social war occurred at the birth of  the first actual 
empire in the West: the Roman Empire. Before becoming an empire, 
Rome was an unimpressive little city-state built upon seven hills, far 
from the glories of  Athens or Babylon. After nearly losing their inde-
pendence to the Etruscans, the Romans discovered that the best de-
fence was a good offence, and thus began the long and bloody transfor-
mation of  the Roman Republic into the Roman Empire. The Romans 
gathered a league of  Italian allies around them in return for a share of  
the bounty of  their wars. Yet secretly the Romans also determined that 
Rome would be the first amongst equals, and kept the wealth and land 
accumulated from their conquests to themselves, slowly building mas-
sive slave plantations instead of  parcelling out the spoils amongst Italian 
freemen from other cities. The former allies of  Rome demanded to be 
treated as equals and declared themselves a new republic—known as 
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“Italia”—with its capital at Abruzzo. Let it not be said that history lacks 
a sense of  irony; at the G8 in 2009, the new Roman empire of  late capi-
talism had its most imperial of  meetings on the earthquake-devastated 
rubble of  Abruzzo.
After decades of  bloodshed between the former allies, Rome 
emerged triumphant and granted all of  those that did not revolt the 
right to become Roman citizens. By this act, the Roman empire ex-
panded Roman citizenship outside of  Rome, a process that soon spread 
across all of  the Mediterranean world. Even those who had revolted 
could become Roman citizens if  they submitted themselves at the feet 
of  a Roman praetor! Why was this forgotten war between Rome and 
the other city-states a social war, rather than a military war? Unlike a 
military war where the vanquished are either enslaved or slaughtered, 
the Romans created a new kind of  asymmetric war in which the war 
was won by transforming the vanquished into citizens. 
What does it mean to think through the social war not as a 
historical event, but as a strategic concept? Which is worse: to die in a 
military war or to become a citizen in a social war? At least a slave can 
dream of  insurrection against his master: the insurrection of  Spartacus 
against the Romans followed shortly after the social war. Part of  the 
strategy of  social war is to avoid the inevitable slave revolt of  those ex-
cluded from citizenship with its concomitant framework of  rights. Yet 
to be a citizen is to adopt a whole new form of  life, a form of  life taken 
from the outside either willingly or through the threat of  force: Death or 
citizenship! In contrast to the Greek concept of  citizenship that ensured 
the barbarians would always be excluded, the Romans re-conceived the 
notion of  the citizen to be based on shared customs, shared language, 
and being bound to a single legal-juridical framework—transforming 
the ethnic nation-state into an expansive empire capable of  expanding 
across the entire world, at least in theory. 
Advocates of  empire would have us believe there are two phases 
to its expansion, which always occur in succession: the first phase of  
conquest and bloodshed and the second one of  peacefully assimilating 
the conquered into empire as citizens. This is a lie—the social war shows 
that the assimilation of  citizens into empire is just a different kind of  
war, one that takes place simultaneously via outward military forms of  
colonisation and via a more inward war on social relationships that be-
gins before and continues long after any military operations have ended.
The social war is a war between forms of  life in which the vic-
torious form of  life subsumes the conquered one. A form of  life evades 
definition; it exists as the totality of  lived material conditions, whose 
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very basis is the social relationships that compose a world. We find 
ourselves always expressed by and taking part in such forms of  life. 
They are more real than the very concept of  the individual, for they are 
something that simultaneously conjoins and forms the foundation for 
objective conditions and subjectivity. 
Subsumption is the primary tactic of  social war, as via subsump-
tion a form of  life can be replaced with another form of  life. A form of  
life acts as a configuration of  habits and a sort of  certain order of  life; 
subsumption reconfigures these habits and re-orders these differences. So-
cial war does not result in destruction for the vanquished: the subsumed 
do not disappear into ashes like the victims of  Hiroshima, but instead 
the losers of  the social war are remade in the interest of  the dominating 
form of  life, be it Rome or late capitalism. Subsumption was originally 
theorised by Kant in terms of  the application of  abstract concepts to the 
particulars of  the vast manifold; some concepts allow us to register “red 
apples” despite the fact that each apple is on some metaphysical level 
indescribably different in tone and hue. Something in Kant still rings 
true, for the violence of  subsumption destroys the concrete particular, re-
shaping reality into the image of  a concrete universal. 
In a social war, the concrete universal takes the form of  the 
citizen, the being without social relationships. The only relationship al-
lowed to the citizen is that of  being dominated by the state, which today 
has expanded its power via domination by commodities. The particular 
is all forms of  life that resist incorporation into the state apparatus. To 
ward off  civil war, citizenship must expand to subsume all other forms 
of  life, which is only possible by having a new kind of  war that destroys 
the possibilities for social relationships. Under late capitalism, this is ac-
complished by constantly consuming citizens with work or by isolating 
people via artificially instilled fear of  each other (as done via primitive 
scaremongering around race or religion). The citizen is not just stripped 
of  social relationships by the social war, but also re-composed in terms 
of  language, habits, and inclinations. Witness the mania for learning 
English in Greece—the surest sign of  the spread of  empire is a univer-
salising language! The Roman form of  life spread in lock-step with the 
Latin language, much as English is spreading over the entire world as 
the new lingua franca of  global capital. The social war even expands 
into the very geography of  a town (as Baron Haussmann realised all too 
well); where once each city had its own building style, the skyscraper is 
the monstrous form of  life of  capitalism made real, an inhuman abode 
fit only for capital. It is not by accident that every metropolis appears 
eerily similar and that everywhere the same miserable citizens rush to 
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and fro, driven mad by work. Even in Greece, one can see in Ermou 
Street the eternal return of  shopping in the form of  anorexic girls and 
strangely “American”-looking men wandering amid the sterile display 
of  commodities, with Athens being no different than any other me-
tropolis. The victory of  the social war is complete only when the citizen 
feels deep metaphysical anguish at witnessing the destruction of  com-
modities and other violations of  “private” property and fails to wince at 
the death of  living beings.
A form of  life can be destroyed by attacking and dissolving the 
social relationships that compose its autonomous world one by one, re-
placing them with relationships to images and dependence on the state 
and capital. In order to transform indigenous populations to citizens, 
the state must also strategically destroy their relationships to each other 
(families, tribes, friends) and their connections to the natural world, sub-
stituting a wholly imaginary relationship to the idea of  the nation and 
absolute dependence on wage labor for these primordial relationships. 
In this way, the social war of  the present empire is far more advanced 
than the social war of  the Roman era, since today the military war is 
always limited to living bodies while the social war has the unlimited 
scope of  social relationships. As the primary goal of  social war is the 
elimination of  any social relationships outside domination, social war is 
inherently anti-social. 
It is true that the Greeks invented tragedy, and so perhaps more 
than superficial Americans they take the death of  one of  their own with 
a proper measure of  seriousness. Yet their insurrection reflects also that 
many Greeks intuitively understand the horizon of  what lies ahead for 
the future of  this world far better than the most well-read of  activists. 
It is no surprise that Alexis was murdered by the police—it was the 
most predictable response of  the empire of  capital when faced with a 
renegade youth who refused to become a citizen, instead inclined to 
loiter in Exarcheia amongst the excluded. The empire needs such ex-
amples, just as Rome needed to hang the bodies of  rebellious slaves on 
the highways. Far from an accident, police killings of  those who refuse 
the assimilation of  the social war will doubtless become increasingly 
common as the social war intensifies. Again, what was surprising was 
that the consequent December insurrection generalised to attack the 
totality of  the symbolic order of  capitalism itself, reaching its height in 
the torching of  Europe’s largest Christmas tree. It was not in terms of  
violence that the events of  December stepped outside the normality of  
Greek anarchist demonstrations, as Molotov cocktails are often to be 
seen in Greece at large demonstrations. What was abnormal even to 
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Greece was that those outside the anarchist milieu also simultaneously 
aimed for the transformation of  everyday life while assaulting capital in 
acts of  pure negation. In this way, the insurrection is a rupture with the 
previous forms of  protest that emerged over the last ten years even in 
Greece: the first battle of  a new sequence in the global civil war.
THE LIMITS OF THE ANARCHIST IDENTITY 
From 1969 on, the spectacle, in order to still be believed, had to attribute to 
its enemies incredible actions, and in order to still be accepted, it had to credit 
proletarians with unacceptable actions, and thereby ensure sufficient publicity 
so that people who allow themselves to become frightened always choose “the 
lesser evil,” namely the present state of  affairs.
—Gianfranco Sanguinetti, On Terrorism and the State
One hypothesis that has been put forward for the power of  the in-
surrection of  December was the incredible strength of  the anarchist 
movement. Credit must be given to the Greek anarchists, as it was 
their quick response that sparked the events on the evening of  Alexis’s 
death. Furthermore, the tactical forms of  the anarchist movement did 
diffuse throughout other sectors of  the population like students and 
immigrants. Yet in retrospect, the insurrection of  December was both 
the apogee and the limit of  the insurrectionary anarchist movement in 
Greece. For what the hypothesis of  giving all credit to the “incredible 
Greek anarchists” does not account for is their subsequent paralysis. 
On the anniversary of  December in 2009, as students took the streets 
again in Athens, many of  the anarchists remained surrounded by police 
and isolated in their squats—the most visible example being the raid of  
the anarchist space Resalto in Keratsini, Piraeus.
In the midst of  a general strike in May 2010 that nearly led to 
the storming of  government buildings, a handful of  anarchists burned 
down a bank, accidentally killing the three bank employees inside. This 
event was ready ammunition for the state and media, and used to full 
effect to nearly abort what appeared to be an even more wide-scale 
insurrection against the austerity measures being imposed on Greece 
by the IMF and EU. Although it is true that many people—far more 
than three—are likely to die in any insurrection, and that it was almost 
sheerly a matter of  luck almost that such events did not occur earlier, 
the deaths in May 2010 led to massive demoralisation and infighting, 
including the departure of  many of  the voices of  intelligence like those 
from the journal Flesh Machine.2 
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While revolutionaries must never in bad faith attack other 
revolutionaries that in good courage put themselves on the front line, 
nothing should be above analysis and critique from comrades who are 
involved in the same struggle. To avoid analysis and critique would lead 
anarchists to the same sort of  ideological blindness that stopped many 
communists from critiquing Stalin (which shockingly many authori-
tarian communists in Greece somehow still refuse to do). Analysis is a 
sign of  fidelity to insurrection and critique is honesty to our sisters and 
brothers in insurrection. We do not want to assign blame, like collabo-
rators with the state. It is obvious that the deaths were caused by both 
a lack of  care on the part of  insurrectionaries and the twisted logic of  
capital that caused the boss to demand them to be at work on the day 
of  a general strike. Instead, we want to understand why the aftermath 
of  such an event could so easily thwart a growing popular insurrection. 
One possibility is that it was the resurgence of  a kind of  anar-
chist identity in Greece after December that led to a careless cult of  mil-
itaristic attack by anarchists, which in turn let the state and media iso-
late anarchists from the general population. Our counter-hypothesis is 
that the anarchist identity—as developed in Western Europe and North 
America since the 1980s and taking hold increasingly in Greece—is 
structurally counter-revolutionary. If  this is true, while the first step of  
insurrection may be started by insurrectionists, for it to be complete the 
insurrectionists themselves must destroy their identity as “insurrection-
ists” so that the insurrection can generalise.
Following Badiou, the modern European sequence of  insurrec-
tions starts with the Paris Commune, which expressed in a few days the 
ability of  people to self-organise their lives without the accumulation 
of  capital or domination of  the state.3 However, the Paris Commune 
was short-lived, as it was unable to defend itself  from the inevitable 
military war that massacred it. The result of  this failure of  form was 
thirty years of  successful counter-insurrection until revolutionaries ad-
opted the form of  the Leninist party, which adopted the Fordist factory-
form—a strict discipline and hierarchy—to the revolution in order to 
create a revolutionary army that could withstand the capitalist counter-
offensive (and did, after the insurrection in Russia). While the form of  
the Leninist party could defend an insurrection, such a centralised form 
failed to abolish relationships of  domination, leading to the worst of  all 
worlds: the professional revolutionary activists used “communism” as 
an attempt to intensify capitalism in pre-industrial societies. 
After decades of  further counter-insurrection, May 1968 iden-
tified the crux of  the problem that Lenin failed to understand —that 
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capitalism was based on social relationships rather than merely military 
domination. Yet the abortive insurrection of  May 1968 failed to find a 
new form outside of  the Leninist party, and so was incapable of  gener-
alising into a global insurrectionary process. Focusing on social relation-
ships but unable to comprehend the new historical positioning of  capital 
and the state, the movements of  May ’68 could only articulate the ne-
cessity for a revolution in social relationships in terms of  recognition of  
the differences in domination, rather than their commonality. This led 
these movements to fall into an increasingly schizophrenic identity poli-
tics that was ultimately only compatible with further subsumption, via 
the creation of  new markets around identity. However, the memory that 
it could have been otherwise still haunts the state. It is not by accident 
that Sarkozy stated in response to the December insurrection in Greece 
that “We don’t want a European May ’68 in the middle of  Christmas.”4 
In the last round of  struggle, the anti-globalisation movement finally 
developed an alternative to the Leninist party through the network form 
of  organisation, but was unable to develop any further revolutionary 
content, instead becoming trapped in the identity politics of  1968. 
In contrast to the revolutionary anarchist tradition of  those 
like Bakunin, anarchism as a specific “countercultural identity” is a 
relatively new phenomenon that developed after 1968, although traces 
of  it can be found in historical movements such as the nihilists of  pre-
revolutionary Russia and the moralism of  the Spanish revolution. In 
its current form, the anarchist identity as the “hooded one in black” 
descends—in dress, at least—from the German Autonomen. The Au-
tonomen first appeared in Germany at the tail end of  the seventies; 
their open street-fighting was a self-conscious rejection of  the tacti-
cal stance of  armed guerrilla groups like the Red Army Faction. This 
new generation (who were called the “Black Bloc” first by the media, 
and then by themselves) are best understood as revolutionaries whose 
discontent came not in particular from the exploitation of  their la-
bor at their jobs (contra traditional Marxism), but from the capitalist 
subsumption of  their own daily life. This accounts for the fact that 
this generation’s most elementary form of  resistance was cultural: the 
“barbaric” inversion of  bourgeoisie morality known as punk. The tra-
dition of  wearing black occurred as if  by accident, although the tacti-
cal advantages of  remaining anonymous were soon obvious to all and 
repeated with success. 
This subcultural anarchist identity was globalised with the rise 
of  summit-hopping at the turn of  the millennium. Yet while this anar-
chist identity must be given due credit for helping reinvigorate an ex-
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plicitly anti-capitalist trajectory in street protests, the anarchist identity 
never fully disassociated from the more confused reformists of  the an-
ti-globalisation movement, as exemplified by the explicitly social dem-
ocratic pretensions of  Naomi Klein and Ya Basta! This is likely due to 
the dissolution of  the proletarian insurrectionary anarchist movement 
in Europe and the United States after the crushing defeats like those of  
the Industrial Workers of  the World and the Spanish Civil War, which 
led to a veritable erasure of  the revolutionary anarchist tradition. So 
the new anarchists of  the 1990s made an almost infantile return to a 
sort of  radical democracy and Proudhon-inspired federalism, despite 
the fact that such ideologies were anathema to revolutionary anarchists 
generations before, who learned all too well the theoretical and practi-
cal failures of  these dead-ends. While there is no doubt that the anti-
globalisation movement led to the valuable development of  techniques 
and a renewed internationalism, the anti-globalisation movement was 
more a global petite bourgeois movement for the reform of  empire into 
a global democracy than an explicitly insurrectionary movement. An-
archists were either side-lined as a sort of  “out of  control” element or 
fell into a sort of  confused radical democratic posturing, as witnessed 
by the fetish of  many anarchists for formal consensus even when such 
consensus exiled the Black Bloc to the fringe of  the movement. 
Let us give an honest funeral oration for the anarchist identity 
and the anti-globalisation movement from which it emerged. In pre-
cious few years, the form of  networks pioneered by the anti-globalisa-
tion movement was able to produce a new kind of  decentralised organ-
isation that took the power of  capital and the state off  guard, an answer 
to a Leninist party for the 21st century. It was as if  a new Internationale 
had materialised out of  thin air. However, are networks revolutionary 
merely by virtue of  their form? If  somehow networks are indeed always 
structurally revolutionary, what a curious agreement between Silicon 
Valley marketing firms and autonomist theory! Our second hypothesis 
is that this absurdity results from a fundamental confusion between con-
tent and form, one that must be solved for the insurrection to proceed. 
The anti-globalisation movement pioneered a new form, but failed to 
provide it with revolutionary content. 
From the standpoint of  those enslaved to the centralised Ford-
ist factory-form, the anarchic network-form seemed inherently revolu-
tionary, perhaps even anti-capitalist. What is obvious in retrospective is 
that the network form has been given the content of  capital. Soon after 
the anti-globalisation movement had taken centre stage, other groups 
with less-than-revolutionary content also began forming networks. Po-
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lice were creating affinity groups and corporations like Google organised 
themselves in a decentralised fashion. When the reactionary elements of  
political Islam also adopted the network form, within a day the shock-
waves set off  by the events of  11 September 2001 destroyed the mo-
mentum of  the anti-globalisation movement. At the present moment, 
the situation has become even more deranged. Invented by Indymedia, 
digital user-generated content is the heart of  capitalist production. More 
and more youth belong to digital social networks like Facebook that serve 
as unimaginable treasure troves for police and surveillance. Given that 
Israeli military strategists read Deleuze,5 one cannot help but agree with 
Fredric Jameson that there is something about Deleuze that strangely 
resonates with contemporary capitalism.6
Forms like networks (or hierarchies) are methods of  organisa-
tion, but their content is the intentions that fill the form. While there 
can be no content without form and no form without content, the two 
do not necessarily march together hand in hand, but can even become 
dislocated temporally. Each historical epoch has its own limits, and so 
the determination of  revolutionary content requires historical anal-
ysis. What was revolutionary in St. Petersburg in 1909 or Seattle in 
1999 may not be revolutionary in Greece in 2009. If  capitalism can 
be thought of  as a particular form of  life, any content is revolutionary 
insofar as it seeks to completely abolish this form of  life and replace it 
with a new form of  life without monetary exchange or domination. An 
insurrection in turn is a concrete event that, to a greater or lesser de-
gree, expresses the emergence of  this new form of  life and negates the 
power of  capital and the state. 
Identity as such forms when the image of  a form of  life the 
possible social relationships, and therefore the proliferation of  identi-
ty-based politics and subculture is merely another form of  spectacular 
society. So it should be of  no surprise that even as faith in neo-liberal 
capitalism collapses, a politics based on identity remains as strong as 
ever, as even self-professed revolutionaries are trapped within a politics 
based on images. Why is it so hard to overthrow the yoke of  image-based 
politics? Could it be because the social relationships of  the citizen under 
capital are almost gone, and so the citizen needs to have the image of  
social relationships—an “identity”—to avoid complete breakdown? Cit-
izens express themselves only as a certain shifting pastiche of  identities: 
the nationalist, the feminist, the punk, the hippie, the homosexual, the 
exercise-nut, the sci-fi fan, the person rediscovering their “ethnic” roots. 
Since subsumption has nearly stripped each person of  any ability to hold 
onto her own presence, identities come and go, no more afflicting than a 
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passing crush or the value of  stock. These identities at their core are then 
just new brands of  citizenship in the social war, the most advanced tech-
niques thus far of  subsumption. One can be a citizen while maintaining 
one’s individuality and “unique” style.
While the anti-globalisation movement created new forms of  
organisation, its content was still held hostage by identity politics. When 
the anarchist re-emerged in the anti-globalisation movement, its insur-
rectionary content was also neutered by an inability to supersede the 
image of  being an anarchist. Instead of  focusing on actually creating 
social relationships without domination or exchange and strategising 
how these relationships could be cultivated into an insurrectionary pro-
cess capable of  bringing about revolution, anarchists became identified 
with a particular kind of  image as given by dress and music, as well as 
pre-defined taboos on eating and consumption. For example, in Berlin 
one can go from one anarchist bar to another every night for months—
living and eating only with other black-clad vegans—and never leave 
this bubble. 
One of  the most refreshing aspects of  Greece until recently 
was the relative lack of  anarchist identity. One could not easily iden-
tify “an anarchist” sipping a frappé coffee on the streets of  Athens. 
Although sometimes vaguely counter-cultural, anarchists in Greece 
were not easily identifiable by dress or mannerisms, unlike areas like 
the United States or Germany where a veritable anarchist uniform de-
veloped. Isolated linguistically and geographically from mainland Eu-
rope, anarchists in Greece also remained isolated from identity politics 
that became integrated within anarchism elsewhere, and Greek anar-
chists kept loyal to a concept of  revolution that still meant the over-
throw of  the state. There are many diverse factors responsible for this 
divergence from mainstream anarchist identity politics, ranging from 
the unique geography of  the Balkans to the still-living memory of  junta 
in the older generations in Greece. While some Greek anarchists did 
travel and take action in the major summit protests that rocked Europe, 
they participated in these summits by arriving and acting as they did in 
Greece, Molotov cocktails included where possible. Despite the rather 
maddening paranoia of  the Negriists that the Black Bloc in Genoa was 
composed entirely of  cops and fascists, the carefully planned script of  
Ya Basta! was at least partly interrupted by Greek anarchists who just 
didn’t care about such absurd-scripted battles with the police. While 
there was some traffic between the various insurrectionary anarchist 
milieus, the Greek anarchists’ attempts to invite the dying anti-globali-
sation movement to the protests against the EU Summit in Salonika in 
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2003 only brought out a few internationals.7 Further attempts to gain 
international contacts, such as the European Social Forum in 2006, led 
only to further splits (with no less than four separate anarchist counter-
forums organised). To a reader of  the book We Are Everywhere,8 the 
anti-globalisation movement would seem to be everywhere but Greece, 
despite Greece having the largest anarchist movement in Europe.
Attracted by the images of  policemen on fire and destroyed 
streets, anarchists from across the globe showed up in droves to Greece 
after December 2008. While this solidarity is part of  a long and hon-
ourable tradition exemplified also by the International Brigades in the 
Spanish Civil War, anarchists from outside Greece also brought with 
them an increased emphasis on the anarchist identity. When the insur-
rection failed to generalise into a full-scale revolution after December, 
instead of  strategically analysing what tactics could sustain the insur-
rection, factions of  the anarchist tendency in Greece retreated into an 
anti-social politics based around identity, perhaps unconsciously blam-
ing the wider population for not having the courage to rise up. Some 
anarchists also decided that the decreasing quantity of  attacks could 
somehow be compensated by their increased intensity, and so there was 
a distinctly anarchist revival of  the long tradition of  the armed guer-
rilla in Greece.9 This led to increased activity after December by older 
socially-oriented anarchist armed groups like Revolutionary Struggle 
and the formation of  new anarchist armed guerrilla groups like the 
“Conspiracy of  the Cells of  Fire” around a more anti-social and indi-
vidualist ethos. So while the anarchist identity re-emerged specifically in 
Germany as a rejection of  the form of  the armed guerrilla, in Greece 
the content of  the anarchist identity and the form of  the armed guer-
rilla were more compatible. While there are clear historical reasons for 
the difference between the Greek and German experience of  the guer-
rilla cell, there are also metaphysical reasons that connect nihilism with 
the armed struggle.
Perhaps the anarchist identity of  the free individual—despite a 
superficial rejection of  capitalism—is at the same time the most refined 
moment of  bourgeois metaphysics. The “anarchist” is free only insofar 
as he rejects any force that may interfere with his desires. Expressed posi-
tively, this concept of  the individual led to the Enlightenment project of  
human rights, democracy, and freedom. The individual was promised 
the satisfaction of  her ever-expanding desires by capitalism, which in 
turn are defined by and define the absolute freedom of  the individual. 
When this fairy tale comes up against the harsh reality of  the decline of  
capitalism and the consequent inability of  this world to satisfy their de-
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sires, a certain nihilist individualism is produced. As history proved that 
the Enlightenment project resulted solely in nightmares and so, the only 
remaining option for genuinely “free” individuals is to exercise their 
freedom to destroy the totality of  the world, despite the fact that their 
own categories of  thinking are subsumed by capital. The entirety of  a 
social and collective revolutionary force is displaced onto the individual, 
who not surprisingly, then shows the inevitable signs of  stress and burn-
out as she cannot individually defeat the systematic social domination 
of  capital. In honest desperation, the sign of  true devotion to the cause 
becomes the intensity of  the attack, nothing more. “Insurrection” is 
reduced to a series of  actions, applying the same quantitative logic of  
commodity consumption to the number and ferocity of  their individual 
attacks. To negate capitalism through acts of  destruction is the first step, 
but to go beyond capitalism requires new metaphysical foundations for 
social relationships outside that of  the individual and their desires.
This anti-social nihilism has unfortunately become an ever-
increasing component of  the anarchist identity in Greece. Forgetting 
its origins as a tool of  empire, the social war is deployed by the an-
archist themselves against anyone who does not share their identity. 
The anarchists can then in good conscience declare war against any-
one involved in capitalism, mirroring the indeterminacy of  the attack 
of  police. While there is a truth that all citizens are complicit within 
global capital, so are the anarchists themselves, who exist both within 
and against capitalism. It is not just that the anarchists are fighting 
the social war badly, but that they engage in the social war with the 
goal of  transforming others into anarchists like themselves. Taken to 
an absurd extreme, are people to be killed if  they don’t dress in black, 
eat the wrong kinds of  food, aren’t friends with the “right” people? 
More realistically, the taking up of  indiscriminate social war by anar-
chists lets them conceive of  themselves a permanent minority always 
in a losing war with wider society, never capable of  actually achieving 
wide-scale revolution.
So when the events of  May 2010 confirmed Victor Serge’s 
maxim that “carelessness on the part of  revolutionaries has always 
been the best aid the police have,” the police had the perfect excuse 
to isolate and eliminate the anarchists in Greece.10 The combination 
of  anarchist armed struggle groups and a certain careless anti-social 
nihilism allowed for them to be painted by the state and media as some 
spectacular monsters, whose incredible actions might even target the 
average man-on-the-street. This contradicts the efficacy of  the “hit and 
run” street actions that for many years did not go wrong and the very 
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real targets (banks, politicians, police) that armed struggle groups actu-
ally aimed for. However, it was difficult for many citizens to distinguish 
between reality and the spectacle, and the anti-social tendencies of  an-
archists prevented the truth of  the insurrection—which will include a 
certain responsibility for carelessness and the taking of  whatever mea-
sures are appropriate to prevent it in the future, from being commu-
nicated to former allies at the critical juncture in May. This led to the 
isolation of  the anarchists and the halt of  the insurrection, despite the 
fact that even some fellow employees understood it was the threat of  
being fired that kept the employees at the bank during the strike and 
so the bank was responsible at least in part for the deaths.11 The social 
war by the state upon the general population is the self-evident current 
state of  affairs, but the declaration of  social war by anarchists against 
the general population is suicidal.
The crux of  the problem is identity itself, not anarchism. Instead 
of  creating an actual collective force based on shared experience, iden-
tity politics creates imaginary collectivities that are easily manipulated 
by capitalism as a way to divide and conquer potential revolutionaries. 
From the standpoint of  the state and capital, identity is to be encour-
aged insofar as to label one as “different” and so capable of  being dis-
covered and isolated by the state’s social war. As long as any group—the 
blacks, the anarchists, the Muslims, the Jews, the armed guerrilla—can 
be isolated in terms of  identity, they can be destroyed. The anarchist 
actions after the death of  Alexis exploded precisely because many youth 
in Greek high schools could identify with Alexis and many immigrants 
could identify with the hatred of  capital and the police displayed by the 
youth. Had the anarchists been a completely isolated element in the 
population, then the murder of  Alexis would not have been noticed 
by those outside their circles. It was precisely the lack of  a separatist 
anarchist identity in Greece that led the events of  December to be a 
success, as diverse and formerly divided sectors of  the population did 
come together. At the limit of  any insurrection, the identity of  the in-
surrectionaries must be destroyed or become an obstacle to insurrection 
itself. Far better that the insurrectionaries destroy their identity than be 
physically imprisoned or killed by the state apparatus. 
THE LAST CHANCE TO SAVE THE INSURRECTION IN GREECE
Fire is physical time, absolute unrest, absolute disintegration of  existence, the 
passing away of  the “other,” but also of  itself; and hence we can understand 
how Heraclitus, proceeding from his fundamental determination, could quite 
logically call fire the notion of  the process. He further made this fire to be a 
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real process; because its reality is for itself  the whole process, the moments 
have become concretely determined. Fire, as the metamorphosis of  bodily 
things, is the transformation and exhalation of  the determinate; for this process 
Heraclitus used a particular word—evaporation (anaqumiasis)—but it is rather 
transition.
—G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of  Philosophy 
The lesson of  May 2010 should be clear: Greece cannot repeat the 
1970s in Italy. To repeat history due to a certain lack of  creativity would 
betray the true potentiality of  the events of  December. In contrast to 
what we hope is the beginning of  a new cycle of  struggle in Greece, It-
aly was the last dying upsurge of  1968, an explosion particularly strong 
due to a certain failure of  subsumption in the very peculiar industrial 
development of  that country. Towards its decline in the late 1970s, the 
Italian movement also joined armed guerrilla groups and adopted a 
certain workerist ideology that was already historically out-dated. Per-
haps it should be even less surprising that some of  its theorists, like 
Negri, later found themselves as the leading voices of  the anti-global-
isation movement, since this movement was itself  the activists 1968. 
We must go beyond 1968 and beyond Seattle 1999, and the events of  
December in Greece give us a path towards a new authentically in-
surrectionary content capable of  giving such momentum to the forms 
pioneered in the last decade by the “anti-globalisation” movement. It 
is easy to be “revolutionary” with an almost religious zeal in eras when 
the counter-revolutionary tide seems to make questions of  strategy and 
tactics impossible—so why not simply get yet another coffee and read 
another book about bygone revolutions? In revolutionary times, to be a 
revolutionary requires one to confront truly difficult questions of  strat-
egy and tactics with courage and intelligence.
If  the very act of  identification is counter-revolutionary, the 
first act of  insurrectional content should be the desertion of  the sub-
cultural anarchist identity and the ideology of  the “insurrectionary” 
as separate from the general population. The insurrectionary question 
should transform from “How to increase the intensity of  the attack?” 
to “How can the number of  people involved in the attack increase?” As 
the primary maneuver of  the social war is to isolate pro-revolutionary 
individuals in order to prevent them from forming networks that could 
spread insurrectionary practices to the general population, insurrection-
ists should seek to multiply their social relationships. Since the image of  
“being an anarchist” constrains the kinds and types of  relationships 
that one can have, insurrectionists should seek to have relationships that 
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criss-cross the terrain of  a society ghettoised into identities. To fight 
back in the social war, the insurrection must create and increase the 
social relationships it is founded upon.
The insurrection may have more friends than we suspect. It 
is through the politics of  identity that capitalism staves off  its true 
nightmare: that the majority of  the population wishes to destroy the 
capitalism itself. To be revolutionary is to believe that the idea of  in-
surrection can be majoritarian. Being revolutionary is the concrete 
destruction of  the domination of  the state and capital in everyday 
life of  the population—not just inside a few anarchist enclaves. The 
maxim of  Bakunin holds as true today as when it was first uttered, 
“The freedom of  all is essential to my individual freedom.”12 The 
truly important thing about the December insurrection was this ma-
joritarian aspect—that a large part of  the Greek population was in 
open sympathy, and that groups that had previously been outside the 
anarchist identity, like students and immigrants, took to the streets to 
attack the police and occupy spaces. Only then was the previously in-
vincible police and machinery of  the state revealed to be as flammable 
as a paper tiger. 
After December, the question of  insurrection in Greece became 
not how to “start” the insurrection—where, when, and how to attack—
but how to sustain it. This involves far more than spectacular terrorism 
or printing even more posters; answering the question of  insurrection 
affirmatively requires seriously proving to the population that this con-
dition can sustain life better than capitalism. Technical and practical 
questions come to the forefront: how to self-organise sustenance and 
the necessary production, how to raise children, how to build defences, 
how to care for the wounded and elderly. In other words, not just how to 
open the space for a new form of  life, but how to create the space so that 
a form of  life outside capitalism can reproduce. When the insurrection 
dissolves, it is can be because even after generalising outside of  a set of  
given identities devised by capital (anarchists, students, immigrants), the 
insurrection failed to answer the question of  how to sustain itself.
Luckily, it will not be too difficult for the insurrection to sustain 
the world better than capitalism. From the perspective of  future genera-
tions, it will be evident that this is the best of  times for insurrection, as 
the reproduction of  the capitalist form of  life is in crisis. Greece is likely 
only the beginning; the crisis of  2008 and the subsequent jobless recov-
ery points to the possibility that capitalism is itself  in an ongoing a crisis 
due to the over-accumulation of  capital. To simplify dramatically, the 
innovative technologies behind the factories that produce commodities 
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have accumulated to such an extent across all industries that profit is de-
creasing and the further production of  real commodities requires little 
in the way of  “new jobs,” leading to a paradoxical situation of  an over-
abundance of  commodities and a scarcity of  jobs, as has been more 
elegantly said by others.13 The only way to increase profit is to move 
investment further into speculative sectors in the form of  financialisa-
tion as done from the 1970s onwards, but these kinds of  speculative 
commodities are increasingly impossible to assign a value to, leading 
to financial crisis. Capital is by virtue of  its own internal dynamics at 
a period of  crisis, both the moment of  its highest development and its 
immanent end.
Despite the mule-like insistence of  politicians that there must 
be jobs—there are no jobs either now or in the future. The increased 
over-accumulation of  capital makes even industrial jobs less necessary, 
even the workers find themselves soon-to-be-unemployed. The bet of  
the social war waged against this ever-increasing mass of  unemployed 
is that they can be subsumed as citizens. Still, there is a point of  con-
tradiction, for under capitalism citizenship is equated also with being 
a worker. Yet as there are no more jobs, the social war of  the state can 
no longer offer citizenship and global capital’s financial markets have 
no other option than to desiccate the state through austerity measures 
in order to maintain profit. As the future of  ever-increasing unemploy-
ment is nowhere clearer than in Greece, it is not surprising that the 
sector of  the population most vulnerable to unemployment, the youth, 
are the first to join in an insurrection. It is precisely at school where the 
relations of  production (the assignment to jobs) are reproduced, but in 
Greece even a newly minted doctorate speaking half-a-dozen languages 
is lucky to find a job as a waiter. The second to revolt will naturally 
be the immigrants, who are sensitive to the disappearance of  even the 
most precarious jobs in the underworld of  the economy. The last to re-
volt will always be the workers, whose identity and life is most strongly 
invested in the reproduction of  capitalism, and who have benefited the 
most over the last years. The workers, the last of  revolutionaries, are 
now joining the insurrection in Greece, as shown by their behaviour in 
May 2010, despite the Communist Party of  Greece desperately trying 
to police them.
What is the spring from which the insurrectionary process in 
Greece swells, despite the social war of  the state? The answer is obvious 
to anyone who has been to the country: the source of  the insurrection 
in Greece comes from multitudinous social relationships of  the people 
there. Walk in the streets of  Exarcheia or even a small Greek village and 
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what is striking in comparison with the desolate city streets of  Northern 
Europe or North America is that there are simply people everywhere, 
chatting, sipping frappés, laying about—not working at all. In Greece, 
almost unique in modern Europe, life is still intertwined with innumer-
able rich social relationships, letting the streets of  Athens essentially 
remain a social space. What is self-evident is that the source of  their 
insurrectionary strength comes from the historical fact that Greece 
never went through industrial capitalism and the attendant process of  
subsumption: the bulk of  the population went straight from an agrar-
ian world to that of  post-modern late capitalism. So social relationships 
are still mostly intact; one still sees extended families living together, 
people returning to one’s family village and the islands for the sum-
mer, gangs of  friends growing up together in a single neighbourhood, 
the Orthodox church engaging in strange rituals of  fire—and warning 
against multinational corporations that “have no face.” The general 
populace does not trust the state, and rightfully views it at best as some-
thing to be robbed or destroyed, and capitalism as a practice best left 
to the family or individual. Not so much a metropolis in the sense of  
Paris or London; Athens can be considered a mega-village in process of  
transformation to a proper capitalist metropolis, a hopeless amalgam of  
social relations based on friendship, gossip, and family (and thus often 
repressive in a regressive manner). Contra Negri, Greece was not trans-
formed into a “social” factory (much less the use of  Facebook!) leaving 
the subjectivity of  Greeks as a bulwark of  resistance to capital. What 
the murder of  Alexis of  December did was to provoke and mobilise this 
pre-capitalist subjectivity—which like any pre-capitalist subjectivity, has 
a notion of  blood-debt that is foreign to the careless murder part and 
parcel of  capitalism. 
This pre-capitalist subjectivity serves as a possible hidden so-
cial reservoir of  resistance to capitalist subsumption, but is it unique to 
Greece? Of  course not—if  anything these pre-capitalist subjectivities 
are the submerged around the globe. Due to the generalised betrayal 
and destruction of  any sort of  “progressive” anti-capitalist politics at 
the hands of  Stalinism and the inability of  the renewed anarchist move-
ment of  the last two decades to escape its own minoritarian identity 
politics, in times of  crisis the general population falls back increasingly 
on to pre-capitalist subjectivities. Some of  these are classical nationalist 
or ethnic “right-wing” movements, although many of  them are at least 
superficially for the reduction of  the state (such as the Tea Party in the 
US) or religious international forces (political Islam). Further subjectivi-
ties like these can be compatible with capital and so are simultaneously 
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recuperated as its very vanguard. This is to be expected, as the false 
dichotomy between objectivity and subjectivity is itself  a product of  
capital, and many of  these “pre-capitalist” subjectivities are at least in 
part creations of  spectacular capitalism itself.
The situation of  Greek subjectivity serving as the basis for the 
insurrection shows that even these pre-capitalist subjectivities can ex-
press a truth that is antagonistic to capital, a truth that can burst forth 
as an insurrection. In this historical period, a homogeneous interna-
tionalism cannot be majoritarian. The only abstract truth reflected by 
“identity politics” is that the mass of  subjectivities have at their heart 
particular truths of  domination. However, must the insurrection rely 
on pre-capitalist subjectivities? By this logic, there is no hope for in-
surrection among the more fully subsumed forms of  life in places like 
the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany—except possi-
bly from those non-integrated immigrants and permanent underclasses 
(African Americans, Celtic minorities, Turkish groups). Worse, the in-
surrectional process could be combined with a sort of  half-baked na-
tionalism—“of  course they are having an insurrection, that’s just what 
they do in Greece.” This concoction fails to take into account the most 
elementary of  truths: Empire is the truly universal condition of  catas-
trophe created by capital.
This common condition of  catastrophe, brought about by the 
subsumption of  all forms of  life to capital, is the real abstraction that 
provides grounds for unity across all differences and so can provide real 
content to a new Internationale. To the extent that this lived experience 
of  domination and destruction is common, it reduces all differences 
to contingencies, although of  course the insurrectional process must 
take these regional variations in subjectivity into account. As capital 
is a historical rather than transcendental force, it is not surprising that 
the level of  subsumption varies from region to region. Yet insurrection-
ists should neither wait till the forces of  subsumption equalise (which 
while theoretically possible, is unlikely due to both regressive forces and 
the crisis) nor depend on an imported identity. Instead, insurrectionists 
must first explore the common conditions of  their home in order to 
discover how each pre-capitalist subjectivity expresses a particular re-
sistance to the universal truth of  capitalist subsumption. This requires 
revolutionaries to both affirm the differences in their life-worlds on the 
level of  tactics and unite globally on the level of  strategy. In Greece, the 
insurrectionists must be carefully attuned to the themes of  civil war and 
total freedom that resonate throughout a society that lived for centuries 
under foreign rule, while in Great Britain, insurrectionists should attune 
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themselves to the violent expropriation of  the land from the peasantry 
(and thus the love of  the land and animals deeply imprinted on Brit-
ish subjectivity) and historic defeat of  the worker’s world by Thatcher. 
The history of  every pre-capitalist subjectivity should be understood in 
order to make the concept of  insurrection resonate in the widest pos-
sible circles and instead of  looking to the past, the insurrection needs 
to create a new kind of  subjectivity whose horizon is a living anarchy 
yet to come. 
Insurrection can—and must—be re-thought in a majoritarian 
manner. While it may be impossible to destroy identity entirely, insurrec-
tionists can abolish their identity “as insurrectionaries” by acting in such 
a way that tends to dissolve the boundaries inherent in a social terrain 
divided up into identities, rather than just falling back into the even more 
isolated subjectivity of  “the anarchist who has a critique of  identity.” 
The kinds of  acts that dissolve any separatist identity are those—from 
propaganda to direct action to daily life— that show there exists some 
new collective force against the social war, an “open conspiracy” where 
anyone can participate in and form new social relationships in some 
meaningful way. The insurrectionary process is not the social war of  a 
few lonely anarchists condemned to being a permanent minority; it is 
the renewal of  humanity’s social relationships that ends the social war, 
revealing all relationships as immediately social by abolishing the media-
tion of  the commodity. As the insurrection spreads, the sign of  its suc-
cess will be that revolutionaries will become indiscernible from the wider 
population, the concrete realisation of  what even Marx glimpsed in his 
theory of  the self-abolition of  the proletariat.
Revolution is the horizon that insurrection aims towards, oth-
erwise all acts become mere resistance to a supposed permanent state 
of  capitalism. Instead of  wholesale abandoning the collective knowl-
edge of  the anti-globalisation movement, the insurrectionary process 
can breathe new revolutionary content into form of  the network by 
opening this knowledge to everyone—but from the perspective of  in-
surrection. The first step is to open the storehouse of  technical knowl-
edge to the general population, rather than sharing these techniques 
only with those who “fit” some absurd identity. The act of  creating a 
Molotov cocktail should not be the secret technique of  “summit-hop-
ping” anarchists, but a technique that is known by every schoolchild. 
The ability to grow food and build houses should not be confined to 
bourgeois hobbyists, but part of  the common heritage that every parent 
should teach their young. The courage to speak in an assembly should 
not be the province of  a few “professional” anarchist men (who tend to 
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always say the same thing) but an ability shared by even the most self-
effacing of  men and women. There are some that believe that somehow 
the anarchist identity as ideology is necessary to spread the opposition 
of  authority to the general population. What is necessary to spread op-
position to authority is not yet another identity or book about why au-
thority is “bad.” Opposition to authority—a genuine lived anarchy—
can spread through the real collective social relationships involved in 
learning how to get organised, so the population has the material base 
to resist authority. Otherwise anarchist ideology remains pure idealism, 
with no means to prevent authoritarian power dynamics.
Open assemblies are the primary form that allows insurrection-
ary content to resonate with anyone interested enough to attend, and so 
spread networks with revolutionary content. It is almost sad that the fo-
cus on the fire and flames of  Greece led many outside observers to miss 
the open assemblies in the occupied Universities that spread through-
out even union-halls and small villages. Assemblies and occupations of  
buildings provide a space where new kinds of  social relationships could 
form and multiply, so that people previously isolated and atomised from 
each other could form a collective force. Of  course, in Argentina such 
assemblies were eventually co-opted by authoritarians and leftists. To 
prevent this, insurrectionary assemblies should differ in quality from any 
so-called “constituent” assembly that creates another state in embryo, 
and the more self-conscious insurrectionary elements should force out 
any signs of  state collaboration or professional activism, although care 
should be taken to not impose a singular viewpoint—or worse, identity—
on the assembly. The form of  these assemblies will differ from activist 
consensus meetings. For most things, consensus matters little (although 
of  course, it may be used as necessary); what matters is the development 
of  a common feeling and space to debate tactics and strategy. 
These insurrectionary assemblies should ask new kinds of  
questions that go beyond street protests. In an era where all political 
ideas are dead, it is in these assemblies that the post-political material 
questions about how to seize control of  life from capital can be asked: 
How to raise children and nurse the wounded, how to never work at a 
job again yet provide bread and wine at the table, how to both destroy 
an economy and survive without one? Any particular open assembly 
will not have all the answers; often the requisite technical knowledge 
may simply be elsewhere, so the insurrection must grow and encompass 
more and more people. The assembly may need to go to the despair-
ing workers of  factories, to the elderly farmers of  the fields, the isolated 
technicians of  computers, to the outcast immigrants who still preserve 
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their form of  life, and it must gather their complicity by asking them 
directly and honestly: How can we create a new form of  life without 
capitalism? Given the asylum of  the University occupations in Greece, 
hosting an open assembly on insurrection is considerably easier there 
than in many other countries, but in any country such assemblies can 
form. After the excitement of  the riot ends, the open and insurrection-
ary assembly is of  utmost importance to continue.
The relationship of  action to the growth of  the insurrection is 
complex. The level of  technique ideally spreads in step with the gener-
alised level of  civil war, as not to prematurely isolate the insurrection. Of  
course there is a tendency to go clandestine as soon as repression attacks 
public forms of  insurrection like demonstrations or assemblies. How-
ever, more important than the amount of  damage inflicted is the growth 
of  public support for insurrection. One tactic is to focus on actions that 
can be easily replicated, as this undermines the spectacular relationship 
of  passive citizens to professional “insurrectionaries.” We know that in 
Greece even some schoolchildren can make barricades and fight cops in 
the streets. Dangerously, the power of  the spectacle can even spread the 
insurrection, as the burning Christmas tree spelled for all of  Greece that 
the capitalist symbolic order was dissolving and something new was hap-
pening. The important aspect then is not the attack by itself, but whether 
or not the attack spreads the insurrection in combination with other ac-
tivities —which is precisely what an attack on the Christmas tree did in 
connection with thousands of  posters calling to gather in the Polytechnic 
or elsewhere to discuss what to do next and thousands of  other attacks. 
Direct actions are the spread and self-defence of  a new kind of  form of  
life, and so can even create new and more intense social relationships 
amongst all who are complicit, whatever the level of  involvement.
With every new form of  life, there is also a new metaphysics. 
This new way of  being comes only with a little shift, but one that makes 
all the difference. This new kind of  metaphysics is not mere idealism, 
but a new material manner of  being in the world. For example, let us 
consider an assembly in a public space to plan a demonstration. To be 
in a meeting in the light of  a capitalist metaphysics of  isolated indi-
viduals, an individual who advocates an action may appear to be very 
brave, while another individual who expresses some fear that the plan 
will go wrong could be thought to be a coward. By being in an assembly 
through the lens of  a new metaphysics that takes social relationships 
as the foundation of  reality, one person may be expressing a sort of  
bravery that resonates with everyone, but the other is expressing equally 
validly the concerns and fear that everyone in the assembly feels but 
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has been too cowardly themselves too articulate. These fluxes of  fear 
and courage roll over the assembly like waves, until eventually it either 
dissipates into mere individuals or there is a phase transition into a new 
kind of  collectivity, leading to the articulation of  a plan by the assembly 
as a single body. The action itself  becomes an articulation of  a collec-
tive intelligence.
If  Italy in the 1970s was the last gasp of  the abortive revolu-
tion of  May 1968, the insurrection of  2008 in Greece was something 
new: the first strike in a new round of  global civil war after the financial 
crisis of  2008. The terrain of  battle has inevitably changed. The social 
war cannot be fought against by the militaristic means of  a vanguard 
party, even if  that vanguard party has the content of  anarchist activ-
ism or nihilism rather than the content of  Leninism. Instead, the social 
war can only be fought by multiplying new forms of  social relationships, 
and this can be done by taking the friendships that emerge temporarily 
in a riot or an occupation and determining what material organisation 
is necessary to sustain them to the point where they can reproduce of  
their own accord. The social war can only attack us when we are alone, 
but in open assemblies or in our most private of  bedrooms, one by one, 
the lonely citizens can help form the collective intelligence necessary to 
defend and spread the insurrection. Anarchists no longer have to be con-
tent to be the perpetual losers of  a social war, but can escape their iden-
tity to become only the first of  those touched by the spreading common 
feeling for insurrection, and thus must bear the responsibility to bring its 
material organisation into being by re-appropriating the dead forms of  
activism and giving them life with insurrectionary content. 
The events of  December in 2008 were the first moment in a 
global insurrectionary process, a process that may (or may not) take 
years to develop in other countries to the same level as in Greece. Un-
fortunately it was to be expected that the Greek insurrection would not 
to spread outside the country except amongst a few isolated anarchists. 
Worse, after the events of  May 2010 the fire that seemed to spark in 
Greece appeared to have evaporated. Yet what appears to be the evapo-
ration of  the insurrection may only be the dislocation in time of  the 
Greek insurrection from the other moments of  global insurrection. Fur-
ther intensification of  the pacifying operations of  the social war has al-
ready led to its backfiring, as people globally become unemployed and 
so find it increasingly difficult to avoid the profound existential crisis of  
capitalist labour, and may thus be forced by the material breakdown of  
capital to take sides. The long-term case for global insurrection is com-
pelling given the decline of  capital’s global rate of  profit and possible 
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limits to growth. In the short-term, insurrections may also break out 
overnight, and each insurrectionary moment will take on its own char-
acter. In France in 2010, the student and the youth from the banlieus, 
whose revolts were formerly entirely separated by their identities in 2005 
and 2006, merged forces in common cause against capital with striking 
workers, and without a strong anarchist movement providing exemplary 
actions. Even after May 2010, all signs point to the fact that the people 
of  Greece will be unable to tolerate further austerity cuts, so that the 
Greek insurrection could return with renewed ferocity at any moment. 
The insurrectionary process should not become trapped as merely a se-
ries of  concrete insurrections, evaporating after each of  these moments 
ends, but link each concrete visible moment into a global one.
It can be the task of  our generation to fulfil the potential of  all 
failed insurrections. This means that the future insurrection in Greece 
must go beyond the limits of  2008: rather than merely the destruction 
of  shopfronts in some sort of  fiery apocalypse, insurrection signals the 
difficult transition to a new form of  life beyond capitalism and the state. 
This new form of  life must come with a new kind of  metaphysics no 
longer based on individual identity, and it is this new collective meta-
physics that we glimpse when we lose ourselves in a rave, fall in love, 
join in a riot—which is precisely why we return to such events again and 
again. On a more subterranean level it is even possible such a feeling is 
spreading throughout the everyday life of  the citizens of  empire. This is 
revealed best by this real story that could also be apocryphal: 
As the financial crisis continued to take its toll on Greece, a British magazine 
did an expose revealing that Greeks were—against all tenets of  being good 
citizens!— spending money on parties and absurdly expensive gifts. When the 
BBC reporter asked one of  the Greeks why he was enjoying himself  in the 
midst of  a crisis, a party-goer said that ‘everyone deserves a beautiful life’.
Other ways of  having a beautiful life are possible; one sees such 
beautiful smiles on the faces of  those who remember the insurrection 
of  December. Just as the metaphysics of  Western civilisation was born 
in Athens, so it must die there. May something more beautiful emerge 
in its wake.
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default, de· fault, / di'fôlt/ 
1. Act of  failing to meet a financial obligation.
2. Nonpayment: loss resulting from failure of  a debt to be paid.
3. Loss due to not showing up; “he lost the game by default.”
4. Default option: an option that is selected automatically unless an alternative 
is specified.
“At the time when these lines were written”: a disclaimer running 
through many contributions in this book, an acknowledgment that 
these are fluid times in which we find ourselves, an understanding that 
things might be—that they probably will be—completely different by 
the time writers have completed their articles, by the time the book goes 
to print, by the time readers get to hold it in their hands.
At the time when these lines were written, then, the Greek state 
was “about to” throw itself  into the turmoil of  emergency elections 
and by the looks of  it—to default. This long “about to” moment has 
conveniently thrown much of  the likely resistance in limbo; it is not 
easy, after all, to resist something supposedly not happening yet… Not 
yet? Wild, almost unimaginable changes have been sweeping the coun-
try since the revolt of  2008. In these two, long years we saw the end 
of  post-dictatorial social consensus—the end of  whatever welfare state 
that had ever existed around here, the end of  workplace relations as we 
knew them (hell, for so many—the end of  workplaces altogether), the 
end of  public and free education. We saw a frantic increase in policing, 
CAPITALISM BY DEFAULT
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and an end to whatever tiny crumbs of  tolerance to migration that ever 
existed. So many “ends,” all pointing at the end of  capitalist order as-
we-knew-it; the shattering of  all those tiny bits that held together the 
mosaic of  normality.
In a sense the future is already here. The welfare state, mild 
capitalism, post-WWII consensus, the American dream and all its re-
gional variations are well and truly gone. Yet the past still haunts us. 
The state of  emergency as a mode of  rule; that old things-are-bad-ask-
no-questions trick hasn’t come out of  the rulers hat for the first time. 
The state of  emergency is pumped out to an extreme—brute force is 
more brute and longer-lasting than ever, and as wall poster in Athens 
reads: “As carrots run out sticks become plenty.”
What times! The certainties of  capitalist rule crumble and fall, 
one after the other. Why won’t the rulers even bother to prevent the 
unveiling of  the humanist façade of  their rule—is this some obnoxious-
ness on their part? Hardly so. A systemic crisis is, after all, exactly that: 
systemic. It would take more than a few obnoxious leaders (or clumsy, 
inexperienced, totalitarian, or simply too “progressive” and “lenient” 
ones for that matter) to destabilise the existing system of  order. Change 
simply runs much deeper than any single one of  them. Why is capital-
ist rule nakedly exposing its ruthlessness then—could it be out of  fear? 
After all, the wounded animal will sometimes grind its teeth; a show of  
force can be a sign of  desperation.
The 2008 uprising in Greece, the troubled fall of  2010 in 
France, the string of  revolutions in Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt 
in the same year show that there is good reason for fear to nest in the 
minds of  the rulers, fear that people might, and in fact can rise up. In 
2008 Greece, in Exarcheia, a cop’s bullet and a dead boy was the spark 
that caused the boiling rage of  many to spill out onto the streets. In 
2010 France the rage was against the nude new capitalist realm as a 
whole. A single pretext was no longer necessary. Have we reached that 
point, that moment in time when sparks are not even needed, when 
people will rise up against order, period? 
How easy and convenient it would be to think so. But the 
Greek experience in the time of  the IMF so far has taught us a few 
bitter lessons. 
Lesson number one—a revolt does not happen by default. Just 
because “things are too difficult,” people won’t automatically become 
active. And if  they do, it might be for the wrong reasons altogether. 
Lesson number two—when a revolt does happen, as in 2008, 
its legacy is precious. It gets inscribed in our spaces of  the everyday, it 
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livens up our practice and inspires us as a possible direction into which 
change may head.
Lesson number three—the legacy of  an unfinished revolt can 
also be a burden. It remains as a painful memory of  change that came 
to a halt; of  the counter-insurgency launched by authority, of  the limit 
inherent in some of  our own practices even, which can become a coun-
ter-insurgency force in itself—as the deaths of  5 May in Athens were 
sure to show.
We take these lessons into the time of  post-revolt and we move 
on. Every part of  this book reads what happened in December as a 
mostly unwritten, unfinished chapter—as the first instant of  a long, 
long moment of  transition in which we stand.
Here we stand, staring at the frantic collapse of  reality as we 
knew it, just as frantic as mass euphoria had been only a few years ago 
in this part of  the world, when the local variation of  capitalist rule 
seemed to be taking after its elder western siblings.
Here we stand, in our collective not-yet-awake moment, 
just when the dream turns into a nightmare, when the past defaults 
and crumbles but doesn’t quite fall. For now, and now only, it re-
mains by default.
Here we stand, between a present yet to pass and a future still 
to come.
Occupied London Collective, Spring 2011 
POSTSCRIPT: CAPITALISM BY DEFAULT
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17 NOVEMBER 1973. After several days of  anti-junta protests situated mainly in 
downtown Athens and particularly around the universities, tanks, police, and soldiers 
storm the Athens Polytechnic. Clashes follow and more than forty protesters are killed. 
To this day, this date is a point of  reference for the antagonistic movement in the country. 
1979–1980. The first post-junta mass student movement. Universities and schools are 
occupied by students against the so-called educational reform. The Prime Minister, 
Konstantinos Karamanlis (Senior), is forced to withdraw the education act. 
17 NOVEMBER 1980. During the march commemorating the 1973 revolt, barricades are 
erected and clashes with the police take place around the House of  Parliament. On that 
night the worker Stamatina Kanelopoulou and the student Iakovos Koumis are murdered 
by the police. No police officer has ever been held responsible for the two deaths. 
DECEMBER 1984. Hotel Caravel in Athens is attacked by thousands of  anarchists and 
far-leftists, causing the cancellation of  an extreme-right conference where Jean-Marie 
Le Pen of  the French National Front had been invited to give a speech.
17 NOVEMBER 1985. During the annual march commemorating the 1973 revolt, fresh 
clashes erupt between youth and the police. In these street fights, 15-year-old Michalis 
Kaltezas is shot in the back of  the head by MAT officer Athanasios Melistas. Major 
clashes follow in Athens. The Chemical School and the Polytechnic are occupied on the 
same night. On the next day, police are given permission by the university authorities 
to storm the building and make arrests in what was the first withdrawal of  the 
“constitutionally secured” academic asylum. Melistas is sentenced to a suspended two-
and-a-half-year sentence. In 1990, the sentence was overturned at the court of  appeal, 
a decision which led to fresh clashes with the police in the major cities of  Greece.
A BRIEF TIMELINE OF MAJOR PROTESTS 
AND REVOLTS IN ATHENS BETWEEN 
NOVEMBER 1973 AND DECEMBER 2010
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1990–1991. A new student movement that would resist and eventually prevent another 
governmental attempt to “reform education”—namely to limit the provision of  free 
public education—emerges. More than 1,500 high schools and most universities were 
fully occupied for several weeks after the respective decisions of  their assemblies. 
Demonstrations of  several thousand people flooded the streets of  every Greek city and 
town and severe clashes with the police and attacks on governmental buildings took 
place on a weekly basis while the occupied schools became cells of  political activity, 
discussion, and popular resistance to the government. Eventually, joint operations by 
police and members of  the governing party (ND) attacked schools and tried to remove 
the protesting students and teachers. Nikos Temponeras, a mathematics teacher, was 
murdered by right-wing thugs while defending his school. His assassin was Kalampokas, 
a distinguished member of  ND’s local branch in the city of  Patras. Temponeras’s death 
was followed by two days of  major protests and clashes in Patras, Athens, Thessaloniki, 
and other cities.  
17 NOVEMBER 1995. During the events commemorating the 1973 anti-junta revolt, 
anarchists occupy the Athens Polytechnic. The occupation was in solidarity with the 
prisoners of  Greece’s largest prison of  Korydallos, who were in revolt those days, as 
well as with the imprisoned anarchist hunger strikers Christophoros Marinos and 
Kostas Kalaremas. The assembly in the occupied Polytechnic numbered more than a 
thousand participants, while clashes with riot police were taking place all night long in 
the streets around the Polytechnic. Once again, the PASOK government would revoke 
academic asylum, and riot police would storm the institution, arresting more than 500 
occupiers the next morning.
1996–1997. Teachers’ unions all around the country go on strike for several weeks, 
halting most schools’ operation in order to resist the reform of  their working conditions. 
Marches, road blockades, and clashes with the police take place almost every week 
across the country. 
17 NOVEMBER 1998. During the commemoration events for the 1973 revolt, 153 
anarchists are arrested outside the gates of  the Athens Polytechnic during a joint 
operation by riot police (MAT) and the Communist Party’s Youth (KNE), which in the 
previous few years had emerged as the self-appointed steward of  the commemorative 
demonstration. This event signified the long distance that KNE had travelled towards 
conservative practices and Stalinist authoritarianism, a process that was inaugurated by 
the KNE condemnation of  the 17 November 1973 uprising.
1998–1999. Fresh attempts to vote in an education reform bill give birth to a new high 
school student movement that storms the country: high schools and universities are 
occupied while tens of  thousands of  students march in Athens. An attempt by the 
Communist Party to hijack the movement fails as autonomous students take political 
control of  most schools.
SEPTEMBER 2000. Activists from Greece quickly join forces with the movement against 
the globalisation of  sovereignty. Soon after the battle of  Seattle, many hundreds of  
Greek far-leftists and anarchists travel to Prague to protest against the IMF/WB 
summit in the city.
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JULY 2001. Several thousand anarchists and far-leftists from Greece travel to Italy to 
take part in the Genoa anti-G8 mobilisations.
DECEMBER 2001. Hundreds of  Greek activists travel to Brussels to participate in 
the pan-European trade unions’ demonstration, during and against that year’s EU 
summit. EU leaders were discussing the European constitution and common policies 
on privatisation, asylum, unemployment, security, surveillance, and “terrorism.” 
JUNE 2003. Greece hosts the EU leaders’ summit in the northern city of  Thessaloniki. 
During the protests, a more than 4,000-strong black bloc marches through the city 
while several thousands from the left participate in the demonstration.
2004. The year of  the Athens Olympic Games. During the previous three years, several 
constitutional rights were withdrawn, special anti-terrorist laws came into force, and 
armed police presence had increased dramatically in public spaces. One year before the 
Games, Athens resembled a city occupied by police brigades, while more than 1,000 
police-operated CCTV had appeared. Still, the introduction of  CCTV was resisted 
en masse by anarchists who organised several actions sabotaging the majority of  these 
cameras. In the name of  a “successful” Olympiad, public money was wasted on useless 
infrastructure, most of  which has remained unused ever since. Major construction 
contractors monopolised the building of  expensive infrastructure such as stadiums, 
highways, and airports. This allocation of  enormous amounts of  public money to 
private businesses paved the way for the crisis that would follow a few years later. 
MAY 2005.  The closing demonstration of  Athens Social Forum gathers the unexpected 
number of  circa 70,000 participants. Making visible a growing part of  the population 
which identifies with left and anti-authoritarian ideas but does not have any explicit 
political group or party affiliation. 
2006–2007. Yet another attempt by a Greek government to reform higher education, 
this time following the guides set by the neoliberal EU Bologna agreement for 
higher education. The attempted reform triggers a student movement that spreads 
across the country. General assemblies of  students decide university occupations 
and protest against the plan to limit the free public education. During one of  these 
demonstrations, a policeman guarding a ministry in Athens shoots into the air trying 
to intimidate the protesters. Parliament eventually voted the law in during major 
clashes outside the building.
AUGUST 2007. Vast forest fires destroy some of  the most beautiful parts of  the country. 
It is clear to most people that the economic interests of  developers played a major role 
in the fires. The underfunding of  the fire service leaves neither enough firefighters nor 
enough firefighting equipment available. The Prime Minister, Costas Karamanlis, claims 
that “Greece was under attack.” Other governmental sources spread information that 
either anarchists or the political opposition have set the fires. A rally several thousand 
strong takes place in front of  the House of  Parliament protesting against big developers 
and the government. 
FEBRUARY 2008. A few dozen neo-Nazis attempt to march in central Athens and several 
hundred anti-fascists organise a counter-march, with clashes erupting all around, in 
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what was one of  the largest and most intense anti-fascist street fights in recent years.
NOVEMBER 2008. Approximately 8,000 prison inmates revolt and participate in a mass 
hunger strike, demanding more humane jail conditions. A strong prisoner solidarity 
movement is formed only weeks before the December revolt.
6 DECEMBER 2008. Alexis Grigoropoulos, a 15-year-old high-school student, is shot in 
the chest by police officer Epameinontas Korkoneas. The murder triggers a profound 
revolt across and beyond the country’s borders.
17 NOVEMBER 2009. Almost 100 people, mostly teenagers, are detained in Athens 
during and following the events commemorating the 1973 anti-junta revolt. The police 
talk of  “pre-emptive detentions,” admitting these people had not committed any illegal 
acts.
6 DECEMBER 2009. Several thousand people march in the major cities of  Greece to 
commemorate the revolt of  December 2008. Almost 1,000 people are detained or 
arrested before and during the marches.
5 MAY 2010. The Greek parliament votes to receive a €110 billion loan from the IMF/
EU/ECB, effectively making Greece the first euro zone country to ever agree to an 
IMF loan. During the vote, hundreds of  thousands demonstrate outside the House of  
Parliament. Protesters attempt to storm parliament and clashes erupt for hours all over 
Athens. A bank branch on Stadiou Street is set on fire and three bank clerks die from 
the fumes.
6 DECEMBER 2010. For a second consecutive year, several thousand demonstrators 
gather to commemorate the revolt of  December 2008 in Athens and most Greek cities.
15 DECEMBER 2010. General strike against the austerity measures imposed by the 
government and the IMF/EU/ECB, the seventh in that year alone.
 337
17 NOVEMBER: Originally refers to 17 November 1973. On that date, tanks, the 
army and police attacked students and other protesters who had occupied the Athens 
Polytechnic protesting against the dictatorship. Since then, a commemorative march 
has taken every year in Athens, from the Polytechnic to the US Embassy. 
ACADEMIC ASYLUM: A constitutional provision for safeguarding academic freedom, 
under which the police and armed forces have no right to enter university grounds 
without prior permission of  the university’s asylum committee.
ANTAGONIST MOVEMENT: Deriving from the 1970s tradition of  the autonomia in 
Italy, this is an all-encompassing term used to describe the far-left, anti-authoritarian, 
and anarchist movement.
ANTARTIS[ML]; ANTARTISA[FML]: A guerrilla. The term was used to describe those 
who joined the Resistance against the Axis occupation of  Greece in WWII (1940–
1944), especially those who went to the mountains. The same term was used for those 
who joined the communist forces during the civil war (1946–1949). 
ANTIPAROCHI: A system for building apartment blocks, applied en masse for several 
decades in Greece following WWII. Antiparochi brings together in a single joint 
venture operation a landowner and a (small) building contractor, who jointly divide the 
built property produced by the latter on the owner’s parcel. Antiparochi received tax 
privileges and profited from the general increase in construction coefficients in 1968, 
becoming the sole system for condominium building until the late 1970s (Maloutas & 
Karadimitriou 2001).
BASE UNIONS: First degree workers unions developed mostly in precarious work-
GLOSSARY 
REVOLT AND CRISIS IN GREECE
338
places during recent years, partially in an attempt to overcome the reformism and 
bureaucratic structures of  already existing unions.
DEKEMVRIANA (LIT. “[EVENTS]OF DECEMBER”): At the end of  1944 the command 
of  British troops stationed in Athens ordered the complete disarming of  all Resistance 
organisations within ten days. In response, EAM (National Liberation Front, which 
initiated the largest and most active Resistance group during the occupation) called for 
a demonstration in central Athens. On the day, more than 200,000 marched through 
the city. The police, along with British Forces and former Nazi collaborators of  the X 
group, who had been re-employed by the new regime, opened fire on the demonstrators, 
killing twenty-eight of  them. This attack led to thirty-seven days of  clashes between 
EAM and British troops, who fought on the side of  smaller Greek armed units faithful 
to the enforced government. The Dekemvriana ended officially with the peace treaty 
of  Varkiza. The term Dekemvriana has also been used in reference to the December 
2008 revolt. 
EMFYLIOS (CIVIL WAR): The war between the Greek Governmental Army and the 
Democratic Army of  Greece (DSE) between 1946 and 1949. This is considered to 
be the first major conflict of  the Cold War, because the UK and USA supported the 
governmental army while the socialist regimes of  the Balkans supported DSE. DSE 
was fundamentally controlled by KKE and was formed mostly of  former guerrillas 
who had fought for years against the Axis occupation of  the country. The governmental 
army faced severe losses and failures until 1948, yet increased foreign aid combined 
with DSE’s decreasing international aid resources and numerical strength ultimately 
led to DSE’s defeat.  
POLYTECHNIC GENERATION (GENIA TOU POLYTECHNEIOU): Those involved as 
young students or workers in the anti-junta struggle and particularly in the November 
1973 Polytechnic uprising. The term often has negative connotations when referring 
to politicians, journalists, or other figures of  power who will mention their Polytechnic 
credentials in order to justify their subsequent reactionary practices or discourses. 
GOLDEN DAWN: A neo-Nazi group founded in the early 1990s. The leader of  the 
group won a seat on the city council of  Athens in the 2010 municipal elections, the first 
time Golden Dawn had been elected to political representation. 
JUNTA: The seven-year-long colonels’ dictatorship (1967–1974) that started on 21 April 
1967 when a group of  colonels under Georgios Papadopoulos staged a coup supported 
by the US government. It ended with a transition of  power to civilian politicians in 
1974 and elections in November 1974. Whether the post-dictatorial state inherited 
several of  the dictatorship’s legacies remains a contested issue, especially in terms of  its 
oppressive state apparatus. 
KOUKOLOFOROI (LIT. HOOD-WEARERS): Somebody who wears a hood or a 
balaclava during demonstrations. The corporate media use the term pejoratively and 
often almost as a synonym for “anarchist.”
KOUKOLONOMOS (LIT. THE HOODS’ LAW): A law introduced in the summer of  
2009 which dictated that all petty crimes committed by protesters in hoods or balaclavas 
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would receive an enhanced sentence. The introduction of  the law has been directly 
linked to the aftermaths of  December’s revolt.
METAPOLITEFSI (LIT. POLITICAL TRANSITION): The term used to describe 
the historical period of  modern Greek history that follows the end of  the colonels’ 
dictatorship (1974). Many believe the revolt of  December 2008 to signify the end of  
Metapolitefsi.
POLYKATOIKIA (LIT. MANY RESIDENCIES): The most common type of  housing 
building in Athens. These are multi-storey buildings made mainly out of  concrete. Their 
mass construction started after WWII and boomed during the 1960s and 1970s. They 
were promoted by the authorities through antiparochi (see above). With the vertical 
segregation of  its residents (higher classes living in upper floors) and their mixed use 
(commercial and housing), the polykatoikia played a key role in shaping the character 
of  contemporary Greek cities.
POLYTECHNIC UPRISING: The anti-junta protest of  university students that started 
on 14 November 1973 and which escalated into a popular uprising and an occupation 
of  the Athens Polytechnic by students and other protesters, lasting for three days. 
Thousands joined the protests, but in the early morning of  17 November 1973 an army 
tank crashed the front gate of  the Polytechnic, followed by a full-scale attack by police 
and the army resulting in the deaths of  at least forty protesters.  
REVOLTED (EKSEGERMENOI [PL]): The term has been used widely within the 
antagonist social movement in Greece to describe participants in the 2008 revolt. The 
use of  the term—otherwise uncommon in English—has been deemed necessary in 
order to describe the composition of  the revolt’s participants: neither exactly insurgents 
(which would imply more war-like characteristics) nor simply protesters. 
STEKI [SNGLR], STEKIA [PLRL] (LIT. “HANGOUT,” WHERE PEOPLE HANG 
AROUND OFTEN): In the Greek social antagonist movement, the term steki has been 
used to describe spaces—rented or occupied, in universities or other urban areas—used 
by a single group or by groups in close affinity with each other. While most stekia are 
open to the public, they are distinctively different to social centres in that they are most 
often associated with a much tighter group or politics.
SYNASPISMOS: The Coalition of  the Left of  Movements and Ecology, a parliamentary 
party which originates from KKE (int) [see acronyms]. In late 1980s was an electoral 
coalition of  both KKE and KKE (int), but soon became a new party mostly identified 
with KKE (int.) agenda. Today is the largest party of  SYRIZA [see acronyms].  
GLOSSARY
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ALEXANDROS (ALEXIS) GRIGOROPOULOS: the 15-year-old student murdered by 
the police officer Epameinondas Korkoneas on 6 December 2008 in Exarcheia.
ANDREAS PAPANDREOU: Prime Minister of  Greece 1981–1989 and 1993–1996 
(Social Democrat).
ASOEE: The campus of  the Athens University of  Economics and Business, located on 
Patision Avenue a few blocks north of  Polytechneio [See Acronyms].
ATHENS POLYTECHNIC (POLYTECHNEIO): The historical building of  the National 
Technological University of  Athens, located in Patision Avenue. It was the epicentre of  
the 17 November 1973 anti-junta uprising. Much anarchist and other radical activity 
has been centred there since then. 
CHEMISTRY SCHOOL (CHIMEIO): The old building of  the Chemistry School of  the 
University of  Athens, located on Solonos Street.
COSTAS SIMITIS: Prime Minister of  Greece 1996–2004 (Social Democrat).
EXARCHEIA: The central Athens neighbourhood where radical, anarchist, and far-left 
spaces and political activity are concentrated. Alexandros Grigoropoulos was murdered 
there on 6 December 2008. 
GEORGE PAPANDREOU: Prime Minister of  Greece since 2009 (Social Democrat).
GEORGIOS PAPANDREOU (SENIOR): Prime Minister of  Greece, 1944–1945, 1963, 
and 1964–1965.
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IAKOVOS KOUMIS: A university student murdered by police on 17 November 
1980 during clashes between demonstrators and the police in front of  the House of  
Parliament in Athens.
KOLONAKI: The most bourgeois district of  central Athens, with the highest property 
values and expensive boutique shops, high-class bars and cafés. It is adjacent to the 
House of  Parliament but also to Exarcheia.
KONSTANTINOS KARAMANLIS (SENIOR): Prime Minister of  Greece 1955–1963 
and the first post-dictatorial PM (1974–1980).
KOSTAS KARAMANLIS: Prime Minister of  Greece 2004–2009 (Conservative).
LELAS KARAGIANNI: One of  the oldest anarchist squats in Athens, located on Lelas 
Karagianni St. 
MESOLOGEIOU: One of  the most vibrant street in Exarcheia, also the site of  
assassination of  Alexandros Grigoropoulos. 
MICHALIS KALTEZAS: The 15 year-old student killed by a police officer of  the riot 
police unit (MAT) on 17 November 1985, during clashes in Exarcheia.
NAVARINOU PARK: A self-organised open-air space in Exarcheia, located next to the 
site where Alexandros Grigoropoulos was assassinated. 
NIKOS TEMPONERAS: A high-school mathematics teacher assassinated in the city of  
Patras by a right-wing thug of  the then governing ND party in 1991.
NOMIKI: The Law School of  the University of  Athens. Located on Akadimias Street, 
it is one of  the central Athens university campuses.
OMONOIA SQUARE: The most central square of  Athens.
PANEPISTIMIOU AVENUE: The avenue passing in front of  the neoclassical refectory 
of  the University of  Athens, the National Library and the Academy of  Athens. It 
connects Athens’s two most central squares of  Athens, Syntagma and Omonoia. 
PANTEION UNIVERSITY: The primary social and political sciences university of  
Athens. Located on the edge of  the city centre, in the district of  Kalithea.
PATISION AVENUE: The avenue connecting the centre of  Athens with the northern 
district of  Patisia. It runs in front of  the Athens Polytechnic and on several occasions in 
the past forty years has been the battlefield between protesters and police. 
PROPYLEA: The square at the front of  the University of  Athens refectory, located on 
Panepistimiou Avenue. It is one of  the most central university facilities in Athens and is 
protected under the academic asylum legislation. It is one of  the most common sites for 
rallies take place and marches to start.
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STAMATINA KANELOPOULOU: A worker killed by police on 17 November 1980 
during clashes between demonstrators and the police in front of  the House of  
Parliament in Athens.
SYNTAGMA SQUARE: The square in front of  the House of  Parliament in Athens.
TROIKA: Common name for the three organisations (IMF, EU, ECB) which gave a loan 
to the Greek government on May 5, 2010. 
VILLA AMALIAS: The second-oldest anarchist squat in Athens, located in Aharnon 
Street.
KEY PLACES AND PEOPLE
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